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ABSTRACT 
In today's geopolitical climate, when the West's gaze is fixed on radical Islam, the U.S.-
led “Global War on Terror” is used to control Muslims everywhere. Set in this context, 
this research examines how the Chinese State co-created the ethnicity and place of the 
Hui, China's largest Islamic minority group. Attention is focused not upon the 
production of minoritisation but upon its lived experience, with specific reference to 
Hui food cultures. These distinctive food cultures provide an analytically useful and 
empirically accessible route into wider reflections on how Hui perform their identities 
by constructing, claiming, and negotiating practices, spaces, identities, and 
subjectivities. Adopting a feminist political geography approach, this project examines 
how processes of minoritisation and place impact on the identities, experiences and 
everyday geographies of Beijing’s Hui. Specifically, it explores how Hui identity is 
performed, made public, othered, negotiated, and contested through its food cultures 
and associated places. This was done through implementing participant observation, 
semi-structured interviews and semiological analysis of visual referents. Drawing from 
twelve-months of fieldwork conducted in Beijing City between 2015 and 2019, it is 
argued that the Hui’s food cultures and understandings of Qingzhen, or “pure and true”, 
are central to individual and group identities for Beijing-based Hui. These identities are 
publicly performed and manifested spatially in places of Hui food culture. Through 
analysing these places and their meanings for participants, an empirically-driven 
conceptualisation of place is presented which I have termed Qinqie places. Analysis of 
Hui identity performances exposes the place-specific and gendered nature of 
minoritising processes, while simultaneously demonstrating the usefulness of a focus 
upon food cultures. Ultimately, this thesis demonstrates the usefulness of a feminist 
political geographical approach and epistemology when researching geopolitics in a 
Chinese context.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION - MAKING HUI. 
“And what about these decorations? What about them makes people feel 
Qinqie?1 Can you elaborate?” I asked pointing back to the large Arabic sign 
hanging on the wall by the door, before taking a sip of the iced vanilla latte that 
he had given me. My companion took a moment before replying, looking out of 
the dome-shaped window to the dusty, quiet street outside. The sweet smell of 
the freshly baked chocolate gateaux filled the heavy, humid air. After a few 
seconds he replied, breaking the silence that had fallen over the two of us as we 
sat in front of the air conditioner in his small western-style bakery.  
“There is a sense of belonging. For example, you are Irish. In China, if you see 
an Irish flag, you will feel very Qinqie, and you will have a sense of belonging. 
Just like I am Chinese, but when I see a Chinese flag in the United States, or 
when I see the Chinese Embassy, I have a feeling of Qinqie and a sense of 
belonging”. 
He paused again, but it was clear that he had more to say. I knew from our 
previous interactions and his body language that he wasn’t finished.  
“You know, but it’s even more significant for us Hui. When we see these signs, 
especially Qingzhen2 signs or Islamic signs, we feel even more Qinqie. We 
know that we are safe, we are connected. We know that we belong. We know 
that it is our place.”3 
That conversation took place on a hot July day in 2017 with the owner of a small bakery 
in Beijing’s Chaoyang District. This was my third time meeting with him and although 
this meeting hadn’t been pre-arranged, he was nevertheless happy to talk with me about 
Hui culture, food and identity - as he always was. Our conversations always proved to 
be insightful, as he was by nature very kind and eager to share his ethnicity’s culture, 
beliefs and traditions. But this brief exchange detailed in the vignette above is 
particularly poignant as it perhaps encapsulates the central recurring theme of this 
project; namely, the impact that processes of minoritisation have had on the lived 
 
1 亲切。Eng: Cordial, kind, close, familiar, warm, intimate, dear. 
2 清真。Eng: Pure and True/ Halal. See Chapter 5 for detailed discussion.  
3 Extract from field journal dated 28th July 2017. Written in English. Conversation took place in Chinese.  
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experiences, emotional knowings, identities, attachments to place and everyday 
geographies of Hui minority subjects in Beijing. In this thesis, I argue that these 
minoritising processes and practices play a central role in shaping how the Hui, China’s 
largest Islamic minority group, come to view not only themselves and their identities, 
but also their place within Chinese society and the world. These processes, however, are 
not static, nor are they confined to the Chinese context. Rather, as global geopolitics 
have shifted following 9/11 and the subsequent Global War on Terror [GWOT], the 
Islamophobic practices and discourses of the West have had a knock-on effect for 
China’s internal Islamic Other and the places that they make, feel, know and perform in 
Beijing. Partly because I want to approach my subject through the lens of geopolitics, I 
begin with this global setting before moving to the Chinese context in which it allowed, 
without much international protest, the severe minoritisation (see section 2.5 below) of 
Islamic people, most notoriously in the case of the Uyghur, but, as the dissertation will 
demonstrate in detail, also in the less spectacular case of the larger and more widespread 
Hui people.  
1.1  DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMOPHOBIA AND ORIENTALISM. 
Islamophobia is not a new concept in the European/Euro-American psyche, although it 
is certainly one whose popularity appears to be increasing as Western politics are 
shifting towards the conservative Right. Islam and migration are increasingly being 
securitised, and the “Global War on Terror” continues to be used as justification for 
state racism, increased militarisation and discrimination against minority populations. In 
order to understand the current socio-cultural and political climate that Muslims face in 
Europe and the West today, it is necessary to first consider the historical factors that 
have led to this point. Specifically, it is important to look at how Islamophobia has 
developed over time and how Muslims have come to symbolise and embody otherness 
for Western societies within the Euro-American, colonial, Christian-centric, racist, 
patriarchal, capitalist world system.  
Beginning at the end of the 15th century, Muslims became the subaltern internal Others 
in Europe following the re-conquering of Islamic Spain by the Spanish monarchy. Prior 
to this and stemming from the conflicts of the crusades from the 11th to 15th centuries, 
the Islamic and Christian struggle characterise what Mignolo (2000) has called 
“imperial difference”, whereby European empires came into conflict with non-European 
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empires. From the 17th century, as European empires’ relations with their Islamic 
counterparts turned into colonial aspirations and conquests, Muslims came to be viewed 
through a “‘scientific evolutionary hierarchical civilisation’ imaginary that turned the 
late 15th century ‘people with the wrong religion’ (imperial difference) into the inferior 
‘savages and primitives’ of ‘people without civilisation’ (colonial difference) in the 19th 
century” (Grosfoguel and Mielants, 2006: 3-4). This shift in meaning is significant as it 
represents a change from the inferiorisation of religions into an inferiorisation of the 
people who practice those religions, i.e., a racial one. As the Eurocentric racial 
hierarchy and the Christian-centric hierarchy became increasingly entwined, distinctions 
between being racially inferior and Muslim became lessened. During the 20th century, in 
the wake of social rights movements and the defeat of Nazi Germany, this form of 
biological racism declined. However, racism persisted and cultural racism replaced 
biological racism (Grosfoguel, 2003). Cultural racism works as a practice by focusing 
on the cultural inferiority of groups, naturalising and essentialising the cultures of the 
inferiorised and racialised people while fixing them in a “timeless space”, similar to the 
naturalising practices of biological racism (Grosfoguel and Mielants, 2006). Religion 
plays an important role in this process, as modern tropes about the primitiveness, 
underdeveloped, terrorist and authoritarian qualities of the Other are concentrated in 
their religious beliefs.  
Globally, Islamophobia has been used as the dominant cultural racist discourse against 
Arabs, with this anti-Arab racism escalating following the 9/11 attacks. However, 
representations of Arabs as violent terrorists by the US and Israel were commonplace 
long before the 9/11 attacks (Said 1978; 1981). Within the West, there has been a 
conflation between the terms Arab, Muslim and terrorist, with Arabs often being 
perceived as the majority of Muslims in the world despite accounting for only 1 in 5 of 
Muslims globally (Grosfoguel and Mielants, 2006). The longstanding image of Arabs 
and Muslims as dangerous, violent and terrorists in the Western media plays a key role 
in shaping the new wave of anti-Arab racism. These representations are linked to an 
Islamophobic discourse through cultural racism preceding and following 9/11 (ibid: 6; 
Said, 1981). When discussing the representations of Arab people in Hollywood movies, 
Shaheen (2013) notes that Arabs, particularly Arab men, are usually represented as 
dangerous and incompetent villains. Added to this are the stereotypes of Arab men as 
being fanatical, cruel and despotic, Arab women as being emotionless, voiceless and 
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lacking in agency (Said, 1978; 1997; Barker, 2008: 266, Sharoni, 1993: 431) and of 
Islamic people as being irrational fanatics and terrorists (Said, 1981; Shaheen, 2013).  
In his work on Orientalism, Edward Said (1978: 40) examined how Europe historically 
represented the Islamic Orient's presumed cultural, religious and social inferiority in 
such a way as to legitimise colonialism, while at the same time creating a shared 
European identity based upon European superiority. He defines Orientalism as “a style 
of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the 
Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident’” (Said, 1978: 2-3). Orientalism 
encapsulates the more general issue of understanding and representing other cultures 
from North Africa and Asia, and our interactions and relationships with them 
(McLoughlin, 2007; Rane et al., 2014). Stereotypes of Arab people contrasted them 
with the European ideals of what constitutes a European. Similarly, Croft (2012) has 
argued that British identity and Britishness are created in opposition to an imagined 
Islamic identity, placing them in an oppositional binary, while Shaheen (2013) has 
claimed that all aspects of American culture are aimed at projecting the Arab subject as 
a villain.  
Jasbir Puar’s (2007: 67-76) work adds another layer to this by arguing that the 
stereotypical category of the Arab terrorist exceeds the normative boundaries of 
deconstructing the Other. Through her discussion of Mr. Slave, a fictitious character 
from Comedy Central’s adult cartoon South Park, Puar (ibid: 75) argues that this 
character’s visible queerness as a typified leather bottom, leads to the children in the 
show mistaking him for another historically prominent figure of perversion, the Muslim 
Other. Drawing from Said (1978) and Afary and Anderson’s (2005) discussion of 
Foucault’s “Romantic Orientalism”, Puar contends that “the Orient, as interpreted from 
the Occident, is a space of illicit sexuality, unbridled excess, and generalized 
perversion, ‘dangerous sex and freedom of intercourse’, and afflicted with 
nonnormative corporeal practices”, with Mr. Slave exemplifying what Foucault calls 
“pursued pleasures” – i.e., “bodies, practices and energies both sought after and 
searched out”.    
When discussing the image of Muslims in the Western media, Morey and Yaqin (2011: 
1) describe them as “unenlightened outsiders”. Following the attacks of 9/11, many 
scholars have identified a new Orientalism. New Orientalism mirrors the original 
version almost identically, but it places an emphasis on the inability and failures of 
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Islamic civilisation to adapt to modernity, removing them from the contemporary and 
placing them in a timeless confine of backwardness and barbarism. This perception of 
Muslims as being detached from modernity partly explains why they are viewed as 
being so dangerous: “they are medieval (from the Dark Ages) and yet diabolically 
advanced” (Cole, 2011: 133). These arguments of Islam’s incompatibility with 
modernity are particularly evident in relation to its presumed incompatibility with 
gender equality, human rights and democracy (Yamaguchi, 2012).  
One central aspect of Orientalism, both the original and new forms, and its inherent 
cultural racist arguments is the depiction of Islam’s patriarchal and sexist abuse of 
women (Grosfoguel and Mielants, 2006). Muslim women are continually portrayed as 
being the voiceless victims of their male counterparts’ violent and abusive natures. They 
are perceived as needing to be saved from the brutality of Islam, with Euro-American 
(non-Muslim and non-Arab) men viewed as the saviours. This discourse of coloured 
women needing to be saved by white men from dangerous coloured men is not a new 
one, although it is certainly one that has found new vigour following 9/11 and the 
ensuing GWOT (Ahmed, 2014; Bartolucci, 2012; Bhattacharyya, 2008). Historically, 
this rhetoric has been used as a means of justification for colonization and as a way of 
masking the true reasons behind the colonial aspirations of Western nations (Grosfoguel 
and Mielants, 2006). This familiar narrative was employed by the Bush administration 
in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in an attempt to justify the global War on Terror and its 
corresponding wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, while covering-up American imperial 
military and economic designs (Grosfoguel and Mielants, 2006; Bhattacharyya, 2008). 
Following an era in many western countries of progressive social movements for 
women’s rights and sexual minority rights, the Islamic Other is seen as being sexually 
dysfunctional and oppressive in opposition to the West’s supposedly open and healthy 
attitude towards sexuality and gender equality (Bhattacharyya, 2008). This complete 
openness and equality in the West is of course fictitious, as oppressive patriarchies 
continue in Europe and North America, particularly in regards to Christian 
fundamentalist groups (many of whom supported Bush’s administration during the 
GWOT) (Ibid, 2008; Grosfoguel and Mielants, 2006).  
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1.2  THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR. 
The reassertion of the West as liberal and inclusive was part of a broader practice of 
reinvigorating American nationalism following 9/11, a reassertion that had global 
implications (Bhattacharyya, 2008). The language used by the Bush administration in 
rallying support from America’s allies defines a political and cultural border not a 
national one, by implementing a cultural “us” versus “them” global imaginary: “either 
you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”, “they stand against us”, and “they hate 
our freedoms – our freedom of religion” (Grosfoguel and Mielants, 2006; 
Bhattacharyya, 2008; Bartolucci, 2012: 571-567). In so doing, these allied nations are 
tied together through an appeal to shared values and culture, specifically orientated 
around Christian unity (Graham, Keenan and Dowd, 2004; Kearns, 2008). 
Bhattacharyya (2006: 9) writes “as with all cultural alliances, it can only exist through 
constant reaffirmation of key myths and narratives. Ideas about gender identity, 
sexuality and affective relations play a central role in this process”.  
The pronouncement of these new cultural alliances – the US and its allies versus the 
“rest” and the “axis of evil” – brought about new interest in Huntington’s (1993) Clash 
of Civilisations theory and Lewis’ (1990) “Roots of Muslim Rage”, with some 
neoconservatives claiming that this clash is a new normal akin to the earlier Cold War 
(Bonney, 2008). Lewis’ (1990) work claims that the anti-American sentiments felt in 
certain parts of the Muslim world could only be explained as civilisational jealousy, 
whereby members of these once proud Muslim civilisations now consider themselves to 
be overcome by civilisations that they consider inferior. As Kearns (2008: 236) asserts, 
Lewis’ (1990) work is representative of a branch of scholarship that “explains Arab 
identities solely in terms of religion, and understands as the principle context for the 
expression of those identities the relations between those countries and the West”. In a 
similar fashion, Huntington’s (1993) theory views culture and religion as the 
fundamental bases of international relations and national alliances, and in so doing it 
essentialises and naturalises cultures while speculating that these cultural divisions will 
be future (and inevitable) causes of conflict (Rane et al., 2014; Huntington, 1993). The 
theory was very influential within US and UK policy following the attacks of 9/11, and 
the US-led GWOT was shaped greatly by it. For Richard Bonney (2008), however, this 
claim of a permanent clash of cultures is nothing more than a “false prophet”, another 
way of exploiting a history of hostility between the West and Islam. Rather, the Global 
 7 
War on Terror is rather a clash of fundamentalisms or a clash of patriarchies than a 
clash of civilisations (Ali, 2002; Grosfoguel and Mielants, 2006).  
The GWOT, according to Bhattacharyya (2008), not only entails the military actions of 
warfare, but it also involves a distinct and important cultural project that aims to not 
only legitimise these military actions but also rewrite the terms of law and citizenship 
along sexualised racial lines. This is done through the refuting of multiculturalism and 
the suspension of international law. Behind both of these instances, there is an 
underlying suggestion “that there are absolute and impassable differences between 
cultures and if progressive western values are to be preserved then alien threats must be 
ruthlessly contained” (ibid, 2008: 12). These foreign policies and security procedures 
inevitably draw heavily from, and have strong implications for, geographical 
imaginaries (Agnew, 2003; Bialasiewicz et al., 2007). Such imaginaries of places, and 
by extension the people who inhabit those places, act to reinforce rhetoric and 
discourses that support the GWOT. These imaginations of place as produced for and by 
the GWOT, create political and spatial realities for those people inhabiting them 
(Gregory, 2004; Bialasiewicz et al., 2007). These effects of the War on Terror and the 
discourse of Islamic terrorism are truly global in nature, extending beyond the borders 
of western nations. Countries such as China, Morocco, and Russia also use these 
legitimising discourses when targeting their own internal opponents and in furthering 
their own domestic agendas in relation to controlling dangerous groups and territorial 
expansions (Bartolucci, 2012).  
On November 29th 2001, two months after the attacks of 9/11, the government of the 
People’s Republic of China [PRC] released a document called “Terrorist Activities 
Perpetrated by ‘Eastern Turkistan’ Organisations and their Ties with Osama bin Laden 
and the Taliban”, which claimed that China faced an imminent threat from existing 
Uyghur terrorists within the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region [XUAR] (Clarke, 
2010). Throughout this report, and in subsequent reports such as the January 2002 
report “East Turkistan Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away With Impunity”, Chinese 
authorities claimed that China has faced, and continues to face, a security threat from 
Uyghur terrorists since the 1990s (Clarke, 2010; Roberts, 2018). Since the 1990s, there 
had been a number of incidences of unrest and violence in the XUAR involving the 
Uyghur, many of whom are unhappy about China’s rule of their homeland. However, as 
Roberts (2018: 232 - 233) has noted, there is little proof that at that point any organised 
 8 
Uyghur militant group existed in XUAR or elsewhere, and the incidents of violence 
were by and large spontaneous and non-premeditated clashes between Uyghurs and 
security forces, or protests that escalated when faced with suppression.  
Throughout the 1990s, in particular following the Tiananmen incident of 1989, 
numerous human rights violations were reported in China, not only in relation to pro-
democracy protesters, but also involving Tibetans and Xinjiang’s Uyghur (UNHCR, 
2019). Of particular importance were the Gulja Massacre in 1997, the short-lived riots 
in Baren County in April 1990 and the Government’s “strike hard” anti-crime 
campaigns (Amnesty International, 1999; Human Rights Watch, 2005; UNHCR, 2019). 
In light of these human rights violations the European Union - and to a lesser extent the 
United States (primarily under the Clinton administration) - attempted to coerce the 
PRC into protecting the human rights of its citizens and minority groups. However, as 
the decade progressed, both the EU and US were increasingly faced with a stark 
dilemma between their human rights principles and economic engagement, and as such, 
lessened their demands on the PRC (Baker, 2002; Dittmer, 2001; Shen, 2013).  
Following 9/11, and despite the questionable nature of the PRC’s claims and its history 
of human rights violations in Xinjiang, they garnered enough international support to 
convince the US and UN that the Uyghur group, East Turkistan Islamic Movement, 
posed a terrorist threat to China’s security. In September 2002, the group were 
recognised as a terrorist organisation by the UN and subsequently categorised as an 
enemy in the GWOT. The implications of the re-branding of Uyghurs from “separatist 
threats” to “terrorists” reach beyond the merely rhetorical. The labelling of Uyghurs as 
terrorist threats in the context of the GWOT has altered the relationship between the 
state and the group, increasingly rendering their conflict irresolvable. Whereas 
separatists may be reintegrated and reformed into society, terrorists are uncivilised, 
unchangeable and without grievances (Roberts, 2018). Following the work of Michael 
Foucault (1997), Roberts (2018: 234) argues that in the context of the Uyghur and PRC 
relations, the term “terrorist” evokes a biological threat to society which needs to be 
eradicated: “Terrorists are viewed not merely as a threat to state sovereignty but as a 
threat to all of society if not to all of humanity. Consequently, they must be suppressed, 
eliminated, or quarantined to save society itself”.  
Under the guise of the GWOT, the PRC has been suppressing unsanctioned “extremist” 
religious practices in the XUAR as a means of countering terrorism. Between 2001 and 
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2005, thousands of Uyghur people were reported to have been arrested or detained in 
XUAR, with a reported 18,227 people arrested over a twelve-month period for 
“endangering national security” by early 2006 (Clarke, 2010). Following a string of 
violent “terrorist” attacks in XUAR and other areas of China, which the PRC 
government blamed on religious extremists, the “people’s war on terror” was launched 
in 2014. Largely resulting from this, the number of Uyghurs being withheld is even 
higher today, with some sources reporting that as many as one million Muslims (mostly 
Uyghurs) are being detained today in numerous detention centres around the region 
(Wen and Auyeziv, 2018). Outside of these internment camps, Muslims also feel the 
pressure of government suppression, with increased military presence, regular security 
checks taking place, and numerous attempts to ban XUAR residents from participating 
in Ramadan (Aljazeera, 2015; Mortimer, 2017).  
In recent times, the suppression of Islamic extremism appears to be an increasing 
priority for other provinces too, particularly in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region 
[NHAR]. Like in XUAR, the authorities in NHAR are concerned that established ties 
between Chinese Muslims and Muslims outside of China may lead to Islamic 
extremism and terrorism. As such, they’ve taken a number of measures to halt what 
they deem to be an Arabisation and pan-Islamisation of Chinese Muslims. For NHAR’s 
Hui population, 2018 saw the unfolding of two important events. The first significant 
anti-Arabisation and anti-pan-Islamisation event came when the NHAR’s authorities 
announced that all Qingzhen food labels must be changed in accordance with new 
guidelines. The former labels, which included Arabic writing, must now be replaced by 
labels that feature pinyin characters (Latin alphabet). The move is believed to be an 
attempt at countering pan-Islam and the Arabisation of Islam within the region, which 
has previously enjoyed good relations with many Arab countries (Liu, 2018). Secondly, 
in August 2018, NHAR authorities prepared to demolish the newly built Weizhou 
Grand Mosque, citing improper building permits. The mosque, which is not built in the 
traditional Chinese style, features several minarets and domes, and has a distinctly 
Middle Eastern appearance. Contrary to the authorities’ claims, many spectators and 
locals believe that the reason behind the decision to demolish the mosque was because 
the local authorities viewed the mosque as an example of the Arabisation of Chinese 
Islam (see Chapter 4 for a consideration of the links between Chinese Islam among the 
Hui and Middle Eastern sects). In response to the attempted demolition, hundreds of 
local Hui protested outside the mosque, engaging in a tense standoff with authorities 
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and resulting in the authorities reluctantly halting their plans (BBC: 2018a; South China 
Morning Post, 2018; Stroup, 2018). Both of these events show that the PRC’s concerns 
with Islamic extremism, stemming from international networks, is not confined solely 
to XUAR, although it is certainly strongest felt by the Muslims who reside there.  
1.3  “NEW” RIGHT-WING POPULISM 
Another area where Islamophobia has been developed within the contemporary world 
structure is the increasing popularity of right-wing populism, particularly within 
western societies. Over the past number of years, there has been a sharp rise in right-
wing populism and extreme far-right movements in the United States and in many 
European countries. These developments made it more difficult for civil society in 
Western countries to put effective pressure upon their governments to raise with the 
Chinese government human rights issues that relate to Muslims in China. This, 
alongside the broader GWOT, is another geopolitical context for the relative impunity 
with which government of the PRC could marginalise and discriminate against Muslim 
citizens at this time. In 2009, the people of Switzerland narrowly voted in favour of a 
ban on the construction of minarets nationwide, followed in early 2010 by Belgian and 
French bans on the wearing of burqas in public (Kallis, 2013). On 22 July 2011, Anders 
Breivik, a far-right extremist and a fascist terrorist, carried out the deadliest mass 
shooting by a single gunman anywhere in the world in Norway, murdering 77 people, 
including 33 people under the age of 18 (BBC, 2017a). In 2014, far-right political 
parties across Europe won a record number of seats in the European Parliament, with 
huge gains for parties such as the French Front National [FN], the Danish People’s 
Party, the UK Independence Party [UKIP], the Austrian FPÖ, the Greek Golden Dawn, 
the Hungarian Jobbik and the True Finns (Elgot, 2014; Traynor, 2014; Halikiopoulou 
and Vasilopoulou, 2014). In March 2016, in the midst of Europe’s “migrant crisis”, the 
European Union [EU] and Turkey struck a deal to return migrants arriving to Greek 
islands to Turkey in exchange for EU funding and other concessions, with specific 
policies put in place for Syrian refugees (Corrao, 2018). On June 23rd, 2016, 51.9% of 
British voters chose to support the “leave” side in the Brexit referendum, voting to 
remove the United Kingdom from the European Union following notably anti-
immigration campaigns from parties such as UKIP (Durrheim et al, 2018; Hunt and 
Wheeler, 2019). On 20 January 20, 2017, President Donald J. Trump assumed office as 
the 45th President of the United States of America, followed shortly after by his issuing 
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of Executive Order 13769, dubbed the “Muslim ban”, precluding immigration from ten 
predominantly Muslim countries (Pyle et al, 2018). On 18 March 2019, a 28-year-old 
far-right Australian gunman named Brenton Harrison Tarrant used Facebook to live-
stream footage of his shooting rampage as he murders 50 people during Friday prayers 
in two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand (BBC, 2019a).  
These events along with numerous other similarly disconcerting acts and discourses 
were brought about by, and contributed to, the “new right-wing populism” in Europe, 
whereby once taboo views and narratives have increasingly found a place within the 
mainstream Western political sphere. Yet, despite certain nuances in form and practices, 
right-wing populism is not a “new” phenomenon. Rather, it can be traced back to the 
Second World War (Wodak and KhosraviNik, 2013). What is new, however, is the 
recent surge in support for far-right movements and the means by which many of the 
disparate (and often conflicting) right-wing populist thoughts and ideologies have 
established themselves as mainstream political narratives within many of Europe’s 
liberal democratic societies. Contemporary right-wing populism does not convey a 
single, coherent ideal but rather, it encompasses a diffuse range of stereotypes, beliefs, 
and attitudes that mobilise disparate portions of the electorate. Right-wing populism 
splits society into “us” and “them”, based on religious, ethnic, regional and national 
lines (ibid, 2013: xx).  
As Kallis (2013) explains, extremist ideas begin as marginal counterpropositions to 
mainstream values. By transgressing the boundaries of acceptability and by 
subsequently breaking taboos, right-wing populist parties are attempting to “remap 
these established cognitions and subvert the mainstream ‘frames’ that support them” 
(ibid: 55). Central to this process of mainstreaming and taboo breaking is the 
intersection of supply and demand. Here, Kallis (2013) borrows from the field of 
economics, using supply and demand theory to explain a political process. As far-right 
ideas, parties and movements become visible to wider audiences, they tap into 
previously suppressed demand within the broader population. The more relevant the 
counter propositions are to the fears, insecurities and perceptions of the audience, the 
more likely they are to relate to underlying, implicit demand and to appeal to sentiments 
that may sustain or magnify future demand. This demand is not an innate, biological or 
naturally occurring feature; rather it is the by-product of the historical development of 
racism and Islamophobia in the West, whereby western people are conditioned to view 
 12 
the racial and religious Other as a dangerous potential threat. This concept involves the 
transference of ideas and associated practices from certain places and times to others, 
while adapting and transforming them to fit with context-specific factors and histories 
(Wodak and Fairclough, 2010: 21 – 25). Concurrently, the supply being offered by the 
populist right, as exacerbated and disseminated through the media, gains momentum by 
accessing wider social audiences and demonstrating the appeal of the counter-frame. 
The subsequent result of this demand-supply dialectic is the breaking of taboos and the 
mainstreaming of either the entire counter-frame or parts thereof (Kallis, 2013: 56). As 
has been seen across Europe, particularly during the European Union Parliamentary 
elections of 2014, the mainstreaming of extreme far-right ideas has often garnered 
electoral successes for far-right populist parties. However, the successes of the far-right 
parties are perhaps underrepresented by such electoral wins as actors from the 
traditional political mainstream respond to these emerging demands by making 
concessions to the far-right ideas (Eatwell, 2000: 416-418; 2005: 101-120; Kallis, 2013; 
Price and Tewksbury, 1997: 173-181; Ruzza and Fella, 2009). This process has 
contributed greatly to the legitimisation of extreme ideas within the realm of 
mainstream politics and has unearthed massive demand for such sentiments. It is this 
supply-demand dialectic that has allowed for the ongoing securitisation of Islam [SOI] 
in Europe and the increasingly discriminatory treatment of Muslim minorities. 
1.4  SECURITISATION OF ISLAM. 
Although institutional racism is not a new development in many European countries, 
since 9/11, the 7/7 London bombings and the 2004 attacks in Madrid, Muslims have 
found themselves becoming increasingly victimised by the conflation of Islam, 
immigration and terrorism across Europe (Cesari, 2009; Karyotis, 2007). Muslims are 
increasingly portrayed as the dangerous Other. Simply put, the SOI builds upon the 
West’s history of racism towards Muslims, supplying anti-Muslim and anti-immigration 
far-right actors with sufficient evidence to transgress borders of acceptability, break 
taboos and make their extreme rhetoric mainstream.  
Within the field of security studies, there are two schools of thought relating to the 
labelling of an issue as a security concern: the Copenhagen School and the Critical 
School. According to the Copenhagen School, the naming of an issue as a security 
threat is the speech act (Waever, 1995a). This speech act signals the securitisation of an 
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issue by the power holders, whereby they move it “into a specific area, and thereby 
claim a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it” (Waever, 1995b: 
55). Followers of this school believe that the securitisation of an issue represents a 
suspension from the field of normal politics (Buzan et al, 1998; Fierke, 2007; Waever, 
1995a) requiring “emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal 
boundaries of political procedure” (Buzan et al, 1998: 24). As a result, securitisation 
implies urgency and it grants an issue high priority (Waever, 1995b). Contrary to the 
Copenhagen School's claims that securitisation involves a suspension of normal politics, 
scholars of the Critical School view securitisation as a continual technique of 
governance, meaning that the “state of exception” becomes the norm (Fierke, 2007: 
112). They believe that securitisation should not, and cannot, be understood as a simple 
speech act but rather as a process (Balzacq, 2005; Stritzel, 2007; Christou et al, 2010).  
The security framing of an issue involves the distribution of fear and trust, whereby 
people and societies can be divided into the culturally similar and dissimilar; or “us” 
and “them”. The culturally dissimilar are often viewed as having the capacity to corrupt 
the cultural identity that reinforces trust amongst the culturally similar, marking them as 
a threat (Huysmans, 2006). Security and insecurity are bound together, meaning that 
security must constantly reproduce images of insecurity in order to retain its meaning 
(Burke, 2002). These shared threats or insecurities can create unity within a group 
(Huysmans, 2006). In relation to the SOI, it is the Critical School which is most useful 
in explaining how Islam has been moved into the realm of security using the 
distribution of fear and insecurities as well as the narratives of identity.  
Within Europe and its contemporary security arena, Islam and Christianity would 
appear to be resurgent, as Christian values are re-emerging at the level of European self-
definition in relation to their Islamic neighbours (Gündüz, 2007). Many scholars refute 
conventional understandings of secularisation (Berger, 1967) as religion is believed to 
be “the emerging political language of our time” (Agnew, 2006: 183) and “international 
politics is being increasingly scripted in the spatial grammar of a millennial struggle 
between good and evil” (Bialasiewicz, 2006: 172). It has been argued that religion has 
become delinked from culture, developing in decentralised ways as it encounters its new 
global environment (Roy, 2010). The decentralised nature of religion, combined with 
the increasingly global flows of people, has resulted in the religious, cultural and ethnic 
composition of European nations being far more complex and diffuse than many 
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conservative governments and right-wing parties care to admit. Bogus claims of the EU 
being a union of Christian states suddenly appeared during discussions surrounding 
Turkey's desire to join the EU (Gündüz, 2007), and recent security measures within the 
EU have been undeniably aimed at tackling the threat of Islam (Cesari, 2009). This 
threat of Islam is one that academics have had a role in fostering, with many acting as 
scaremongers, forewarning of impending clashes between Islam and the West (see - 
Huntington, 1993; Buzan, 1991). 
Muslims and their communities have been unfairly targeted by a number of security 
measures under the guise of counter-terrorism and immigration control (Mythen et al., 
2012; Cesari, 2009; Benotman, 2012), as western media and political discourses depict 
Muslims as a dangerous Other (Said, 1978; Gündüz, 2007; Mavelli, 2013). This fear of 
Islam has led to a rising level of Islamophobia, racially motivated crimes and the 
marginalisation of Muslim communities across Europe (Mythen et al., 2012; Mavelli, 
2013). The SOI has contributed to a recent upsurge in support for far-right political 
parties across Europe (Elgot, 2014; Traynor, 2014). Muslims in Western societies are 
now expected to fall into categories on a spectrum of Islamism (Fekete, 2011), fulfilling 
the roles of a “good Muslim” or a “bad Muslim” (Mavelli, 2013: 165), attending either a 
“good mosque” or a “bad mosque” (Brown, 2008: 487). 
The conflation of Islam and terrorism in political and popular discourses has meant that 
distrust for Muslims has continued to grow (Karyotis, 2007), particularly as the 
perpetrators of many of Europe’s recent terrorist attacks were “home grown” 
(Benotman, 2012). Muslims living in the EU are increasingly targeted by counter-
terrorism measures (Mythen et al., 2012) as the “War on Terror” becomes increasingly 
referred to as the “War on Islam” (Barrett, 2013). As in China, anti-terrorism statutes in 
Europe have been invoked overwhelmingly against Muslims, resulting in increased 
surveillance of Muslims, banning of Islamic groups and deportation of radicals (Cesari, 
2009). This precarious situation is complicated further, and indeed worsened, by the 
simultaneous conflation of migration with Islam and terrorism.  
Migration first became a prominent feature on the security agendas of numerous 
European countries, during the 1990s following the dismantling of the EU's internal 
borders and the breakup of the former Yugoslavia (Huysmans, 2006; Fierke, 2007; Van 
Houtum and Pijpers, 2007; Marsh and Rees, 2012). Post 9/11, the threat posed by 
migration seemed to intensify as it became entangled in the same discourses as 
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terrorism (Fierke, 2007; Huysmans, 2006; Marsh & Rees, 2012), with the scale of 
migration to European countries being drastically exaggerated by the media and 
politicians (De Haas, 2008). Non-EU Migrants are generally represented as a dangerous 
collective with different religions, languages, cultures and races to Europeans 
(Huysmans, 2006; Buzan, 1991; Weiner, 1993; Fierke, 2007), posing a threat to the 
cultural identity and economic stability of the welfare zone (Van Houtum and Pijpers, 
2007). If migrants wish to make it past the “White Wall” into Europe's “Gated 
Community” (Van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007: 303) then their ability to assimilate is 
important (Huysmans, 2006). These facts, combined with the EU's newly rediscovered 
Christian values, has meant that Muslim migrants are being increasingly restricted 
access to Europe (Cesari, 2009; Gündüz, 2007) and Muslim diasporas in the West face 
constant marginalisation and discrimination, even if they are second or third generation 
migrants (Benotman, 2012). Furthermore, the anti-immigration rhetoric of many 
extreme right-wing parties in the Europe, including the British National Party, has 
become markedly anti-Muslim (Cesari, 2009). This mainstreamed anti-migrant and anti-
Muslim stance became blatantly apparent during the EU discussions and negotiations 
which aimed to address Europe’s escalating “migrant crisis” from 2015, where the SOI, 
racialized nativisms and entrenched Islamophobia resulted in the issue of migration and 
asylum being framed as a security “crisis” by the European powers (De Genova, 2017).  
According to Cesari (2009), SOI is now no longer within the realm of security, rather it 
inspires policies that simply target the securitised minority for discrimination. This 
evermore volatile and Islamophobic political realm has had, and is continuing to have, a 
drastic impact on the lived experiences of Muslims in the West, making public displays 
of Islamic identity a precarious and increasingly risky activity. According to the 
monitoring group Tell Mama’s annual report, 2017 saw a huge surge in the number of 
hate crimes reported against Muslims in the United Kingdom. Throughout 2017, there 
were 1,201 verified reports of Islamophobic attacks, an increase of 26% from the 
previous year. Muslim women accounted for 6 out of every 10 victims of these hate 
crimes, with their greater visibility making them more vulnerable to perpetrators 
(Marsh, 2018). This bears similarities to the work of Puar (2007) where she found that 
Sikh men in the US were frequently targeted in violent attacks because of their 
traditional turbans, which perpetrators mistakenly took as signifiers of the men’s 
presumed Islamic devotion. Similarly, the advocacy group the Council on American-
Islamic Relations, reported that in 2017 anti-Muslim hate crimes rose 17% in the US 
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(Malone, 2018). According to the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(2018), attacks against women wearing headscarves are numerous, as are those against 
Islamic public spaces such as mosques and community centres.  
Alongside attacks on public displays of Islam there is, in many countries, a legislative 
and political assault. Within the European context, there have been three key political 
“successes” for the far-right’s campaign against public visibility of Islam. Firstly, in 
relation to the visibility of mosques, a 2009 referendum in Switzerland banned the 
construction of minarets, a move that was praised and supported by far-right parties 
across Europe, including in Denmark, Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Austria (Betz, 
2013; Kallis, 2013). This landmark event boasts similarities to the move by Chinese 
authorities to counter what they consider to be the Arabisation of mosques in XUAR 
and NHAR. The Swiss referendum was quickly followed by another two pivotal events 
in early 2010 in relation to public displays of Islamic identity. In quick succession first 
Belgium, and then France, introduced a ban on wearing the burqa in public spaces 
(Betz, 2013; Wallach Scott, 2007). These three landmark events against public 
visibilities of Islam are significant for at least three reasons. To begin with, they mark a 
change from divisive and radical anti-Muslim rhetoric to political exclusionary practices 
(Kallis, 2013; Krzyżanowski and Wodak, 2009: 71-122). Secondly, by repressing 
religious freedoms, they unleashed political and social demand for similar actions in 
other countries. Thirdly, the effects of the 2009 and 2010 bans have impacted on the 
political mainstream parties, causing a shift in rhetoric to undeniably more anti-
immigration, anti-Islam and anti-multiculturalist discourses. In sum, there has been a 
fundamental shift in the boundaries of acceptability and belonging. Kallis (2013: 62-63) 
calls this “a political and societal ‘paradigm shift’” across Europe.  
For some far-right leaders, the matter of religious – specifically Islamic – intrusion into 
secular society and the public arena goes beyond the issue of places of worship and 
clothing. For Marine Le Pen of the Front National in France, the sight of Muslims 
praying on the streets of Paris is representative of a territorial conquest, comparable to 
Nazi occupation during World War 2 (Betz, 2013; Chabrout, 2010). Le Pen went further 
still in her attack on Islamic visibility in public spaces by campaigning against what she 
claimed was the advancement of halal meat into canteens, school cafeterias and 
elsewhere, which she viewed as a further example of the intrusion of religion into 
France’s supposedly secular society (Betz, 2013; Le Bars, 2012). Le Pen’s attack on 
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public displays of Islam recall France’s 2004 ban on “conspicuous signs” of religious 
affiliation in public schools; which as Scott (2007) has argued, was aimed at Muslim 
girls wearing the headscarf. Rather than being a solution to a problem, Scott (ibid: 181) 
asserts that the ban is “a symptom of France’s inability or unwillingness to face racism 
– the continuing power imbalance based on ethnic/religious difference – that has 
characterized its dealings with North Africans for so long.” Similar to Le Pen, Boris 
Johnson, Prime Minister to the United Kingdom and former Foreign Secretary, has 
likewise criticized public displays of Islam, by saying that burqa wearing women “look 
like letter boxes”, a comment that he refuses to apologise for (BBC, 2018b). These 
examples further prove what was suggested above, that there has been a shift in the 
nature of public spaces in Europe, specifically ascertaining to the newly redrawn 
boundaries of acceptability and belonging relating to visual displays of Islamic identity.  
The changing political landscape of Europe, specifically the rise of right-wing populism 
and the increasing SOI that accompany the GWOT, are redefining how “public” spaces 
should look, what activities should take place there, and which members of society 
belong. Muslims, their places of worship, and their religious life practices, including 
clothing and eating habits, are being contested, debated, regulated and discriminated 
against in unprecedented ways across Europe’s “liberal democracies”. Similarly, 
Muslims in China’s north-western regions are also coming under pressure from the 
GWOT and the PRC’s harsh crackdown on all activities, individuals and groups that it 
deems to be religiously extreme and that fall under its loosely defined conceptualisation 
of “terrorism”. Given similar developments in Europe, China is subject to very little 
international criticism for these attacks on human rights.  
My own research considers how the most basic and necessary life practice – eating – of 
Muslim minorities has become a security issue within current geopolitics. Specifically, I 
ask if the securitisation and politicisation of public displays of Islamic identities are 
solely an European/Western/Western Chinese issue, or whether the Global War on 
Terror impacted on the lived experiences of Muslims in other, more “harmonious”, 
parts of China? Are other provincial authorities in China using the free pass awarded to 
them by the GWOT to label their Islamic minorities as terrorists too? If so, are life 
practices of these Muslim minorities elsewhere subjected to similar discriminatory and 
exclusionary practices and policies? What about those that are deemed to be “good 
Muslims” (Mavelli, 2013:165) or model minorities (McCarthy, 2009)? Do they have to 
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endure the same levels of oppression from the majoritarian population surrounding 
them? If so, how does this affect the lives, experiences and identities of minority groups 
and how are these factors played out spatially?  
1.5  COMING TO BEIJING: 
With these questions in mind, the capital city of the PRC and the epicentre of Chinese 
politics, Beijing, was selected. As the political and cultural centre of the PRC, Beijing is 
of great significance not only to Chinese affairs, but also in terms of global geopolitics. 
Given Beijing’s role as the national seat of power for the Chinese Communist Party 
[CCP], it holds great symbolic and political power. So much so, that when referring to 
the PRC’s government and its actions many spectators will simply refer to the CCP 
government as “Beijing”. This is because the CCP’s power is largely consolidated in 
Beijing. Although there are Communist Party secretaries for each province, these 
individuals are appointed by, and answer to, the Beijing-based CCP government, 
meaning that Beijing is the symbolic site of CPP authority and rule. Internationally, 
Beijing is also recognised as the site of Chinese political strength as it is from here that 
decisions are made regarding international relations, geopolitical affairs, and economic 
trade. 
With a population of more than 21.5 million people at the end of 2018 (Beijing 
Municipal Bureau of Statistics, 2019), Beijing is one of the most populous cities in both 
China and the world. According to the sixth national census in 2010, which showed the 
population of Beijing to be 19.612 million people at the time, the Han accounted for 
18.811 million individuals. The remaining 4.1% of the population, accounting for 
801,000 people, belonged to minority groups. Of these 801,000-minority people, 90.2% 
of them belonged to the Manchu, Hui, Mongolian, Korean or Tujia ethnic groups. Of 
these five groups, the Hui are the second most populous minority group and the largest 
Islamic group in Beijing, representing 249,000 people, which was 31.1% of the 
minority population of Beijing in 2010 (Beijing Statistical Information Net, 2011). As 
such, the Hui accounted for 1.27% of Beijing’s total population in 2010. Although the 
number of Hui in Beijing has grown 35% from 184,693 people according to the 1982 
census, they now represent a smaller percentage of Beijing’s overall and minority 
populations. In fact, they now represent just 1.27% of Beijing’s total population, down 
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from 2% in 1982, and 31.1% of the minority population, down from 57% (see Figure 
1.1).  
The growth in the minority population of Beijing mirrors a wider national one and is not 
resulting purely from increasing birth-rates. Rather, as Gladney (2004: 20 - 23) points 
out, there has been a process of ethnic “coming out” in China in recent times, especially 
in Beijing. This process has meant that it has become commonplace for Han people to 
“come out” as ethically Manchu, Tujia or other ethnicities – explaining in part the huge 
increase in these minorities’ populations both in Beijing and nationally. It had become 
particularly popular for people in Beijing to make claims of Manchu ethnicity, partially 
explaining why the Manchu now represent a higher percentage of the minority 
population than the Hui at 41.9% (Beijing Statistical Information Net, 2011). The 
reason for this “coming out” phenomenon is due to the privileges awarded to ethnic 
minority groups in modern China since the mid-1980s. The most significant benefits 
include lower tax rates, the opportunity to obtain better education, having greater access 
to local office, the rights to practice their native religions and speak their native 
languages, and importantly, the right to have more children (albeit not in urban areas) 
(Gladney, 2004).  
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Year 1982 2010 
Total population of Beijing 
(approx) 
9.231 million 19.612 million 
Minority population of Beijing 
(approx) 
323,000 801,000 
Minorities as percentage of 
total population (approx) 
3.50% 4.08% 
Population of Hui in Beijing 
(approx) 
184,693 249,000 
Hui as a percentage of Beijing 
total population (approx) 
2.00% 1.27% 
Hui as percentage of Beijing 
minority population (approx) 
57.2% 31.1% 
Figure 1.1: Comparison of census data from 1982 and 2010. 
Source: Beijing Statistical Information Net (2011). 
The Municipality of Beijing is divided into 16 districts, with each district being home to 
at least 30 ethnic minority groups. These districts range from urban to rural areas, with 
each possessing different demographic, infrastructural, developmental and economic 
attributes. For the purpose of this study, I decided to focus solely on five of the city’s 
central/urban districts: Chaoyang District, Haidian District, Xicheng District, 
Dongcheng District and Fengtai District. These urban districts were selected as the 
project focuses on Beijing City, as opposed to the Beijing Municipality and its rural 
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districts. This is an important distinction as it is likely that Hui communities in rural 
districts encounter very different socio-cultural and eco-political contexts than urban 
Hui, and as such would provide a greater profusion of experiences, understandings and 
identities than the confines of this project might allow adequate analysis of. Another 
reason for the selection of these urban districts is that they are home to greater numbers 
of minority populations. According to the Beijing Statistical Information Net (2011), all 
55 minority groups could be found in Chaoyang and Haidian districts in 2011, more 
than 50 groups were found in Xicheng and Fengtai districts, and at least 40 groups were 
found in Dongcheng District. In relation to the Hui, 67.2% of the group are concentrated 
in the five districts of Chaoyang, Haidian, Xicheng, Fengtai and Tongzhou. Within 
these chosen districts, the Hui are widely dispersed, although there are certain areas that 
act as ethnic enclaves for them. Specifically, Niujie in Xicheng District, Madian in 
Haidian District, and Chaowai and Changying in Chaoyang District (Gladney, 1996; see 
– Wang et al., 2013 for a discussion of how Hui enclaves are changing in Beijing due to 
social and geographical factors).   
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Figure 1.1: Location Map. 
Source: Author’s own (2020).
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1.6  MAKING HUI: THE MINORITISATION, PERFORMANCE AND 
PLACE OF ISLAM IN CONTEMPORARY BEIJING: 
The aim of this research is to examine how, under the impress of the Global War on 
Terror, processes of minoritisation and place impact on the identities, experiences and 
everyday geographies of the Hui people. Specifically, the overarching aim is to explore 
how Hui identity is performed, made public, othered, negotiated, and contested through 
its food cultures. Thus, the following objectives have been identified; 
• To gain an understanding of the minoritisation mechanisms experienced by the 
Hui population and to explore how minoritising processes are performed 
through Hui food cultures and their associated places. 
• To explore public and visible ‘outings’ of Hui peoples through an examination 
of the ways in which they create distinctively Hui spaces and places. 
• To explore how these above processes impact on the emotional geographies of 
Hui people, vis-à-vis the places of Hui food culture they frequent and the 
practices they engage in. 
• To explore the cultural meaning of food in the establishing and performance of 
Hui identities and places and how these relate to gender. 
Throughout the following chapters, these points will be explored, drawing upon 
fieldwork conducted in Beijing City between 2015 and 2019. Over the course of this 
time period, three trips were made to China for research purposes, varying in duration 
from 17 days to eight months. Altogether, almost twelve months were spent in the field 
researching this topic with Hui individuals and communities involved in the 
performance and production of Hui food cultures.  
In chapter 2, the theoretical framework for this project will be laid out, detailing the 
conceptual lens and scope of this project. Specifically, an argument will be made in 
favour of an approach akin to the “feminist political geography” defined by Jennifer 
Hyndman (2019). Building from this, it will be argued that emotions are inescapably 
embodied phenomena that play a key role in shaping how we understand both our 
identities and our place-worlds, offering the potential for greater understandings to be 
gleaned into the socio-spatial relations of place and geopolitics. The chapter will begin 
by discussing the evolution of critical geopolitics and three of their associated concepts 
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and their relevance to this project: feminist geopolitics, popular geopolitics and 
subaltern geopolitics. These sub-branches of political geography combine as a feminist 
political geography. Moving on from this, the development of emotional geographies 
will then be explored, paying particular attention to the work of feminist, 
phenomenological and post-structural theorists. After this, the concept of place will be 
explored, and an argument will be made for a post-colonial, or more specifically a 
feminist political-geographical, critique of dominant Anglo-American theory. This 
critique challenges hegemonic understandings of place by dismantling them and 
extracting relevant aspects to compile a conceptualisation of place that I term Qinqie 
places. Following this discussion, identity theory will then be examined, paying 
attention to the concepts of intersectionality and performativity. Literature relating to 
the processes of minoritisation, representation and othering will then be explored with a 
focus on how these practices have led to the creation of an Islamic Other in China and 
how this impacts upon the politics of belonging. The usefulness of using food as a tool 
for exploring political geography will then be discussed, focusing on the connections 
between food cultures and identity.  
In chapter 3, the methodological aspects of the project will be discussed. It will be 
argued that a qualitative methodology is best suited to this project. The chosen methods 
of participant observation, semi-structured interviewing and semiological analysis of 
documentary sources and visual texts, will be detailed. These methods suit a feminist 
political geography approach and allow for the political processes of minoritisation and 
identity formation to be explored. They also take seriously the research participants’ 
individual experiences, understandings and emotional knowings of their socio-cultural 
and political place-worlds.  
Chapter 4 will then turn to the historical and political context of the Hui and the 
development of ethnicity within China. The importance of historical Chinese 
conceptualisations of nationalism to the establishment of both the Chinese state and the 
CCP’s understandings of ethnicity will be investigated. How these understandings 
brought about the “Classification” project of the 1950s will be looked at, with due 
attention being paid to the importance of the classification team’s vague and shifting 
interpretation of Stalin’s (1953) criteria for ethnic classification. The important role of 
Ronghe and assimilation theory to CCP policy will then be explored. Following that, the 
chapter will focus on the specificities of the project’s chosen group, the Hui, by first 
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discussing the long history of Islam in China. The group’s unique positioning and 
attributes will then be detailed using the criteria for ethnic classification mentioned 
above. It will be shown that unlike many of the other officially recognised ethnic groups 
in China, the Hui fail to meet all four criteria set out by Stalin and the initial 
classification team: that is to say, “a common language, a common territory, a common 
economic life, and a common psychological make-up manifested in common specific 
features of national culture”. The last criteria, “a common psychological make-up 
manifested in common specific features of national culture” will be used as an entry 
way into the following chapter where it will be explored in greater depth through 
analysing the role that the Hui’s distinctive food cultures and conceptualisations of 
Qingzhen play in the identities of Hui participants.  
Chapter 5, “Hui Identity, Food Cultures and Qingzhen”, looks at the development of a 
shared culture and identity among Beijing Hui based on their food culture and the 
concept of Qingzhen. In his book “Muslim Chinese”, Gladney (1996) suggest that 
Qingzhen is central to Hui identity and culture, as was evidenced in diffuse ways among 
four Hui communities across China in the 1980s. Building on these claims, this chapter 
argues that for Beijing Hui it is the ways that Qingzhen has shaped the group’s food 
cultures that are the most commonplace and significant performances of Hui identity 
today. Specifically, I argue that Hui identity, local understandings of Qingzhen, and Hui 
food cultures form an interlocked and inseparable triad of understanding and 
identification for Hui participants living in central Beijing. This triad is manifested in 
multiple ways along several axis of understanding, of which five are outlined: religion, 
“small” nationalism/ethnicity, “big” nationalism/state nationalism, cleanliness, and 
place. Importantly for this thesis’ wider arguments, this chapter makes evident the ways 
in which this triad of identity draws from the group’s diverse attachments and 
imaginaries of place.  
The attachments of place discussed in Chapter 5 are built upon in Chapter 6, “Places of 
Hui Food Culture”. This chapter focuses on the concept of place and on the place-
making tactics employed by Hui in Beijing. In this chapter, I argue that a post-colonial, 
feminist conceptualization of place is needed, one that is more encompassing of place’s 
multifaceted nature, and less exclusionary of the concept’s complexities. Building from 
the conceptualisation of Qinqie place presented in Chapter 2, it is understood that: 
places are embodied; central to all places is their experiential and emotive imports; 
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places are not static, rather they are mobile and processual; places possess a bounded 
openness; they are connected and relational to other places and people; they hold 
multiple temporalities; they are historically and socially contingent “gatherings”, or 
bundles; and they are undeniably political. Such an understanding challenges the 
dominant, gendered and western-centric understandings of place present within western 
academia, suggesting that an exploration of place-making processes within a non-
Western context may enrich our understandings. This conceptualisation of Qinqie 
places forms the theoretical framework necessary for understanding how Hui places of 
food culture work. The chapter then explores the place-making tactics and 
representational practices employed by Beijing Hui in claiming places where they feel 
welcomed, safe and Qinqie. The visual referents used to demarcate these places as Hui 
are analysed using semiotics, exposing the politics and cultural meanings behind such 
representations. Participants’ subjective decodings of these signs are also examined, as 
are their emotive resonances and attachments to these places. Ultimately, the concept of 
Qinqie places is empirically evidenced throughout this chapter, exposing the need for a 
more expansive, feminist political-geographical understanding of place.  
The final empirical chapter, “Performing Hui Food Cultures”, will explore 
performances of Hui food culture as expressions of Hui identity. Underpinned by the 
knowledge that food is consumed and produced within a variety of affective social and 
political arenas, from which we construct boundaries of self and other, identity and 
belonging (Isakjee and Carroll, 2019), this chapter aims to evidence how performances 
of food cultures can provide important insights into the lived geopolitical realities of 
Hui minority subjects. A number of performances will be examined which relate to 
various facets of Hui identity in contemporary Beijing. These performances are grouped 
into three themes. Firstly, dishes that can be understood as performances of place-based 
identities will be explored, exposing the ways in which people’s emotive ties to places 
and geographical imaginaries impact on how they perform and consume certain dishes 
and foods. Of the numerous examples provided, three dishes or foods and their 
relationships to places are discussed in detail: Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Noodles and its ties 
to Northwest China; Meat from Beijing’s Niujie neighbourhood; and chocolate cake and 
geographical imaginaries of the West. The chapter then explores the impact that 
assimilative forces and inter-ethnic relations are having on Hui food cultures in Han-
dominated Beijing. Specifically, attention is focused on the increasing presence of 
alcohol within Hui restaurants, and on the moral and ethical precariousness that it 
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entails for participants hoping to live a Qingzhen lifestyle. This change in status for 
many Qingzhen restaurants from being alcohol-free places to actively selling alcohol is 
the result of a two-fold minoritising and assimilative process. Firstly, restaurants 
increasingly have to sell alcohol as a means of economic survival in Beijing’s 
competitive market. Secondly, discourses of modernity simultaneously play a role in 
changing many participants’ views of the divisive product. The final theme to be 
discussed in this chapter is the performance of gender through food cultures. In this 
section, I argue that minoritisation is an inherently gendered and place-specific process, 
resulting in localised manifestations of gender roles and norms. Specifically, I argue 
that male dominance is reconfigured within the place-specific context of Beijing’s Hui 
restaurants and eateries, as Hui patriarchy and minoritisation are synthesised to 
accommodate to life in a Han-dominated society where Muslims are increasingly 
treated as suspect under the guise of the Global War on Terror.  
In the concluding chapter, Chapter 8, I begin by laying out the current geopolitical 
climate for Islam in the PRC today. I focus on recent developments relating to the 
Uyghur and other Muslim minority groups in XUAR, showing how the case for 
Muslims in China has unfortunately worsened throughout the duration of this project. 
Set within this context, I then reflect on what the main findings and contributions of this 
project are. I draw specifically from arguments made throughout the thesis’ chapters, 
covering a range of empirical, methodological, and theoretical contributions, while also 
reflecting on my own experiences of conducting this research project. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW. 
“This time it’s different. It feels different. It doesn’t feel like the same place that 
I was once so comfortable, secure and happy in - the place that I shared with 
Denis, Bernie and Lara. This place is different to that one, its unknown and it 
feels foreign to me. Even though the street’s physical structure has largely 
remained the same, it feels like I’m seeing it with new eyes. It’s changed. Its 
little details have changed. Our apartment block has been painted a new shade of 
red, the restaurant we ate dinner at every day is gone (as is the Disanxian that 
they knew we wanted without us needing to order it), and the baozi lady by the 
bridge has been moved away – most likely as part of Xi’s clean-up of Beijing. 
This Beijing is not the same one that I left just two years ago and that I looked 
forward to coming back to. This place feels different. This place is different” 
(Extract from field journal entitled “First Day Back” - dated Monday 31 August 
2015). 
As academic scholarship has taught us, emotions are powerful. They influence and 
shape our lives in ways that very few other phenomena can. They impact on how we 
come to view ourselves, our position within society, our memories of past experiences 
and our expectations for the future. How we engage with, and indeed understand, the 
world around us is greatly affected by how we feel. Our personal geographies are thus 
intimately linked with our emotional states (Davidson and Milligan, 2004; Davidson 
and Bondi, 2004; Lupton, 1998). Through our bodies, we come to be in the world and 
are inextricably bound up with the places that we inhabit. Each is a vital ingredient in 
the other (Casey, 2013). Our socio-spatial interactions, histories and familiarities with 
these places make them meaningful to us. As such they influence our emotions as much 
as our emotions impact on them. This interplay between our emotional states and our 
understandings of places became clear to me as I reflected on my own experience of 
having (re-)discovered Beijing, as the opening excerpt shows. 
Throughout the course of this chapter, it will be argued that emotions are an inescapably 
embodied phenomena that form an essential part of how we know our place-worlds and 
our identities. Drawing from a range of academic literatures, an argument will be made 
in favour of emotional geographies, attempting to demonstrate the usefulness of this 
branch of geographic enquiry in understanding socio-spatial relations, specifically in 
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relation to place and geopolitics (Bondi et al., 2007; Pain, 2009). In addition, attempts 
will be made throughout to justify the use of food and its associated embodied practices 
as sites of geographic studies. Specifically, it will be asserted that a focus on food may 
provide a means of exploring the complex, entwined relationship between emotions, 
identity, embodiment, place and the political (Isakjee and Carroll, 2019; Waitt, 2014). 
The first section of this chapter will begin with a discussion of the development and 
evolution of geopolitics, specifically focusing on the sub-field of critical geopolitics. An 
argument shall then be made in favour of three concepts that have emerged from within, 
or in response to, critical geopolitics and an attempt will be made to justify their 
relevance to this project. Namely, these concepts are feminist geopolitics, subaltern 
geopolitics, as defined by Joanne Sharp (2011a, 2011b), and Dodds’ (2007) 
understanding of popular geopolitics. The usefulness of these concepts to geographical 
enquiry will then be used to respond to Jennifer Hyndman’s (2019) call for a “feminist 
political geography”, which arguably addresses the lack of inter-sub-disciplinary 
engagement that I find quite problematic. Such a feminist political geography would 
take seriously “postcolonial critique, subaltern geopolitics, and a refusal of Orientalist 
rescue narratives”, thus creating “more space for projects that take violence, exclusion, 
inequality, the materiality of the bodies, and their various subjectivities seriously” (ibid: 
8).  
The next section will work by examining the place of emotions within the Western 
tradition of academia, with specific references to its role (or assumed lack of) within 
geography (Anderson and Smith, 2001; Bondi, 2007). Tracing the history of emotions 
within academia, the work of particularly relevant individuals and approaches will be 
acknowledged: from the formal separation of emotions from knowledge associated with 
Descartes’ mind-body dualism, to contemporary times and the influential work of 
feminist, phenomenological and post-structuralist theorists. The chapter will then 
engage with ongoing debates and discussions about what an emotion actually is, and the 
difficulties with representing their often-ineffable nature. Non-Representational Theory 
and its use of affect over emotion will be briefly discussed here, referencing both its 
productive emphasise on the performative, along with its shortcomings which have 
ultimately led to the use of emotion throughout this thesis (Smith et al., 2009; Bondi, 
2005). Before progressing to the next section of the chapter, the unavoidable, yet often 
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overlooked relationship between emotions and the political will then be considered 
(Pain, 2009; Gregory and Pred, 2007; Sparke, 2007).  
The concept of place will then be discussed, specifically the contributions of 
phenomenologists in furthering understandings of our most intimately felt spatiality. 
Placing particular emphasis on the role of the lived body in the production of place, it 
will be established that bodies and places are mutually constitutive of each other 
(Casey, 2013). It will also be proposed that consideration of an emotio-spatial 
hermeneutic may be productive when thinking about the relationship between emotions 
and the places we inhabit (Davidson and Milligan, 2007). Specifically, a more 
expansive conceptualisation of place is presented, one which acts as a feminist political-
geographical critique of dominant Western theories of place. This conceptualisation of 
place, which I term Qinqie place, is one that views places as: embodied; emotively felt 
and experienced; mobile and processual; possessing open boundaries; connected and 
relational; multi-temporal; historically and socially contingent; and political.  
Identity, specifically the performative and multifaceted nature of it, will then be 
explored (Butler, 1990; Goffman, 1956). Following this, I will discuss the divisive 
concept of intersectionality, highlighting its usefulness to a geographic piece of research 
such as this. In this context, the concept of minoritisation will then be elaborated. 
Specifically, this chapter considers processes of exclusion, othering, and representation, 
and their place in the securitisation of Islam and the creation of the “Islamic Other”. The 
concepts of belonging and the politics of belonging will then be discussed, with specific 
reference to how these processes unfold in place and in relation to minoritisation. 
Before concluding, the area of food studies will be discussed, with particular attention 
being paid to the work of geographers. It will be argued that: food plays a central role in 
shaping both our individual and group identities, and may allow for important insights 
into the socially constructed nature of gender and ethnicity; that food is highly emotive 
and political; that food is intertwined with place and place identities; and that through 
consuming certain foods, we often simultaneously consume geographical imaginaries of 
place (Isakjee and Carroll, 2019; Di Giovine and Brulotte, 2016; Jansen, 1997; Bell and 
Valentine, 1997).  
 
 32 
2.1  CHALLENGING THE LABELS – CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS. 
Since it was first coined in 1899 by Rudolf Kjellen, the concept of geopolitics has 
undergone considerable transformation, largely resulting from the multiple changes to 
the structures of world order and the evolution of the concept's understandings 
historically (Agnew, 2003; Ó Tuathail, 1998: 1). These factors have resulted in the 
concept being exceptionally difficult to define, with any attempts to do so being highly 
contested (Ó Tuathail, 1998: 1). At the core of geopolitics is the two-way relationship 
between politics and geography; both human and physical. This relationship has varied 
over time and is usually driven by particular theories and state practices, such as 
imperialism, colonialism, Mackinder's heartland theory, the domino theory and the 
emergence of a new world order (Knox and Marston, 2004: 339). Geopolitics allows for 
the connections between communities and places to be analysed and understood 
(Dodds, 2007: 3), while also allowing local and regional dynamics and events to be 
related to the broader global system (Ó Tuathail, 1998: 1). This is an important 
argument for the usefulness of geopolitics in modern times considering the manner in 
which globalisation increasingly links localities and places together, regardless of 
geographical distances or time (Giddens, 1990: 64). Traditionally, geopolitics had been 
used to layer world space, creating a hierarchy of importance from the world scale 
downwards through four specific scales; global, international, domestic and regional. 
Understandings of these geographical scales, or representations, play a decisive role in 
the practices of world politics (Agnew, 2003). 
In the absence of a single, agreed upon definition, Dodds (2007: 4-5) has identified two 
distinct understandings of geopolitics. The first understanding is that geopolitics offers a 
guide to the global landscape through the use of geographical terms and descriptions. 
Places are identified and labelled accordingly, creating a simple model of the world which 
can then be used to inform policy making. This dividing and labelling of global space 
based on perceived levels of importance by political elites is inherently biased as powerful 
individuals and groups act in pursuit of their own interests and identities (Agnew, 2003). 
By identifying, labelling and representing places in this manner, a geopolitical imaginary 
is created (Dodds, 2007: 10; Agnew, 2003). Within Western media, which is of course a 
powerful tool for distributing such imaginaries, this process is largely euro-centric as the 
dominant “Western” geopolitical imaginary is projected onto the rest of the world 
(Agnew, 2003). The creation of these imaginaries is gradual, evolving over time as a 
 33 
result of changing world politics. By identifying three specific eras between the early 
nineteenth century and the 1980s in which geopolitics developed, Agnew (1998: 86) 
highlights that although the leading geopolitical imaginary of each era is distinctive in its 
own way, there are many continuities as pre-existing themes are re-used in new contexts. 
In today's post-Cold War era, theories such as Mackinder's heartland theory and the 
domino theory continue to influence world politics as the US remains steadfast in its 
objective to prevent one power from controlling the Eurasian landmass as leading world 
powers continue to fight for global primacy (Kearns, 2008: 223; Agnew, 2003). The use 
of these theories in modern world politics can be referred to as “conservative geopolitics”, 
whereby geopolitics and geopolitical imaginaries aim to serve contemporary imperialism 
by preserving existing global inequalities (Kearns, 2008: 223). As Dodds (2007: 4) points 
out, this first version of geopolitics, the belief that geopolitics offers a guide to the global 
landscape, is by far the most common and it continues to feature heavily in political, 
popular and media discourses. 
The second understanding of geopolitics which Dodds (2007: 5) discusses is the one 
upon which this research is founded. It focuses on how geopolitics works as a practice 
by questioning the labels given to places and how these labels generate certain 
understandings of places, communities, and identities. This perspective of geopolitics is 
referred to as critical geopolitics (Ó Tuathail, 1996). The objective of critical geopolitics 
is to reveal the hidden politics of geopolitical knowledge. Critical geopolitics regards 
geopolitics as a discourse that is culturally and politically varied in how it represents 
geography and world politics, rather than simply defining it as an unproblematic 
description of the world political map. It views the creation of geopolitical imaginaries, 
knowledges and discourses as an intrinsically political act by a select group of 
individuals and institutions (Ó Tuathail, 1998: 3). Drawing from Foucault's (1980: 52) 
work on “Power/Knowledge”, critical geopolitics acknowledges that those in power 
constantly create knowledge, and that this knowledge continually induces effects of 
power. In doing so, critical geopolitics examines the power relations involved in 
geopolitical representations while challenging the role of the state and how its 
institutions envision the world (Hague, 2004: 227). In order to accurately analyse 
geopolitical reasoning, a number of concepts have emerged from critical geopolitics 
(Sharp, 2011a: 271). These include formal geopolitics, popular geopolitics, practical 
geopolitics (Hague, 2004: 228), feminist geopolitics, anti-geopolitics and subaltern 
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geopolitics (Sharp, 2011a: 271). Of these, feminist geopolitics, subaltern geopolitics and 
popular geopolitics are of most relevance to this research.  
2.1.a  Subaltern Geopolitics. 
Inspired by Mohammed Ayoob’s (2002) “subaltern realism” which aimed to challenge 
classical realism within international relations, Joanne Sharp (2011b) employs the term 
“subaltern geopolitics”, melding together two rather opposing terms – one which 
unmistakably refers to powerful political optic, while the other connotes weakness. 
Subaltern geopolitics challenges accounts which reject formal politics and the state by 
acknowledging the importance of such scales, while also drawing attention to their 
spatial and social construction. As a concept, subaltern geopolitics references 
postcolonial understandings of power relations by “suggesting a position that is not 
completely other, resistant or alternative to dominant geopolitics, but an ambiguous 
position of marginality as the term is used by hooks (1990)” (Sharp, 2011a: 271). 
Specifically, geographers using subaltern geopolitics have looked at the various 
practices used by those people marginalised by dominant geopolitics; not simply 
critiquing dominant geopolitics, but offering alternative worldviews, experiences and 
imaginaries of geopolitics. To this end, Sharp (2011b: 298) turns to Bhabha’s (1990) 
concepts of hybridity, and more specifically “mimicry”; which allows for subversion, 
strategy, and survival, or a “way of ‘doing’ world politics in a seemingly ‘similar’ yet 
unexpectedly ‘different’ way” (Bilgin, 2008: 6). By drawing from Bhabha’s (1990) 
“mimicry”, the binary categorised of “same” and “different” are destabilised (Sharp, 
2011b: 298).  
In Subaltern Geopolitics, the marginality of the groups considered is understood in 
largely metaphorical terms. Yet there is also a geographical basis to marginality and in 
the context of world-system of global capitalism that produces its cores and peripheries 
through processes of combined and uneven development, it is important for Critical 
Geopolitics to learn from knowledges produced outside the core and to reflect upon this 
peripheralization as a constitutive process of forming and validating research as Taylor 
(2012) proposes for the cognate field of International Relations.  
As an intersection of political, post-structural and post-colonial geographies, subaltern 
geopolitics is concerned with the spaces of geopolitical knowledge production “which 
are neither dominant nor resistant”, as the study of these accounts serves to reiterate and 
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strengthen this “binary geopolitical structure rather than challenging it” (Sharp, 2011a: 
271). Through placing an emphasis on the post-colonial, those voices and accounts 
which are normally made marginal are brought to the fore. As such, it allows a way of 
“doing” the political which is neither limited to, nor completely distinct from, the binary 
of dominant and resistant geopolitical imaginaries. Such an approach to geopolitics 
necessarily involves a post-colonial emphasis by bringing into the geopolitical realm 
those views that are normally rendered marginal (ibid, 2011a).   
2.1.b  Popular Geopolitics and Representation. 
The concept of popular geopolitics is also particularly relevant given its focus on 
geopolitical representations and discourses (Dittmer and Dodds, 2008: 438). Popular 
geopolitics recognises that political life is fused with the mass media, that 
representations of global political geographies circulate within and beyond national 
political cultures, and that the media both circulates and produces images of global 
politics (Dodds, 2007: 17). These geopolitical representations influence our 
understandings of the world and are therefore often subjected to government regulation 
and control. The production, consumption and circulation of media representations is 
inherently uneven as certain individuals and groups are in better positions to either 
produce or gain access to different sources. In regard to the production of such 
representations, large Euro-American corporations tend to be dominant (Dodds, 2007: 
148-149), which generally results in the continuation and preservation of the 
“conservative” geopolitical imaginary. However, that is not to say that such 
conservative geopolitical imaginaries are reproduced solely by Euro-American 
corporations and regimes, as many “Second” and “Third” World states continue to 
produce such imaginaries for their own benefit. 
2.1.c  Feminist Geopolitics. 
Since the mid-1990s, the concept of feminist geopolitics has been developed in response 
to the lack of engagement between the sub-discipline of political geography and 
feminist scholarship (Hyndman 2004). Prior to the mid-1990s, feminist scholarship had 
been making significant contributions to various other sub-disciplines and areas of 
geography, yet its theories had not been adopted by political geography (Dowler and 
Sharp, 2001), with Staeheli (1996) claiming that the boundaries between political and 
feminist geographies were actively being maintained and reinforced through academic 
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practices. Feminists had long argued that women were actively excluded from the 
political as their actions were confined to the private sphere and spaces of home. 
Traditionally, these private spaces were considered to be feminine, while public spaces 
were deemed to be masculine. However, as Dowler and Sharp (2001) have rightly 
pointed out, the political can be housed in the home, challenging this binary.   
In her influential and pioneering chapter “Feminism, Gender Relations and 
Geopolitics”, Eleonor Koffman (1996) used the term feminist geopolitics to call for 
further feminist engagements and critiques of critical geopolitics, which she considered 
to be an important but flawed school of thought. Critical geopolitics has similar aims to 
feminist, and even post-colonial, theory in that it attempts to expose the “hidden and 
insidious workings of power throughout the structures of everyday life” (Dowler and 
Sharp, 2001: 167). Yet, as Jennifer Hyndman (2004: 312; 2001: 213) argues, although 
critical geopolitics is a useful and necessary departure point for a feminist geopolitical 
imaginary, it fails to articulate other, embodied and situated ways of seeing, and 
generally ignores the gendered landscape of dominant geopolitical debates. Dowler and 
Sharp (2001) extend this critique of critical geopolitics further by claiming that it is 
undifferentiated by various other markers of difference, including, but not limited to 
gender, race, class and sexuality (see also Sharp 2000). Further, they rightly point out 
that critical geopolitics often uses language as universal, yet it is a sub-discipline that 
has largely been dominated by Western, white, male academics (Dowler and Sharp, 
2001: 167).  
The rise of feminist and post-colonial scholarship within geography over the past few 
decades, or what has been referred to as “feminist geographies of difference” (Pratt, 
2000: 259-262), marked a cultural turn within the discipline (Hyndman, 2001). The 
cultural turn within feminist geography drew attention to the spatialised processes of 
racism and racialisation by demonstrating how social relations and space are mutually 
constituted (Kobayashi and Peake, 1994). These post-colonial and post-structural 
feminist geographies interrogated the construction of social categories for 
subordination, including the categories of “woman”, “ethnic minority”, “immigrant”, 
etc (McDowell and Sharpe, 1997: Hyndman, 2001). The work of feminist and post-
colonial geographers concerned with the politization of the everyday required a 
reconceptualization of the political, something that the sub-discipline of political 
geography would benefit greatly from. Further, the cultural turn also called on feminist 
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geographers to challenge the boundaries of their previously Euro-American-centric 
boundaries and imaginaries, and as such, allowed a renewed accountability to other 
places and peoples. Subsequently, questions of identity and difference came to the fore 
(McDowell and Sharp: 97; Hyndman, 2001: 211). Despite the ensuing shift of focus 
within political geography to the everyday exercises of power, it has generally been 
expressed in terms of the cultural turn, rather than through an acknowledgement of the 
feminist claim that “the personal is political” (Dowler and Sharp, 2001: 165). In light of 
this, Hyndman (2001: 212) began making a case for a “political turn in feminist 
geography”, one which acknowledged that feminist geography was already political, but 
that brought together and enmeshed the “small ‘p’ political of feminist geography with 
the larger ‘P’ political of political geography”.  
Stemming from this, feminist geopolitics attempts to “bridge scholarship in feminist and 
political geography by creating a theoretical and political space in which geopolitics 
becomes a more gendered and racialised project, one that is epistemologically situated 
and embodied in its conception of security” (Hyndman, 2004: 307). For nearly 20 years, 
geographers have worked to flesh out Hyndman’s (2001) call for a “feminist 
geopolitical imaginary” through: “complicating our understandings of key concepts 
such as corporeality, emotions and ethics; exploring new objects of analysis such as 
trauma and violence, terrorism, security and conspiracy; and reaching out to other 
disciplines, including psychology and literary theory, as well as politics/political science 
and international relations and postcolonial and development studies” (Dixon and 
Marston, 2011: 446). Feminist geopolitics allows a more embodied response to 
international relations, elevating visceral conceptions of security and violence (Dowler 
and Sharp, 2001; Hyndman, 2004). This embodied understanding of the geopolitical 
builds upon, and responds to, the disembodied work of critical geopolitics by resituating 
knowledge production as a partial understanding from somewhere; from particular 
“subjugated positions structured by gender, race, nation, and class” (Haraway, 1991: 
193; Sparke, 2000; Hyndman 2004). Rather than being a new or alternative theory of 
geopolitics, feminist geopolitics offers an approach to global issues and international 
relations with feminist politics in mind through an emphasis on situated knowledge and 
spatialised conventions of “security” across multiple scales (Hyndman, 2001; 2004).  
As a specific branch of geographical enquiry, feminist geopolitics exposes the 
production of inequalities and uneven power relations through a distinct methodological 
 38 
and analytical approach (Massaro and Williams, 2013; Williams and Massaro, 2013; 
Hyndman, 2019).  Therefore, rather than merely re-writing women into geopolitics, 
feminist geopolitics offers a lens through which the everyday, lived experiences of 
subordinated and marginalised peoples can be made more visible (Dowler and Sharp, 
2001). As Dixon and Marston (2011:445) have shown, feminist analysis has worked to 
bring to light the everyday, embodied practices that “make manifest the ‘place’ of 
traditionally disempowered people… within all manner of ostensibly geopolitical 
landscapes”. Through de-centring geopolitics by attempting to develop a politics of 
security at the scale of the body (Hyndman, 2004), feminist geopolitics exposes the 
analytical possibilities of exploring the unavoidable links between the body and local 
with the national and international levels (Dowler and Sharp, 2001). Such an 
acknowledgement of the “alternative and multiple loci of power” challenges the 
traditionally global perspective of geopolitics, an approach advocated for by Anna 
Secor’s (2001: 193) “Feminist Counter-Geopolitics”. By challenging the scales at which 
the geopolitical is considered to operate, and by demonstrating the lived implications 
and manifestations of geopolitics through an appreciation of embodiment, feminist 
geopolitics has tried to make visible the previously invisible acts of violence taking 
place within private, “feminine” spaces (Hyndman, 2019). Thus, it reiterates the 
feminist stance that “the personal is political” (Dowler and Sharp, 2001: 165), through 
opposing the conceptual division between public and private spaces that previously 
framed political geography (Hyndman, 2001: 210). In light of this, Dowler and Sharp 
(2001: 171) suggest that if we are to begin thinking about “a feminist (or post-colonial 
feminist), geopolitics, it is necessary to think more clearly about the grounding of 
geopolitical discourse in practice (and in place) – to link international representation to 
the geographies of everyday life; to understand the ways in which the nation and the 
international are reproduced in the mundane practices we take for granted”. The focus 
on the everyday practices and manifestations of geopolitics, as argued for by feminist 
geopolitical scholars, is of central importance to this thesis, and is a key analytical 
underpinning for the focus on Hui food cultures.  
2.1.d  Feminist Political Geography. 
The above sections have outlined four key areas of political geography, or more 
specifically geopolitics, that are important in framing the issue of minoritisation among 
Beijing’s ethnically Hui community and in understanding the lived implications, 
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experiences and performances of such a political process. Together, they provide the 
important analytical and epistemological tools and frameworks necessary for 
understanding the complexities and multi-scalar manifestations of geopolitics within the 
chosen context. Drawing from critical geopolitics, subaltern geopolitics, popular 
geopolitics and feminist geopolitics, they shape a “critical, post-colonial, post-
structuralist, feminist” approach to geopolitics. The difficulty, long-windedness and 
messiness involved in naming this approach to geopolitics is, I believe, representative of 
a broader theoretical issue within the sub-discipline of geopolitics, and indeed, political 
geography. When attempting to source literature that could relevantly frame the 
phenomena being explored by this thesis, I was struck by how seemingly disparate and 
isolated many of the sub-disciplines within geopolitics were, and how little they seemed 
to actively engage with one another, despite bearing analytical, methodological and 
epistemological similarities. Each had developed out of a critique of the problematic 
and universalistic conceptualizations and foci of traditional, or “conservative”, 
geopolitics (Kearns, 2008), yet many of them operated in isolation from one another. 
In light of the sub-discipline’s seemingly fractured nature, I think that Hyndman’s 
(2019) recent publication “Unsettling feminist geopolitics: forging feminist political 
geographies of violence and displacement”, is a particularly rich and much needed 
contribution to the field. Hyndman acknowledges the contributions and usefulness of 
feminist geopolitics, while simultaneously attempting to bring subaltern geopolitics into 
the theoretical fold in order to better understand her case study of human displacement 
and refugee sponsorship in Canada. Yet, she suggests that “a bigger tent than just 
feminist geopolitics” is not only needed for understanding the geopolitical violence and 
the security of people “out of place”, but that it is also indispensable to geographical 
thinking. To that end, Hyndman suggests that we need the broader, more inclusive, 
umbrella term of “feminist political geography”.  
This feminist political geography would not only draw from the rich theories of feminist 
geopolitics but would also take seriously subaltern geopolitics and critical 
understandings of power. In doing so, Hyndman (2019: 4) aims to “create more space 
for and provoke a wider range of feminist interventions related to embodied geopolitical 
phenomena, materialism, violence, displacement (of all kinds), and scale to consolidate 
a thoroughly feminist and anti-racist political geography that does not succumb to 
Orientalist rescue narratives or produce regimes of care and security that subjectify 
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refugees”. I find that Hyndman’s (2019: 24) call to consolidate feminist work under the 
term of feminist political geography, and to “name, occupy, and transform this wide, 
deep and incisive assemblage of theory, ontology, and geographical analysis, and move 
forward”, is of critical importance to both the theoretical framing of this project and also 
to the discipline of geography more broadly. This feminist, post-colonial, anti-racist, 
political geography recognises the “embodied, contradictory, messy, co-constituted 
illiberal subjects contesting multiple modalities of violence” (Hyndman, 2019: 23). By 
using feminist political geography here, and eschewing the singular framings and 
terminologies of the sub-discipline’s fragmented variations, a feminist framework is 
being implemented that is committed to “postcolonial critique, subaltern geopolitics, 
and a refusal of Orientalist rescue narratives”, thus creating “more space for projects 
that take violence, exclusion, inequality, the materiality of the bodies, and their various 
subjectivities seriously” (Hyndman, 2019: 8).  
2.2  DEVELOPMENT OF AN EMOTIONALLY AWARE 
GEOGRAPHY – FROM KNOWING TO FEELING. 
Within the social sciences, and indeed academia more broadly, academics have long 
claimed to have discovered facts about our world through objective, rational thought. 
These facts, it is often said, are void of any qualities that may be deemed subjective or 
unscientific (Bondi, 2007; Anderson and Smith, 2001). Leaning heavily on the 
Cartesian mind-body dualism, in which the body and mind are believed to be separate 
and distinct factors, Western academia has traditionally privileged the mind and its 
associated characteristics over other forms of knowledge associated with the body 
(Grosz, 1994; Johnston, 2009; Smith et al., 2009). Emotions and emotional knowing, 
given their presumed irrationality and embodied nature, have thus been silenced and 
excluded historically from the formal production of knowledge (Anderson and Smith, 
2001; Rose, 1994; Bendelow and Williams, 1998).  
The marginalisation of emotions and embodied knowledge has been an intrinsic part of 
the gendered politics of research, whereby “detachment, objectivity and rationality have 
been valued, and implicitly masculinized, while engagement, subjectivity, passion and 
desire have been devalued, and frequently feminised” (Anderson and Smith, 2001: 7). 
Within the discipline of geography, this gendered exclusion of the emotional and 
embodied has been just as pervasive as in other academic subjects, with many of its 
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practitioners presenting the world as an emotionally barren terrain (Bondi et al., 2007; 
Bordo, 1993). As feminist geography has shown, this mind-body dualism both 
underlies, and is integral to, human geography (Longhurst, 2009). Furthermore, Rose 
(1993) has argued that geographical knowledge always assumes a male “knower” that 
can be disassociated from both his body and emotions, thus excluding feminised forms 
of understanding and knowing such as emotional knowing and embodied knowledge. 
However, as Bondi (2007) rightly points out, there is a very clear contradiction in the 
belief that researchers can successfully detach themselves from their emotions, which is 
that the very act of conducting research is often believed to depend on an initial moment 
of inspiration or creative thinking, both of which are emotionally intensive. “Thinking is 
never emotion-free: rather, our feeling states and our thinking are closely intertwined” 
(ibid: 236). 
2.2.a  Feeling in and through our bodies. 
The notion that a “knower” can disassociate from their body is implausible, as both 
feminist geographers and phenomenologists have noted. Building upon Husserl’s 
doctrine of pre-predicative experience and his explanation of being-in-the-world’s 
centrality to dasein, Merleau-Ponty (1962) wrote of a matter-pregnant–with-form. As he 
explained, meanings grow from embodied structures and the experiential body’s 
situation. In similar fashion, Edward Casey (2013) developed the notion of 
implacement, claiming that it is through the collusion of the lived-body and place that 
the spatial meaning-structures of directionality and dimensionality become known. 
Therefore, it is in and through our bodies that we are located and come to know our 
being-in-the-world. The body is an important site of identity, representation and socio-
spatial relations (Johnston, 2009). It is also our most intimately felt geography and is 
considered the location, or place, of the individual and emotions. As such, our bodily 
movements are undeniably emotional and influential in how we understand our 
engagements with space (Davidson and Milligan, 2004). Feminist geographies have 
been particularly influential here in arguing the importance of embodied, or situated, 
knowledge; that is to say, an understanding of knowledge that recognises its embodied 
and situated subjectivity (Rose, 1997; Cook et al., 2005; Longhurst, 2009). 
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2.2.b  Difference.  
In addition to the valuable work done by feminist geographers and phenomenologists, 
post-structuralist critiques of science have been particularly revealing in challenging the 
dualistic separation of mind and body. Following from Derrida’s (1976) work on 
différance, whereby he unsettled not just differences between the terms of a binary but 
also the co-constitutive character of their resulting hierarchies, many post-structuralists 
have argued that in having only “partial or context-determined access to reality”, we 
may possibly be “socially constructing something that doesn’t actually exist” (Jones III, 
2013: 24; Hacking, 1999; Baudrillard, 1994). Such is arguably the case with the 
powerful, hierarchical binaries of Mind/Body, Rational/Irrational or 
Knowledge/Emotion. Post-structuralist explorations of identity have also been 
particularly fruitful in understanding academia’s long-running denial of emotion. 
Derrida’s (1970) work was once again influential here as his critique of identity exposed 
the presence of centres, peripheries and in-between grounds (“free-play) in the creation 
of one’s identity. In asserting claims of positive identity, individuals attempt to control 
and manage differences, or in-between grounds. This is done in order to establish a 
stable referential subject or centre (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Jones III, 2013). In so 
doing, people, groups and categories are constructed as being different to the self, thus 
establishing them as the Other (Longhurst, 2009). These Others are necessarily forced 
to the periphery when constructing identities. However, the centres formed are not 
completely void of the peripheralised. In fact, by identifying against the Other and 
claiming difference to it, the resulting identity retains some of the marginalised (Jones 
III, 2013: 25; Longhurst, 2009). In line with this, dominant notions of knowledge, its 
objectivity and its location in the mind, are challenged by an awareness of the presence 
of emotions, subjectivity and embodiment. Therefore, attempts to exclude emotions 
from knowledge, did not just fail, but were in fact never an achievable reality (Bondi, 
2009). The recent “emotional turn” within geography can subsequently be understood 
not as a re-direction to a newly found, foreign phenomena, but rather as an 
acknowledgement of what has always been present within our discipline (Bondi et al., 
2007). 
2.2.c  Emotional Geography. 
The geographies of emotion that have emerged from the above re-appraisal of emotions 
within our discipline can contribute greatly to how we understand our experiences and 
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engagements with space, as well as the lived implications of geopolitics. Emotions are a 
key set of relations through which lives are lived and societies are formed (Neu, 2000; 
Pugmire, 1998). They play a vital role in shaping our life-worlds and identities, 
informing our personal geographies, influencing our sense of the world around us, and 
even how we reflect on the past or project the future (Davidson and Milligan, 2004; 
Davidson and Bondi, 2004; Lupton, 1998). In light of the important role that emotions 
play in our everyday engagements with space, emotional geography tries to “understand 
emotion – experientially and conceptually – in terms of its socio-spatial mediation and 
articulation” (Bondi et al., 2007: 3). In so doing, it must attempt to express something 
with language that is virtually indescribable using words, that is to say, the emotional 
attachments and engagements between people and places. Regardless of the 
representational difficulties that geographers engaging with emotional studies are faced 
with, a number of highly revealing, contextual studies have emerged which successfully 
highlight the conceptual and methodological gains of conducting emotionally aware 
geographical research. 
Dias’ (2003) study of anorexia and its “owners”, is a telling account of the often-
conflicting emotions experienced by those suffering from eating disorders as they 
navigate a place (Cyber-space) deemed safe for sharing their emotional pain. The study 
skilfully shows how the embodiment of emotion is both deeply personal on the one 
hand, yet also shaped by a sense of sharing with other people whose bodies are similarly 
placed. In her study of women of colour working on South African farms, Mathee 
(2004) shows that eating and its associated acts are embodied, social practices that are 
both meaningful and meaning making. By highlighting the enormous social significance 
of food, she demonstrates how food preparation and eating practices can produce spaces 
of resistance and relationality in her participants’ lives. Drawing heavily on Valentine’s 
(1999: 514) work on “the spatial dynamics of cooking and eating”, Mathee shows how 
food practices can be (re)negotiated to allow for constricting narratives of identity to be 
challenged, transformed or replaced. Germann Molz (2007) uses the experiences of 
North American tourists who visited McDonald’s restaurants while travelling to analyse 
how these places of food consumption are experienced and represented using a 
spectrum of emotions from comfort to guilt or even betrayal. Through analysing these 
emotional accounts, Germann Molz shows how these various emotions effect 
understandings of McDonald’s as occupying multiple scales and sites: from home to 
away, and from local to global.  
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Although these three studies are but a small fraction of the work published to date 
within emotional geographies, they draw out many of the main arguments for emotional 
geographies being made in this research. Firstly, each study looks at the emotional 
experiences of its participants to gain a better understanding of their personal 
geographies and experiences in the world. Secondly, each project demonstrates how 
emotions and spaces are mutually constitutive as the participants are both affected by, 
and in turn affect, their spatial settings. Thirdly, each of the studies highlight the 
importance of embodiment when discussing emotions and the intrinsic link between 
what we feel and what we do. Fourthly, each one shows the emotionality of food and 
the usefulness of studying food practices when exploring socio-spatial relations, for 
eating is one of our most basic embodied movements, and is indisputably emotional 
(Bell and Valentine, 1997; Srinivas, 2013; Bordo, 2013). Finally, each illustrates the 
often over-looked and under-studied links between the embodied processes of food 
preparation/consumption, our emotional states and our personal geographies: whether 
those links take the form of personal and social empowerment through engaging in food 
preparation; varied emotional responses to physically entering a space of globalised 
food consumption while travelling; or intentionally refraining from eating practices and 
policing your intake of food in order to alter or gain a sense of control over your body. 
2.2.d  Emotions. 
Despite a growing appreciation for emotions within academia, and the development of 
distinctively emotional branches of enquiry within most social science subjects, 
differences still remain regarding definitions of what an emotion is and what they 
actually mean. Nevertheless, a number of analytically useful conceptualisations have 
emerged from both within and outside of Geography. Although this chapter will 
predominantly focus on the theoretical advances made in geography, due to their 
emphasis on socio-spatial relations, relevant contributions made in other disciplines will 
also be considered, particularly those from sociology and psychology. Emotions are part 
of all of our lives, and they are essential to how the human world is constructed and 
lived (Davidson and Bondi, 2004; Anderson and Smith, 2001). Our emotional lives are 
characterised by the fluidity, mutability and multiplicity of emotions (Bondi et al., 
2007). Rather than viewing emotions as objects or things to be obtained, it is productive 
to think of them as being intrinsically relational (Bondi et al., 2007). This non-objective 
approach would suggest that emotions should be viewed as events that occur in and 
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through our world at the interface between people and their contexts (Smith et al., 2009; 
Bondi, 2009). As Sartre (2004: 61) has taught us, emotions are a mode of conscious 
existence, allowing our consciousness to understand its Being-in-the-world (to borrow 
Husserl’s term). Within social settings, emotions can be considered as ongoing, 
developing responses to interactions with others (Boiger and Mesquita, 2012). These 
interactions shape and impact on emotions and as such, emotions are often understood 
as being “socially constructed” and dependent on social interactions (see – Averill, 
1980; Harré, 1986; Hochschild, 1983; Lutz, 1988). These social interactions are always 
framed by prevailing cultural systems that often play a role in guiding emotional 
responses, influencing the emotional narratives chosen to describe feelings, and in 
determining the meanings that individuals extract from these emotions (Lutz, 1988; 
Mesquita et al., 2012; Markus and Kitayama, 1994). Essentially, our emotions are 
culturally specific, learned responses which one’s consciousness chooses to perform, 
i.e., emotions are structures of consciousness (Sartre, 2004).  
As Doyle McCarthy (1994: 268) has argued “emotions cannot be divorced from the 
sociocultural meanings in which they are expressed and experienced”. Although it is 
undeniably true that emotions cannot be parted from their cultural and social settings, it 
is equally important not to overlook the most common setting for human interaction, 
place – and this is where geography can be most useful in furthering our understandings 
of emotions. After all, it is not just our emotions that effect how we perceive the world 
around us, but the spaces and places that we inhabit can greatly influence how we feel 
(Davidson and Milligan, 2004; Tuan, 1979: 409-410). Therefore, our emotions and the 
places we inhabit are mutually constitutive. Another important aspect of the close 
association between emotions and geography is made clear in Ho’s (2014) paper “The 
Emotional Economy of Migration Driving Mainland Chinese Transnational Sojourning 
across Migration Regimes”. Ho shows how the value of certain emotions is appreciated 
or depreciated as the emotions are mobilised geographically during transnational 
sojourning, demonstrating a nuanced spatial variation of the emotional.  
2.2.e  Representing the ineffable. 
As with all research topics, there are certain difficulties and challenges to studying 
emotions. Namely, how do we accurately represent something linguistically that is often 
ineffable? If we are to stop for a moment and consider the difficulties that we might 
have in effectively communicating verbally how we feel during times of intense 
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emotions – particularly relating to loss, love and uncertainty – then it becomes apparent 
that some emotions cannot be completely rendered into words. The language we use to 
communicate and represent our feelings, understandings and beliefs can be understood 
as being comprised of signs. Each of these signs are composed of two parts: a signified, 
i.e., the concept or object being represented; and a signifier, the language or image used 
to represent or communicate the signified (Saussure, 1983; see Chapter 3). We use 
words such as fear, delight, dread, hope and regret in attempts to communicate how we 
feel to others. However, beyond our limited emotional vocabularies, it becomes 
apparent that much of what we feel, or the signified, lacks an adequate signifier that can 
succinctly convey our emotional states. This limitation of representation has led many 
geographers to prefer Non-Representational Theory (NRT) and its use of affect over 
emotion. Resulting from language’s failure to represent the ineffable, geographers who 
use NRT believe that affect is more suited to studying our immediate embodied 
engagements with space that lie beyond linguistic representation (McCormick, 2003; 
Paterson, 2005). NRT rightly highlights the importance of the performative and the 
necessity to consider what people do, and not simply what they say they do (Smith et 
al., 2009).  
However, NRT is not without its own short-comings, and indeed, contradictions. The 
failure of language to represent our feelings and embodied spatial engagements lies at 
the core of NRT, yet as Thien (2005) points out, many of NRT’s practitioners ironically 
employ incredibly dense and complex language to represent those performances which 
are supposedly beyond linguistic representation. More importantly however, NRT’s 
denial of representation overlooks the important and inescapable role that representation 
plays in both the symbolic order and our self-understandings (Smith et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, performances are not simply silent, unspoken acts and as such the use of 
words to communicate experience may also be considered as performative and therefore 
worthy of further academic exploration. As with all performances, however non-
verbally immediate, these linguistic performances cannot be meaningful if they are not 
related to certain interpretive pre-configurations (Bondi, 2005; Smith et al., 2009). Due 
to the short-comings of NRT and the necessity of representation, the word emotion will 
continue to be used throughout this thesis. 
 47 
2.2.f  Emotions as political. 
At the cognitive level, emotions have been described as “language forms” for they 
allow the individual to represent aspects of themselves to others (Perinbanayagam, 
1992; Goffman, 1983). The use of language to communicate feelings to others, 
particularly the use of our well-established yet limited emotional vocabulary, creates 
emotional narratives. In doing so, emotions are replaced by discourses about emotions, 
which may destroy both emotional knowing and its corresponding geographical 
knowledge (Bondi, 2009). Emotions and discourses of emotion are intensely political 
matters (Ahmed, 2014; Anderson, 2013). As Foucault (1990) has shown, power is not 
simply enacted at the macro-level of the State. Rather, it is through the tiny acts of 
micro-power, such as language and embodied practices, that power may truly be made. 
Technologies of power penetrate the body, producing “normal” bodies, psyches and 
emotions through self-regulation. This micro-power often operates a self-regulating 
form of bio-power, whereby the individuals themselves are involved in a form of self-
policing and disciplining. Discourses are vital to this level of micro-power as they act as 
a form of linguistic regulation of normality and abnormality, the sane and insane, the 
appropriate and the inappropriate (Sharp et al., 2000). 
Despite the profoundly political nature of emotions, formal politics often rely on, and 
therefore reinforce the belief in, traditional Western notions of an existing, emotionally-
free, abstract space (Lefebvre, 1992). If we consider Foucault’s (1990) work on the 
biopolitical management of populations by states and Agamben’s (1998) account of 
how people are increasingly reduced to the category of “bare life”, then it is clear to see 
that the abstract visualisation of space has resulted in an emotionally-void, statistical 
and politically-motivated view of human life. Within this view, only certain lives are 
deemed “grievable” or worthy of emotional response, whilst othered lives are 
considered expendable in order to protect the grievable (Butler, 2009). Within political 
regimes, emotions and emotional discourses are often viewed as resources to be 
exploited for political gains or for the biopolitical management of populations 
(Hochschild, 1983; Foucault 1980). Such biopolitical modes of emotional governance 
are not only enforced by political regimes at the scale of the nation-state, but rather at 
multiple and varied scales in societies. As Clara Ang and Elaine Lynn-Ee Ho (2019) 
have shown, emotions are actively used as tools of governance in schools in Singapore, 
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exposing the links between emotions, space and social structures of power operating at 
local scales.  
As Rachel Pain (2009: 304) has shown, emotions such as fear are drawn into 
geopolitical governance, in what has been called “the new geopolitics of fear” (see also 
– Gregory and Pred, 2007; Sparke, 2007). Stemming from a series of geopolitical 
events, such as numerous terrorist attacks in western countries and the Global War on 
Terror, fear and emotion have become increasingly political (Pain, 2009). However, the 
political use of emotions is not limited to such securitised or exceptional incidences as 
terrorism. As Nussbaum (2006) has shown, despite claims of objectivity and reason, the 
laws which govern and discipline us in our everyday lives are not only inextricably 
linked with our emotions but are also completely reliant on them. The emotions of 
shame and disgust are particularly important tools in maintaining social normality and 
order. The use of emotions in political contexts is not confined however to those 
governing our nation states, as many social movements and protests centre around the 
emotionally charged issues of “identity politics” (Blumenthal, 1992; Puar, 2007) and 
“life politics” (Giddens, 1991). Further, as Kath Browne (2007) has shown, emotions 
are political in ways that extend beyond the common use of fear, disgust and shame. For 
Browne, positive emotions such as enjoyment and fun should also be viewed as 
political, as they are so often central in the performance of politics. Browne 
demonstrates this point through the examination of LGBTQ Pride celebrations, arguing 
that discussions of discrimination and prejudices need to also recognise the importance 
of enjoyment in the political, and therefore the (re)constitution of sexed bodies, 
identities and spaces. In light of these arguments, emotional geography has the potential 
to offer great insights into both the political usage of emotions and emotional 
discourses, while also allowing those who are impacted by such political practices to 
show their lived and felt experiences, hopefully paving the way for a more human-
centred notion of security (Hyndman, 2001; Fagan and Munck, 2009). 
2.2.g  The place of emotion- feeling places and placing feelings. 
Emotions undeniably play a significant role in shaping our personal geographies. As we 
engage with the world around us, our emotions can impact greatly on how we come to 
view and understand our milieu (Davidson and Bondi, 2004). Thus, our emotional states 
can influence our socio-spatial interactions, specifically how we experience the places 
that we inhabit. As was argued earlier in this chapter, humans are embodied creatures 
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and it is in and through our bodies that we come to know the world around us (Johnston, 
2009). Rather than simply viewing places as locations, Whitehead challenged us to re-
think the concept of place and the role that our bodies play in situating us within places, 
so that we become a part of that place (Casey, 2013: 214). As both Merleau-Ponty 
(1962) and Husserl have argued, it is primarily through the lived body that we have 
access to the “primary world” that we inhabit (Casey, 2013: 228). The body, Husserl 
has argued, is not merely a physical thing but is also the bearer of “I” and the locus of 
sensations. The way that our bodies move in and through a place affects how we 
experience that place (Casey, 2013: 217 - 219). Following from Husserl, Merleau-Ponty 
built upon the idea that our bodies are essential to how we live and know the pre-
existing world that we inhabit. Specifically, he showed that it is our kinaesthetic 
feelings that constitute the most valuable evidence of the way the world, and indeed 
places, are known to us. The places that we inhabit are only known to us through the 
bodies that we live. So much so, in fact, that we cannot be implaced without being 
embodied and to be embodied is to be capable of being implaced. Furthermore, bodies 
(either real or virtual) are implicit to all places, and as long as somewhere could 
possibly be a habitat for human bodies, it has the potential to be a place. Therefore, the 
body and place are mutually constitutive (Casey, 2013: 233 - 234). The bodies that we 
live, Merleau-Ponty contended, act as our anchorages in the world, a world regionalised 
into a series of familiarised settings. These settings, however, are not merely sub-
divisions of absolute space, but instead are the intimate, lived places that we inhabit. 
These places, he stated, have porous boundaries and lack specific orientations (Casey, 
2013: 233). Elaborating further on the work of Merleau-Ponty, Casey (2013: 231) 
explains that “place, precisely because it is not merely positional and often has 
indeterminate boundaries, presents itself to us as an ambiguous phenomena – as 
ambiguous as the lived body by which it is experienced and known”. 
So given this ambiguity, how then do we concisely define place as a fixed thing? The 
answer, of course, is that we don’t. Places are not fixed, rigid or reducible to simple 
materiality or to any formal structure outside of an appreciation for the mutually-
constitutive nature of bodies and places. Naturally, there is a certain pre-given 
materiality in places that has been impacted on, and sedimented by, its historicity but 
this materiality can hardly be considered a place without being animated by the lived 
body (Merleau-Ponty as discussed in Casey, 2013: 240). In light of this inability to 
define place as a fixed object, the final chapter of Edward Casey’s (2013) highly 
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influential book “Fate of Place” looks instead at how recent philosophical thinkers have 
concerned themselves with the “faces” of place, that is to say the everyday workings 
and manifestations of place as it is made known to us. Given our discipline’s innate 
focus on the spatial, it is perhaps unsurprising then that the concept of place has long 
stood at the core of our subject and that it, and indeed its many “faces”, have been a 
central topic of enquiry for many geographers interested in understanding people’s 
interactions with the world around us. Of these geographers, it is perhaps those from 
humanistic geography that have been most influential in furthering our understandings 
and conceptualisations of place as it is experienced, specifically the work of 
phenomenological geographers such as Yi-Fu Tuan (Adams et al., 2001).  He was 
undeniably at the forefront of developing an experiential perspective within geography, 
one where individual experience and knowledge of place became valued (Tuan, 1979). 
This experiential perspective of place allowed for the more intimately felt geographies 
of home and private places to be explored (Tuan, 1982), which was an essential step in 
the development of an emotionally aware geography. Emotions are believed to be both 
personal and environmental, stemming from within us while also being linked to the 
environments around us (Smith et al., 2009) Therefore, our emotions are intimately tied 
into the places that we inhabit (Urry, 2007).  
In order to understand this relationship between emotions and place it is useful to 
consider what we might term an emotio-spatial hermeneutic. Whereby, emotions are 
sensible and knowable to us, but only in and through the contexts of the places and 
spaces that we inhabit. Likewise, places must be felt in order for them to be knowable to 
use. Our sense of space emerges only from the embodied, and indeed emotional, 
interactions between people and places (Davidson and Milligan, 2004). Through our 
lived bodies’ implacement “place can be felt, like the weave of a cloth, yet we are, after 
all, part of that weave” (Adams et al., 2001: xxvii). Tuan (1979) was once again 
influential in developing an understanding of how we feel place. Sense of place, he 
explained, could only be experienced by human beings as we know the world through 
our senses, similar to Merleau-Ponty’s assertion of the importance of kinaesthetic 
feelings (ibid: 410). 
However, the insertion of emotions into academic study challenges an inadequacy of 
affect that had allowed people to describe the most appalling violence and poverty as 
anchored in local conditions and not relating at all to the colonial relations that 
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depressed living standards in one place, the more easily to exploit its people and 
resources for the benefit of people in another place. Ling (2014: 582) proposes that: 
‘Taking emotions seriously involves decolonizing our minds and our world politics, 
away from a single hypermasculine model that banishes all that is feminine and 
emotional, towards a cross-cultural model of understanding that accepts multiplicities, 
including multiple emotional worlds.’ I have noted above some of the work on 
emotional worlds from outside the historical core of global capitalism system (Ang and 
Ho, 2019; Ho, 2014; Mathee, 2004) and there is a growing literature on the emotional 
force in the colonised spaces of colonialism and its legacies (Nandy, 1983; Scott, 2019). 
This study makes its own contribution to this work on the study of emotions in non-
Western contexts. 
2.3  PLACE AND PLACEMAKING 
The concept of place is central to Geography. However, it was not until the 1970s that 
Western geographers began conceptualising it as a particular location with a distinct set 
of meanings. Specifically, it was the influential work of phenomenologist and 
humanistic geographers such as Yi-Fu Tuan (1974), Anne Buttimer (1976) and Edward 
Relph (1976), among others, that argued for the importance and richness of 
geographical enquiry into the experiential perspectives of our “being-in-the-world”. 
Despite over four decades having passed since its re-emergence in academic 
geographical writings, place is still a conceptually contested topic within both Anglo-
American geography and other Western academic disciplines, while remaining under 
theorised within Chinese academia. There has been some work theorising urban places 
from the perspective of scholars situated outside the so-called core of the world system. 
This development of Urban Studies within Southern Theory offers many valuable 
insights into the way Euro-American models of cities have occluded the examination of 
other socio-spatial formations (Lawhon et al., 2014; Robinson, 2006; Sheppard et al., 
2013). Little of this work has specifically focused upon aspects of place-making. 
This ongoing debate has resulted in a diffuse array of approaches and imaginings of 
place, with several noteworthy and conceptually important contributions being made 
about the nature and constitution of places. Today, places are often understood as the 
settings of people’s everyday lives (Knox and Marston, 1998: 3), and as consisting of a 
combination of three interrelated aspects: locale, location and sense of place (Agnew, 
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1987: 28). Yet, place offers a breadth of analysis beyond these somewhat simplistic, be 
they important, understandings. This depth of place, according to Adams, Hoelscher and 
Till (2001), is captured particularly well by humanistic geographers in their attempts to 
explore how place acts as a context for human experience.  
For geographers like Seamon (2018) and Relph (1976), and philosophers such as Casey 
(2013), places provide the context for all human existence and experience. As such, 
they include our emplaced memories, imaginations and emotions, making them far 
more than mere physical locations. This “more than” quality has caused considerable 
debate among scholars, with many advocating for the importance of an oft-overlooked 
facet of place’s complex, existential, multivalent construction. Despite the richness of 
arguments put forward – particularly in relation to places as sensorial/emotive, 
relational/networked, temporal, political, processual, mobile, open and as gatherings – 
authors often advocate for one such aspect of the phenomenon at the expense of the 
others, or at the very least, without giving due credit to the full complexities and depths 
of places. This point somewhat echoes that of Pierce, Martin and Murphy (2011) who 
claim that place-making is an inherently networked and political process, yet the three 
concepts of place, networking and politics are rarely discussed together within 
academia, something that their notion of “relational place-making” aims to address. 
Although these authors are correct in their assertion that the three concepts are 
inextricably linked, their focus on these select points omits other aspects of the 
processual nature of place-making that I contend to be equally important; specifically 
the emotive/sensorial. Drawing from the work of several key theorists on place, the 
following sections aim to demonstrate the complexities of place by setting out a more 
expansive version of the concept. Specifically, it will be argued that: places are 
experienced in and through our bodies; a fundamental property of all places is their 
emotive and experiential imports; places are mobile and processual rather than static; 
they possess a bounded openness; places are relational and connected, both to other 
places and people; they are multi-temporal; they are historically and socially contingent 
“gatherings”, or bundles; and they are inescapably political. Such a conceptualisation of 
place, I argue, is more suitable for framing places of Hui food cultures as it is 
empirically driven and evidenced. Further, it acts as a post-colonial, or more specifically 
a feminist political-geographical, critique of hegemonic Anglo-American theory, 
challenging dominant concepts by dismantling them and extracting relevant facets to 
compile a view of place that I term Qinqie Places (Chapter 6).  
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2.3.a  Embodied Implacement 
As was discussed in Section 2.2.g above, Casey’s (2013) arguments that bodies and 
places are mutually constitutive and that we are always in place/implaced are central to 
how I understand place and how this project is framed theoretically (see also Seamon, 
2018). Stemming from Aristotle’s teachings, place is understood here as the starting 
point for all other existence, as everything that exists must have a place. According to 
Aristotle, place takes precedence over all other things as it is “that without which 
nothing else can exist, while it can exist without the others, must needs be first” (Casey, 
2013: 52). Building from this, Heidegger (1993) insisted that “to be” is “to be 
somewhere”, a concept for which he proposed the term “dasein” – or “being there”. For 
Heidegger, all human existence takes place “in the world” with this notion of being-in-
the-world developing out of his work on “dwelling”. Dwelling, in the Heideggerian 
sense, means more than simply residing or living in a place, but rather, it refers to the 
ways in which we exist in the world and how we make it meaningful through 
attachments and experience. 
Drawing from phenomenological approaches such as this, along with the work of earlier 
cultural geographers such as Carl Sauer and Paul Vidal de la Blache, the humanistic 
geographers of the 1970s argued that geographers needed to reconceptualise the human 
subject: i.e., humans needed to be thought of as knowing and feeling subjects rather 
than as objects or as wholly rational beings. In line with this, human engagements with 
place became central to humanistic geography, with Yi-Fu Tuan (1977: 9) writing that 
the “given cannot be known in itself. What can be known is a reality that is a construct 
of experience, a creation of feeling and thought”. Therefore, places are meaningful 
contexts of personal attachments and intimate knowledges, bearing connotations both 
positive and negative, both individual and shared (Seamon, 2018; Smith, 2018a; Tuan, 
1977).  
If we accept that the body is the locus of an “I”, and that it is in and through our bodies 
that we experience, feel and know our being-in-the-world (Section 2.2.g above), then 
our bodies are inextricably and unavoidably bound up in place. Through arguing for an 
understanding of knowledge that is embodied and situated, feminist geographers such as 
Longhurst (2001), Rose (1999), Shilling (1993) and Thomas (2009), have highlighted 
the co-constitution of bodies and the spatial, and as such, have shown the necessity of 
conceptualising places as embodied. The body is what links the self – i.e., agency and 
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identity – with place through its sensory and perceptive abilities (Casey, 2013; Merleau-
Ponty, 1962; Seamon, 2013; Tuan, 1977). To turn again to Edward Casey (2001: 684), 
the self, body and place are all tied together in diffuse ways, with each playing a role in 
the making of the other; a phenomenon that he calls “constitutive coingredience”.  
2.3.b  Places as Mobility and Processual 
Despite the significant contributions made by humanistic geographers, their definitions 
of place are not without their limitations and critiques. Specifically, humanistic 
geographers often conceptualised place as static and rooted. Tuan (1977) puts forth an 
understanding of place in which, if space can be understood as lending itself to 
movement, then places are “pauses” in that movement. Relph (1976) elaborates further 
on the relationship between places and movement by claiming that places are becoming 
placeless due to increased mobility, along with mass production and the creation of 
“disneyfied” and “museumified” places. Both Relph’s (1976) placelessness and Tuan’s 
(1977) “pauses” maintain that too much mobility works against place as it disallows for 
sense of place, and that places are thus static. Anthropologist Marc Augé (1995) mirrors 
these sentiments by claiming that spaces of transit and high-mobility are “nonplaces”, 
while true places are marked by their bounded and rooted natures. Such understandings 
of place are arguably too narrow in their scope and fail to capture the important 
theoretical contributions made elsewhere in relation to place, particularly in relation to 
places’ “constitutive coingredience” (Casey, 2001). If we understand all existence as 
happening “in place”, and all human experience as being implaced, then these 
“nonplaces” and “placeless” spaces are in fact different sorts of places; as they are 
nevertheless being experienced through our embodied and sensorial engagements with 
them.  
Building from the work of Merleau-Ponty (1962), who asserted that our being-in-the-
world was primarily about the body and not the mind, Seamon (1980) developed a 
humanistic notion of place that centred on movement. He argues that our embodied 
movements and “time-space routines” (a term he uses to describe our habitual embodied 
practices throughout the day) contribute to the making of places as much as their static 
and bounded characteristics do. Pred (1984: 279) also counters the traditional account of 
places as static by proposing a view of place as process. For Pred, places and actions are 
locked in a co-constitutive process that are tied to social structures and saturated with 
power. In a manner similar to Seamon’s (1980) time-space routines, Pred suggests the 
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idea of “paths”. For Pred, as people move through time and space, they create paths. 
These paths then make human and object biographies, which coalesce to create places. 
“Place is therefore a process whereby the reproduction of social and cultural forms, the 
formation of biographies, and the transformation of nature ceaselessly become one 
another at the same time that time-space specific activities and power relations 
ceaselessly become one another” (Pred, 1984: 282).  
2.3.c  Connected and Open Places 
Another major critique of humanistic geography’s definitions of place is that they imply 
that places have fixed borders. If we are to conceptualise place as mobile, we not only 
challenge understandings of places as static and rooted, but we also need to reassess 
traditional understandings of places as bordered. Thinking of places as bounded is a 
highly political act involving problematic practices of boundary making. The drawing 
of lines between places and the labelling of them as distinct often results in the 
association of such places with specific, usually majoritarian, assumptions of group 
identities and histories. Such associations between assumed homogenous identities and 
places creates a reactionary sense of place and belonging, whereby individuals and 
groups lying outside the “norm” are seen as being “out of place”, or as politically, 
socially and culturally threatening to the dominant group and place. Such a bounded and 
static view of place often excludes mobile individuals and those that have crossed the 
imagined, socially constructed and often politically enforced borders - including the 
broad spectrum of people labelled as migrants; such as refugees, travellers, homeless 
people, tourists, migrant workers, etc. 
In response to this view of place as static, bounded and rooted, Doreen Massey (1993) 
proposed a conceptualisation of places as being constituted by mobility and as being 
inherently relational. For Massey (1993, 1994a, 2005), places are: processual; mobile; 
connected to other places; not limited by a space’s physicality; and they lack fixed 
boundaries. Rather than viewing places as being fixed with closed borders, Massey 
(1991: 24) argues that places are “outward-looking” due to their innately relational 
composition. These places are produced through connections and relations to the rest of 
the world, facilitated through the movement of people, commodities and ideas. As such, 
they are the sites of heterogeneous identities and senses of belonging and attachment, 
rather than being tied to assumed homogenous identities (1993). Massey (1993) calls 
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this rich and informative conceptualisation of place a “global sense of place”, or a 
“progressive sense of place”. 
In her arguments For Space, Massey (2005: 130) contends that if we understand space 
as being “a simultaneity of stories-so-far, then places are collections of those stories, 
articulations within the wider power-geometries of space”. As such, Massey (1994a, 
2005) contends that these stories happen in places that are ever-changing, relational and 
dynamic, but which maintain their specificities through the linkages formed in and from 
each place. All places are relational in Massey’s conceptualisation (Callard, 2011), 
stemming from the movement of objects, people and ideas between places. These 
relations add further specificity to places, particularly as each is shaped by its own 
unequal power geometries (Massey, 1991). Places can therefore be defined as 
“articulated moments in networks of social relations and understandings” (ibid: 28).  
Jeff Malpas (2012, 2017) develops this relational understanding of place further while 
also adding complexity to places’ boundaries. For Malpas (2012), places are embedded 
within each other through their connecting relations – places are positioned in networks 
of other places, they have other places embedded in them, and they impact on, and are 
impacted by, the places that they relate to. Importantly, Malpas (2012) contends that 
places have boundaries, although he believes that these boundaries are open and 
changeable. This open boundedness is central to the relationality of places, as these 
open boundaries not only provide a certain orientated locatedness to places, which in 
turn allows for relationality, but they are also created by the relations themselves. As 
places are connected or differentiated, boundaries are created which are open, porous 
and dynamic.  
2.3.d  Multi-Temporal Places 
If we are to accept the preceding conceptualisations of place, that is that places are 
processual, full of movement and relational, then questions arise around temporality and 
the associations between places and time. As was discussed above, Pred (1984) presents 
an understanding of place as a historically contingent process, intimately tied to the 
time-space specific activities of people and objects. Pred draws from time-geographies 
to stress the inseparability of time and space in the making of places: if places are 
processual, then they are always in a state of becoming. This point is mirrored by 
Massey (2005), whose concept of space as the “simultaneity of stories so far” and of 
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places as collections of these stories, encapsulates the importance of space-time 
relations and the inseparability of the two concepts. Consequently, Massey (1994a: 141; 
2005) proposes a view of places as bundles of time-space trajectories, or as “temporary 
constellations”. These bundles of time-space trajectories allow for places to be 
empirically analysed according to how they are “drawn together by individuals through 
cognitive and emotional processes” (Massey, 2005: 119).These bundles are like Casey’s 
(2013) notion of gatherings, whereby places are viewed as gatherings of people, 
emotions and discourses. Pierce et al. (2011) build on Massey’s (2005) 
conceptualisation of places as bundles of time-space trajectories by asserting that the 
bringing together of multiple and diverse “bundles” creates places.  
Hamilakis’ (2017) work complicates Massey’s (2005) notion of bundles of time-space 
trajectories somewhat by placing an emphasis on the multi-temporality of assemblages, 
rather than focusing simply on the present. Although Hamilakis’ (2017) work deals with 
assemblage theory, it holds great insights for those of us engaging with place and place-
making. For Hamilakis (ibid: 169), assemblages are “temporary and deliberate 
heterogeneous arrangements of material and immaterial elements, [and] are about the 
relationship of in-betweenness”. Further, he contends that “sensoriality and affectivity, 
memory and multi-temporality are key features of assemblage thinking, and that 
assemblages also imply certain political effects”. All of these aspects of assemblages, as 
defined by Hamilakis (ibid), and as argued for throughout this chapter, are also relevant 
for place: places consist of material and immaterial elements; places are primarily about 
the relationships that form them; that the sensorial and felt experiences of places are 
important; that they are inherently political; and that they are constituted by multiple 
temporalities. For Hamilakis (ibid: 174), time can be viewed as a co-existence, rather 
than as successive, resulting in the co-presence of multiple temporalities. As we 
experience, and indeed make, places in the present, we draw from multiple memories 
and temporalities in the process. This not only impacts on how we experience and know 
these places in the present, but it also shapes the very constitution and nature of these 
places through our engagements with them. To refer back to Pred’s (1984) work once 
more, if it is the coalescence of human and object biographies that make places, then the 
multiplicity of temporalities present in these biographies needs to be taken into account.  
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2.3.e  Places as Political 
Places are political. Unlike the somewhat apolitical understandings of place proposed 
by the humanistic geographers of the 1970s, place here is understood as being 
inseparable from politics. As Marxist, feminist and post-structuralist geographies have 
shown us, a critical view of place is needed, one which is aware of the social processes 
that are involved in the construction of places. Specifically, a view is needed that is 
mindful of the fact that matters of power are inextricably bound up with place: in how 
places are constituted and made; in how they are represented; in how their borders are 
imagined and controlled; in how they are experienced and felt; and in which bodies are 
perceived as belonging “in” place and who is viewed as “out” of place. 
Pierce, Martin and Murphy (2011: 54) suggest that “Place-making – the set of social, 
political and material processes by which people iteratively create and recreate the 
experienced geographies in which they live – is an important but oft-neglected part of 
political theory”. As places are (re)created, both through altering the material settings 
and by governing the embodied engagements with those physical settings, they are 
impacted by, and impact on, social processes. When discussing place, Harvey (1993: 5) 
claims that “The first step down the road is to insist that place in whatever guise, is like 
space and time, a social construct. The only interesting question that can be asked is, by 
what social process(es) is place constructed?” Although I do not agree with Harvey that 
a focus on the social processes behind a place’s construction is the “only interesting 
question that can be asked” – as I would view the experiential and emotional knowings 
of places to be just as important – he does rightly identify the socially constructed 
nature of places and attributes importance to the social processes behind place-making. 
The ability to change a place’s physical setting and materiality, and to inscribe meaning 
to these places through representational and discursive practices, is most often possible 
only to those people who hold power over the place. The politics of place making, in 
this regard, often surround a struggle over the “defining” characteristics of a place. This 
practice is an important tactic in the creation of place-based identities and group 
mobilisations, creating a normative, and usually homogenous, notion of place and 
belonging – as is often seen in relation to nationalist movements and groups. 
By attributing a specific, normative identity to a place and by determining who should 
be in that place, an exclusionary practice is also happening, whereby those lying outside 
of the norm are deemed “out of place” in rather reactionary or regressive ways (Harvey, 
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1993; Massey, 1994). Such reactionary senses of place often result in the drawing of 
either imagined or physical boundaries, which is of course, a politically charged 
practice. The construction of borders around places, either imagined or materially 
enforced, is a powerful act of exclusion that works through interrupting, influencing or 
preventing embodied engagements with certain places. By creating physical borders, the 
very materiality and corporeality of one’s body becomes a political matter as people are 
either permitted or denied the opportunity to physically engage with that place, often 
based on their embodied qualities – i.e., race, class, ethnicity, gender, age, (dis)ability, 
or even religious dress. These embodied distinctions are also relevant for imagined 
borders, whereby individuals and groups may be made to feel “out of place” because of 
their corporeality, thus impacting on how they experience and interpret their emplaced 
engagements.  
Politically and socially constructed borders rely on a static vision of place, one where 
places are seen as being natural and authentic and where mobility is viewed as 
threatening. The creation of borders, along with other social, economic, cultural and 
political factors, contributes towards a person’s ability to move through places. These 
“power geometries”, to borrow the term from Massey (1994a), refer to the spatially 
differentiated opportunities and mobilities afforded to people depending on social 
structures that either allow or disallow an individual to move across space and thus 
engage with places. Similarly, Pred (1984) also draws attention to operations of power 
in his work. For Pred (ibid) “paths” occur within the contexts of social structures and 
processes, with social structures being both produced by, and producing, these “paths”. 
Therefore, for both Massey’s (1994) and Pred’s (1984) mobile and relational 
conceptualisations, matters of power are central to how we understand place.  
The politics of place is made evermore clear when the aforementioned temporalities of 
place are considered. Practices of remembering and memory are undeniably political 
acts. As Hamilakis (2017: 175) explains, “the actualization of distinctive modes of time, 
the mnemonic selection of certain instances and the forgetting of others will produce 
political effects, as distinctive times can operate instrumentally to valorise events, 
ancestors and situations past and present, whereas the forgetting of others can erase 
difficult or inconvenient truths”. Thus, as places are physically shaped by those holding 
power, discursive and representational referents indicate which temporalities are to be 
inscribed in the material fabric of the place. Subsequently, certain temporalities are 
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remembered and particular emotional responses evoked, engendering and supporting 
particular political effects (ibid, 2017: 175; see also Section 2.2.f for a discussion of 
emotions as political). However, that is not to say that this political practice of 
provoking memory and emotion is wholly successful in its attempts to shape group 
remembering. Rather, as will be discussed in relation to specific representational 
practices in subsequent sections, these signs are often decoded in divergent ways by 
different individuals, resulting in a diffuse array of emotional and remembered 
responses.  
2.4  IDENTITY. 
Questions relating to identity – both individual identity and group identities – have long 
been an area of interest and a topic of enquiry for those working within the social 
sciences and indeed, academia more broadly. Given its history of defining and labelling 
places and people, the discipline of Geography has often had an obsession with racial 
identities. Fortunately, the move from conservative geographical practices to more 
critical stances was not confined solely to the sub-discipline of geopolitics. Cultural and 
social geographers engaging with the topic today have largely moved away from the 
once colonialist and racist practices of our predecessors. As such, the discipline has 
become less involved with the assigning of rigid and fixed collective identities to people 
and places, shifting the focus instead to a more fluid and experiential understanding of 
identity. Informed by the work of Butler (1990) and Goffman (1956), identity is viewed 
by many as something that is decentred, anti-foundational and performed, rather than an 
as innate, biological or fixed trait. Approaching identity-making as a processual work of 
performance enables insights to be gleaned into the ways in which people manoeuvre 
between identity poles depending on their spatial contexts and their interactions with 
others. As people move between different social and spatial settings and encounters, 
they may figuratively shift between poles of their identities, thereby successively 
performing different versions of the Self (Butler, 1990; Goffman, 1956). Emotions play 
a dominant role in shaping these performances as they continually impact on our 
understandings of who and what we are (Davidson and Milligan, 2004).  
Feminist geography – following feminist studies within the social sciences more 
broadly - has once again been particularly beneficial in aiding theoretical advancements 
in this area and in highlighting the relevance of identity as an area of geographical 
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investigation, particularly since the 1990s. As geographical work on embodiment has 
shown, the body is the primary locus of the Self: it is where we, the individual, and our 
identities are placed (Longhurst, 2001; Shilling, 1993). Many aspects of our identities 
are linked with the physical and material qualities of our bodies, or rather, with the 
socially constructed truths that these traits are believed to signify, such as race, sex, 
ability/disability, etc (Rose, 1997; Cook et al., 2005; Longhurst, 2009). This point leads 
onto what is arguably the greatest contribution made by feminist studies to the field of 
identity studies over the past three decades: that is, intersectionality.  
2.4.a  Intersectionality. 
McCall (2005) views intersectionality as one of the most important developments in 
women’s studies (McCall, 2005). Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989, 2016) first employed the 
term intersectionality to bring light to the fact that individuals are often impacted by 
multiple forms of discrimination at any one time. These social inequalities overlap at 
particular points, like roads meeting at an intersection, hence the metaphorical term 
intersectionality. Although the term intersectionality did not emerge until 1989, the idea 
of multiple systems of oppression occurring at once was not a new one (Lutz et al., 
2011).  
Prior to Crenshaw’s coining of the term, a number of other scholars and groups were 
actively engaging in debates surrounding the multiple levels of discrimination faced by 
certain people. Of particular importance to English language academia are the 
Combahee River Collective (1981: 213) whose assertion that they “find it difficult to 
separate race from class from sex oppression because in our lives they are most often 
experienced simultaneously” has been hugely influential in shaping contemporary 
understandings of intersectionality, and arguably, the triad of race-class-sex that so 
often pervades intersectional studies (Lutz et al., 2011; Phoenix, 2011). Despite being 
focused on intersectional topics, these early works differ from more recent 
intersectional studies in that they were not carried out from a theoretically intersectional 
perspective (Lutz et al., 2011). Such a perspective only became available once 
Crenshaw (1989) coined the term, subsequently allowing for a new platform for the 
disparate theoretical approaches within feminist scholarship to come together. 
Specifically, intersectionality allowed for two distinct currents of thought from within 
feminism to come together: post-structural feminist theory and critical feminist theory 
(Davis, 2011: 45).   
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Intersectionality addresses the central concern of feminist scholarship, that is to say, it is 
concerned with difference (Zack, 2007: 197). Due to the history of exclusion of the 
feminine within academia, the difference between the male and female experience has 
been of principal importance to feminist scholars (Davis, 2011). Intersectionality, 
however, brings this emphasis on difference a step further by providing a theoretical 
perspective to challenge notions of a homogenous female experience through 
acknowledging that gender is simply one dimension of oppression faced by women. At 
any given time, the individual may be discriminated against due to an infinite number of 
perceived characteristics such as race, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, age, and so on. As 
Crenshaw (1989: 139) defines it, intersectionality is “the multidimensionality of 
marginalized subjects’ lived experience”. Minnow (1997: 38) elaborates further, 
explaining that intersectionality is “the way in which any particular individual stands at 
the crossroads of multiple groups”. It can be understood epistemologically as a 
development of feminist standpoint theory which argues that it is important to account 
for the social agent’s positioning while challenging the assumed hegemonic, masculine 
positioning of the subject (Yuval-Davis, 2011). It illuminates clearly the consequences 
that social categories have on people, but it does so through using methodologies that 
work in line with the post-structuralist project of deconstructing categories and 
exploring the dynamics of power (Brah and Phoenix, 2004: 82; Davis, 2011).  
As our identities shift depending on our social interactions and geographical contexts, 
so too do the systems of oppression which we operate in relation to. The term 
“intersectional invisibility” (Knapp, 2011) is of relevance here, whereby one aspect or 
face of our identity is given more significance or higher meaning than another, 
depending on our context. Put another way, we identify or disidentify with certain traits 
or characteristics depending on where we are and who we’re engaging with (Valentine, 
2007). Echoing Villa’s (2011) call to view intersectionality through a somatic lens, we 
should note that these identifications take place in and through the lived body, as was 
discussed earlier in the chapter. Within the discipline of geography, intersectionality 
was largely overlooked until the last two decades, with geographers turning to the 
concept later than many other social scientists (Valentine, 2007; O’Neill Gutierrez and 
Hopkins, 2015). Fortunately, the concept is now far more prominent within 
contemporary geographical enquiry and as Valentine (2007: 18 - 19) points out, 
intersectionality not only provides feminist geography with the theoretical framework to 
develop geographical thinking about the relationship between multiple categories of 
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oppression, but geography can also supplement intersectionality with a focus on the 
spatial. 
Intersectionality has been described as a catchall phrase for the everyday multiple 
positionings of subjects (Phoenix, 2006: 187). Over the past three decades a number of 
other terms have been deployed to address the same topics such as, “interlocking 
systems” (Collins, 1990), “axes of difference” (Yuval-Davis, 2006), and “dynamic 
processes” (Staunaes, 2003). However, Crenshaw’s metaphoric phrase is best used here 
given not only its useful – albeit simplistic and somewhat misleading – imagery, but 
also its widespread understanding within academia. Often, the scholars who employ 
intersectional theory focus (too heavily, I would argue) on the triad of race-class-sex. 
Although these three categories are undeniably important when trying to understand an 
individual’s experience in the world, a focus solely on these inevitably omits other 
important factors. This has led to some academics incorporating additional categories 
such as age and sexuality into their intersectional analysis (Bradley, 1996; Kitzinger, 
1987). As Yuval-Davis (2011) points out, some scholars even began compiling lists of 
categories; with Bunch (2001) listing 16 categories and Lutz listing 14. Attempts to list 
possible traits or potential systems of oppression are, I would argue, futile due to the 
immeasurable number of identities which people may relate to. Resulting from the 
concept’s potential to be applied to an incalculable number of categories, attempts to list 
the traits of an individual often end with an ‘etc’. In “Gender Trouble”, Butler (1990: 
143) mocks the ‘etc’, claiming that it is an admission of a “sign of exhaustion as well as 
of the illimitable process of signification itself”. In light of this “illimitable process of 
signification”, questions surrounding representation arise. Namely, does this 
acknowledgement lead us to a representational dilemma? If we approach this question 
from a performativity theory perspective – that is to say that representations or naming 
are an act of performance – then it is understandable to assert that these self-
representations are important, similar to the dilemma of representation discussed above 
in relation to emotions. Given the ambiguity surrounding who, or more precisely when, 
intersectionality applies to, many have argued that it is too vague a term and requires a 
concrete, definitive, clear definition. This ambiguity, however, is what has ultimately 
led to the concept’s success as different groups have been able to interpret and apply 
intersectionality differently (Davis, 2011). 
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2.5  MINORITISATION. 
The term minoritisation relates to the political, cultural and social processes and 
practices of creating a minority group and rendering them as distinctive. A minoritised 
group is one that is in a position of inferiority based on any number of markers of 
difference, including but not limited to: political, social, cultural, religious, linguistic, 
economic, or sexual (Atkinson, 2000; Montaner, 1988). Atkinson (2000), borrowing 
from Montaner (1988: 16), explains that minority groups are an endemic phenomenon 
in modern nation states. Ultimately, differences are asserted and maintained between the 
majoritarian population and the minority group. The minority group are usually seen as 
a threat to the dominant group as they are perceived to be a polluting body (Sibley, 
1995). As was the case in the relations between Protestants and Catholics in Northern 
Ireland, especially in the period between 1922 and 1998. The majoritarian group is 
usually in the more powerful position in relation to the minority group and as such, 
often holds a great deal of influence over them – although there are some notable 
exceptions, such as the apartheid regime in South Africa. Specifically, majoritarian 
groups may play a central role in the drawing of spatial and social boundaries, the 
cultural practices of representation and stereotyping, the determining of notions of 
belonging, and in shaping the politics of belonging (Yuval-Davis, 2011). It is important 
to acknowledge the difference between the two terms of “belonging” and “politics of 
belonging” at this point.  
2.5.a  Belonging. 
Belonging is best understood as a dynamic and ongoing process rather than as a rigid, 
fixed status (Yuval-Davis, 2011). This process in multi-scaled, occurring at different 
levels (Antonsich, 2010). Importantly for this study of the Hui, belonging at one scale 
does not necessarily equate to belonging at another – for example, participants alluded 
to belonging at the national level but having felt excluded at a more localized level in 
Beijing. As Ho (2011: 731) has pointed out through the example of highly skilled 
migrants in London, places of inclusion and exclusion (or belonging and not-belonging) 
are largely mediated by intersecting axes of identity such as ethnicity, gender, 
nationality and class. By establishing places where people belong, alternative spaces of 
otherness and marginality are often produced. Through an examination of womyn’s 
separatist spaces, Browne (2009) argues that critical engagement with marginalised 
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spaces of difference allows us to consider tensions and affectivities while also 
acknowledging relations of power. In spaces and places of marginality and exclusion 
such as these, intersectionality is of great importance as often these places of exclusion 
act to further marginalise vulnerable people. In the case of the Michigan Womyn’s 
Music Festival studied by Browne, the womyn’s spaces created acted to further 
marginalise trans women.  
According to Yuval-Davis (2011: 10), belonging refers to emotional attachment to 
spaces, it’s “about feeling ‘at home’”. “Home” is linked with projections of hope for the 
future (Hage, 1997: 103), and these hopes are believed by some to be linked with 
notions of safety (Ignatieff, 2001). This notion of safety is particularly relevant when 
the concepts of minoritisation and securitisation are taken into account, specifically in 
relation to Islam. Belonging is part of our everyday lives; it has been naturalized. 
However, during times when safety is threatened, belonging may become not only a 
political issue (Fenster, 2004) but also a securitized one. This is arguably the case with 
Muslim minority populations in many countries across the globe today. Since the 9/11 
terrorist attacks and the 7/7 London bombings Muslims have found themselves 
becoming increasingly victimised by Western, and indeed other, governments’ 
conflation of Islam, immigration and terrorism (Karyotis, 2007).  
2.5.b  Politics of Belonging. 
Within the context of minoritisation, the politics of belonging may refer not only to the 
classification of majority/minority labels, but also of their assumed territories and 
places. Processes of inclusion and exclusion are central here, with those in power – i.e., 
the majoritarian population – determining where the differentiated groups belong or do 
not belong (Yuval-Davis, 2011). Concepts of power are useful in understanding the 
politics of belonging. Foucault’s (1995) “disciplinary society” refers to a concept within 
which “power increasingly operates through impersonal mechanisms of bodily 
discipline and a govermentality which escapes the consciousness and will of individual 
and collective social agents” (Yuval-Davis, 2011: 19). Foucault’s theory, however, 
would suggest that power only operates when resistance occurs which is perhaps too 
monolithic. Bourdieu’s (1984; 1990) theory of “symbolic power” shares Foucault’s 
emphasis on the role of bodily practices yet avoids the same shortcoming of Foucault’s 
“disciplinary society”. The subject, according to Bourdieu is both socially constituted 
and embodied. Symbolic powers are vitally important when addressing concerns of 
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belonging and not-belonging. As Favell (1999) has stated, the politics of belonging may 
be viewed as the “dirty work” of boundary making. The concepts of “us” and “them” 
are used by groups to reproduce symbolic, and occasionally physical, boundaries 
between political communities. It is here that Anderson’s (1991) work on imagined 
communities is crucial. The politics of belonging involves both the reproduction of 
various communities of belongings’ boundaries by presumably homogenous 
majoritarian political powers and also their contestation by other groups (Yuval-Davis, 
2011). Such productions and contestations are central to how belonging is defined for 
communities at multiple scales, from ethnic groups to national citizenship. Such 
projects are powerfully emotive. As Ho (2009: 789) has shown in a study of 
Singaporean transmigrants in London, the politics of belonging involved in citizenship-
making practices is both challenged and produced through the emotions, in what they 
have termed “emotional citizenship”.  
2.5.c  Representation, Othering and Stereotyping. 
Culture can be defined as “the systems of shared meanings which people who belong to 
the same community, group or nation use to help them interpret and make sense of the 
world” (Hall, 1995: 176). These meanings are not fixed, and it is their interpretation by 
participants that creates a culture (Hall, 1995: 176; 1997a: 2). Meanings may be 
conveyed in a multitude of ways and can be implicit or explicit. It has been argued that 
the visual is central to the cultural construction of social life in Western societies as we 
are constantly surrounded by images in our everyday lives (Rose, 2001: 6). 
Representations are immensely powerful as they shape how people make sense of the 
world and can influence people's actions and practices (Orgad, 2012: 3). These 
representations render the world in visual terms and are never innocent (Rose, 2001: 6). 
Global media outlets are a common source of representations, presenting viewers with 
authoritative messages that make socially constructed boundaries seem natural and 
unavoidable. Ideology is a system of representations that underpins social and cultural 
life, mediating between people and their relationship to society as well as their social 
identities (Spencer, 2006: 2-3). These ideologies are constructed in such a way as to 
legitimise social inequalities (Rose, 2001: 70). 
Representations can help to form individual and group identities through a process of 
“othering”; the creation of “us” and “them” (Spencer, 2006: 3). Questions of difference 
are essential to this process, as binary opposites are used by social groups to impose 
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meanings on their worlds by organising things into a classificatory system (Hall, 1997b: 
236). Ideals are created and those holding characteristics dissimilar to our own are 
classified as the Other. Interaction with the Other is necessary for the forging of 
identities; both individual and group (Spencer, 2006: 8). Stereotyping is a 
representational practice that reduces people to a select number of distinguishable 
characteristics, which are made to appear fixed and natural (Dyer, 1999: 1-6; Hall, 
1997b: 257). Within stereotyping, there is a connection between representation, power 
and difference as the ability to represent someone or something in a certain way holds 
great cultural and symbolic power. Race is one characteristic that is often the base for 
stereotyping. Stereotypes based on race may be referred to as a racialized regime of 
representation (Hall, 1997b: 250). In his work on Orientalism, Edward Said (1978: 40) 
examined how Europe represented the Islamic Orient's presumed cultural, religious and 
social inferiority in such a way as to legitimise colonialism, while at the same time 
creating a shared European identity based upon European superiority. 
2.5.d  Securitisation of Islam. 
In contemporary times, it is argued that a new form of Orientalism is taking place across 
the West, one where European and American identity is being increasingly founded on 
its difference to Islamic fundamentalism (Rose, 1995: 95). In many countries, Islam has 
been undergoing an increasingly intense process of securitisation in recent years as 
Muslims and their communities have been unfairly targeted by a number of security 
measures under the guise of counterterrorism and immigration control (Mythen et al., 
2012; Cesari, 2009; Benotman, 2012). This process of securitisation is fuelled by Western 
media and political discourses which continue to depict Muslims as a dangerous and 
culturally different Other (Gündüz, 2007; Mavelli, 2013). The security framing of an 
issue involves the distribution of fear and trust through a process of othering, with the 
culturally dissimilar being viewed as having the capacity to corrupt the cultural identity 
that reinforces trust amongst the culturally similar, making them a threat. By creating a 
domain of insecurity in which a fear of Islam holds political merit, a shared identity can 
be created amongst the non-Muslim population. This fictitious identity is believed to be 
homogenous and salient, and in need of constant protection from the dangerous, Islamic 
Other (Huysmans, 2006). Croft (2012) elaborates further, claiming that Britishness is 
created in direct contradiction to a perceived Islamic identity founded upon negative 
stereotypes and reinforced by media representations. Despite being far-less researched 
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than the links between Western politics and Islam, Muslims in China are increasingly 
being subjected to similar unequal security measures and a securitization of their religion. 
Under the guise of anti-separatist and anti-terrorist actions, Muslims in China are 
progressively being faced with intense policing and monitoring by authorities, with 
members of these minority groups and international organisations claiming that they are 
being targeted because of their religious affiliations (Gladney, 2004; Bovingdon, 2010). 
According to Amnesty International (2018) the Chinese authorities are carrying out an 
“intensifying campaign of mass internment, intrusive surveillance, political 
indoctrination and forced cultural assimilation” against the Uyghur, Kazakh and other 
Muslim groups living in XUAR. Human Rights Watch (2019) have reported that these 
actions, which are part of China’s “Strike Hard Against Violent Terrorism” campaign, 
have resulted in an estimated 1 million Muslims being arbitrarily detained in XUAR’s 
political education camps, with a further unknown amount being held in detention centres 
and prisons.  
2.5.e  Belonging in practice - identifying with and against places. 
As Adams, Hoelscher and Till (2001: xxi) explained, Tuan’s assertion that home is an 
intimate place “leads directly to questions regarding the politics of identity and 
processes of identity-formation”. Through examining how individuals and groups 
identify with or against a place, it becomes clear that identities are bound up in the 
spatial (Rose, 1995). As with the production of all knowledge, questions of difference 
once again play a role here in establishing traditional notions of where places are, what 
lies within and outside of their imagined boundaries and who belongs, or does not 
belong, in and of those places (Hall, 1995). Said’s (1978) work on Orientalism is a 
prime example of this politically motivated alignment of place and identity. European 
identity, and by extension Europe as a place, he argued, were created in direct 
opposition to presumed differences between it and the Orient. The use of negative and 
racist stereotypes not only shaped how European people came to view the Orient as a 
place, but in doing so it also constructed an idea of what Europe was using hierarchical 
binaries. In contrast to the Orient’s apparently cultural and religious inferiority and its 
barbaric nature, Europe was seen as a superior, civilised place, thus legitimising the 
“civilising” force of colonialism. Furthermore, a shared sense of European identity was 
created as people did not merely identify with Europe, but rather, they identified against 
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another place and its seemingly racially and religiously different people, i.e., the Orient 
and its inhabitants.  
The relationship between an individual’s identity and place is not, however, solely due 
to their immediate identifying against other places. In fact, people may also primarily 
identify with places (Rose, 1995). That is to say, that the linking of identity with a place 
need not be exclusively based on the othering of another - although questions of 
difference are still central in deciding what the place’s boundaries are and who belongs 
within them. Identifying with one’s home-place or hometown is perhaps an example of 
when we might, at least primarily, identify with a place rather than against another as 
these connections are ones based on personal histories, familiarity and socio-spatial ties 
with the place. Bennet’s (2009) investigation of nostalgia and identity in a small British 
village successfully demonstrates the role of such socio-spatial engagements and 
practices in the formation, and indeed maintenance, of a community’s shared identity. 
Narratives of “belonging to” and “being of” certain places are undeniably contentious 
issues. As with emotional narratives, these discourses very often take on a political 
form, whereby certain people and groups are claimed to “not belong” in what Massey 
(1994a) calls a “reactionary” notion of place. Unfortunately, one does not have to look 
far to see such discourses at work, simply take note of the language being used by 
Western politicians and media outlets in response to the “migrant crisis” of the past two 
decades (see - Huysmans, 2006; Fierke, 2007; Van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007; Marsh & 
Rees, 2012). 
2.6  CONSUMING PLACES, CONSUMING IDENTITIES: FOOD 
PERFORMANCES. 
As a branch of social scientific enquiry, food studies involve the exploration of food and 
its inherent relationship to human experience, allowing researchers to investigate the 
deeper meanings underlying the everyday practices of food preparation and eating 
(Almerico, 2014). For geographers, food is seen as holding deep political and 
sociological meaning, extending beyond the biological and physical realm (Isakjee and 
Carroll, 2019; Waitt, 2014). Further, food and meals are central in the communication, 
performance and reproduction of cultures (Tellström et al, 2006; Barthes, 1975; 
Douglas, 1982; Bell and Valentine, 1997; Handelman, 1998). As Di Giovine and 
Brulotte (2016: 1) argue, “we all must eat to sustain ourselves. Yet, how we eat, and 
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what we eat, and when we eat, and with whom we eat, all uniquely vary from place to 
place, group to group, time to time – thanks to longstanding geographic, economic, 
social, and cosmological differences throughout the world”. Preparing and eating food 
are socially, temporally and geographically dependent practices that are deeply political 
and inescapably personal, yet social.  
2.6.a   “You Are What You Eat”: Food and Identity.  
Our choices of food and food practices take place “within an array of affective social 
and political engagements” from which “we construct boundaries of self and other, 
identity and belonging” (Isakjee and Carroll, 2019: 2). As such, food can be a 
significant marker of group and individual identity (Di Giovine and Brulotte, 2016). 
Jansen (1997: 87) argues that through acting as a marker of difference and distinction, 
food and meals simultaneously express identity as processes of differentiation and 
identity are bound together: “They not only differentiate but also define ‘us’ versus 
‘them’”. Borrowing from Bourdieu (1979: 192), Jansen (1997: 87) reminds us that 
“social identity is defined by as well as defines difference”. In their paper “Food, gender 
and Irishness”, Kneafsey and Cox (2002) showed how Irish identity for Irish women 
living in Coventry was intimately tied to food consumption and preparation practices. 
Through their involvement in the preparation and performance of food, Irish women 
played central roles in the construction of a collective Irish identity in Britain. More 
recently, Turkkan (2019) has shown how upper middle-class women in Istanbul 
involved in alternative food networks, are increasingly linking their identities as 
mothers and food activists, while using discourses of motherhood to distinguish 
themselves from others and thus reinforcing socio-economic boundaries.  
For many societies, food and food practices are closely entwined with concepts of 
gender: “Food helps to draw lines between men and women, and masculinity and 
femininity in many different ways” (Jansen, 1997: 88). Food and food practices hold 
many possibilities for furthering our understandings of “gendered social relations, 
knowledge construction, and cultural identity in communities” (Beoku-Betts, 1995: 
535). Although food and food work have been rightly analysed by feminist scholars as 
sites of oppression and subordination for women, as they often act to reinforce unequal 
gender roles, these gendered meanings of food are challenged and made more complex 
when intersections with ethnicity, race and diaspora are taken into account (D’Sylva and 
Beagan, 2011: 279). In her study with African American women in Gullah 
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communities, Beoku-Betts (1995) showed how food work was simultaneously 
reaffirming women’s subordination through reproducing unequal gender roles, while 
also acting to empower women and provide them with a source of valued identity. 
Similarly, D’Sylva and Beagan’s (2011: 279) study among Gaon Canadian women also 
demonstrated the ways that gendered food roles were viewed as “having particular 
power or ‘currency’ within the family and community, valued for fostering and 
supporting Goan identity.” Therefore, although Western feminist scholars have rightly 
highlighted the ways in which gendered food roles can act to exacerbate women’s 
subordination, a post-colonial consideration of other ethnic, racial or national 
experiences highlights the ways that these gendered roles may also be empowering 
when the links between identity and food are taken seriously.  
Taken as a potentially unifying or differentiating set of practices, food not only 
reinforces boundaries along the lines of gender, but also registers other markers of 
difference, such as ethnicity. Central to ethnic classifications are concepts of difference 
(for a discussion of the development of ethnicity within the Chinese context see Chapter 
4). Eriksen (1992) argued that ethnicity is processual, relying on continual acts of 
differentiation and reidentification. Boundaries are established between groups to 
distinguish between “ethnic insiders” and “outsider Others”, creating notions of 
belonging (Di Giovine and Brulotte, 2016: 3; Barths, 1969). As with other social 
categories of difference, the construction and reproduction of ethnic identity is carried 
out through “a relational dialectic of negotiation, contestation, self-fashioning, and re-
presenting” (Di Giovine and Brulotte, 2016: 4). Food and food practices play a central 
role in allowing for these socially constructed categories of belonging (Lu and Fine, 
1995; Bell and Valentine, 1997).  
The proverb “you are what you eat” is one that is frequently used within food studies, 
and with good reason. Food not only becomes part of who we are in a socio-cultural, or 
socially constructed, sense of identity, but it also has an embodied, biological aspect. As 
Di Giovine and Brulotte (2016) point out, food biologically becomes part of us when 
we consume and digest it. By eating, and thus digesting, certain foods, we are 
physically impacting on the composition of our embodied Self, directly linking our food 
practices and our embodied states. This physical embodiment and biological link to 
food holds symbolic, or even religious, meanings for many people. In their paper 
“Blood, body and belonging: the geographies of halal food consumption in the UK”, 
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Arshad Isakjee and Brídín Carroll (2019) explained how for their Muslim participants, 
ethical and theological understandings of halal food entail an embodied response. Halal 
food, which is considered cleaner and purer by their participants, is ultimately viewed as 
being healthier for both participants’ bodies and spirits (ibid: 14). This religious 
perception of the embodied qualities of food consumption demonstrate the 
inseparability for many people between what we eat and who we are.   
Given the impactful role that food can play in shaping our identities, both individual 
and group, it is unsurprising that food and food practices are extremely emotive (Di 
Giovine and Brulotte, 2016; Dias, 2003; Mathee, 2004; Germann Molz, 2007). This 
viscerality is inherently political as our food choices are shaped by social norms and 
networks of governance (Isakjee and Carroll, 2019: 7; Hayes-Conroy and Hayes-
Conroy, 2010). The politics of food are made evermore apparent when we consider: the 
associations between food, identity and belonging; the limitations on access to food and 
the uneven distribution of it globally; and the governance of food, food production and 
food certification at different scales. Within Europe, numerous political controversies 
have arisen over the past decade in relation to religious, specifically Islamic, foods 
(Chrisafis, 2015; Isakjee and Carroll, 2019). As such, food ethics and production have 
become an area for cultural and identity politics, a phenomena that Appadurai (1981) 
has termed “gastropolitics” (Isakjee and Carroll, 2019). Such controversies and 
emotivities, specifically surrounding halal food, are not confined to Europe. As 
Matthew Erie (2018: 390) writes, “the symbol of Qingzhen [taken here to mean halal] 
has proliferated in the course of China’s economic modernization such that it pervades 
the public sphere, creating anxiety among Han Chinese that Chinese society and 
government is becoming ‘Islamicized’”. This “anxiety” surrounding the symbol of 
Qingzhen/halal food and its perceived signalling of an Islamicising wave sweeping over 
China, shows the ways that food can be both highly emotive and political, but also how 
it also can bring about a fear of the Other and ignite discourses of belonging and 
exclusion.  
2.6.b  “You Are Where You Eat”: Food and Place Identity.  
Food and place are tied together in complex ways in geographical imaginations, which 
are central to our “lifeworlds” (Feagan, 2007), and individual and group identity (Bell 
and Valentine, 1997). As a meaning-loaded and powerful set of beliefs and practices, 
food can tie people and places together (Lin and Lin, 2014). “People’s visceral 
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experiences of food – tastes, textures, and aromas – can tell us a great deal about their 
emotional and affective relations with place” (Longhurst et al, 2009). As Bell and 
Valentine (1997) rightly pointed out in their landmark geographical text, “we are where 
we eat”.  
Rather than being innate, biological, fixed traits, people’s identities are decentred and 
performed. Depending on the socio-cultural, and indeed spatial, contexts that we 
inhabit, we may perform a diffuse number of roles in our enactments of identity as we 
figuratively manoeuver between poles of our identity (Butler, 1990; Goffman, 1956; 
Johnston, 2009). This means that as we move between contexts, we perform different 
versions of the Self. Emotions play a dominant role in shaping these performances as 
they continually shape our understandings of who and what we are (Davidson and 
Milligan, 2004). Due to the mutually constitutive nature of places and the people that 
inhabit them, it is reasonable to assert that we lend ourselves, our traits and our 
identities to places. Places, in turn, reciprocate by impacting on what we identify as and 
how we perform the Self. As such, some places are believed to be synonymous with the 
identities of certain individuals and groups.  
Rather than being mere objects, the materiality of these things resides in the sensuous 
processes of “human interaction with things”, often resulting in emotional responses 
from people (Pels, 1998: 100; Spyer, 1998; Hockey et al., 2007). These material 
referents work by acting as synecdochal signs for certain places, fulfilling the role of 
signifier for the places that they are believed to be part of (Peirce and Hoopes, 1991). 
As such, the embodied act of eating certain foods in in specific places may be viewed as 
not only consuming food, but also as the consumption of place and place identity, 
whereby a place is “sold” to consumers (Philo and Kearns, 1993; Bell and Valentine, 
1997). This consumption of foods associated with place is an essential practice through 
which individual and group identity is formed (Bell and Valentine, 1997; Ohnuki-
Tierney, 1993). As Ho (2018a) has shown in a study of African student migrants in 
China, people may seek out certain dishes and foods associated with different places in 
an attempt to demonstrate aspects of their identities that may counter more distressing 
aspects of social relations. In the case of the African students in Ho’s study, they not 
only consumed foods that reminded them of home, but they also actively sought out 
foods associated with the West in an attempt to demonstrate their cosmopolitan 
identities, thus countering racialisation in China. Further, through exploring food, food 
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practices, and the socio-cultural meanings of food in non-Western contexts, insights 
may be gleaned into how space, place and other geographical concepts happen outside 
of Anglo-American geography. This point was made evident in Low and Ho’s (2018) 
introduction chapter to a special edition of the journal “Food, Culture and Society”, 
where they demonstrated the usefulness of examining food in Asian cities as a lens for 
challenging Western interpretations of urban space.  
Places, identities, food and emotions are bound together in complex ways (Feagan, 
2007; Bell and Valentine, 1997; Longhurst et al, 2009). The act of eating, which is one 
of our most basic embodied functions, is closely linked to our personal identifications 
and attachments to place, and is highly emotive (Di Giovine and Brulotte, 2016; 
Kneafsey and Cox, 2002). Given the inescapably political nature of places (Massey, 
1994; Pierce et al, 2011), emotions (Ahmed, 2014; Pain, 2009), identity performances 
(Butler, 1990) and concepts of belonging (Yuval-Davis, 2011; Anderson, 1991), it is 
unsurprising that practices of food preparation and consumption also hold deep political 
meaning (Isakjee and Carroll, 2019). The political nature of food is evident at multiple 
scales: from the controversies surrounding halal food (Erie, 2018; Chrisafis, 2015; 
Isakjee and Carroll, 2019); to the subordinating, yet often empowering effects of food 
preparation (D’Sylva and Beagan, 2011; Beoku-Betts, 1995); to the role of food in 
demarcating group identity and belonging (ibid; Ho, 2018a). Food studies therefore 
offers a great deal of theoretical insights that may be of use to this project given its 
political focus, feminist political geographical approach and its goal of exploring the 
everyday, lived implications of global geopolitics.  
2.7  CONCLUSION. 
As Chapter 1.6 stated, the aim of this research project is to examine how, under the 
impress of the Global War on Terror, processes of minoritisation and place impact on 
the identities, experiences and everyday geographies of the Hui people. Specifically, the 
overarching aim is to explore how Hui identity is performed, made public, othered, 
negotiated, and contested through its food cultures. As such, a theoretical framework 
needed to be developed which would not only allow for the lived realities of global 
geopolitics to be explored, but which would also justify such a focus as a serious line of 
geographical enquiry.  
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Addressing this need, this chapter has presented a theoretical framework that builds 
upon an eclectic, yet interlinked and synergistic, collection of theoretical and conceptual 
developments from within geography, while also drawing from other relevant branches 
of academia. The resulting approach, which is underpinned by the feminist teaching of 
“the personal is political” (Dowler and Sharp, 2001), allows for the inescapably 
(geo)political dimensions of Hui people’s everyday lives and seemingly mundane 
practices to be explored. Borrowing the term feminist political geography from Jennifer 
Hyndman (2019: 4) such an approach attempts “to consolidate a thoroughly feminist 
and anti-racist political geography that does not succumb to Orientalist rescue narratives 
or produce regimes of care and security that subjectify” minority people. Further, such 
an approach takes “violence, exclusion, inequality, the materiality of the bodies, and 
their various subjectivities seriously” (ibid: 8), something which is important given the 
project’s aims.  
The feminist political geography approach implemented throughout this research and as 
discussed in this chapter is hinged upon a number of key theoretical and conceptual 
understandings. Emotions are important (Neu, 2000; Pugmire, 1998). How we feel 
directly impacts on what we know (Bondi, 2007). Our emotional states undeniably 
influence how we view ourselves, our social positionings and the world around us. They 
are essential to how we come to know the world within which we live, and they play a 
central role in shaping our personal geographies, either enabling or limiting our 
engagements with our spatial settings (Davidson and Milligan, 2004; Davidson and 
Bondi, 2004). As with our identities, our bodies act as the locus of our emotions, 
providing them with an embodied form through which we can engage with space. 
Subsequently, places are produced that are far more than a mere location or sub-division 
of space. These places are intimately known to us as they are closely intertwined with, 
and indeed mutually constitutive of, our lived bodies (Casey, 2013). In this way, such 
places become meaningful to us, eliciting emotional responses (Tuan, 1977; Seamon, 
2018). As we live out our lives in these settings, we come to know them, to feel and 
sense them, by means of our bodily, and indeed emotional, engagements with them 
(Longhurst, 2001; Rose, 1999; Thomas, 2009; Davidson and Milligan, 2004). Just as 
our emotions help to shape our sense of Self, so too do the places that we are 
inextricably bound to (Casey, 2001). Feelings of belonging and not-belonging are 
equally important in the establishment of identities. These place-based identities may be 
profoundly personal at the level of the individual, resulting from intimate and 
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experiential understandings of that place. Alternatively, there may be a sense of a shared 
identity amongst multiple people, whereby a group’s collective identity is believed to be 
linked to a particular place. In return, that place is believed to be synonymous of that 
particular group (Yuval-Davis, 2011; Rose, 1995). These identities are fluid and 
context-dependent, and as such, their performances vary across socio-spatial settings as 
people navigate between differing poles of their identities (Butler, 1990; Goffman, 
1956). Despite its seemingly benign, apolitical surface, food and its associated practices 
of preparation and consumption are highly emotive and irrefutably linked to questions 
of identity, belonging and place (Isakjee and Carroll, 2019; Bell and Valentine, 1997). 
So much so that eating, despite being one of our most basic embodied functions, is a 
highly political and emotive act of self-identification (Di Giovine and Brulotte, 2016; 
D’Sylva and Beagan, 2011).  
Taken together, these theoretical and conceptual understandings provide the theoretical 
framework necessary for further developing a feminist political geographical approach 
and advancing it through a study of Hui identity. Further, it provides the theoretical 
tools necessary for exploring geopolitics through embodied practices, food cultures and 
place. Yet, significant questions remain in relation to how such a study can actually be 
carried out methodologically. Chapter 3 will build upon the feminist political 
geographical approach developed here, by contributing an epistemological framework 
and methodological approach that is informed by the theoretical underpinnings above. 
Specifically, an argument will be made in favour of applying qualitative methods when 
engaging critically and reflexively with Hui food cultures in Beijing to better 
understand the group’s lived realities of the geopolitical.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY. 
As was stated in Chapter 1.6, the aim of this research is to examine how, under the 
impress of the Global War on Terror, processes of minoritisation and place impact on 
the identities, experiences and everyday geographies of the Hui people. Specifically, the 
overarching aim is to explore how Hui identity is performed, made public, othered, 
negotiated, and contested through its food cultures. In order to achieve these aims, a 
number of key objectives were set out:  
• To gain an understanding of the minoritisation mechanisms experienced by the 
Hui population and to explore how minoritising processes are performed 
through Hui food cultures and their associated places. 
• To explore public and visible ‘outings’ of Hui peoples through an examination 
of the ways in which they create distinctively Hui spaces and places. 
• To explore how these above processes impact on the emotional geographies of 
Hui people, vis-à-vis the places of Hui food culture they frequent and the 
practices they engage in. 
• To explore the cultural meaning of food in the establishing and performance of 
Hui identities and places and how these relate to gender. 
Given these aims and objectives, a qualitative methodology using the methods of 
participant observation, semi-structured interviews and semiotic analysis of local 
materials was implemented. This methodology, it is argued, allows for the political 
processes of minoritisation and identity formation to be examined, while also taking 
seriously the research participants’ individual understandings, experiences and 
emotional knowings of their socio-cultural worlds. Further, such a methodology is 
useful for demonstrating how Hui identity is performed, made public, othered, 
negotiated, and contested through its food cultures, and in arguing for the usefulness of 
using food as a method for researching the lived realities of geopolitics. Therefore, 
through discussing this project’s methodology and chosen methods, this chapter 
demonstrates the ways in which the aims and objectives were addressed. 
The methodology chosen for conducting this research project is aligned with the 
theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2. As was discussed in that chapter, this 
project’s theoretical approach is closely aligned to what Jennifer Hyndman (2019) has 
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called a “feminist political geography”. This theoretical framing is one that is feminist, 
post-colonial, critical and anti-racist in its approach to knowledge production, and 
which takes seriously people’s emotive and lived experiences of the (geo)political. Such 
an approach faces serious methodological and epistemological challenges, which are 
discussed in this chapter. Namely, the conceptualisation of feminist political geography 
implemented by this research project understands knowledge as anti-foundational, 
embodied, situated and as being actively made in the field – an epistemology that draws 
on post-structuralist and post-modernist approaches, such as those developed by 
feminist, post-colonial, anti-racist and queer scholars. Yet, despite actively trying to 
articulate their epistemologies, these scholars, according to Browne and Nash (2010: 1) 
“are seemingly less inclined to consider the implications of these approaches to 
methodologies and methods”. As such, this chapter aims to address this critique by 
focusing on a discussion of its methodology and methods, as guided by the theoretical 
framework outlined in Chapter 2.  
Although the current project does not employ queer theory explicitly, its attempt to 
develop a feminist political geography owes much Browne and Nash’s (2010) “Queer 
Methods and Methodologies”, and to the broader invitation to understand “queer” as “a 
mode of thinking that questions how social norms are formed and created” (Browne and 
Brown, 2016: 2; Browne, 2006). In their introductory chapter, Browne and Nash (2010: 
1) raise questions around: how to gather data from fluid and unstable subjects through 
methods such as interviewing; how to make sense of data when it is only momentarily 
fixed; and “how does this perpetual destabilising position us as researchers and what 
can we make of this destablisation”? Although these questions are being raised in 
relation to queer methods and methodologies within the social sciences, their 
questioning of researching unstable and fluid subjectivities and of researchers’ 
positionalities are useful methodological guides for a political feminist geography 
approach to research.  
This chapter aims to address these concerns, while showing the relevance of qualitative 
methods and methodologies in overcoming them. This qualitative approach, as is 
discussed throughout this chapter, is underpinned by certain epistemological 
understandings that are linked with a feminist political geography approach. Firstly, as 
knowledge is both situated and socially produced, fieldwork is a dialectical process. The 
knowledge gathered during fieldwork neither arise wholly from the body, nor are they 
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purely social and detached from our embodied states. Rather, this research’s approach 
acknowledges that knowledge is produced in response to both our corporeality and our 
social contexts and relations. This is not only true for research participants, but also for 
the researcher. My own situated knowledge, interpretations and understandings come 
from my own positionality, my embodied state and my emotional knowings, all of 
which happen within specific socio-cultural, emotive and political arenas (Harraway, 
1988; Limb and Dwyer, 2001; Walsh, 2009), an important point given the personal and 
health difficulties that I faced throughout the research process (see Section 3.3.h). 
Secondly, a feminist political geography approach to qualitative research allows for the 
messiness and co-existence of experiences, identities and subjectivities to be taken into 
account. This acknowledgement of the complexities of experiences, identities and 
understandings challenges those Western, masculinist, methodological approaches that 
attempt to “clean-up” or “tidy” accounts of phenomena that are unavoidably messy and 
multifaceted (Cope, 2002; Walsh, 2009). Thirdly, as this qualitative methodology is one 
shaped by a feminist political geography approach, it entails a certain genre of 
interpretative and meaning-making methods and ethical practices, stemming from the 
longer histories of feminist, post-colonial, anti-racist, queer and critical scholarships 
within geography and the social sciences. More specifically, the project entails and is 
centred around an ethics of care (Tronto, 2017). This ethics of care is an important 
aspect, especially given the increasing precariousness of life for Muslims in China. 
Further, it has been influential throughout all stages of the project, including: the choice 
of ethnic group and the focus on food cultures; the forms of consent requested from 
participants; the anonymising practices implemented; the data security procedures used 
to ensure safety; the translation and transcribing practices carried out; the interpretation 
of data and choice to include Chinese characters as footnotes; the attempts to 
continually re-visit and re-engage with the field; and my own reflective practices as a 
co-producer of knowledge. Such a methodological approach is, I believe, well suited for 
such a feminist political geography.  
Epistemologically speaking, there is an important distinction to be made between 
methodology and method before this chapter can proceed. Methods can be understood 
as the tools or techniques used to produce knowledge during the research process, such 
as interviewing. Methodology, however, is the justification for selecting those methods 
or particular approach. As such, this chapter will be structured in two parts, with both 
being framed by the theoretical approach of feminist political geography outlined 
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above. Firstly, in order to make the case for the suitability of qualitative research 
methods to this project, this chapter begins with a discussion of its research 
methodology, focusing on the value of qualitative methods, while also examining some 
of their limitations. The chapter then discusses how the chosen methods of participant 
observation, semi-structured interviews and semiotic analysis were applied in this study 
of Hui food culture in Beijing. 
3.1  WHY A QUALITATIVE METHODOLOGY? 
In order to achieve the goals of this research project, a qualitative methodological 
approach was deemed to be most appropriate due to the emphasis placed on the lived 
experiences of the participants, and on their personal understandings of their social 
worlds. As Limb and Dwyer (2001:6) argue, rather than understanding the world as an 
objective context into which people must fit, qualitative methodologies view the social 
world as dynamic and changing, and as constituted by this social action. As such, 
projects that implement qualitative methodologies – including this one – view our social 
worlds as being continually produced through the intersection of political, cultural, 
social and economic processes. An emphasis is placed by qualitative methodologies on 
understanding lived experiences, and on interpreting the shared meanings that frame 
people’s everyday social worlds. 
Smith (1988) suggests that there is no “real” world that exists independently of the 
relationship between the research subjects and the researcher. In this spirit, this project 
considers existing theoretical work, but it also attends to the complex explanations that 
local experts develop. In other words, the project aims to explore what Glaser and 
Straus (1967) term “grounded theory”. The positivist inductivism of the earliest 
versions of grounded theory has been addressed in later developments. Clarke (2005) 
takes up the challenge of postmodernist epistemology and asks the researcher to attend 
to the hierarchical contexts in which they practice their field research, suggesting that 
the original formulation fail to interrogate positionality. Charmaz (2014) incorporates 
constructivist perspectives insisting that the categories with which we apprehend the 
world are already theoretical, embodying assumptions about what we value. This is an 
important aspect as throughout the research process an effort was made to avoid simply 
projecting Western theory into Beijing. Another important factor is that qualitative 
methodologies acknowledge the importance of reflexivity in the research process 
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(Clarke, 2005), viewing the relationship between the researcher and subject as being 
influential to the production of knowledge and understandings. As Kearns’ (1998) work 
on “the virtuous circle of facts and values” shows, we can understand knowledge 
production as a continuous relationship between one’s values and facts. As such, it is 
important that we allow our political and moral stances to be informed by what we learn 
about the world, and similarly, that we “set up theoretical categories so that we can 
draw ethically relevant conclusions from our studies (idib, 1998: 378). Such practices 
show the need for researchers to be reflexive of their subjugated positionings and 
agendas. Further, by choosing qualitative methodologies Smith (2001) argues that a 
political choice is being made, whereby “non-dominant” knowledges are placed at the 
centre of geographical studies, something that this project is actively trying to achieve. 
Such an approach is particularly well suited to this project given the de-colonising 
aspirations of a truly feminist political geography that is post-colonial and anti-racist.  
The suitability of qualitative methodologies to this research becomes ever more 
apparent if the historical associations between such methodologies and their uses within 
the discipline of geography are taken into account. Specifically, their development 
within branches of geographical thought that have been influential to this project (see 
Chapter 2). With the emergence of humanistic geographies in the 1970s, and their 
critique of geography’s reformulation through a Quantitative Revolution, geographers 
were faced with a methodological crisis (Limb and Dwyer, 2001). Humanistic 
geographers reviewed qualitative methodologies in an attempt to elaborate what Tuan 
(1977) termed a “truly human geography.” This was one which stressed the importance 
of understanding people’s lifeworlds, meanings and experiences (Buttimer, 1976; 
Relph, 1976), and which allowed for the development of “grounded theory” (Ley, 
1974). Developing from this, social geographers attempted to use qualitative 
ethnographic methods to interpret human experience (Pile, 1991; Limb and Dwyer, 
2001). In their pioneering text Qualitative Methods in Human Geography, Eyles and 
Smith (1988:2) proposed that “much of our experience of everyday life is shared and an 
investigation of this experience and world requires methods which allow the acquisition 
of ‘insider knowledge’ through interaction, observation, participation in activities and 
informal interviewing.”  
In bringing back into geography and geographical knowledge, the subjective experience 
of people, these approaches proved valuable for feminist geographers who sought to not 
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only include women as topics of geographical research, but to rework the fundamentally 
masculinist premise of the discipline itself (Rose, 1993). Beyond this, feminist 
geographers extended qualitative methodologies developing collaborative work to 
challenge unequal power relations (McDowell, 1992; Limb and Dwyer, 2001). 
Qualitative methodologies would prove important to the emergence of even more 
branches of geography from which this research draws inspiration: post-structural 
geography, post-colonial geography and the “cultural turn” in geography. The 
successful use of these methodologies by post-structural geographers to explore the 
multiple subjectivities of research subjects has, for obvious reasons, been a source of 
inspiration for this project’s use of qualitative methodologies. So too has the qualitative 
research carried out by post-colonial geographers on the politics of knowledge 
construction and representation of the Other (Geetz, 1983; Marcus and Fischer, 1986). 
Further, the use of psychoanalytic approaches to identity, and the exploration of 
embodied knowledges, subjectivities and practices so often associated with the “cultural 
turn” in geography, all call for a qualitative approach.  
Despite the suitability of qualitative methodologies to this project, there are certain 
issues associated with such an approach that needed to be consideration if the research 
was going to be successfully carried out in an ethical manner. Specifically, the main 
concerns for this project are issues related to reflexivity and the role of the researcher in 
the production of knowledge, the difficulties and concerns of representation, 
acknowledgement of the inherent power relations, navigating the roles of insider-
outsider, confidentiality and anonymity of data and participants, and gaining consent. 
Each of these concerns are discussed in the following sub-sections in relation to the 
methods selected for use.     
3.2  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY. 
In order to carry out the research, a multi-method approach was implemented using 
several qualitative methods. Namely, participant observation, semi-structured 
interviews, field diaries, and analysis of local materials were chosen as suitable 
methods. This multi-method qualitative approach was deemed necessary if a reasonable 
understanding of Hui identity, food culture and the impacts of minoritising processes on 
them, were to be gained. By implementing this range of methods, it was hoped that an 
understanding would be gained of not only how Hui identity is performed at the nexus 
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of minoritisation, food culture and ethnicity, but also how these processes are impacting 
on the emotional geographies and lived experiences of the Hui. Further, this 
triangulation of methods ensures the validity of the research through establishing 
findings in more than one method while leading to a more comprehensive 
understanding of the phenomena being investigated (Hastings, 2010). 
3.2.a  Participant Observation. 
Originating within the discipline of anthropology, participant observation is perhaps 
most simply explained as an attempt to understand the everyday lives of others from 
their perspectives (Bennett, 2002). As a method, it involves spending time in particular 
socio-cultural spaces with those who occupy them in order to gain a better 
understanding of the phenomena being studied. The focus with participant observation 
is on what people do, not merely what they say they do (Walsh, 2009). This means that 
the researcher must be willing to situate themselves in the lives of others accepting that 
they inevitably influence the research agenda (Bennett, 2002). As a method, there is no 
pre-set list of steps to carrying out participant observation, rather the approach that the 
researcher takes is context dependent (Laurier, 2003). As Bennet (2002:139) has 
argued, participant observation is not about retrieving answers to questions framed by 
specific knowledges. Instead, it is about “opening oneself to different ways of 
constructing social life and knowledge. This implies not only learning to unravel and 
interpret behaviour and coded meanings, but also striving to think and behave in a way 
which makes sense to those you’re living with”. The extent to which one either 
participates or observes the researched will vary depending on the project, with some 
arguing that too much observation will diminish a fuller understanding of the 
researched, and an excessively participatory role will result in “going native”, thus not 
being critical enough of the researched culture (Thornton, 1997).  
Despite the aim of participant observation to understand other people’s everyday 
worlds, it must be acknowledged that there is in fact nothing natural about such an 
effort. By inserting ourselves into the lives of our research subjects, we are establishing 
a distinct space where we may engage with relevant people in order to conduct our 
research. As Katz (1994: 67) explains, “to have these conversations in a way that is 
distinct from everyday life, we must have a ‘field’ marked off in space and time”. In 
other words, by attempting to conduct research in the field, we are in fact involved in 
shaping the field with our presence, our words, our actions and our objectives. As such, 
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“the field” is a construction, a setting that has been intentionally and deliberately chosen 
and delineated by the researcher and the researched. The field where we attempt to 
conduct participant observation may therefore be seen as a space of “betweenness” 
(Katz, 1994) as it is the space between ourselves and the researched, not the unmediated 
world of “others” (Hastrup, 1992: 117; Bennett, 2002: 141). It is, rather, the 
“interworld” (Crossley 1996) where the subjectivities of the researched and researcher 
become enmeshed. Further, any attempt by the researcher to be “herself/himself” or 
“natural” in such a space is unrealistic (Okely, 1983). As Till (2001) has shown, 
researchers often construct spatial, temporal and emotional boundaries between spaces 
that we consider the “field” and the “home”. Yet, the field and home are unstable 
categories and as such, we must acknowledge “that research spaces are always hybrid; 
they are complex social spaces of dislocation” (ibid: 46). This is a particularly important 
point for research that involves multiple visits to the field as our repeated moving 
between shifting homes and fields involves unpredictable changes in our research 
relationships, agendas, and understandings of ourselves.  
As one might expect, such an acknowledgment of the researcher’s role in the shaping 
the field raises some issues. Specifically, surrounding the issues of reflexivity, 
positionality, situated knowledge, inherent power relations and the navigation of 
insider-outsider roles. Given the manner in which the researcher inevitably influences 
their fieldwork, it is important that they are reflexive, critical and maintain an awareness 
of the ways that they are affecting the researched individuals, communities and places 
(Coffey, 1999: 74). As Gregory (1978: 146) made clear in his defining work, “Ideology, 
Science and Human Geography”, if geography is to reclaim its “traditional attachment 
to particular places and the people that live in them, geography will have to dismantle 
the oppositions between subject and object, actor and observer, and emphasise the 
mediations between different frames of reference”. This can be done, Gregory argues, 
by bringing ourselves into the situation. Kobayashi (2009) defines reflexivity as “the 
practice on the part of a researcher of reflecting upon his or her own identity or 
positionality in relation to those studied, the recursive practice of self-examination and 
self-transformation in the exchange of knowledge between the researcher and those 
studied”. By adopting a reflexive approach to fieldwork, the researcher is allowing for 
the challenges to their theoretical positions that so often accompany fieldwork 
(England, 1994: 89). Such a reflexive approach to participant observation inevitably 
entails an awareness of positionality and situated knowledge. All knowledge, Haraway 
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(1988) argues, is the product of the setting within which it has been developed, and as 
such, these “situated knowledges” are always local, partial and embodied. Further, 
positionality recognises that each of us are differently positioned subjects with different 
biographies. We are not in fact disembodied, dematerialized entities (Bennett, 2002). As 
such, it is important that the emotional, sensual and embodied experiences of the 
researcher are taken into account (Walsh, 2009).  
In addition to these concerns, due consideration needs also be given to the roles of both 
the researcher and researched within the participant observation process. Traditionally, 
these roles are perceived as an insider-outsider binary. However, thanks in part to 
feminist research, there is now a growing awareness of the need to acknowledge the 
manner in which people may shift between positions, or even hold several positions at 
once (Walsh, 2009). This is of particular importance to research such as this, where the 
participants (and researcher) often shifted between various positions and subjectivities. 
Such positionalities and subjectivities inevitably have an influence on the inherent 
power relations of the research process. Given the role of the researcher to study the 
researched, there is undoubtedly a power imbalance involved. However, that is not to 
say that the researcher is always in the dominant position. In fact, efforts can be made to 
shift the position of power onto the research participants. One example of this might be 
the recognition that the participant is in fact the expert on the topic of enquiry and that 
the researcher starts off knowing relatively little. Such inequalities of power need to be 
taken into account when conducting research. 
A further concern with participant observation is the matter of informed consent. Within 
the social sciences, there is much debate regarding the matter of gaining informed 
consent from those being researched. In relation to consent, two distinct approaches to 
participant observation may be assumed. Firstly, overt participant observation occurs 
when the researcher is forthcoming with the project’s details and their own research 
agendas, making their desire to conduct research clear to their perspective participants 
and seeking their consent. Commonly, researchers engaging in overt participant 
observation will seek either written or verbal consent from participants, asking them to 
clearly show their agreement to participation. The other approach commonly used is 
covert participant observation (Hoggart et al, 2002). This form of participant 
observation is far more contentious than its overt counterpart, with many researchers 
arguing that it is dishonest. This method may be understood as the practice of carrying 
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out participant observation without having informed the researched of the researcher’s 
identity or intentions, and without having gained consent. Although viewed by many 
researchers as being unethical, such a covert approach is often required to gain access to 
certain individuals or knowledge, with many other researchers arguing that it is a 
necessary compromise to achieve access to certain socio-cultural spaces that would 
otherwise be unavailable (Walsh, 2009). As such, some researchers may decide to use 
cover participant observation as a method for either gaining all, or part, of their data.  
3.2.b  Semi-Structured Interviews. 
Semi-structured interviews are perhaps most simply understood as verbal exchanges 
between the interviewer and the interviewee, whereby the interviewer attempts to gain 
information through the process of asking questions that are deemed relevant to the 
research topic (Longhurst, 2009). Very often, the interviewer may prepare a pre-set list 
of interview questions or topics to help guide the interview and to allow for continuity 
between interviews. Such interviews generally unfold in a conversational or fluid 
manner depending on the interests and experiences of the participants (Valentine, 1997). 
Unlike structured interviews, the interviewer is not limited to the prepared list of 
questions and topics and the interviewee is allowed to steer the conversation depending 
on what they deem to be important. Such an approach often involves asking open-ended 
question which allow for the in-depth exploration of the research topic from multiple 
angles (Longhurst, 2003; 2009). Although semi-structured interviews are often guided 
by the interviewee, they nevertheless involve a certain degree of direction by the 
interviewer but in ways that are self-conscious (Longhurst, 2009). As Eyles (1988) 
explains, interviews are conversations with purpose. A major benefit to this method is 
that it allows interviewees to describe their social worlds, opinions and experiences in 
their own words (Bryman, 1988). Another strength is that it allows for the interviewee 
to raise issues and concerns that the interviewer might not have otherwise considered 
(Silverman, 1993). As a result, the data gathered by semi-structured interviews is 
detailed and multi-layered (Burgess, 1984). The gathering of such data is not intended 
to be representative of a larger group or community. Rather, it is designed to gain an 
understanding of how individuals make sense of their own lives and the meaning that 
they attach to their life-worlds (Valentine, 1997). 
As with participant observation, there are certain ethical concerns with using semi-
structured interviews. In fact, each of the ethical considerations discussed in the 
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preceding section may also apply here; that is to say the need for critical reflexivity, an 
awareness of positionality, an acknowledgement that knowledge is situated, careful 
consideration of inherent power relations, the navigation of insider-outsider roles, and 
obtaining informed consent from participants. There are, of course, other ethical 
questions raised by such a method. Specifically, in relation to representation, 
confidentiality, and anonymity. These three issues also apply to participant observation; 
however, they are perhaps most clearly seen in relation to semi-structured interviews. 
As was mentioned above, semi-structured interviews allow the interviewee to describe 
in their own words their individual views, understandings and experiences. As such, any 
information obtained is solely representative of that individual person. It cannot be 
assumed that such information is representative of any broader group or community 
(Valentine, 1997). Just as the individual experiences of interviewees cannot be 
considered representative of a larger group of people, the actions and practices 
witnessed during the participant observation cannot be assumed to take place in every 
other relatable field. The two remaining ethical considerations, confidentiality and 
anonymity, are particularly important for semi-structured interviews. Interviewees 
should be assured that all information gathered will remain confidential and that they 
will remain anonymous (unless they choose otherwise). Specifically, interviewees 
should be provided with details of how the data will be stored after collection and of 
any security measures being taken to safeguard their involvement in the research 
(Longhurst, 2003). For an account of this project’s security procedures see Section 3.3.l.  
3.2.c  Semiotic analysis of local materials. 
Visual representations are powerful and can play a role in shaping how we view and 
understand people, cultures and places, thus impacting on our sense of self and our 
relation to the places that we inhabit (Orgad, 2012). These representations render the 
world in visual terms and are never innocent. By analysing such representations, an 
understanding may be gained of the cultural practices that help form group identities. 
As such, the gathering and analysis of relevant local documentary sources may be 
extremely beneficial when conducting research on identity. However, visual analysis of 
such sources is a contested issue with a number of methods available. Each of these 
methods involves its own set of methodological and theoretical debates. As such, the 
decision to implement any of them requires an acknowledgement of their associated 
theoretical and methodological assumptions. Further, given the ethical concerns 
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discussed above surrounding reflexivity, positionality and situated knowledge, it is 
important that any visual method chosen allows for a critical approach to analysing 
images. Rose (2001: 15) sets out three criteria for approaching an image critically: that 
visual representations be taken seriously, that consideration be given to their social 
effects, and that reflexivity is necessary. In light of this criteria, semiotics was chosen 
for the analysis of local documentary sources.  
Semiotics offers analytical tools and a precise vocabulary for analysing visual 
representations and tracing their relationship to broader systems of meaning (Rose, 
2001). The most important tool offered by semiotics is the sign, as semiotics can be 
most simply described as the science of signs (Saussure, 1983; Peirce and Hoopes, 
1991). These signs are intrinsically linked with human culture and are extremely 
important. As Bal and Bryson (1991: 174) explain, “human culture is made up of signs, 
each of which stands for something other than itself, and the people inhabiting culture 
busy themselves making sense of those signs”. It is often claimed that semiotics is a 
scientific approach to the study of meanings as it offers certain analytical precision 
through the use of a refined set of concepts (Rose, 2001: 70). An ideology is knowledge 
that is constructed in such a way as to legitimize unequal power relations. Dominant 
groups in a society represent the world in such a way as to reflect their own interests, in 
hopes of retaining their structures of dominance (Hodge and Kress, 1988: 3; 
Williamson, 1978). The representations found in local documentary sources are 
ideologies, and semiotics can be used to reveal the ideological statuses of them 
(Williamson, 1978; Goldman, 1992; Rose, 2001). However, in choosing to denaturalise 
relations of dominance, semiotics takes a stance of its own and thus, while the current 
research is self-critical and aspires to be fair-minded, it cannot claim the absolute 
separation of science and ideology that some have. It is important here to once again 
remember Kearns’ (1998) work on “the virtuous circle of facts and values”; whereby 
our semiological readings cannot be considered an objective science, but rather, the 
facts that we are faced with are in a continuous relationship with our values. It is 
therefore important to acknowledge our subjugated positions and ideologies when 
looking to examine the “facts” that we see in visual materials.   
Saussure (1983) points out that a sign is formed from the union of the signifier and the 
signified. The signified is the object or the concept that is being represented while the 
signifier is the image, or the sound, attached to the signified. The relationship between 
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the two parts of a sign is crucial as it means that the relationship between the signifier 
and its meaning (signified) is conventional (Rose, 2001: 74). Depending on the 
relationship between the signified and the signifier there are three types of signs. Each 
of these involve some level of social convention. The three types are symbolic, iconic 
and indexical. A symbolic sign is one that is based upon a purely arbitrary relationship 
between the signified and the signifier. An indexical sign involves an inherent 
relationship based on the occurrence of co-presence within a particular context. While 
an iconic sign is one whose relationship between its signifier and signified is based 
upon resemblance (Peirce & Hoopes, 1991). Examples of these signs, to borrow from 
Rose (2001:78), are: 
• Iconic: A photograph of a baby is an iconic sign of that baby.  
• Indexical: An image of a baby soother might be understood by Western readers 
as signifying a place for baby-changing facilities. 
• Symbolic: A picture of a baby may represent notions of the future. 
Signs work in relation to other signs, and this consideration leads to a further distinction 
between syntagmatic signs and paradigmatic signs (Rose, 2001: 78). A syntagmatic sign 
is one which gains meaning from the signs that surround it in a sequence, while a 
paradigmatic sign is one which gains its meaning from a contrast with other signs. 
Another distinction between signs can be made depending on how symbolic they are: a 
denotive sign is one which is descriptive of something while connotive signs carry 
higher meaning. These connotive signs can be further broken down into two kinds; 
metonymic (meaning that it is associated with something else, causing it to represent 
that thing) and synecdochal (this sign represents something that it is part of or that is 
part of it). An image can often hold more than one possible denotive meaning (Rose, 
2001: 81). According to Barthes (1977: 38 – 41), an image's accompanying text plays a 
decisive role in determining which denotive meaning a reader takes; these texts are 
called anchorage whereby the accompanying texts are even more important to the image 
as they are complementary and have a relay-function. As was mentioned earlier, the 
vocabulary provided by semiotics is extensive. The above terms are the ones that 
proved most useful during this research. It is also important to note at this stage that 
signs are complex and can be described using several terms at once (Rose, 2001).  
Many of the signs discussed during this research refer to broader systems of meaning. 
These systems have been given a variety of names. However, this research will use 
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Barthes' (1973: 117) term “myths”, and to a lesser extent, Hall's (1980) term “codes”. 
Barthes' (1973: 123) notion of mythology suggests that a myth is a second-order 
semiological system, whereby a myth builds upon denotive signs. Consisting of a 
signifier and signified, a denotive sign is quite easily understood. These denotive signs 
then become the signifier at the second, or mythological level of meaning, creating 
second-level signs. Barthes (1977) provides a set of vocabulary for these different 
elements of signs. The sign at the first denotive level is called “meaning”, but when this 
sign is referred to as the signifier of a mythical sign it is called a “form”. The mythical 
sign's signified is the “concept”, while the second level sign becomes the “signification” 
(see Figure 3.1). A myth enters as a non-historical truth, appearing natural, thus myths 
are ideologies (Rose, 2001: 89 - 91). Rose gives an example of mythical signs, 
borrowing from Barthes (1973: 125), when discussing an image Barthes saw in “Paris-
match”: a young black person “in a French uniform is saluting, with his eyes uplifted, 
probably fixed on the fold of the tricolor”. This is the denotive sign’s meaning at the 
first-level. However, this sign becomes the signifier, or the form, at the second-level. 
The second-level meaning of this myth is, according to Barthes, “France is a great 
Empire, that all her sons, without any colour discrimination, faithfully serve under her 
flag, and that there is no better answer to detractors of an alleged colonialism than the 
zeal shown by this…[black person]…in serving his so-called oppressors”.  
 
Figure 3.1: Mythical Sign. 
Source: Author’s own (2016). 
This research will also refer to Hall's (1980) codes where relevant. A code is a set of 
accepted methods of meaning-making that are specific to a certain group of people, 
similar to myths (Rose, 2001; 88). Images are “encoded” with meanings which may be 
“decoded” differently by groups, depending on their social positioning (Chandler, 
Denotive 
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2014). “Aberrent decoding” occurs when a text has been decoded by means of a 
different code to that used to encode it (Eco, 1965). 
Given the nature of this method, there are of course a number of difficulties. Firstly, the 
signs within the images have to be identified. As Bal and Bryson (1991: 193) point out, 
it is often difficult to differentiate between signs in an image due to the absence of 
boundaries between different parts of the image. This issue is further complicated when 
we consider the relationality of signs (Bal and Bryson, 1991: 177). As a result of this, 
any point of entry will be unavoidably “artificial and arbitrary” (Rose, 2001: 91). 
Secondly, there is the matter of how representative the chosen texts are. As with the 
data gathered from interviewing and participant observation, the texts that are chosen 
for analysis are representative of themselves and their contexts only. In cases where a 
text or visual image was offered by an individual or group to the researcher for 
consideration, these texts will be seen as representative of that individual or group’s 
understandings. In addition to these issues, the ethical issues of reflexivity, positionality 
and situated knowledge also emerge. As was already stated in relation to the earlier 
methods, all knowledge is situated and each of us approach research with differing 
biographies and positionings. As such, when analysing images, we inevitably decode 
the texts from our specific viewpoints, often resulting in aberrant decoding. As such, it 
is essential that the researcher recognize this and recognize how their own decodings 
may very well differ from those of the research participants. Lastly, unlike other 
methods, there is no clear guidelines to follow when carrying out semiotic research. The 
claim that semiotics is a science rather than an ideology must thereby be qualified in a 
manner similar to the cases of most other understandings of society. In light of this, 
Rose (2001) offers some helpful suggestions; 
• Decide what the signs are. 
• Decide what each sign signifies in itself. 
• Consider how they relate to other signs, both within the image and in other 
images. 
• Explore their connections to wider systems of meaning; myths. 
• Then return to the signs via their codes and explore the precise articulation of 
ideology.  
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3.2.d  Fieldnotes. 
Ultimately, the aim of writing fieldnotes and reflections is to provide the researcher 
with a detailed record of the research process. This record is written as the research 
process unfolds. It allows for the documentation of what the researcher observes and 
what they have come to learn and understand as a result (Cook, 1997). It is an essential 
part of the research methodology where participant observation is being used. Such 
fieldnotes or field diaries generally consist of three main elements: descriptive notes 
about field observations and engagements, interpretative notes that attempt to make 
sense of these observations, and reflective notes that explore the researcher’s emotions 
in relation to the research (Bennett, 2002). In addition to such descriptive, interpretive 
and reflective fieldnotes, researchers often draw maps and sketches, and formulate 
questions about the social spaces, everyday geographies and emotions faced during the 
research process (Till, 2009). Although each of these forms of fieldnotes are valuable, 
when writing it is important for the descriptive notes to be written separately from the 
interpretive and reflective ones (Hoggart et al, 2002). This is because the true meaning 
behind certain behaviours may not actually become clear until it has been observed in 
multiple settings (Schensul et al, 1999). Thus, it is important to distinguish between 
what is observed by the researcher, and what they interpret the meaning to be.  
The writing of fieldnotes ideally takes place during the research encounter. However, 
this may raise concerns. As Miles and Crush (1993) have made clear, if it is known that 
part of your role is to write and document what you observe as it occurs, this may 
heavily influence how the research participants come to view you. Ultimately, it 
potentially reaffirms the roles of researcher and researched, manifesting unequal power 
relations and alienating participants. As such, it may be necessary to avoid writing 
fieldnotes until after the research encounter, in which case the notes should be written 
immediately afterwards to avoid the loss of details. In order to minimise the loss of 
details during longer periods of participant observation, it is helpful to write short notes 
down at every opportunity. One way of achieving this is by removing yourself 
temporarily from the research space and jotting down brief notes or reminders to aid 
with later discussion: some have termed this “ethnographer’s bladder” (Cook, 1997). 
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3.3  RESEARCHING THE HUI – METHODS CHOSEN.   
Following the decision that a qualitative methodology based on participant observation, 
semi-structured interviews and analysis of local materials was most suited to this 
project, it needed to be applied to the Beijing context. When attempting to implement 
this methodology, a number of obstacles were faced, which required changes to be 
made to the originally proposed method in order to make it locally suitable.  
3.3.a  Gaining Access to the Field -  
From an early stage of research design, the issue of access had to be resolved before this 
project could hope to progress. Gaining access to the field in China is often a 
complicated and difficult task for non-Chinese researchers. Further, once access is 
gained, it is often difficult to navigate the field as one attempts to achieve one’s research 
agenda while respectfully adhering to the limitations and restrictions imposed by the 
Chinese authorities. This is usually made even more difficult when the research focuses 
on any subject area deemed to be “sensitive” by the Chinese authorities –generally 
speaking, the subjects of ethnicity and religion are considered sensitive by most 
municipal governments. Subsequently, this project was faced with the issue of access 
early on given its focus on Chinese Muslim minority subjects. As such, a necessary 
process of narrowing the research subject was undertaken during the design phase in 
order to minimise the apparent sensitivity of the project, while still allowing for the 
subject to be researched. As a result, it was decided that the project would focus on the 
Hui, rather than other Islamic minority groups, in part for the following reasons: 
• Gaining physical access: The Hui are the largest and most widespread of 
China’s ten Islamic minority groups, consisting of more than ten million 
individuals. Further, they are the largest Islamic minority group in Beijing with a 
population of more than 200,000 people (Gladney, 2004). As such, gaining 
access to them was practically more feasible than for other groups.  
• Ability to access them alone: As the Hui are the only minority group in China 
not to possess their own distinct language (Gladney, 1996), access could be 
gained to the group without the need for a translator. This was an important 
aspect given the project’s emphasis on participant observation and the financial 
limitations of the project.  
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• Gaining official access: The Hui are widely perceived in China to be less 
“troublesome” than other Islamic minorities, such as the Uyghur. Therefore, it 
was expected that they might be subject to less governmental control and as 
such, easier to gain access to for research purposes.  
Once the Hui had been identified as the subject for this research on minority identity, a 
decision had to be made regarding which aspect of their identity would be focused on. 
This, again, carried a number of issues related to access. Specifically, how would I be 
able to gain access to relevant cultural practices given my positionality and “outsider” 
status? Further, which identity “hooks” would be less sensitive and thus less monitored 
by the authorities? Considering these questions, and the importance of their dietary 
traditions highlighted in the limited existing literature, it was decided that a focus on 
Hui food cultures would not only allow access to the group but would also be 
theoretically fruitful and context appropriate. By focusing on the Hui’s food culture, 
alleyways were opened to researching other topics that might have been off-limits had 
they been explicitly stated: such as ethnicity, religion, gender, etc. Participants were 
also more willing to engage with the researcher once they learned that the focus was on 
food cultures and not other sensitive issues. From a logistical perspective, the project 
was no longer deemed sensitive by authorities and as such, could be carried out without 
needing special permission or documentation. For both of the initial phases of the field 
research, student visas ware obtained by enrolling in language courses at Chinese 
universities: a X2 visa was obtained for the longer period from Beijing Normal 
University (August 2015 – April 2016), and a X1 visa from China Youth University for 
Political Sciences for the second field visit (June 2017 – August 2017).  
3.3.b  Positionality. 
Given the nature of this research project, its focus on the Hui, and its Beijing context, 
one of the key concerns that needed to be address was the researcher’s positionality. 
Specifically, my positioning as a white, Irish, Western-educated, gay man who was 
raised a Roman Catholic but is now spiritual but not religious, and who is a non-native 
speaker of Mandarin Chinese, needs to be made explicit. As was discussed earlier in 
this chapter, when attempting to conduct research in the field, we are actively shaping 
the field through our presence, our actions and our objectives. Therefore, the dataset 
that is co-produced in the field is influenced largely by the researcher’s positionality. 
Further, the researcher’s positionality is also central to how the dataset is analysed, 
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understood and interpreted. In light of these conceptual understandings, it is vital that 
the researcher’s positionality not only be made explicit, but that it is also taken seriously 
and critically reflected on throughout the research processes in order to challenge 
potential biases. As such, a central component of this research’s methodological 
approach was active reflexivity, which was implemented at all stages of the project in 
order to better understand my own engagements with, and interpretations of, the dataset. 
These reflexive practices will be discussed in greater detail in Section 3.3.e.  
Further, through critically reflecting on my own positionality as a researcher, measures 
could be taken in an attempt to lessen potential power imbalances between the 
participants and myself which might place participants in a vulnerable position. In an 
attempt to minimise risk or discomfort to participants, and to negotiate the power 
relations inherent in my positionality and “outsider” status, a number of measures were 
implemented. Specifically, the uneven power relations surrounding my positioning as a 
western, non-Chinese, white, non-native Mandarin speaker were somewhat countered 
through the hiring of an interpreter for the interviews, and through seeking help from a 
Chinese friend in recruiting restaurants (see sections 3.3.f and 3.3.i for details). 
Additionally, the uneven power relations stemming from the positionings of 
“researcher” and “researched” were offset somewhat through placing an emphasis on 
my status as a student and their roles as local experts. Through stressing my student 
status and highlighting the participants’ role as local experts, an attempt was being 
made to shift the power relations by placing the participants’ in a superior position 
through emphasising the fact that they knew more than me about the research topic and 
that they were helping me to learn (see Section 3.3.e).  
One further obstacle raised by my positionality was my non-Muslim status, something 
which was problematic for only a small number of participants. Occasionally when 
recruiting participants, I would be asked if I was Muslim or if I was religious, to which I 
would answer honestly saying that I am not. Although this was not an issue for most 
participants, early in the research some individuals refused to participate as a result, 
including the owner of a restaurant selected for participation (see Restaurant 3 in 
Section 3.3.g). During a discussion with one restaurant manager, he declined the 
invitation to participate, while also describing me as non-religious. After reflecting on 
this interaction, I began to suspect that for this man, it was my assumed non-religious 
status that was most problematic for him rather than my positioning as a non-Muslim. 
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Following this, I began telling participants that I was raised a Roman Catholic but that I 
was no longer of that religion when they asked if I was religious. After I began 
disclosing this aspect of my positionality with potential participants, they were more 
willing to participate in the research. Through reflecting critically on researcher 
positionality, obstacles surrounding uneven power relations such as these could be 
addressed, allowing for the research to be conducted in an ethical manner.  
3.3.c  Language Competency. 
Due to the nature of this project and the research methods chosen to carry it out, a 
working knowledge of Mandarin Chinese was essential. Among China’s 55 officially 
recognised minority groups, the Hui are the only group not to possess their own shared 
language and as such, they predominantly speak Mandarin Chinese. Further, given its 
status as the official language of the People’s Republic of China, Mandarin Chinese is 
the language that most of the local documentary sources that were gathered are in. 
Therefore, it was important that I be sufficiently able to communicate and work through 
Mandarin Chinese. 
Prior to commencing the PhD programme in October 2014, I had lived in Beijing for 13 
months (August 2012 – September 2013), during which time I learned a foundational 
level of Mandarin, successfully passing the state-operated HSK4 level 2 exam. 
Following my enrolment in the PhD, and in preparation of the project’s fieldwork, I 
began taking second-year undergraduate, Mandarin Chinese classes in Maynooth 
University’s Department of Chinese Studies, beginning in November 2014. I continued 
to take classes in Mandarin Chinese during the first two research trips. Eight months 
were spent studying at Beijing Normal University (2015 – 2016) during the first 
research trip. Throughout this eight-month period, I studied at a high-intermediate level: 
between HSK level 4 and HSK level 5. A further two months were spent studying the 
language at the China Youth University of Political Sciences (2017) in Beijing, where I 
studied HKS level 4. By continually studying Mandarin Chinese, both in preparation for 
fieldwork and throughout time spent in Beijing, I ensured that I was proficient enough 
 
4汉语水平考试。Eng: Chinese Proficiency Test. HSK is the standardised test for assessing the language 
proficiency of non-native Mandarin Chinese learners. The test is administered by Hanban, which is an 
agency of the Ministry of Education of the PRC. There are six levels of HSK, with each increasing in 
difficulty.  
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in the language to hold meaningful conversations with participants, comprehend menus 
and other materials gathered, and translate generated data. 
3.3.d  Knowing the Local Foodscape. 
Once access had been gained to the field, the task of familiarising myself with the Hui 
foodscape in Beijing was undertaken. This was achieved in part by collecting local 
documentary sources, which were then analysed using a semiological method in order 
to gain a better understanding of local representations of the Hui people and their food 
cultures. The collection and analysis of local documentary sources has continued 
throughout all phases of the research process, but collection was particularly active 
during the three phases of fieldwork.  
Although the use of documentary sources was valuable when familiarising myself with 
the Hui foodscape in Beijing, even more important was the initial scouting and covert 
participant observation phase that was carried out during the first five months – from 
September 2015 to December 2015 inclusive. During this phase, Hui restaurants were 
located, visited and documented across five districts of the city, usually with rather brief 
sessions of participant observation being undertaken. These sessions usually lasted less 
than one hour – the time it took to slowly consume the meal ordered. Given the size of 
Beijing and the socio-economic differences between the inner districts of Beijing City 
and outer districts of Beijing Municipality, it was decided that the research would focus 
on five of the city’s inner districts: Haidian, Chaoyang, Xicheng, Dongcheng and 
Fengtai. In order to locate Hui restaurants, a number of tactics were employed. To begin 
with, key Hui neighbourhoods and ethnic enclaves within the city were identified. The 
restaurants in these neighbourhoods were visited, with participant observation taking 
place in the form of observing, documenting and occasionally photographing (with 
permission) what was seen, while participating in such activities by ordering and 
consuming the food, thus engaging with the performance of their food culture. Usually 
this participant observation was done covertly, whereby I assumed the role of customer, 
conversing primarily with the waiting staff as they took my order and payment. On 
occasion, I would inform the staff that I was a student and that I was researching Hui 
food culture. This overt approach was largely limited to the first few encounters as it 
became apparent that such an approach often acted as a deterrent for the restaurant staff, 
subsequently disrupting conversation. As such, the covert approach was used more 
frequently. It was also found that the staff were more likely to engage in conversation if 
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I assumed the role of customer by ordering food, instead of simply approaching them to 
ask questions. Although I would not generally inform the staff that I was researching the 
Hui, I would tell them that I was a student in China and that I was interested in Hui food 
culture. This proved to be fruitful, opening a dialogue between the staff and myself. 
During such conversations, they would often offer advice about the menu or provide me 
with more general information about Hui culture, Hui life in Beijing and the restaurant’s 
history and décor.  
Another benefit to these conversations was that they allowed me the opportunity to ask 
the staff for advice about which other areas had Hui residents or restaurants, and which 
restaurants they recommended that I visit. Given the negative response received to the 
overt approach mentioned above, writing in field diaries was avoided during these short 
covert participant observation sessions. Instead, I would wait until I had left the 
restaurants before writing descriptive and highly detailed passages in the diaries. 
Sketches were also drawn of the restaurant layouts and décor. This was generally done 
immediately after leaving the restaurant to minimise the loss of information and details. 
On occasion, short notes would be typed into my phone during longer covert sessions. 
These notes would act as a reminder, aiding with the writing of fieldnotes later on. By 
carrying out covert participant observation in this manner, I gained an understanding of 
the range and nature of Hui food cultures in Beijing. I also familiarised myself with the 
local linguistic and cultural specificities, while beginning to establish a recurring 
presence in restaurants that I would later return to for the following overt participant 
observation. Prior to conducting covert participant observation, ethical approval was 
granted by Maynooth University. It is important to make clear that although covert 
participant observation was used to familiarise myself with the range and style of food 
available in restaurants, no conversations were audio recorded during this phase, nor 
were these conversations written into the final thesis. The omitting of such data was 
done in an effort to mitigate the inequitable power relations involved in conducting the 
initial covert research.  
Once the above restaurants had been visited and documented, a new approach was 
needed to locate further establishments. This approach primarily consisted of the use of 
online search engines and applications to locate restaurants. Specifically, the Baidu 
Map5 application was used. This application was particularly useful as it allows you to 
 
5 百度地图。 
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refine your search using key words or neighbourhoods. In order to find relevant 
restaurants on the application, several key words were used: Hui,6 Huizu,7 Huimin,8 
HuiHui,9 Qingzhen,10 Halal, Ningxia,11 Xibei,12 Xibeifang,13 Lanzhou,14 and Gansu,15 to 
name but a few.  Further, its mapping format showed the locations of all relevant 
restaurants within the search area, allowing you to see which neighbourhoods had the 
highest number of Hui restaurants (Figure 3.2). Also, many of the restaurants listed 
displayed their menus on the application in addition to reviews and photographs (Figure 
3.3). This application was primarily used to identify neighbourhoods that contained the 
highest number of relevant restaurants, or to identify restaurants that were significantly 
different from those more commonly found. The restaurants in these neighbourhoods 
were then visited and short participant observations were undertaken, similar to those 
described above. Often, it was found that these neighbourhoods contained more relevant 
restaurants than shown on the application. As such, once an area was chosen, it would 
be explored extensively with this exploration often extending into neighbouring areas. 
This rather random and time-consuming method of locating and observing restaurants 
was without doubt the most effective and its documented findings formed the largest 
part of the early dataset. 
 
6回。 
7回族。 
8回民。 
9回回。 
10清真。 
11宁夏。 
12西北。 
13西北方。 
14兰州。 
15甘肃。 
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Figure 3.2: Screenshots of Baidu Maps 1. 
Source: Author’s own (2020). 
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Figure 3.3: Screenshot of Baidu Maps 2. 
Source: Author’s own (2020). 
As was mentioned above, in order to conduct these short sessions of participant 
observation, I would assume the role of a customer and consume a meal in the 
restaurants. At times this was quite a daunting task, especially at the beginning of the 
first fieldtrip as it was my first time to engage directly with potential research 
participants. Further, during this scouting phase of the research, I was particularly 
apprehensive of my status as an outsider while eating in these establishments. This 
awareness of my positionality was often brought about by the visibly surprised and even 
nervous reactions of some restaurant staff when I entered their establishments. 
Unsurprisingly, these nervous reactions were most commonly encountered in the 
residential areas of Fengtai, Haidian and Chaoyang districts, rather than other areas that 
were more accustomed to international residents, tourists and students. Initially, when 
 102 
faced with these reactions, I would become quite self-conscious. However, I quickly 
realised that by conversing with the staff while ordering food, both the staff and I would 
become less hesitant and more comfortable. Specifically, I found it very useful to ask 
the staff for suggestions as to what dishes I should order. This tactic of asking staff for 
recommendations proved to not only put us both at ease through starting a conversation, 
but it also acted as a productive method of familiarising myself with the dishes and 
ingredients that Hui restaurant staff considered to be most typical or representative of 
their ethnic group. Further, this approach to learning about the food that various staff 
considered to be significant was an important tool in familiarising myself with Beijing’s 
diverse local foodscape.  
In the early stages of fieldwork, and even during much of the overt participant 
observation, this method of asking for recommendations was the most common way 
that I chose dishes to order. While ordering and eating these dishes I would feel excited 
by the fact that I had gained an interesting insight into the staff members’ views of Hui 
food cultures. Yet I would often also feel a sense of personal dissatisfaction and even 
disgust. These negative emotional responses were not due to the helpful suggestions of 
staff and our usually friendly conversations, rather they were because of the fact that I 
was being faced with the reality of eating dishes that contained meat. Since the age of 
10, I have been a vegetarian and in more recent years have moved towards a plant-based 
diet. As such, the prospect of eating meat was one that caused me to feel uncomfortable, 
and at times repulsed. However, I felt that eating these small amounts of meat was a 
worthwhile sacrifice that I needed to make in order to gain access to potential 
participants in the initial stages of fieldwork. During the overt participant observation 
phase, I only ate meat in the participating restaurants when invited to do so by 
participants, which rarely happened as generally staff would be working. Even 
throughout the interviewing phase in 2017 when my interpreter and I occasionally 
shared a meal with interviewees, I rarely ate meat, instead I would eat the vegetable 
dishes that had been ordered. Following the initial phases of research, I would order 
vegetarian dishes from the restaurants’ menus. By doing so, I not only avoided the 
negative emotions that I experienced when eating meat dishes, but I was also better able 
to observe my surroundings and engage with participants as I was not distracted by 
negative emotions.  
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3.3.e  Active Reflexivity. 
As was discussed in Section 3.2.a, issues of reflexivity, positionality, situated 
knowledges, power relations, and navigating insider-outsider roles, are of particular 
importance to this project given the research focus, theoretical approach and methods 
chosen. In attempting to insert ourselves into the lives of others, be it through 
participant observation or interviewing, researchers are creating a distinct, unnatural 
space, whereby our very presence shapes the field. Our level of influence over the 
research field, participants, communities and places depends largely on our 
positionality. Given my positionality discussed in Section 3.3.b, I had to be particularly 
mindful and considerate of how my positionality might impact on participants, their 
practices and the places that they allowed me to experience with them. As such, it was 
important that I be reflexive and self-critical at all times. In order to habitualise such 
reflective practices and incorporate them into my research methods, I continually wrote 
reflexive memos throughout all stages of the research process. Many of these memos 
were directly aimed at challenging my preconceived notions and eventual 
interpretations of the research and the data, along with reflecting on my emotional, 
sensory and embodied experiences of conducting research in place. As Figure 3.4 
shows, certain questions were continually asked in my interpretive notes and reflexive 
memos, centred around the questions of “who”, “why”, “where”, “what”, “when” and 
“how”. Such a practice of reflexivity was also important in addressing the issue of 
situated knowledges and in challenging my admittedly Western theoretical position. 
Further, this reflexive practice was essential in shaping my research methods, as they 
continually evolved in the field in response to obstacles faced, observations made, 
participant responses.  
Core 
Question. 
Elaborated questions – taken from 
notes and memos.  
Example from reflexive 
memos. 
Who 
• Who said/did it?  
• Who was it said to?  
• Who was it said about?  
• Who was present?  
• Who was not present?  
“I was a bit surprised that she 
spoke so honestly and frankly 
with me, I hadn’t expected it. I 
didn’t think that we had built up 
that level of familiarity yet – she 
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had always seemed stand-offish. 
So, this made me wonder, what 
had suddenly changed? And I 
realise now, it’s because we were 
alone for the first time. Is it 
possible that the problem up until 
now wasn’t me? But rather, it 
was who was with me – the 
manager.” – Dated 23 January 
2016.  
What 
• What was said/done? 
• What was the context for it 
being said/done? 
• What are the details of it? 
(Check descriptive notes). 
• What was our relationship? 
• What were my initial 
interpretations/understandings 
of it? 
“When we were speaking about 
Qingzhen, it became clear that I 
didn’t fully understand his 
meaning at first. I misinterpreted 
it. Luckily though, I quickly 
realised that for him, Qingzhen 
means something deeper than 
what I expected. But what did I 
interpret it as at first? I thought 
he meant halal, but it’s obvious 
that his understanding is much 
more complex. What does this 
initial misunderstanding tell me 
about my own western-centric 
understandings and applications 
of meaning? This is definitely 
something I need to be careful 
of.” – Dated 15 December 2015.  
Where  
• Where did it happen? – 
Location in Beijing and in 
establishment.  
• Where is the person from? 
“I feel tired today. Not just 
physically, but emotionally and 
mentally. It was a long day. I 
visited R1 and R2, they weren’t 
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• Where was I when it 
happened? 
• Where did I want to be? 
very long visits, maybe an hour 
each, but they’ve really impacted 
on me. In R1 the chefs were 
taking their lunch. 
Unsurprisingly, they spoke about 
wanting to return home for 
Chinese New Year. That’s 
something that I can relate to – 
wanting to go home. Did I want 
to be there? If not, how did this 
impact on my experiences? 
Although the four of us were in 
that place together, I think we all 
wanted to be elsewhere. It was a 
strange experience, being in 
place with others, yet we all 
longed for somewhere else.” – 
Dated 5 February 2016.  
When 
• When did it happen? 
• When did the event they were 
talking about happen? 
• What memories does it bring 
up for me? 
“I’ll be returning to Beijing soon, 
for my last research visit. I’m 
feeling a mix of emotions, both 
positive and negative. It’s 
strange how one place can hold 
so much emotional weight for a 
person. So, I’ve had to ask 
myself, why am I feeling like 
this? Or more to the point, when 
am I thinking of and what 
memories is this upcoming trip 
bringing up for me? On the one 
hand, I’m a bit worried, but I 
realise that these feelings are tied 
to my memories of early 2016. 
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But even more than that, I’m 
excited and positive because my 
last visit in 2017 went so well. 
Also, I’m excited to see my 
friends, especially Sophia. So, 
I’m not just thinking of two time 
periods from the past, but my 
current emotions are also tied to 
predictions of the future.” – 
Dated 29 December 2018.  
How 
• How was it said? 
• How was it done? 
• How did I/others respond? 
• How did I initially translate 
it? 
• How did I feel at the time? 
• How did I feel before it? – 
Was there a change? 
• How did they seem at the 
time of saying/doing it? – 
How did I interpret this? 
“As she told me about her 
family, it was clear that she 
missed home – she didn’t try to 
hide it. But how did I feel at that 
time? How did I feel listening to 
her stories of home? How was 
her story resonating with my 
own experiences? I miss home 
too. I miss my family. I wish I 
could go home, but I feel like 
I’m stuck here– just like her. 
These feelings of homesickness 
are something that we have in 
common, she suggested so 
herself. So, this makes me 
wonder, how do these emotional 
connections affect my research 
and research relationships?” – 
Dated 19 February 2016.  
Why 
• Why did they do/say it? 
• Why did this seem significant 
to me? 
“This word Qinqie, I’ve been 
translating it as connected. But 
why? I know that that’s how 
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• Why did I translate it using 
those words? 
• Why did I respond the way I 
did? 
• Why did I feel the way I did? 
• Why have I interpreted it the 
way I have?  
Shige translated it initially, but 
what if I’m missing a deeper 
meaning? After all, connected is 
how he interprets the word, but 
that doesn’t mean that that’s how 
I, or especially the participant, 
understand it.” – Dated 4 August 
2017.  
Figure 3.4: Questions often asked during reflexive memos. 
Source: Author’s own (2020). 
This positionality unavoidably, and unsurprisingly, positioned me as an outsider within 
the places of Hui food culture, a position that would be difficult, if not impossible for 
me to overcome. However, rather than attempting to ignore or dismiss my position as an 
outsider, I embraced it and tried to use it to my advantage in my negotiation of the 
power relations present in the research context. Given the fact that I am neither Chinese 
nor Muslim, participants could be established as local experts by explaining that as an 
outsider, I knew far less about the research topic than them, that I valued their opinions, 
experiences and insights, and that they were ultimately helping me to learn about 
something that they were experts in. These attempts at shifting power relations and 
positioning participants as local experts were aided by the fact that I was also a 
registered student at local universities. This student status acted to further affirm 
participants’ dominant role. Such a position of inferiority in regard to expert knowledge 
allowed for participants to volunteer information, or for me to ask questions about 
topics, that participants might otherwise have assumed that I know. This fact allowed 
for more detailed accounts to be given of some of the Hui’s, and indeed Chinese and 
Islamic, cornerstone events, practices and ideas, such as: Qingzhen, Ramadan, Eid al-
Adha, Chinese New Year, conceptualisations of ethnicity and nationalism, and inter-
ethnic differences. Further, the fact that I am a non-native speaker of Mandarin Chinese 
meant that on occasion I did not understand specific terms being used by participants to 
describe specialised topics. However, rather than remaining silent, I would use this as 
an opportunity to ask participants to explain the term to me in another way. This often 
resulted in a rich and descriptive account of specialised terms. In fact, this tactic proved 
to be so beneficial and fruitful that I often used it even when I understood the key term 
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being used. This method allowed for detailed accounts to be given for some of this 
project’s key issues, specifically Qingzhen, Qinqie, Minzu16 or numerous terms relating 
to the Hui’s food cultures. As was discussed in Section 3.3.d, the decision to assume the 
role of a customer during the initial covert participant observation phase, rather than 
fully disclosing my status as a researcher, was done in an attempt to navigate the 
inherent power relations faced. During this initial phase of research, I found that 
immediately disclosing my status as a researcher acted as a deterrent for restaurant staff. 
As such, when conversing with restaurant staff I would tell them that I was a student in 
China and that I was interested in Hui food cultures. Although such an approach was 
deemed to be necessary for familiarising myself with the local foodscape in Beijing, the 
decision to initially conceal my status as a researcher from restaurant staff undeniably 
involved inequitable power relations. As such, the decision was made not to record 
conversations from this time, nor to include any of these conversations in the thesis. 
This was done to mitigate such unequal power relations and to safeguard the restaurant 
staff.  
3.3.f  Selecting Sites for Further Study. 
Before any of the located restaurants could be asked to take part in the extended overt 
participant observation phase, the compiled list of visited establishments first needed to 
be understood. In order to make sense of the extensive list of Hui food spaces found, it 
was decided that producing a typology of the restaurants found might be beneficial in 
narrowing the sample. As such, the restaurants that had been previously documented 
were grouped together depending on distinguishable characteristics and traits. Given the 
diverse array of restaurants and establishments found, the list of categories varied, 
including groupings based on size of the restaurant, average price, type of 
establishment, ownership, and referents to other places.  
Size Price  Type of 
Establishment 
Type of 
Ownership 
Referents to 
Place 
Small, Inexpensive Restaurant, State-owned, Beijing, 
 
16民族。Eng: ethnicity, nationality.  
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Medium, 
Large. 
 
Moderate or 
Average 
Priced, 
Expensive. 
Street-food stand, 
Bakery, 
Butchers, 
University Canteen, 
Fast Food 
Restaurant, 
Snacks, 
Food Court, 
Café/ Teahouse. 
Family / 
Privately 
Owned, 
Chain, 
Unknown. 
Ningxia, 
Lanzhou/Gansu, 
Xinjiang, 
Xibei/ 
Xibeifang, 
Xi’an/ Shaanxi, 
West. 
Figure 3.5: Typology of restaurants. 
Source: Author’s own (2017). 
These restaurants were then further differentiated depending on the district that they 
were found in. Ultimately, it was decided that four restaurants would be asked to 
participate in the research. These four restaurants were each in a different district and 
each of them represented different groupings from the typology. For each of the 
districts, a list of restaurants was created and ranked in terms of preference. The first 
restaurant from each district was asked to participate and if they refused, the next 
highest ranked restaurant was asked. It was important to have a strategy that allowed for 
rejection given the likelihood – and indeed reality – that many restaurant managers 
would refuse to participate in an extended study. The task of gaining consent from 
restaurant managers to conduct research on their premises would prove to be one of the 
greatest methodological difficulties faced by this project. Despite showing interest in 
the project when first approached, many restaurant managers and owners were reluctant 
to agree to participate. Once asked to participate, these individuals would often become 
visibly uncomfortable and nervous. Many would refuse to participate, usually without 
giving a reason, while others would offer to think about it and contact me if they should 
decide to consent. On three occasions during these early interactions with potential 
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participants, the restaurants’ managers had initially agreed to participate but later 
declined once they heard that a consent form needed to be signed. In order to overcome 
this issue, a number of different tactics and alternate methods were used.  
Upon careful reflection of the various outcomes, it became evident that it was not 
necessarily participation in the study itself that was concerning these individuals. 
Rather, it was participation in the study with me, a non-Chinese, and the requirement of 
written consent that were causing them the most concern. Therefore, it was decided that 
a gatekeeper of some sort may prove to be helpful when approaching these 
understandably cautious individuals. As such, I invited a friend to assist with recruiting 
participants. As this friend is a Chinese woman from Northwest China, her presence 
seemed to put them at ease somewhat. In line with this, a new method was devised 
when approaching potential participating restaurants. I continued to make the initial 
visits to the restaurants alone, building a presence, engaging in informal conversation 
with staff and explaining my interest in Hui food culture to them. Once I had then 
selected a restaurant for the next stage of participant observation, my friend would 
accompany me to the establishment, introduce both of us and the research to the 
manager, and would then answer any questions that they might have regarding 
participation. Rather than simply refusing to participate, the managers and owners 
willingly engaged in conversation with the Chinese friend about the practicalities and 
legalities involved in participation. Her positionality as a north-western Chinese woman 
seemed to reassure them somewhat and as a result, consent was given by the 
managers/owners of the participating restaurants. Despite having offered financial 
recompense to this friend for her help, she refused to accept, instead insisting that no 
repayment was needed. After some negotiation, she agreed that I compensate her by 
buying our meals on the days that she accompanied me for research – an extremely 
generous offer for which I am incredibly grateful.   
It is also worth mentioning that although two of the restaurant managers agreed to sign 
consent forms, many others refused to do so, even after initially agreeing to participate 
in the research. Following the refusal of numerous restaurant managers to provide 
written consent, it was decided that the remaining potential participants not be asked to 
sign consent forms. In such circumstances, verbal consent was given by the individual 
responsible for the running of the restaurant. Ultimately, four restaurants gave their 
consent for participation in the overt participant observation phase. The table below list 
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some of the distinguishable characteristics used to select the four restaurants that agreed 
to participate.  
Restaurant Restaurant 1 – 
Haidian 
District 
Restaurant 2 
– Dongcheng 
District 
Restaurant 3 
– Xicheng 
District 
Restaurant 4 
– Chaoyang 
District 
Size Medium Large Small Medium 
Price  Inexpensive Expensive Moderate or 
Average  
Moderate or 
Average  
Type of 
Establishment 
Fast Food 
Restaurant 
Restaurant Restaurant, 
Bakery, 
Butchers, 
Snacks 
Restaurant 
Type of 
Ownership 
Chain Part Privately 
Owned/ Part 
State-owned 
Family / 
Privately 
Owned 
Family / 
Privately 
Owned 
Referents to 
Place 
Lanzhou/Gansu Ningxia Beijing Xinjiang 
Figure 3.6: Restaurants selected. 
Source: Author’s own (2017). 
3.3.g  Overt Participant Observation. 
Of these four restaurants, participant observation was carried out overtly in two of them 
from mid-January 2016 to March 2016. These restaurants were Restaurant 1 in Haidian 
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District and Restaurant 2 in Dongcheng District, with a several visits also being made to 
Restaurant 4 in February. Although Restaurant 3 and Restaurant 4 had given their 
consent, both had asked that I wait until after the Spring Festival to begin visiting their 
restaurants, before they eventually decided to pull out of the research. Restaurant 4 
explained that they would be shut for a number of weeks as their staff were all from 
Xinjiang and would be returning home to celebrate the festival. Shortly after staff had 
returned to Beijing, and some visits were made to the restaurant, the owner explained 
that she no longer wished to participate in the project as the restaurant was facing some 
legal difficulties stemming from issues in relation to official certificates  – the restaurant 
and its second branch have both since been closed down by authorities. The reason for 
non-participation by the owner of Restaurant 3 remains uncertain. The elderly owner 
continually provided excuses to postpone their involvement, before they ultimately 
pulled out of the project in February 2016. She chose not to explain the reasons behind 
her decision. Although I cannot say with any certainty why she chose to stop 
participating, I would expect that it may be linked to my “outsider” status, both in terms 
of nationality and religion. Throughout all of our interactions she seemed quite reluctant 
to speak directly with me, preferring to speak with my Chinese friend instead. Further, 
she responded rather negatively when told that I was not a Muslim, something which 
happened a few times in that neighbourhood but was extremely rare in all other areas of 
the city. Although only two restaurants officially participated in the longitudinal 
participant observation, with Restaurant 4 withdrawing consent in February after just a 
few visits, it should not be assumed that this limitation was disabling to the project’s 
advancement. Despite not having officially consented to long-term involvement, several 
other key participants allowed me to visit their establishments regularly throughout the 
eight-month period, including a bakery, a Jianbing17 stand, and a popular north-
western-style restaurant. By carrying out near-weekly visits to these establishments over 
the course of a few weeks, along with the more frequent visits to officially participating 
restaurants, a sufficient dataset was compiled, supplemented by the semi-structured 
interviews and analysis of local materials gathered.  
The first session of overt participant observation in participating establishments, both 
officially participating restaurants and the informal short-term participants, always took 
place with the manager or supervisor present. These sessions largely acted as 
introductory sessions whereby I was introduced to both the manager and staff, while 
 
17煎饼。Eng: Thin pancake made of millet flour.  
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also receiving an introductory “lesson” on the restaurants, their practices, menus, 
customers and histories. These first sessions began in similar ways, with the member of 
management acting as gatekeeper between the staff and I. Together we would walk 
around the restaurant to meet the various groups of employees, and the manager would 
briefly introduce of me, my role and the research. In all three consenting restaurants, the 
management encouraged the staff to speak with me during my visits and to help me 
with any queries that I might have. Although the managers were trying to help me by 
introducing me to the staff, such an introduction by the managers needs to be considered 
critically given the inherent power relations involved and the issue of informed consent.  
As such, I asked the managers to explain to their staff that they did not have to 
participate in the research if they did not want to, a point which I felt was important to 
make in order to avoid the staff feeling pressured or coerced into participation. Further, 
when speaking privately with staff, I would remind them that participation was 
voluntary and that they could withdraw from the research at any time if they wished to.  
Once I was greeted by the staff, the managers walked me through the restaurants, 
introducing me to their establishments, their menus and practices. In all of these 
establishments, the “lesson” (as the manager of Restaurant 1 called it) provided an in-
depth account of how the restaurants were run on a daily basis, what food and services 
the restaurants provided their customers with, and what their histories and clientele were 
like. During this first visit in Restaurant 1, the manager suggested that I audio record 
our conversation as he intended to provide details on all aspects of the restaurant. He 
also explained that he felt it was necessary to provide me with such a detailed tour in the 
first session, as he was unlikely to be available for all of my following sessions. With 
this in mind, I agreed that recording our conversation would be wise. At one point 
during this visit, he asked one of the chefs to demonstrate how each of the varieties of 
speciality hand-pulled noodles were made. The chef suggested that I video record his 
demonstration, which I did. Although my role as researcher to document my 
observations was particularly noticeable during this first visit in Restaurant 1, the 
recording of observations and interactions was done more discretely throughout the rest 
of the participant observations. In this regard, the writing of fieldnotes was done in a 
similar way to the covert method described earlier, whereby detailed accounts were 
written immediately after each visit. In addition to writing these descriptive fieldnotes, 
reflective and interpretive essays were regularly written. 
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Once the initial visits had been carried out, an effort was made to establish a regular 
presence in these restaurants. Restaurants 1, 2 and 4 would be visited once or twice a 
week, with the length of each visit varying between forty minutes to over two hours. 
The other informally participating establishments were visited once a week, or once 
every second week, for up to two months, with each visit lasting between 30 minutes 
and an hour. This was done in the hopes of developing a relationship with the staff 
while allowing the staff to become comfortable and familiar with my recurring 
presence. These visits, which were carried out largely in February and March 2016, 
were primarily sessions of observation, with very little active participation other than 
occasionally helping staff members with minor cleaning tasks. During visits to these 
establishments, I would generally occupy a position in the staff section of the 
restaurants. In Restaurant 1, I would often stand in the kitchen with the chefs, in a 
position that allowed for the rest of the restaurant to be seen through the large opening 
at the service space. At other times, I stood with the waitresses at the cash desk at the 
other side of the restaurant. In Restaurants 2 and 4, I would generally stand next to the 
service window with the waitresses.  
Rather than directly approaching the staff, I would allow them to approach me in their 
own time. For the most part, the staff were extremely interested in both me and the 
research project. They often asked questions not only about the research, but also 
personal questions relating to my studies, nationality, family, life in Beijing, and even 
love life. Although many of their questions may have appeared rather personal and 
direct, my previous experiences of having lived in Beijing assured me that this was 
simply due to cultural differences. The questions that I may have initially considered 
too personal, weren’t considered such by the staff. Despite being mildly uncomfortable, 
I tried to answer these questions in a way that was honest yet didn’t disclose any 
information that I feared might negatively affect our relationship or jeopardise the 
future of the research, specifically surrounding my sexuality. Typically, once the 
questions of the staff had been answered, the focus could then progress onto matters that 
were more closely related to the research topic, such as their personal histories and 
lives, their work experience and roles in the restaurant, their opinions of the restaurant’s 
décor, and their understandings and preferences of Hui food. Conversations with 
cooking and waiting staff were largely confined to quiet times, when there weren’t 
many customers. As such, many of the visits to restaurants were intentionally scheduled 
to take place at these times. However, I also made a few visits during busy times, such 
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as during lunch and dinner service. During these busier times, I would converse with 
members of the restaurants’ management, particularly supervisors and managers.  
3.3.h  Suspension of Studies. 
In late March 2016, the participant observation section of research had to be 
discontinued four months early due to ill health. Unforeseen changes in personal 
circumstances, combined with deteriorating health, led to the continuation of the project 
being an impossibility for me at that time. My declining mental and emotional 
wellbeing was resulting in an inability to conduct the research on a practical level, while 
my emotional state was also preventing me from engaging critically with the research. 
Despite having to cease fieldwork while I took a suspension from studies between April 
2016 and September 2016, I continued to write reflective notes about the time spent in 
Beijing, about my emotional connections to the places that I had spent time in, about 
how I felt in relation to the research given my role as researcher and what I had 
experienced, and most importantly, about how my emotions may have impacted on how 
I understood and engaged with the project, participants and places. During this period, a 
lot of time was spent learning how to acknowledge, understand and accept my emotions 
and emotional states with the help of psychiatric and therapeutic professionals.  
This period of personal learning was arguably an important period for this project as it 
allowed me to gain a better understanding of the importance of reflexivity, while 
teaching me the important tools necessary for reflecting on my own emotional knowing. 
The ability to identify, engage with, and reflect on my own emotional states and 
responses is important for this project, particularly in regard to the ethics of care 
discussed in the introduction. Such an ethics of care appreciates that self-care is an 
important step in being a more attentive, engaged, receptive and responsive researcher. I 
believe that in order to understand and take seriously the situated knowledges and 
emotional knowings of others, we must first be able to actively engage with our own 
through reflective practices. To this end, I find that there is a great deal of insights to be 
gleaned from mindfulness practices.  
I began learning of mindfulness practices during my suspension of studies by taking 
part in an eighteen-month mindfulness-based course. This again, has had a 
methodological impact on this project. Specifically, the theories and practices of 
mindfulness influenced to a certain degree the method taken during the interview 
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process, whereby interviewees were asked to engage in brief mindfulness exercises, 
such as: describing what they saw in the restaurant, along with the flavours, sounds and 
smells that they were experiencing. By asking interviewees to focus on their sensory 
experiences through brief engagements with mindfulness, interviewees were focusing 
on their present experiences. This not only helped the interviewees relax, but it also 
allowed them to focus on their current emotional states and embodied experiences. This 
was a useful technique when followed up with questions relating to the interviewees’ 
personal attachments to the sensory stimulants that they were being questioned about, 
be it visual representations and décor, or their attachments to dishes, foods and flavours.  
3.3.i  Second Field Visit. 
Once work on the project had recommenced, the methodology had to be reconfigured in 
line with the new timeline. Initially, it was intended that fifteen semi-structured 
interviews would be carried out in Beijing near the end of the participant observation 
phase from May to July 2016. However, as the participant observation had been stopped 
at such an early stage, the interviews could not be carried out. Therefore, a second 
research trip was undertaken between June and August 2017 to allow for the semi-
structured interviews to be carried out. Not only was the time of the interview phase 
necessarily changed, but so to was the number of interviews to be conducted. Rather 
than conducting 15 interviews, it was decided that 30 interviews would make for a 
better dataset, compensating for any potential shortages in the data gathered from the 
overt participant observation. These 30 interviews were conducted with 34 individuals 
from nine provinces. 
No. Gender Province of 
Origin 
Occupation Establishment 
Interviewed 
In 
Age Range 
1 Female Shandong Waiting Staff Restaurant  30 - 40 
2 Male Gansu Waiting Staff Restaurant Under 20 
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3 Male Gansu Chef Restaurant 20 - 30 
4 Male Gansu Manager Restaurant 50 - 60 
5 Male Anhui Manager Restaurant 40 - 50 
6 Female Shandong Waiting Staff Restaurant Under 20 
7 Female Shandong Waiting Staff Restaurant 20 - 30 
8 Male  Heilongjiang Owner Bakery  30 - 40 
9 Male Beijing Butcher Butcher Shop 50 - 60 
10 Male Beijing Butcher Butcher Shop 50 - 60 
11 Female Gansu  Waiting Staff Restaurant 20 - 30 
12 Male Gansu Chef Restaurant 20 - 30 
13 Female Gansu  Intern Restaurant 20 - 30 
14 Female Shandong Waiting Staff Restaurant 20 - 30 
15 Female Shandong Waiting Staff Restaurant 20 - 30 
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16 Female Ningxia Waiting Staff Restaurant 20 - 30 
17 Female Ningxia Supervisor  Restaurant 40 - 50 
18 Female Ningxia Manager/ 
Owner 
Restaurant 50 - 60 
19 Male Gansu Manager  Restaurant 30 - 40 
20 Male Gansu Manager Restaurant 20 - 30 
21 Male Shandong Butcher Butcher Shop 40 - 50 
22 Male Shaanxi Owner Bakery  50 - 60 
23 Female Ningxia Manager/ 
Owner 
Bakery & 
Butcher 
60 + 
24 Male Gansu Chef Restaurant 20 - 30 
25 Male Shandong Supervisor Restaurant 20 - 30 
26 Male Gansu Supervisor Restaurant 20 - 30 
27 Female Beijing Manager/ 
Owner 
Restaurant 50 - 60 
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28 Female Ningxia Waiting Staff Restaurant 20 - 30 
29 Male Qinghai Manager  Restaurant 20 - 30 
30 Male Shaanxi Owner Restaurant 50 – 60 
31 Male Beijing Owner Restaurant 60 + 
32 Male Beijing Intern Restaurant 20 - 30 
33 Male  Hebei Imam Bakery 50 - 60 
34 Male Ningxia Customer Bakery 20 - 30 
Figure 3.7: Interviewees. 
Source: Author’s own (2020). 
Total 
Number 
Gender Province of 
Origin 
Occupation Establishment 
Interviewed 
In 
Age 
Range 
34 Male: 21 
Female: 13 
Anhui: 1 
Beijing: 5 
Gansu: 10 
Hebei: 1 
Waiting 
Staff: 9 
Chef: 3 
Supervisor: 
3 
Bakery: 4 
Butcher Shop: 
3 
Bakery & 
Butchers: 1 
Under 20: 
2 
20 – 30: 16 
30 – 40: 3 
40 – 50: 3 
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Heilong-
jiang: 1 
Ningxia: 6 
Qinghai: 1 
Shandong: 
7 
Shaanxi: 2 
Manager: 5 
Manager/ 
Owner: 4 
Owner: 3 
Butcher: 3 
Imam: 1 
Intern: 2 
Customer: 1 
Restaurant: 26 50 – 60: 8 
60 +: 2 
Figure 3.8: Overview of Sample. 
Source: Author’s own (2020). 
Before the second leg of fieldwork began, a research assistant was hired. Originally, it 
was decided that an interpreter would be needed to assist with the interviews to allow 
for more in-depth topics to be explored and to avoid any misunderstandings or missed 
linguistic nuances. Also, given the difficulties faced during the first stage of fieldwork 
when attempting to recruit participants, it was decided that an assistant would also be 
needed to help successfully recruit interviewees. As such, a research assistant was hired 
using an internship website. The role of the assistant was to help with the recruitment of 
interviewees, interpret during interviews, transcribe all interviews, and translate the 
transcripts into English. Of the applicants, an ethnically non-Han Chinese male 
university student named Shige was hired, due not only to his English abilities and 
academic suitability, but also because of his positionality. By hiring a non-Han Chinese, 
it was hoped that similarities between the interpreter and the research participants may 
be drawn on, as was the case with my north-western Chinese friend during the first field 
visit. Further, given the positive responses that the restaurant staff encountered during 
the first field visit had when told that I was a student, it was hoped that the Shige’s 
student status would evoke a similar response. Through enlisting the help of Chinese 
nationals, specifically a non-Han Chinese person, their positionings arguably helped to 
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improve my credibility among the Hui, similar to how Ho (2013) enlisted Mainland 
Chinese researchers for her study of Southeast Asian “refugee returnees”. 
Once access had been secured to the field through registering on a summer language 
course and obtaining a student visa, the second phase of fieldwork could begin. Before 
returning to Beijing, a number of cities across China were briefly visited that had 
previously been identified as significant centres of Hui food culture. The cities visited 
were Hohhot City in Inner-Mongolia Autonomous Region, Yinchuan City in the 
Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region, Xi’an City in Shaanxi Province, and Kunming City 
in Yunnan Province. The purpose of these trips was to observe, and document displays 
of local Hui food culture in order to better understand not only the regional variations 
referenced by participants, but also to better understand the distinctive qualities of Hui 
culture in Beijing by comparison. Local documentary sources were gathered, and brief 
sessions of covert participant observations were carried out, similar to Beijing. These 
non-Beijing sources were important in providing a broader framing of participants’ 
experiences and opinions, especially as many of the participants originated from these 
areas. Ultimately, the data gathered from these visits does not feature heavily in the 
empirical discussions, with the exception of the Hui’s cultural diversity discussed in 
Chapter 5, and the historical development of the Hui as an ethnic group in Chapter 4.  
Before returning to China, an effort was made to prearrange some interviews. A number 
of previous participants were contacted and three agreed to interviews. These three 
interviews were carried out first, with the interviewees also acting as gatekeepers to 
further interviewees. This snowball approach resulted in four further interviews. 
Another approach taken to prearrange interviews involved me identifying suitable 
restaurants and Shige either visiting or phoning them to ask about participation. 
However, this approach was less successful, resulting in only one interview. The most 
effective approach for recruiting interviewees was cold-calling, where individuals were 
approached without having previously been consulted about the research. As with the 
early stages of the covert participant observation, certain areas were selected based on 
volume or quality of Hui restaurants. These restaurants were then visited, and Shige 
would introduce the project and myself to members of staff. It quickly became apparent 
that staff were more likely to agree during the restaurant’s quiet times. Specifically, the 
three-hour period between 2pm and 5pm was most productive for both approaching 
interviewees and conducting interviews. Before entering restaurants to approach 
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individuals, preferences of their gender and position would be considered. This was 
done in order to gain a relatively representative sample. However, it should be noted 
that strict selection based on such characteristics was not always enforced, and on 
occasion no such preference was pre-decided.  
Considering the difficulties faced in earlier stages of research, written consent was not 
asked for although the use of data was always discussed, and verbal consent obtained. 
This verbal consent covered all items included in the written consent form. This 
possibility had been discussed with my supervisors and with the ethics committee at 
Maynooth University. Given the experience of a previous doctoral student (Lin, 2016) 
in Geography at Maynooth University, this prospect had been anticipated. Lin’s 
research into the Falun Gong had likewise found a deep suspicion of any written 
documentation of participation in the research project. Participants considered it safer to 
leave no record of their signature. In this case too, the questions on the ethics form had 
been put verbally to the local experts and their consent sought in this way. 
All of the interviewees found through cold-calling, bar three, were interviewed 
immediately in the restaurants. As we visited the establishments outside of busy times, 
it was usually quiet enough to allow for privacy, meaning that the interviewees could 
speak openly without fear of being overheard. Although most interviews took place in 
the main area of the restaurants, five of them were carried out in private spaces, such as 
a manager’s office, a staff room, a private dining room, and an enclosed outdoor space. 
Most interviews involved one interviewee, however, some involved two or more 
individuals being interviewed at the same time. These small group interviews were 
carried out at the request of the interviewees, who felt more comfortable being 
interviewed in the presence of another colleague. As the interviews were semi-
structured, a list of topics was used to provide a very loose structure, which was 
deviated from as the participant led the conversation. Topics were added or removed 
from the list as their relevance and importance to the research became apparent. At the 
beginning of the interviews, simple questions relating to the participants’ biographies 
and histories were asked, which not only proved informative but was helpful in putting 
the interviewees at ease. Shige was asked to translate all responses, even when I 
understood the answers. This was in done in order to ensure that no misunderstandings 
happened.  
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Given the project’s interests in the emotional attachments of Hui people to food and 
places, a mindfulness-inspired and reflexive approach was taken when asking 
interviewees about their favourite dishes and the décor of the restaurants. At certain 
points throughout the interview, the participants were encouraged to focus on the 
present through bringing their attention onto their current sensory experiences. 
Specifically, they were asked to focus on certain aspects of the restaurants’ décor and, 
where possible, the flavours of the food that we were eating. They were then asked to 
describe what they were seeing and tasting, an action that brought them into the present 
moment according to mindfulness theories. Once this was done, they were then asked 
what thoughts came to mind when reflecting on the particular visual aid or taste. 
Generally, the answers would relate to memories of home, family, childhood, religion 
and ethnicity. They were then asked to reflect on their emotional responses to these 
thoughts and memories. Such a practice proved very fruitful for discussions of 
emotional attachments to food and places, things that might otherwise have been 
difficult topics to approach.  
3.3.j  Translation, Transcribing and Coding Processes. 
Once the interviews had been carried out, they needed to be transcribed and translated. 
As was discussed earlier, these were part of Shige’s duties. This task was left to Shige 
not only to maximise time efficiency, but also to avoid the loss of any linguistic nuance 
or meaning. A format was provided which he was instructed to follow. This format 
included guidelines about how the English and Chinese sections should be written, and 
how it should be translated. Once these documents had been written, they were emailed 
to me. I then checked the transcripts and translations. Certain translations were 
highlighted and noted when the translation from Chinese to English possibly changed 
the original meaning. This was an important step, particularly in relation to the language 
used by interviewees to describe their emotional attachments to places and food. Many 
of the interviewees used the term Qinqie18 to describe how they felt about Hui food and 
the décor of Hui restaurants. Originally Shige had translated this as meaning 
“closeness”. However, as we discovered, the word was in fact being used to signify a 
range of emotions beyond such a simple translation to English (see Chapter 6).  
 
18亲切。 
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Following the translation of transcripts, they were coded thematically using MAXQDA 
software. Rather than approaching the documents with a pre-set list of themes to look 
for, a blind approach was taken. Themes were allowed to emerge from the transcripts, 
and once identified they were documented. After the first coding of the field journals, 
reflections and transcripts, they were then read through again. This was done as some 
themes only emerged in the later transcripts and as such, it needed to be seen if they 
were also present in the earlier documents. This coding process resulted in 115 thematic 
codes being identified within the transcripts and field notes, categorised under 13 
primary groupings. A further 54 thematic codes were used for photographs and visual 
materials, grouped into 15 themes. In total, there were 169 codes, with 28 main themes 
emerging which formed the foundations for this thesis’ arguments.    
When writing the thesis, I decided to include as footnotes all the Chinese characters 
from transcripts, fieldnotes and materials used. This again, is in line with my intended 
ethics of care. As Krzywoszynska (2015) has pointed out, there are many issues with 
how we translate research data, especially in the context of overseas research. I 
therefore believe that one should not only reflect upon the translation processes, but also 
be transparent about choices made. Such transparency allows for the interpretive nature 
of the translation process to be exposed, something that is important given the post-
colonial aspirations of a feminist political geography approach. Once the chapters had 
been written, and the Chinese characters included as footnotes, they were given to Dr 
Zhouxiang Lu, who is a member of my supervisory panel. Dr Lu is a native Mandarin 
Chinese speaker. He read through my translations, ensuring that no misinterpretations or 
mistranslations occurred.  
3.3.k  Third Field Visit.  
Once the dataset had been coded and analysed, and conversations were held with the 
project’s supervisors and mentors, I began formulating arguments based on empirical 
data. It was decided that a third research trip would then be undertaken in January 2019. 
The trip lasted 17-days and its purpose was two-fold. Firstly, the validity of proposed 
arguments would be tested through further observation and conversations with Beijing’s 
Hui residents. This approach was not only deemed to be the most ethical and 
methodologically-sound, but also necessary for certain arguments given the claims of 
temporal change being made. This is particularly true in relation to the arguments being 
made in Chapter 7.2 regarding alcohol and assimilation. The second reason for this 
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return trip was to gather more photographic evidence of the place-making tactics 
discussed in Chapter 6. Although many photographs had been gathered during earlier 
phases of fieldwork, I felt as though more photographs were needed to evidence the 
specific visual referents used by restaurant owners in establishing distinctively Hui 
places.  
During this field visit, 111 establishments were visited. Of these 62 were restaurants. 
These establishments were primarily located based on my past experiences of 
researching in Beijing. Many of the establishments and areas had previously been 
visited during the first two field visits – although I quickly realised that some 
restaurants had closed down in the interval. However, many of these restaurants were 
replaced by new establishments, although some had been completely demolished (see 
chapter 7.2.a for a discussion). Once all previously visited areas had been returned to, I 
once again turned to online search engines and applications (particularly Baidu Maps 
and the social media, micro-blogging site Weibo) to locate new areas of interest within 
the chosen five districts. As with earlier field visits, these restaurants were visited and 
informal conversations with staff were recorded. Photographs were also taken, with the 
permission of waiting staff or managers. Fieldnotes and reflective memos were 
continuously written, focusing specifically on the proposed arguments for the thesis, 
namely: gender and changing gender roles; the importance of visual references to places 
in the making of Hui restaurants; and the increasing presence of alcohol within Hui 
restaurants. These documents were then coded and analysed using MAXQDA software, 
once I had returned to Maynooth University. As of 7 February 2020, a total of 579 
fieldnotes and reflexive memos have been written, comprising of: 280 descriptive 
fieldnotes; 82 interpretive notes; and 217 reflexive memos.  
3.3.l  Security of Data. 
The security of data was of upmost importance throughout the entirety of this research 
project, particularly given its Chinese context and the sensitivity of Islam and ethnicity 
in China. Much of the project’s dataset, specifically interview transcripts, field-notes 
and personal reflexive memos, were initially saved as encrypted Word Documents, but 
later as encrypted MAXQDA coded files. Photographs were encrypted in JPEG format, 
and audio files were also encrypted. All audio files were deleted once I checked the 
translated transcripts for any errors or oversights. All written files were anonymised 
immediately. A metadata file was encrypted, containing the five potential indirect 
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identifiers gathered for all interviewees (age range, occupation, gender, type of 
establishment they work in, and province of origin). All files were securely stored on an 
encrypted hard-drive, and my secure folder at Maynooth University. Therefore, data 
was backed-up with two copies, in two different mediums, with one copy offsite to 
ensure safety. All files were encrypted, as was my hard-drive and computer.  
While in China, HEAnetFileSender was used to send encrypted files from my computer 
to one of the project’s supervisors, Professor Boyle, in Maynooth University, who then 
stored them in an encrypted folder. These files were then deleted from my computer. 
Only I had the password for encrypted files. In regards to written consent, these 
documents were scanned, encrypted and stored separately from other files. Paper copies 
were shredded immediately thereafter. Participants were asked to consent to the 
archiving of the data. This anonymised data will be prepared for archiving following 
successful completion of the PhD and then made available through the Irish Qualitative 
Data Archive at the time of publication. 
3.4  CONCLUSION. 
In Chapter 2 of this thesis, a theoretical framework was developed which is feminist, 
post-colonial, critical and anti-racist in its approach to knowledge production. This 
feminist political geographical approach considers people’s emotive and lived 
experiences as being important sites of (geo)political inquiry. Further, such an approach 
understands knowledge as being embodied, situated, anti-foundational and as being 
actively produced in the field. In line with this epistemology, this chapter set about 
discussing this project’s methodology and methods.   
Given this project’s overarching aim – which is to explore how Hui identity is 
performed, made public, othered, negotiated, and contested through its food cultures – a 
methodology needed to be developed which would allow for a critical exploration of 
Hui food cultures. In order to achieve this, a qualitative methodological approach was 
devised, centred around the methods of participant observation, semi-structured 
interviews, semiotic analysis of local materials and the writing of fieldnotes. Together, 
these methods allowed for Hui food cultures to be analysed as performances of Hui 
identity, and for people’s emotive ties to places of Hui food culture to be explored. 
Central to this project’s methodology was an ethics of care which played a central role 
at all stages of project design and data collection, and which was integral in adapting the 
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chosen methods to suit the Beijing context. When attempting to implement such a 
methodology in Beijing, a number of challenges needed to be addressed, as was 
discussed in sections 3.3.a to 3.3.l. Specifically, there were challenges regarding 
language and translation, gaining access to the field, selecting the sample, reflexivity 
and security of data. Through addressing these issues in line with the feminist political 
geographical approach of this project, the research’s aims and objectives could be 
successfully achieved, as the ensuing chapters will demonstrate. However, before these 
aims and objectives can be addressed in the empirical chapters, it is important that the 
project be framed historically. As such, the following chapter will discuss the historical 
development of the Hui ethnic minority group and the political and ideological 
reasonings behind the Chinese Communist Party’s classification of ethnic minorities. 
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CHAPTER 4: HISTORICAL CHAPTER. 
Following the theoretical and methodological development of the feminist political 
geographical approach discussed in chapters 2 and 3, it is important that the historical 
and political context of the Hui be explored in order to better contextualise the empirical 
data. This chapter addresses such a need by discussing the political and historical 
development of ethnicity in China, specifically focusing on the history of Chinese Islam 
and the Hui. Structured in 4 sections, this chapter begins by first discussing the pivotal 
role that historical Chinese conceptualisations of nationalism have played in the 
establishment of both the Chinese state and the CCP’s understandings of ethnicity, before 
then turning to the important “Classification” projects of the 1950s and the central role 
that Ronghe and assimilation theory play in CCP policy. Section 4.2 will then turn to the 
long history of Islam in China before Section 4.3 narrows its focus to the specificities of 
the project’s chosen group, the Hui. In particular, it is shown that the Hui fail to meet all 
four criteria for ethnic classification set out by Stalin and the initial classification team: 
that is to say, “a common language, a common territory, a common economic life, and a 
common psychological make-up manifested in common specific features of national 
culture”. Section 4.4 will focus on the last criteria, “a common psychological make-up 
manifested in common specific features of national culture”, using it as an entry way into 
Chapter 5.  
4.1  MAKING THE CHINESE NATION. 
The concepts of nation, nation-state and nationalism were first introduced into the realm 
of Chinese politics in the late nineteenth century as instruments of defence and 
regeneration in the face of Western imperialism and the weakening of the Qing Dynasty. 
Within Western scholarship, Smith (2010: 13) has defined the concept of nation as “a 
named human community residing in a perceived homeland, and having common myths 
and a shared history, a distinct public culture, and common laws and customs for all 
members”. Despite there being similarities between nationalism and pre-modern Chinese 
sentiments, nationalism and the nation appeared with the establishment of the nation-
state system, or Westphalian system, in Europe (Zhao, 2004: 16). As Hsü (1960: 13) has 
noted, “imperial China was not a nation-state” and as such, nationalism did not exist in 
ancient China. Rather than being bound by national consciousness, the people of 
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traditional China were linked by culturalism and universalism,19 whereby China was 
perceived as being the only civilisation in the universal world20 and all those who adopted 
its teachings and principles could be incorporated within its culturalist bounds (Levenson, 
1959; Zhao, 2004). The defeat of the Chinese by the British in the 1840-42 Opium War 
and by the Japanese in the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War, would prove to be major catalysts 
in fuelling Chinese nationalism and nationalistic movements. According to Liang Qichao 
(1935) one of China’s most important and influential early twentieth century nationalists, 
the 1895 loss to Japan was a particularly poignant moment in Chinese history as he claims 
that it awoke the Chinese people “from the dream of 4,000 years”, with many other 
scholars agreeing that it proved to be a watershed moment in the development of Chinese 
nationalism (Yahuda, 2000; Zhao, 2004). Although prominent Chinese sociologist Fei 
Xiaotong (1989) argues that China had existed as an “unconscious nation” 21  for 
thousands of years, he conceded that the Chinese nation only came into being as a 
“conscious national entity”22 as a result of contact and conflicts with Western imperial 
forces in recent times. Following the Sino-Japanese War, Chinese nationalism was 
specifically centred on ethnic nationalism, whereby the nation is viewed as consisting of 
a single politicised ethnic group. At the turn of the twentieth century, this form of “racist 
and anti-imperialist” (Friedman, 1995) nationalism would be the defining quality of the 
Han nationalists’ attempts to not only fight off Western powers, but also to topple the 
minority Manchu rule.  
Following the fall of the Qing empire in 1912, Sun Yat-sen and other nationalist 
revolutionaries realised that their Han-centric version of ethnic nationalism risked the 
dissolution of Qing territories by excluding other self-identifying ethnic groups. Thus, 
Sun began to promote a vision of the newly established Chinese nation as being multi-
ethnic while rejecting the ethnic nationalism that he had once argued so passionately in 
favour of; instead claiming that China was one country with five united ethnic groups 
(Zhao, 2004). Once again, the work of Liang Qichao (in Liu, 2000) is useful in 
understanding this development in Chinese nationalism as it spearheaded the change in 
Chinese nationalistic views of the nation-state by making a conceptual distinction 
between the nation and the state. Importantly, he claimed that a nation could be defined 
as the result of humans’ natural tendency to gather in larger groups. Further, he believed 
 
19天下主义。 
20天下。 
21自在的民族。 
22自觉的民族实体。 
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that these nations may be spread across many states and a state may in fact contain 
multiple nations (Liu, 2000; Zhou, 2004). In relation to these distinctions, Liang (1935, 
1999) developed and introduced two new Chinese terms: xiao minzuzhuyi,23 or small 
nationalism; and da minzuzhuyi, 24  or big nationalism. Small nationalism may be 
understood as the nationalism existing among individual ethnic groups, similar to ethnic 
nationalism among the Han. However, big nationalism unites all ethnic groups within the 
state together, particularly in opposition to foreign powers and is thus comparable to state 
nationalism (Liang, 1999; Lu and Fan, 2014: 132). Liang’s definition of Chinese 
nationalism prioritised territory as the most important criterion for Chinese nationalism, 
as opposed to the ethnic nationalism and expulsion of minorities pursued by Sun Yat-sen 
and other nationalists at the time. Although as Ho (2018b: 8) points out, Liang’s 
nationalism still worked through excluding ethnic minorities from the majoritarian Han 
race, or the ‘genuine yellows,’ by normalising racial classification in Chinese society.” 
Initially, Sun objected to Liang’s definitions and views, however, following the fall of 
the Qing Dynasty and the subsequent separatist movements of China’s frontier regions, 
Sun attempted to transcend his previously ethnic nationalist approach by establishing a 
“national people”25 that was inclusive of certain non-Han groups (Zhou, 2004).  
The Republican era was marked by a struggle between nationalists advocating for a 
centralised state system and those nationalists who sought to establish a federalist system, 
similar to the United States of America (Chen et al., 1987; Zhao, 2004). Those in support 
of a federalist system believed that provincial identity and autonomy should be preserved, 
as provincial traditions were the foundations for the nation-state. The contest between 
the centralists and federalists was particularly heated in the 1920s (Zhao, 2004). During 
this time, warlordism was rampant throughout China, with the years between 1916 and 
1928 being referred to as the Warlord Era. Each of these warlords held tremendous 
political, military and economic power over substantial territories, and some were 
controlled by members of ethnic minority groups who consolidated power through 
uniting populations against the exclusionary Han ethnic nationalists. The north-western 
provinces of Ningxia, Gansu and Qinghai were controlled during this time by a group of 
Hui warlords known as the Ma family warlords (Lipman, 1997). 
 
23小民族主义。 
24大民族主义。 
25国民。 
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Many federalists believed that a centralised state was too weak to challenge China’s 
numerous warlords and as such, provincial forces would be better equipped to tackle the 
problem. Although the federalist movement was focused on provincial self-governance, 
it nevertheless became a tool used by these warlords in their struggle with each other, 
resulting in political crises for the fledgling state’s government. In 1922, Sun Yat-sen 
began the Northern Expedition, a military campaign to unify China’s feuding provinces 
and territories by establishing a centralised national government. The Northern 
Expedition was continued by Sun’s successor, Chiang Kai-shek, and in 1927 a central 
government was established in Nanjing and territorial integrity and power was largely 
regained (Zhao, 2004: 70-78). Interestingly, despite the successful establishment of the 
Guomindang Government (Chinese Nationalist Party), warlordism continued to play a 
role. In 1934, the Guomindang Government allied with the Hui warlord Ma Zhongying 
to overthrow the separatist state of the First East Turkestan, which was established by the 
Uyghur nationality in western Xinjiang province (Lu and Fan, 2014). The willingness of 
the Hui warlords and armies to assist Chiang’s government in overthrowing their fellow 
Muslim minority group held huge significance, especially in relation to the construction 
of a Chinese national concept. Their cooperation with the Han government in defending 
the territorial integrity of the Chinese nation shows that although the Hui were actively 
pursuing a type of “small nationalism” during the Warlord Era, by 1934 they were 
working with the Han nationality to practice “big nationalism,” similar to that proposed 
by Liang (1935, 1999). Thus, the Hui consolidated their small nation identity while also 
working with the Han in defence of their common identity, their Chinese national identity. 
4.1.a  Classifying a nation: 
Despite there being enormous cultural, geographical, linguistic and religious differences 
among China’s Muslims, they continued to be grouped together under the term “Hui” 
until the 1950s. This notion of a homogenous Islamic population in China was further 
developed by Dr Sun Yat-sen and his idea of the “Five Peoples of China,”26 which would 
prove vitally important in his efforts to topple the Qing empire. In order to unite the 
broader Chinese populace against the ruling Manchurian elite, Dr Sun devised the “Five 
Peoples of China”, identifying five nationalities or minzu27 and establishing the Han as 
the majority nationality. In addition to the newly united Han and Manchu nationalities, 
 
26 五族共和。 
27民族。 
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Dr Sun also identified the Mongolian,28 Tibetan29 and the Hui30 (Gladney, 2004: 15). 
During Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist era, his government argued vehemently that there 
was in fact only one nationality in China, the Chinese people,31 asserting that groups such 
as the Hui were in fact merely a sub-variety of the same minzu. Early communists in 
China began to dispute this mono-ethnic claim, promoting the belief that China was 
composed of a variety of distinct, yet politically equal ethnic groups (Mullaney, 2011). 
This multi-minzu stance was forged during the 1930s in an attempt to gain the support of 
those people that were discontented by Chiang Kai-shek’s nationality policy. Crucially, 
it was during the Long March that communist leaders, faced with possible extermination, 
were forced to make promises of special treatment to the “barbarians” that they 
encountered on their 371-day trek. Specifically, promises were made to the Miao,32 Yi,33 
Tibetan and Hui (Gladney, 1996). The commitment of the Chinese Communists to grant 
recognition to non-Han minzu was further emphasised in a series of treatises written 
during the 1930s. Most famously, the minzu policies of Republican and Imperial era 
China were criticised in “The Question of the Huihui Nationality”. In this text, it was 
argued that the Hui constituted a distinct nationality, rather than being a mere religious 
sub-division of the Han people. It was argued that Nationalist policies were designed to 
impede the “national awakening”34 of the Hui people and that by failing to recognise the 
Hui as a separate minzu, the Nationalist Government were avoiding the issue of political 
equality and representation for the Hui (Minzuwentiyanjiuhui, 1980). 
Following the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the Chinese state set 
about documenting and categorising China’s many nationalities, challenging both Dr 
Sun’s notion of a “Five Peoples” nation and Chiang Kai-shek’s mono-minzu version. 
Over the ensuing three decades, a series of extensive ethnographic and linguistic 
classification projects under the collective title of “Ethnic Classification Project”35 would 
result in the identification of fifty-six nationalities using a criteria that Mullaney (2011: 
106) has termed “ethnic potential.” Beginning in the early years of the Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) rule, a team of ethnographers and linguists were instructed to 
 
28蒙族。 
29藏族。 
30回族。 
31中华民族。 
32苗族。 
33彝族。 
34民族觉醒。 
35民族识别。 
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categorise and classify China’s diverse population using Stalin’s four-point criteria for 
ethnic evolution (Sautman, 1999; Zang, 2015). This set of criteria requires groups to 
possess four shared traits in order to be considered a nationality: “a common language, a 
common territory, a common economic life, and a common psychological make-up 
manifested in common specific features of national culture” (Stalin, 1953; Gladney, 2006; 
Zang, 2015). However, the classification team quickly realised that many of the self-
identifying groups they met across China did not in fact meet all four requirements 
identified by Stalin. Despite this, some of these groups were considered to hold sufficient 
cultural difference from the Han and other newly identified minority groups to warrant 
classification as nationalities. As such, the classification team leader, Lin Yaohua, 
devised a new approach for assessing the eligibility of applicant groups based on an 
enlarged definition of minzu (Gros, 2004: 278; Mullaney, 2011). Rather than requiring 
groups to already possess all four criteria, they would be assessed on their potential to 
acquire these traits, i.e., their potential to achieve nationality status. Further, this new 
approach aimed to allow for the self-identification of groups (Tapp, 2002: 67; Mullaney, 
2004: 230). This liberal approach to self-identification would result in more than 400 
applicant groups seeking recognition across China. However, by 1982, just 56 ethnic 
groups had been officially recognised, including the majoritarian Han population and 55 
minority groups (Fei, 1981; Gladney, 2004). As such, people in China were then provided 
with a pre-determined list of ethnicities to choose from, resulting in the official 
amalgamation and exclusion of certain groups for political expediency (Mullaney, 2011). 
In line with the Stalinistic approach, these 55 non-Han groups are considered by much 
official and popular discourse to be fossilized remnants of early stages of the evolution 
towards socialism. Yet, it is apparent that these groups are by no means fossilised. Rather, 
they are in a constant state of flux and change, a continuum of reinvention and contention 
(Caffrey, 2004). 
As Connor (1984) and Mullaney (2011: 20) have pointed out, Marxist writings claim that 
“nationalities are parts of the superstructure, ideational manifestations of underlying 
economic relationships and processes that are destined to wither away once the inherent 
contradictions within the economic structure resolve themselves dialectically”. So why 
then would the newly formed government of the People’s Republic want to classify and 
categorize that which is seemingly destined to disappear in time? Once again, Mullaney’s 
(2011) insightful work is helpful in addressing this question as he points towards three 
reasons. Firstly, leading up to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the 
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Communists had been engaged in a bitter battle for power with the Nationalists. From 
the 1930s on, the Communists devised an ethnopolitical platform that put them in 
opposition to the Nationalists in an attempt to garner support from the increasingly 
disgruntled people of China. Throughout the first half of the twentieth century, the 
Nationalists became evermore committed to their mono-minzu stance, claiming that 
China comprised of only one people, the Chinese people. The Communists set about 
placing themselves in opposition to this stance, proposing a vision of China as a 
composite of different, yet politically equal, groups. The second point is that the 
classification of China’s nationalities needs to be situated within the broader history of 
the post-imperial transition in China and the historical issue of maintaining the territorial 
integrity of a diverse and vast empire. Throughout history, the communist party’s 
predecessors had long struggled to incorporate China’s western tribes and people into a 
unified polity. In order to overcome this problem, many regimes attempted to create 
policies that manipulated the various practices of the people whom they attempted to 
govern. From this standpoint, it is clear to see why the Communists wished to categorise 
the diverse people of Western China and document their cultural, economic and societal 
practices. Finally, the categorisation may be seen as an attempt to address the 
government’s initial failures to live up to earlier commitments. Initially, the government 
adopted a non-interventionist approach of self-categorisation when dealing with the 
question of ethnicity. However, the astonishing proliferation of nationality categories that 
appeared on the first national census of 1953-1954 showed that a non-interventionist 
policy with regards to minzu categorisation would mean that the government’s earlier 
commitments to proportional representation for non-Han people would be an 
impossibility. As such, they needed to establish a definable list of minzu in order to 
guarantee proportional representation. As the initial, extremely liberal, self-
categorisation aspirations of the Chinese state proved to be unfeasible, the Chinese 
people were then be provided with a pre-set list of 56 options from which to choose their 
ethnonational identity. These options were in line with the earlier policy proposal of Fang 
Guoyu, whereby each group was to be given “one name, one spelling, one pronunciation, 
not to be changed at will” (Mullaney, 2011: 121).  
4.1.b  Ethnicity and Ronghe in China. 
Although Mullaney’s (2011) work certainly sheds light onto some of the possible 
political reasonings behind the CCP’s decision to identify and document China’s 
minority populations, it arguably overlooks a key point – minorities and their assimilation 
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were not new issues in China. This is an important point if we are to fully understand the 
historical development of the minoritising processes at work in China today. By the 
1940s, the term minzu was not one that at that time had a particularly long history in 
China, having only been introduced into the realm of Chinese politics by the Japanese in 
the early 19th Century (Zang, 2015). However, that is not to say that the idea of culturally 
distinct ethnic group did not exist before that time. Heberer (1989: 18) points out that the 
Han Chinese identified distinct non-Han groups of “barbarians” as far back as the Han 
Dynasty (260BCE – 220CE). According to Confucian philosophy, these barbarians could 
become part of the Han community if they adopted the Han culture. Confucianism 
promoted the idea of political, cultural and economic intermingling to encourage ethnic 
and cultural assimilation of “barbarians” into the Han community (Dreyer, 1976; He, 
2004: 114-115; Mackerras, 1984: 188). In essence, the Confucian concept of cultural 
communities promoted the assimilation and acculturation of minority people into Han 
society (Zang, 2015: 19). Central to this assimilation process were military conquests, 
after which the minority group would eventually merge with the Han, adopting their 
cultural practices and language (Hansen, 2005; Zhu and Yu, 2000; Zang, 2015). Key to 
this interface is the notion of ronghe,36 whereby non-Han minorities became assimilated 
to the Han majority (He, 2004: 112; Zang, 2015: 20). Dr Sun Yat-sen turned to this 
concept of ronghe when attempting to promote Chinese nationalism based on the unity 
of Han culture by arguing that the Han had a long-standing society that the Manchu 
“barbarians” had conquered. Despite playing a valuable role in the overthrow of the Qing 
Empire, Dr Sun’s ronghe-inspired ideology would prove divisive and problematic in the 
aftermath, alienating minority groups and threatening China’s territorial integrity. It was 
in response to this issue that Dr Sun began promoting the notion of zhonghua,37 or 
Chinese nation, and the unification of China’s five minzu groups and their territories. He 
claimed that these five groups were all subdivisions of the same people, the Chinese 
people, 38  and that they would ultimately be assimilated into a “single cultural and 
political whole” led by the Han (Shin, 2006; Barabantseva, 2008: 570-572; Hyer, 2009: 
259; Gladney, 1996; Zang, 2015).  
Following the fall of the Republic of China (ROC) and the emergence of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC), the CCP continued Dr Sun’s ronghe approach, promoting a 
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unified Chinese nation and encouraging assimilation and acculturation of minorities. In 
the 1950s and 1960s, the ronghe policy was promoted through socialist transformation 
with the CCP arguing that the Han had already achieved a coherent society and that the 
minorities were feudal and backward by comparison. By implementing this rhetoric of 
socialist development, the Han were legitimising their control of the minorities, leading 
them to a better stage of socio-economic development which “pre-determined the 
uniformity of interests of Han Chinese and non-Han peoples in the socialist 
transformation of ethnic minority groups and minority areas” (Zang, 2015: 22). It was 
argued that these minorities could only achieve socialist transformation and modernity 
through establishing a socialist system under the CCP by engaging in class struggle. 
Throughout this era, the CCP implemented a relatively soft approach to the assimilation 
of minority groups. In 1957 Zhou Enlai, the PRC’s Premier, stated that “assimilation 
would not be welcome if it were achieved by force. Assimilation should be promoted if 
it were the outcome of mutual efforts of the majority and minority peoples. Successful 
examples of assimilation include the Hui people and the Manchu people” (He, 2003: 226; 
Zhu, 2012). This mild approach to assimilation was quickly replaced by the political 
extremism and forced assimilation imposed during the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution. 
During this turbulent era, efforts were made to forcefully assimilate minorities, with the 
CCP officially denying that China was a multinational country, thus resolving the 
minority issue (Clothey, 2001: Leibold, 2010). Despite a further shift in political 
governance after 1978, the ronghe ideology still lives on in the CCP’s nationalities policy. 
Today, the term Zhongguo Ren,39 or Chinese person, is used to refer to all Chinese 
citizens, as opposed to the term Han Chinese, and the CCP stresses economic 
development in its nationalities policies. Officially, China is viewed as consisting of 
many united nationalities, linked economically, culturally and historically (Mackerras, 
2011a and 2011b; Hyer, 2006). Yet, the belief remains that minzu extinction is an 
inevitable consequence of China’s modernisation as it is the final stage of minzu 
development. As China modernises, it is hoped that a national community will continue 
to be formed, whereby ethnic minority distinctions will become irrelevant as people 
assimilate and adopt a “higher level of identification – Zhonghua Minzu” (China’s Ethnic 
Unity Textbook Compiling Team, 2009; Zang, 2015), a concept that is still fraught with 
political meaning and notes of assimilation as the Han are considered to be most central 
to the Zhonghua Minzu (Fei, 1989; Shin, 2006). 
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4.1.c  Current Policy. 
Despite their underlying ideology of ronghe, the CCP have, in theory, taken the 
protection of minority cultures, languages and religions very seriously. Following the end 
of the Cultural Revolution and its associated forced assimilation policies, the CCP partly 
restored the moderate approach to ethnic policies that it had taken pre-1957 (Lai, 2009). 
The government in Beijing have created a series of policies and laws to serve this purpose 
with Article 4 of the PRC Constitution of 1982 declaring that all nationalities have the 
right to preserve or change their own ways and customs, to develop their own languages, 
and that the state will assists them with their cultural and economic development (Zang, 
2015: 59). Religious freedom of minorities is also, in theory, protected by the Chinese 
State under Article 36 of the PRC Constitution. With the exception of Uyghur Muslims 
in Xinjiang and Tibetan Buddhists, most minorities enjoy relative freedom of religion. 
The Hui are among such groups and their religious practices are neither encouraged nor 
discouraged as long as they do not affect government ideology or policy (Zang, 2015). 
However, religious institutions and places of worship or religious practices must be 
registered with the religious bureaus of local governments who ensure that they are run 
by patriotic individuals and groups, thus safeguarding the government’s ethnic policies 
(US Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2005b). As Yang (2012: 45-50) 
noted, today’s policies regarding religion are based on a branch of Chinese Communist 
atheism called enlightenment atheism. This form of atheism considers religion as both 
backward and non-scientific, believing that atheist propaganda, scientific developments 
and mass education are needed to eradicate religious ideas. One of the principle 
documents influencing religious policy in China today is the CCP circular “The Basic 
Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Affairs during the Socialist Period of Our 
Country”, better known as Document No. 19 of 1982 (MacInnis, 1989). This document 
claims that religion in socialist China has five characteristics: that religion has masses of 
believers, it is complex, it will exist for a long time, it affects international relations, and 
it is entwined with ethnicity. Although the document states that religious freedom should 
be guaranteed, it insists that it will eventually disappear. Under Document No. 19, which 
“announced the beginning of religious governmentality to institutionalize and normalize 
religious activities between religion and Communism” (Lin, 2018: 4), legal existence is 
granted to five religions: Islam, Buddhism, Daoism, Protestantism and Catholicism. 
Following Document No. 19, the 1982 PRC Constitution reaffirms that religious 
freedoms are protected. However, only “normal” religious practices are protected, an 
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arbitrary distinction to be decided by authorities, specifically the Religious Affairs 
Bureau, the Public Security Bureau and the United Front Department (Yang, 2012: 75). 
As Weihsuan Lin’s work (2018: 2) on the domestic religious geopolitics of China post-
1978 has shown us, “the PRC’s authority to brand, ban and suppress religious movements 
or groups as ‘evil cults’ turns religion into an object of the Chinese Party-State’s 
sovereign power”. China’s domestic religious geopolitics can be most evidently seen in 
the case of the Falun Gong (Lin, 2016) and their branding as an “evil cult”, but also helps 
to explain the processes involved in branding certain Islamic practices as “extremist” or 
“radical”.   
4.1.d  Representing minzu. 
Throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s, the Chinese State ordered one of the largest 
ethnological expeditions in human history, the Social History Research Investigation.40 
From this investigation of the country’s newly designated minzu groups, a series of 
documents were written, detailing the concise histories, or jianzhi, 41  of each group 
(Mullaney, 2011). These jianshi were to act as the basis of the state’s official narratives 
of each newly recognised minzu, detailing the groups’ histories as far back as possible in 
an attempt to make their classifications seem natural, as if it had always been that way. 
Through publishing the jianshi series, two parallel processes were taking place. Firstly, 
new knowledge was being produced to legitimise the state’s classification of minzu. 
Secondly, a process of “silencing the past” was being carried out, a deliberate attempt to 
remove the Classification from public memory (Trouillot, 1995). In contemporary times, 
the US Congressional-Executive Commission on China (2005a: 15) has shown that the 
CCP Government in Beijing has continued to tighten control over how minority groups 
and culture are represented, while undertaking propaganda campaigns on the role of 
minority groups in the multi-ethnic and united nation. These representations do more 
than simply provide a stereotypical version of minority groups. Rather, the practice of 
reducing minority groups to a set list of definable qualities – such as passive, exotic, 
backward, erotic and often feminine in the Chinese context – is vital in constructing Han 
identity, and by extension, national identity. The minority subjects are placed in a binary 
with the majoritarian Han population and their represented traits not only highlight their 
difference to the Han, but in so doing they establish a sense of identity and unity among 
the Han (Gladney, 2004: 52-53). In relation to the Hui, they are rarely portrayed as the 
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“model minority,” exemplars of the eroticized, passive ideal and feminine docility 
(McCarthy, 2009: 130). Rather, their exoticism to non-Muslim Chinese presents them as 
the “familiar strangers” (Lipman, 1997).  
Many minority groups and individuals are dissatisfied with how they have been 
represented in mainstream culture and in official discourses in China (Baranovitch, 2001: 
359). This discontent with official depictions of minzu has political ramifications. As 
Zang (2015: 123) has pointed out, those minorities that are willing to accept the state’s 
official depictions of their ethnic groups and histories are treated favourably. These 
groups are awarded more freedom to practice their cultures and religions, while others 
are confronted with government repression (Zang, 2015; Hansen, 2005; US 
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 2005). Generally speaking, the Hui are 
a group that have largely accepted government representations and as such, have enjoyed 
and benefited from religious and cultural freedoms that are disallowed to other groups, 
such as the Uyghur. Further, the representation and commodification of minority groups, 
their cultures and histories has become, in many ways, a development strategy. Many 
groups choose to accept, and indeed perform state-imposed narratives as a means to 
benefit from the growing trade of ethno-tourism in China. This trade has resulted in the 
establishment of nationality parks throughout China, aimed at showcasing the traditions 
and histories of minority people (McCarthy, 2009; Schein, 2000; Gladney, 2004; 
Litzinger, 2000). One prominent example of these parks is the expansive Zhonghua 
Huixiang Wenhua Yuan42 outside of Yinchuan City in Ningxia which claims to showcase 
all aspects of the Hui nationality, their culture and their traditions (Figure 4.1). 
 
42 Eng: China Hui Nationality Cultural Park. 
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Figure 4.1: China Hui Nationality Park, 2017. 
Source: Author’s own (2017). 
4.2  ISLAM IN CHINA: THE HUI. 
Islam in China has a history of 1,400 years, dating back to the Tang Dynasty (617BCE-
907CE) in the eight century (Lipman, 1997). Many Chinese scholars claim that prior to 
this in 651AD, after the Tang military’s push westwards into Central Asia where they 
encountered the Arabian armies, the Caliph Uthman presented gifts to the Tang imperial 
court as a “prelude to the establishment of friendly relations with China” (Farah, 2003; 
Jones-Leaning and Pratt, 2012). Following the loss by the Tang armies to the Arab and 
Tibetan forces in 751AD, many Arabian and Persian merchants and traders came to 
China via the Silk Road to engage in commerce, before eventually settling in China and 
intermarrying with native people (Jones-Leaning and Pratt, 2012: 308; Zheng, 2010:160). 
Initially, these Muslim traders were concentrated along the overland trade route that 
passed from Persia, through China’s north-western Xinjiang province and into its ancient 
inland cities, such as Xi’an and Louyang. Later, with the development of maritime trade 
routes, these foreign traders began to reside in port cities along China’s south-eastern 
coast, such as Chang’an, Guangzhou, Hangzhou and Yangzhou. These Muslim traders, 
along with other foreigners in China at that time, were known as Fanke,43 or foreign 
guests (Zheng, 2010). 
 
43番客。 
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Following the fall of the Song Dynasty (960-1279CE) to Mongol armies, the status of 
these Muslims and foreigners was to change in China. From the thirteenth century, under 
the rule of the religiously-tolerant Yuan Dynasty (1279-1368CE), significant numbers of 
Arabian, Persian and Central Asian merchants and mercenaries spread to eastern Chinese 
cities such as Beijing, bringing their religious beliefs with them. However, that is not to 
say that there were no Muslims in Beijing before the thirteenth century. There are in fact 
many local legends which suggest that Islam arrived to Beijing much earlier than the 
Yuan Dynasty, with one stone tablet engraving at the Niujie Mosque in Beijing claiming 
that the mosque’s history dates back to the tenth century (Gladney, 2004: 181 and 370). 
Under Mongol rule, a four-class system was implemented in China which delineated 
society based on class. At the top of this system were the Mongols, followed by the 
semuren 44  – miscellaneous foreigners including Muslims – who occupied roles as 
administrators and merchants, thirdly the northern Chinese hanren,45  and lastly the 
southern Chinese nanren46 – who accounted for the majority of the population (Lipman, 
1997; Schirokauer, 1989; Jones-Leaning and Pratt, 2012). By the Yuan Dynasty, the term 
“Hui”47 or “Huihui”48 was used as an umbrella term for all Muslims in China, specifically 
denoting their religious affiliation (Leslie, 1986: 195-6; Zheng, 2010: 161). The Chinese 
term “Huijiao”49 was used to refer to Islam up until the mid-twentieth century, and to call 
oneself a “Huimin”50 was to call oneself a Muslim (Gillette, 2000: 11). Interestingly, as 
Gladney (2004: 188) points out, the term “Hui” may also be seen to reference Islam’s 
foreign ancestry as the word “Hui” can mean “to return”, suggesting that Muslims were 
never at home in China and are destined to leave. 
The collapse of the Yuan Dynasty and the establishment of the Ming Dynasty (1368-
1644CE) was to prove to be another turning point for China’s Muslims. The Ming 
Dynasty is often noted for bringing about a renaissance of Chinese culture following 
years of Mongol rule. During this time, the status of Muslim groups in China changed as 
they gained a sense of permanence and an acknowledgement of their distinctive culture, 
shifting their status from “Muslims in China” to “Chinese Muslims” (Dillon, 1999; Leslie, 
1986; Jones-Leaning and Pratt, 2012). The history of Islam in China during China’s final 
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dynasty, the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), is characterized by political instability, rebellion 
and oppression, particularly in China’s western regions of Yunnan, Xinjiang, Shaanxi, 
Gansu and Ningxia (Atwill, 1997; Jones-Leaning and Pratt, 2012). Most notable of these 
rebellions are perhaps the Panthay Rebellion in Yunnan (1855-1873), the Dungan 
Rebellion in Northwest China (1862-1878) and multiple bloody conflicts in Xinjiang 
(Hsü, 2000; Jones-Leaning and Pratt, 2012). 
4.3  THE HUI: 
Of the 56 nationalities currently recognised, ten are officially considered Islamic. These 
are Hui, Uyghur,51 Kazakh,52 Uzbek,53 Kyrgyz,54 Tajik,55 Tatar,56 Dongxiang,57 Sala,58 
and Bao’an.59 Together these ten nationalities account for more than 20 million people 
(Gladney, 2003). However, it is important to note that the actual number of Muslims in 
China is unknown as the Chinese census does not include a question on religious 
affiliation. Nine of these Islamic groups, excluding the Hui, are found almost exclusively 
in China’s north-western “Quran Belt” region. This region includes the normal 
administrative provinces of Gansu and Qinghai, along with two “autonomous regions”: 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region.  
Although the term Hui was previously used to demarcate all Muslim subjects in China, 
it will be used here to refer to the specific ethnic minority group as identified and 
registered by the Chinese State, rather than all Chinese Muslims. Despite being the 
second largest ethnic minority group in China today, the Hui have largely been ignored 
by Western academic research. Considered by many as too Islamic for Sinological studies, 
the Hui have also been overlooked by Islamic studies – seen as too assimilated to Chinese 
society. The Hui were among the first nationalities to be recognised by the Chinese state, 
receiving their first autonomous county in 1936, no doubt a political gesture of 
recompense for their earlier allegiance. Today, the Hui possess more autonomous 
administrative areas than any other minority group in China. They constitute the second 
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most populous ethnic minority group and the largest Islamic nationality in China, 
accounting for almost half of the country’s 20 million or more documented Islamic 
subjects (Huizu Jianshi Editorial Committee, 1978; Gladney, 2004). According to the 
2011 Census, the number of Hui people in China exceeded 10.5 million people.  
4.3.a  Religion and the Hui. 
Of the many traits and characteristics associated with the Hui, it is arguably their 
presumed religiosity and ancestral connections with foreign Muslim migrants that are 
most commonly believed to be their primary unifying qualities. However, Islam in 
China is not homogenous and as such, the Hui adhere to a spectrum of different 
religious beliefs and Islamic orders. This diversity is the result of a long history of 
reforms and Islamic movements, stemming from ongoing interaction with the Islamic 
world. Although the entire complexity of Islamic history in China will not be discussed 
here, a brief introduction to the various orders will be helpful in understanding religious 
diversity among the Hui and the impacts that this religious heterogeneity has had on 
Hui culture, identity and practices. The Asian studies scholar Joseph Fletcher (1986) 
was the first to argue that the varied nature of Islamic orders in China can be linked 
with “successive tides of influence” that entered China during important periods of 
exchange with the outside world (Gladney, 1996: 36). Specifically, Fletcher (1986) 
claimed that throughout history there had been three major tides of Islamic influences 
and movements in China, with Gladney (1996) building upon this to argue that in 
contemporary times we are on the cusp of a fourth tide.  
4.3.a.i  The First Tide.  
The first tide that is believed to have occurred is “Gedimu Traditional Chinese Islam”. 
As was discussed earlier, Islam first arrived to China with Arab, Persian, Mongolian 
and Central Asian Muslims between the seventh and fourteenth centuries. These 
Muslim settlers followed traditional Sunni Hanafi Islam (Feng, 1985) and they 
generally lived in independent communities centred around a mosque. Eventually, these 
communities became known as the Gedimu, a term originating from the Arabic word 
qadîm meaning “old”. These isolated and disparate communities took the form of 
enclaves, surrounded by the majoritarian Han society and were mostly disconnected 
from each other, often only linked through trade and a belief in a common religious 
heritage. Despite being enclosed enclaves, the Gedimu generally accepted integration 
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with traditional Chinese society and culture. Islamic education was valued by the 
Gedimu and communities were led by travelling imam (Gladney, 1996). Although these 
enclaved communities may still be found in cities such as Beijing and Xi’an, previously 
established communities have been virtually removed from many other urban areas due 
to the Socialist Transformation of Industry Campaign of the 1950s (Whyte and Parish, 
1984). This decentralisation has resulted in the mosque no longer acting as the central 
locus of urban Hui social organisation (Gladney, 1996).  
4.3.a.ii  The Second Tide. 
The second tide to have impacted on Chinese Islam was “Sufi Communities and 
National Networks”. Sufism is not believed to have made significant impact in China 
until the late seventeenth century (Gladney, 1996), although some authors have shown 
the presence of Sufi mystics as far back as the fourteenth century (Jin, 1984). Many of 
these Sufi movements were built around Islamic schools that were established by 
descendants of early Sufi saintly leaders. Often, these movements developed religio-
political and socioeconomic institutions. These institutions became known as menhuan, 
meaning the saintly descent groups, referring to the descent line of the original Sufi 
founder (Gladney, 1996; Ma and Wang, 1985; Jin, 1984). According to Fletcher (1986), 
between the eighteenth and early twentieth centuries a number of these “saintly 
lineages” developed in China’s northwest, gradually replacing the old Gedimu pattern 
by linking together menhuan adherents across the region. This extending of social 
integration made it easier for the “saintly lineages” to harness the economic and 
political potential of China’s Muslim population, thus contributing to the rise of 
Muslim warlordism in the Northwest in the early twentieth century (Fletcher, 1986; 
Gladney, 1996). The ability that these Sufi orders possess for uniting previously 
disconnected Hui communities is a major reason for their rapid proliferation during the 
turbulent eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Unlike the isolated Gedimu communities, 
Sufi orders provided modes of leadership and organisation that helped the Hui to 
survive economically and politically (Lipman, 1984). Unlike Sufi orders in other 
countries which allow simultaneous membership to multiple orders, Chinese Sufi 
Muslims generally maintain membership and allegiance to just one menhuan 
(Trimingham, 1971; Gladney, 1996). Despite the previously vast array of menhuan 
present in China, today only four menhuan hold significant influence on the Hui. 
Pickens (1942 in Gladney, 1996: 42) referred to these as the four menhuan of China 
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following his missionary work in the Northwest of China. These four main menhuan 
are the Qadiriyya, Khufiyya, Jahriyya and Kubrawiyya.  
Qadiriyya - The founder of Qadiriyya Sufism, Qi Jingyi, emphasised poverty, 
withdrawal from society and self-cultivation. He deemphasised formal Islamic ritual, 
specifically the “five pillars of Islam”, instead advocating the importance of private 
meditation. By emphasising ascetic withdrawal, Qi Jingyi was advocating “an inner 
mystical journey where the dualism of Islam and the Chinese world is absolved through 
grasping the oneness of Allah found inside every believer” (Gladney, 1996: 62). This 
dualistic approach to the relationship between Islamic and Chinese traditions and 
beliefs is further seen in the characteristics of Qadiriyya Sufism. Specifically, the way 
in which new Islamic content infused with religious terminology familiar to the Hui, 
Daoist mystical concepts, Confucian moral tenets, and Buddhist folk rituals (Ma, 1983; 
Gladney, 1996).  
Khufiyya and Jahriyya - Through the establishment of the Khufiyya and 
Jahriyyamenhaun, the Naqshbanditarîqa became the most influential in China. As 
Fletcher (in Lipman, 1995) argued, the history of Naqshbandiyya is the history of 
Chinese Islam from the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. Unlike the Qadiriyya, the 
leaders of Naqshbandiyya accepted donations from their followers, often amassing 
huge wealth. These leaders were also more committed to political and social change in 
accordance with their views of Islam and Islamic principles, further differentiating them 
from the withdrawn Qadiriyya. This led to some orders having more 
“transformationist” perspectives and agendas. This is particularly true for the Jahriyya, 
whose repeated conflicts with Chinese rule inevitably led them to be singled out for 
persecution. By contrast to the Jahriyya, the Khufiyya stressed personal internal reform 
over political change, thus seeking more “conformist solutions to local conflicts” 
(Gladney, 1996: 47). Although both orders of Naqshbandiyya advocated for greater 
active participation in society than Qadiriyya Sufism, they differ in relation to how this 
should be done and in their Islamic practices and ideals. The Khufiyya encouraged the 
veneration of saints and the silent dhikr (“rememberance”, the Khufiyya are the “silent” 
ones) (Schimmel, 1975; Gladney, 1996). However, the Jahriyya emphasise vocal dhikr 
(the jahr in remembrance means “vocal”, hence the name Jahriyya means the “vocal 
ones”) and their founder, Ma Mingxin opposed the strong focus on the veneration of 
saints that had become extremely popular in China (Gladney, 1996: 49-50). Following 
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the failed Jahriyya uprisings of the nineteenth century, the order become more 
disconnected and dispersed, eventually leading to the establishment of five main sub-
branches: Shagou, Banqiao, Nanchuan, Beishan and Xindianzi, of which the Shagou 
and Banqiao are most influential today. Although the development of both Jahriyya 
and Khufiyya Sufism in China primarily occurred in the Northwest, both orders have 
expanded beyond the region and can be found throughout China, including in Beijing 
where they have both established mosques.  
Kubrawiyya -The final major menhaun that is still operating within China is the 
Kubrawiyya. However, of the four menhuan, this is far less influential for Chinese 
Islam, specifically among the Hui and as such it will not be discussed.  
4.3.a.iii  The Third Tide.  
The third tide of Islam in China has been characterised as “Scripturalist Concerns and 
Modernist Reforms” (Gladney, 1996). Beginning at the end of the Qing dynasty, this 
third tide occurred due to accelerated exchange between China and the outside world, 
specifically interactions with the Middle East resulting from returning Hui hajji 
(meaning people who have completed the Hajj pilgrimage). Fletcher (in Lipman, 1995) 
noted that in China, it was the more remote Muslim communities that were most 
strongly influenced by the recent Islamic trends and movements occurring in the 
Middle East. Resulting from emerging foreign Muslim ideas and Chinese political 
events, numerous new Hui organisations were established during this time, such as the 
Chinese Muslim Federation60 and the Chinese Muslim Mutual Progress Association61 
to name but two. During this period, a proliferation of Muslim publications also 
occurred to greater extents than ever before with more than 100 periodicals being 
published before the Sino-Japanese War in 1937 (Löwenthal, 1940). These events took 
place during what Ma (1989) has termed the “New Awakening of the Hui at the end of 
the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries,” whereby Hui intellectuals were inspired by 
nationalism and overseas trips to question their identities, initiate reforms and engage in 
the contested space between Chinese culture and Islamic ideals.  
Influenced by fundamentalist Wahhabi ideals encountered in the Middle East, Hui 
reformers introduced the Ikwan Muslim Brotherhood to China (Gladney, 1996: 55). 
 
60 Established in Nanjing in 1912. 
61 Established in Beijing in 1912. 
 148 
Unlike the fundamentalist and anti-modern depictions of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
other countries, the movement was not portrayed as such in China. As Lipman (1994) 
has noted, the fundamentalist and revivalist Wahhabi-inspired aspirations of returning 
Chinese pilgrims “was transformed into a nationalist, modernist, anti-Sufi solidarity 
group which advocated not only Muslim unity but Chinese national strength and 
consciousness”. Eventually these returning Hui became known as Yihewani (Chinese 
for the Ikhwan al-Muslimin) (Gladney, 1996). Religious scripturalist orthodoxy was of 
upmost importance to these reformers to such an extent that many continue to refer to 
them as the zunjingpai or “venerate-the-scriptures fraction” (Lipman, 1994; Ma, 1983; 
Ma, 1982; Mian, 1981). In stark opposition to Sufism, the Yihewani denounced and 
forbade the veneration of saints and their tombs and shrines, while also attempting to 
curb the increasing influence of famous Sufi menhuan leaders and imam. Similarly to 
the Gedimu, and in contrast to the Sufi orders, the Yihewani believe in leadership 
through Islamic education and training, not inheritance. Advocating a purely non-
Chinese Islam, the Yihewani were staunchly opposed to the integration of Chinese 
cultural traditions into Islamic practices and mosques, arguing for the removal of 
Chinese texts from mosques. The architecture of Yihewani mosques is modelled after 
the Arabian-style and features white walls, no inscriptions and a lack of adornments 
(Figure 4.2). This is in direct contrast to the Chinese style mosques of the traditional 
Gedimu which resemble Confucian temples, such as Niujie Mosque in Beijing (Figure 
4.3). Also, the proscribing of mosques being adorned with Chinese or Arabic texts is 
strikingly different from Sufi mosques, whose walls often carry unique Hui art and 
calligraphy (Gladney, 1996). Another movement arising from the “third tide” is the Xi 
Dao Tang. However, as with Kubrawiyya Sufism, the influence of this movement 
within China is quite small and its relevance to the Hui is limited. Therefore, it will not 
be discussed here. 
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Figure 4.2: Yihewani mosque, Beijing. 
Source: Author’s own (2016). 
 
Figure 4.3: Niujie Mosque, Beijing. 
Source: Author’s own (2015). 
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Although the exact number of Hui who maintain membership to these various Islamic 
associations is unknown, Ma Tong’s (1983) pioneering work “Zhongguo Yisilanjiao 
Paiyu Menhuan Zhidu Shilue” provides one of the most comprehensive accounts. Of 
the 6,781,500 Hui individuals recorded by Ma, 58.2% were Gedimu, 21% were 
Yihewani, 10.9% were Jahriyya, 7.2% were Khufiyya, 1.4% were Qadiriyya, 0.5% were 
Xidaotang, and 0.7% were Kubrawiyya. Dru C. Gladney (1996) then builds upon Ma’s 
statistics, while also drawing from several other sources, to provide estimated figures 
for Hui membership of these Islamic orders. According to Gladney, the approximate 
number of adherents to the various orders is as follows: Gedimu 4,000,000; Yihewani 
1,500,000; Qadariyya 100,000; Khufiyya 491,500; Jahriyya 740,000; Kubrawiyya 
20,000; Xidaotang 10,000. Given the range of Islamic orders that the Hui maintain 
membership to today, and the ideological and practical differences between them, it is 
clear that religion is not a homogenous, static and unifying trait for Hui in modern 
China. This religious heterogeneity is made even more apparent when one considers 
that many Hui today are not practicing Muslims, as was evident from the field research 
and which will be discussed in the following chapter.  
4.3.b  A Common Territory? 
In light of the religious diversity evident among Hui today, it is perhaps helpful to 
apply Stalin’s (1953) four-point criteria to the group when attempting to understand 
their current classification as an ethnic, rather than religious, group. That is to say, the 
need for a common territory, a common language, a common economic life, and a 
common psychological make-up manifested in common specific features of national 
culture” (Stalin, 1953; Gladney, 2006; Zang, 2015). Unlike the other nine Islamic 
groups, the Hui are not geographically confined to China’s north-western territories and 
can be found throughout China (Figure 4.4). Having said that, the Northwest is home to 
substantial numbers of Hui, particularly in Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region where 
they comprise one third of the population. Traditionally, they have been concentrated in 
historic port cities such as Guangzhou, or along historic trade routes leading from 
Western China into China proper. The Hui are the most widespread minority group in 
China and according to the 1982 census, they could be found in 2,308 of 2,372 cities 
and counties across China, inhabiting every region and province. Aside from in 
Ningxia, the Hui usually constitute a small percentage of the population in the areas 
where they live. However, in Han-dominated areas they are often the vast majority of 
the minority population. This is particularly true for urban contexts as the Hui are 
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China’s most urbanised minority group, making up the bulk of the minority population 
in every Chinese city, with the exception of cities in Tibet, Inner-Mongolia and 
Xinjiang (Gladney, 1996: 27 and 171). It should be noted at this point that these 
statistics are more than 30 years old, an unfortunate necessity as I was unable to source 
more recent census statistics on the distribution of the Hui during the research process. 
The widespread distribution of the Hui is likely due to a number of reasons. Broomhall 
(1910) and Ekvall (1939) argued in their pioneering works that Hui people often add a 
spiritual significance to pilgrimage, both to Mecca and also to other religious sites and 
tombs. As such, they believe that the Hui value travel more than the Han, who have 
traditionally been tied to place due to strong Confucian and religious ties to kin and 
ancestry. Admittedly, there is a flaw in this comparison, which is that the Han have also 
traditionally had a strong history of migration – one simply needs to take into account 
the Chinese Diaspora to see that. This is especially true in contemporary times as 
advancements in transport have allowed for mass movements of the Chinese populace as 
a whole, and the lessening of distinctions between the migratory practices of Hui and 
Han. However, such an argument against Broomhall and Ekvall’s comparison is rather 
irrelevant at this point. What is important however is that the cultural and spiritual links 
between Hui people and pilgrimage is taken into consideration, and that such existing 
popular perceptions about the Hui are taken into account. In addition to these ties, 
stereotypes of Hui occupations may also shed some light on why the group are so widely 
distributed. Although no doubt embellished with popular perception, historic accounts 
have shown that there is a significant amount of truth in the traditional association 
between Hui people and the role of long-distance tradesmen and soldiers. By the end of 
the Song Dynasty, Hui merchants had become a well-established part of the social and 
economic world of Chinese cities that were connected with international trade routes 
(Lipman, 1997; Caffrey, 2004). These historic roles of Hui people as merchants and 
mercenaries throughout several dynasties is likely to be a major contributing factor to the 
widespread distribution of the Hui.  
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Figure 4.4: Distribution of main Hui centres in China showing populations in excess of 1,000 individuals. 
Source: Pray4Hui.com (2018). 
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4.3.c  A Common Language? 
In addition to being China’s most widespread minority group, the Hui are also the only 
minority group not to possess their own, shared language – except for groups like the 
Manchu, whose native language has now gone out of use. As a result, the Hui generally 
speak the dominant local dialects in the areas that they live. Across China, the Hui 
predominantly speak Han dialects, although some communities do speak Tibetan, 
Mongolian and the languages of the Bai and Dai people, among others. On Hainan Island, 
there is a group of people classified as Hui who actually speak their own Malayo-
Austronesian tongue. Despite their linguistic difference from other Hui people, these 
Hainan Hui have not been recognised as a separate ethnicity, nor can their tongue be 
considered a shared language for the Hui more broadly due to its confines among Hainan 
Hui. Among Chinese scholars, many argue that groups such as the Hui do in fact meet 
Stalin’s linguistic requirements for achieving nationality status if the criteria are applied 
in an historical sense. Many of these scholars claim that the Hui once spoke their own 
distinct language, separate from the Han, inherited from their foreign ancestors. However, 
the Hui’s foreign ancestors did not in fact speak a single language – they spoke Arabic, 
Persian, Turkish and Mongolian. Furthermore, there is no proof that these languages were 
inherited by their Hui descendants past the Ming Dynasty. Therefore, even if applied 
historically, the Hui fail to meet Stalin’s requirement for a common language. 
Interestingly, many Hui people across China use certain Arabic and Persian phrases and 
loan words. This is commonly referred to as HuiHuiHua.62 These non-Han phrases are 
common across the Islamic world and include terms such as ahong63 (from Persian ahung 
meaning imam), and the names of certain Islamic orders. As HuiHuiHua consists of 
Arabic and Persian words, it is likely that its roots lie in the foreign ancestry of the Hui 
people, while also being influenced by today’s growing international networks and the 
religious significance and usage of these terms. Although such words and expressions 
are important signifiers of Hui identity, they by no means constitute a distinct language 
(Gladney, 1996). 
This linguistic and geographical similarity to the Han has resulted in the Hui being 
referred to as the “Chinese Muslims” in much of the existing literature (Israeli, 1978). 
Furthermore, their lack of shared language, territory and uniformity of customs has led 
 
62回回话。 
63阿訇。 
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many to consider the Hui as a none-of-the-above or a catchall category: comprising of 
the Chinese Muslims that the Government considered too distinct from the other nine 
Muslim groups, yet not distinct enough to warrant their own nationality (Stewart, 2009). 
It is important here to remember the amalgamation of groups that occurred during 
China’s ethnic classification program, whereby different self-identifying groups were 
classified under one ethnic title for political expediency (Mullaney, 2011). 
4.3.d  A Common Economic Life? 
Despite lacking the distinct language and easily demarcated territory necessary to qualify 
for Stalin’s model of nationalities, the Hui are often believed to possess the other two 
criteria to varying degrees. However, debate remains as to whether the Hui’s diverse 
economic life and national culture are sufficiently uniform to be classified as shared 
features. Even though the Hui constitute only a small percentage of China’s overall 
population, they have been known to traditionally dominate certain industries and trades. 
As was mentioned above, the Hui have stereotypically been portrayed as long-distance 
tradesmen and soldiers, a belief whose roots stem from the very origins of Islam in China. 
This historical truth has led to the popular perception of the Hui as being rural, nomadic 
people from China’s north-western territories – a perception that is seemingly blind to 
the Hui’s status as China’s most urbanised and widespread ethnic minority group. 
Although the Hui are broadly associated with the roles of tradesmen and soldiers, 
Gladney (1996: 30-32 and 195) states that most urban Hui are employed in common 
labour and industry. In fact, according to the 1982 census, 29% of all Hui were in 
occupations of commerce, service, trade and transport, more than any other ethnic group 
in China, including the Han. Gladney’s revealing study of a Hui ethnic enclave in Beijing 
pointed out several specialisations that the Hui in the city’s Niujie neighbourhood – and 
in all other cities and towns - have become known for. Specifically, they are known for 
butchering lamb and beef, running small restaurants, carving stones and jewellery, 
tanning leather, processing wool, and cobbling shoes. Outside of the urban centres, the 
Hui are primarily engaged in agriculture, most notably wheat and rice agriculture. 
Throughout history, the Hui have occupied a variety of other economic niches, largely 
due to their Islamic restrictions in hygiene and diet, including roles such as restauranteur, 
butcher, innkeeper, jeweller, interpreter, clergyman, shepherd, cavalryman, caravaneer, 
tanner and tea trader (Gladney, 1996: 30). As such, it is clear to see that despite being 
known for certain specialisations and crafts, the economic and occupational situation of 
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the Hui is just as diverse as that of the Han, casting doubt on the government’s claims of 
a shared economic life among the group.  
4.4  CONCLUSION: A COMMON PSYCHOLOGICAL MAKE-UP 
MANIFESTED IN COMMON SPECIFIC FEATURES OF NATIONAL 
CULTURE? 
Throughout this chapter, the historical and political context of the Hui was explored 
with specific reference to Chinese conceptualisations of ethnicity. Specifically, it was 
argued that Chinese understandings of nationalism are central to how the CCP views 
ethnicity, influenced largely by Liang Qichao’s (1935; 1999) concepts of “big 
nationalism” and “small nationalism”. The “Classification” project of the 1950s was 
then examined, demonstrating how the classification team employed a vague and 
shifting interpretation of Stalin’s (1935) criteria for ethnic classification to identify 
distinct ethnic minority groups across China, including 10 Islamic groups. Yet, as was 
shown in Section 4.3, the Hui failed to meet three of Stalin’s four criteria for ethnic 
classification: that is to say a common language, a common territory, and a common 
economic life.  
A question remains then as to whether or not the Hui meet the final criteria for 
consideration, which is the existence of a common psychological make-up manifested 
in common specific features of national culture. Once again, the extent to which the Hui 
meet this criterion is contested. Popular and political representations of the Hui 
continue to portray them as possessing a unified, shared culture by continually 
reproducing stereotypes of the Hui that stem from the Government’s Social History 
Research Investigation in the 1950s and 1960s. These representations generally focus 
on the Hui’s presumed religious worshiping practices, traditional dress and grooming 
habits, and their food culture: all of which are traditionally influenced by Islam. 
However, as one might expect given the Hui’s religious heterogeneity and their status 
as the most geographically diverse minority, Hui culture and cultural practices are 
significantly varied, as will be discussed in the following chapter. This factor has 
resulted in many believing that the Hui do not in fact possess a common culture or 
psychological make-up, stating that they were simply grouped together for political 
expediency (Caffrey, 2004: 257). Further, Hui culture often reflects the cultural 
practices of the majoritarian (mostly Han) populations with whom they cohabitate, 
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similar to the discussion above concerning language. As such, it has been argued that 
the Hui have been already acculturated to Han society (Zang, 2015: 9), suggesting that 
they not only lack a common culture, but that their culture is in fact not distinct from 
Han culture, including by the PRC’s Premier Zhou Enlai in 1957 (He, 2003: 226; 
Leibold, 2008: 113-175; Zhu, 2012). Some authors, such as Banister (1984: 316), have 
subsequently claimed that the only distinction between the Hui and the Han is their 
religion. This physical, linguistic and cultural invisibility of the Hui has led to a 
questioning of Hui ethnicity. In “China and Its National Minorities” Thomas Heberer 
(1989: 73) claims that the Hui are “not ethnically and linguistically different from the 
Han”. Similarly, Naquin and Rawski (1987: 128) state that the Hui are in fact part of 
the Han group, similar to the Hakka people. Although these claims seem appealing 
when attempting to explain the similarities shared between the two groups, they are 
failing to take into account the significance of the notion of Qingzhen to the Hui people 
and the central role that it plays in shaping their lives. As Gladney (1996: 6) writes, the 
concept of Qingzhen has become a “sacred symbol” marking Hui identity in China, 
drawing from the work of Clifford Geertz (1968:79).  
This “sacred symbol” is, I believe, the cornerstone of Hui culture evident in Beijing 
today. While Gladney’s (1996) influential book “Muslim Chinese” explored the myriad 
of ways in which Qingzhen has impacted on the lives and ethno-religious identities of 
various Hui communities across China, the following chapter will argue that within the 
Beijing context, it is the manner in which Qingzhen has influenced and shaped the Hui’s 
food cultures that is the defining feature of Hui culture there and the most salient 
performance of Hui ethnic identity today. Specifically, it will be shown that Hui food 
culture in Beijing draws heavily from the group’s diffuse attachments to places, while 
also being influenced by their individual emplacements and subsequent experiences 
within contemporary Beijing.
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CHAPTER 5: HUI IDENTITY, FOOD CULTURES 
AND QINGZHEN. 
In Muslim Chinese, Gladney (1996) explored the myriad of ways in which Qingzhen 
has impacted on the lives and ethno-religious identities of various Hui communities 
across China. This chapter proposes that, at least for Beijing, it is now the manner in 
which Qingzhen has influenced and shaped food cultures that is the defining and most 
salient performance of Hui ethnic identity today. Here, Hui food cultures and local 
understandings of Qingzhen are mutually dependent and in turn are co-constitutive of 
Hui identity (see Figure 5.5). This triad of Hui identity is expressed in many ways and 
five will be outlined below: religion, “small” nationalism/ethnicity, “big” 
nationalism/state nationalism, cleanliness, and place. The connections drawn here 
between domestic space and the commercial space of a restaurant around issues of 
cleanliness and the expression of religious practice unsettle once again the binary of 
public and private that Feminist Political Geography has done so much to trouble (see 
section 2.1.d above). Importantly for this thesis, this chapter argues that Hui food 
culture, identity and understandings of Qingzhen in Beijing draw heavily from the 
group’s diffuse attachments to places, something that will then form a conceptual 
foundation for, and act as a pathway into, chapters 6 and 7.  
The chapter begins with a review of the elements of cultural expression that have been 
highlighted as elements of Hui identity. I find that some features that derive explicitly 
from a Muslim tradition, such as long beards, headscarves, caps, and gender roles 
within marriage are viewed by at least many younger Hui as no longer essential 
markers of Hui identity. However, other features, particularly around the treatment of 
food are affirmed as foundational. The chapter examines the relations between Halal 
and Qingzhen as disciplines of food making and consumption and finds here the 
fundamental core of Hui cultural expression, the Sinocisation of a Muslim heritage. The 
second half of the chapter takes this further and uses the triad of food culture, Qingzhen, 
and Hui identity to examine themes of religion, ethnicity, nationalism, cleanliness and 
place. 
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5.1  A COMMON PSYCHOLOGICAL MAKE-UP MANIFESTED IN 
COMMON SPECIFIC FEATURES OF NATIONAL CULTURE? 
Stalin’s (1953) final criteria for consideration as an ethnic group is the existence of a 
shared mentality manifested in common specific features of national culture. Once 
again, the extent to which the Hui meet this criterion is contested. As one might expect 
given their status as the most geographically diverse minority, Hui culture and cultural 
practices are hugely varied. This factor has led many to conclude that the Hui do not in 
fact possess a common culture or psychological make-up; that indeed they were simply 
grouped together for political expediency (Caffrey, 2004: 257). Further, Hui culture 
often reflects the cultural practices of the majoritarian (mostly Han) populations with 
whom they cohabitate, similar to the earlier discussion concerning language. As such, it 
has been argued that the Hui have been already acculturated to Han society (Zang, 
2015: 9). Yet, a compelling case exists for arguing that the Hui do possess some 
distinctive qualities that are common across China. Specifically, the religious beliefs of 
the Hui have resulted in the evolution of certain cultural traits that are clearly distinct 
from those of Han people.  
5.1.a  Traditional Dress and Embodied Religious Grooming Practices 
Traditionally, the Hui are believed to have been easily differentiated from the Han by 
their choice of clothing and characteristic long beards (Figure 5.1). As Gladney (1996: 
24) has noted, many Hui men, particularly in the northwest of China, regard the 
cultivation of beards as a duty of Islam, allowing them to grow as long as possible 
while keeping them meticulously clean. Although this practice of physical demarcation 
could be seen in some of the cities visited for this research (especially in Yinchuan, 
Xi’an and Hohhot), it was generally more evident among older men and in Hui 
enclaves surrounding mosques. Within the Beijing context, it was quite rare to meet 
someone with a long beard. As one young male from Shandong told me in Beijing’s 
central Chaoyang District, the cultivating of long beards is not a practice that many Hui 
continue to do, “especially not in Beijing.”64 According to this man, the practice is 
rarely found outside of Xinjiang. Similar to this man’s suggestions that the practice is 
largely confined to history or to Xinjiang Province, other participants also mentioned 
temporal and geographical variation when asked about the stereotype of bearded Hui 
 
64 尤其不在北京。 
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men. For some, the practice of growing a long beard is a distinctly north-western 
custom and is not a unifying trait shared across China, despite the stereotypes present in 
popular and political discourses. One view that is perhaps most representative of this is 
that of a middle-aged Beijing native who refuted the popular imagery displayed in the 
media and claimed that such practices are not representative of the Hui as a whole, but 
rather are only true of some Hui originating from north-western regions: “Beijing Hui 
don’t do it, only Northwestern Hui do it.”65  
However, for many others these cultural practices are in fact shared traditions among all 
Hui and their prevalence in the Northwest is due to there being a larger concentration of 
Hui and other Islamic groups there, and because that area of China is home to more 
conservative communities. Many respondents also linked the geographical differences 
to the differing levels of modernisation between Beijing and north-western provinces. 
As one Qinghai-native man told me, “the difference is because here [Beijing] is a 
modern city, it is like Shanghai or the West. In those cities, traditions are not so 
important, [they] do not help people. But my hometown is not modern. My hometown 
is backwards, its people [are] fengjian.”66 Modernisation was also used to explain 
generational differences and as a way to explain why bearded men are usually of an 
older generation. One view that continuously emerged was that younger people had 
embraced modernity and were more heavily influenced by Han and foreign cultures and 
ideas, thus choosing to have a more “modern” appearance. As one 30-year-old Gansu 
man told me, young people are children of modern China who want to “break free from 
tradition.”67 Given the huge differences and disparities among the Hui discussed earlier, 
it is perhaps unsurprising then to find such differing views of cultural practices such as 
the cultivating of the Hui’s stereotypical long beards. 
The movement away from cultivating long beards and the branding of the practice as a 
north-western, specifically Xinjiang, one is even more intriguing when one considers 
the precarious geopolitical specificities of Islam in China under the Global War on 
Terror, as discussed in Chapter 1. According to reports (Amnesty International, 2019; 
BBC, 2017b and 2019b; Reuters, 2017), the growing of long beards is now categorised 
as a “sign of extremism” in many parts of Xinjiang, given its association with religious 
 
65 北京回民不做，只就是西北回民。 
66封建 Eng: Feudal - This section of the conversation took place in English at the request of the 
participant. 
67摆脱传统。 
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practice. As such, men that choose to grow long beards often face disciplinary 
ramifications in cities, towns and villages across the province. According to one BBC 
report (2019b), the “banning” of long beards has resulted in a steep decline in the 
number of men visibly growing long beards in the north-western province. Although 
such a ban is not enforced in Beijing City, it may yet hold sway over Beijing’s Hui 
population, especially given the fact that many of this project’s participants came from 
China’s Northwest region.  
 
Figure 5.1: Bearded Hui man in Xi’an. 
Source: Author’s own (2017). 
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In addition to growing long beards, men are usually portrayed wearing white rounded 
caps on their heads, similar to the taqiyah seen across the Islamic world, while women 
wear headscarves, hijabs, or gaitou (Wang, 2015; Gladney, 1996: 140). Hui men and 
women across China do often wear such headdresses (Figure 5.2), particularly when 
attending mosque or during prayer time. Once again, this is especially true for those 
living in Northwest China, for older Hui, or for more religiously conservative 
individuals. However, not all Hui people choose to wear the traditional headwear, with 
many foregoing them as backwards or unmodern. This has been particularly true for 
young urban Hui in Beijing, although Wang (2015) suggests that in recent times the 
number of urban Hui women choosing to cover their heads is increasing. However, 
despite differences in people’s decisions to wear such headdresses, their significance 
and relevance to Hui culture is not as disputed as the growing of beards. Such caps, 
gaitou, hijabs and headscarves are seen as being a shared tradition across China and a 
symbol of Hui culture. As such, stereotypes and images which represent the Hui 
wearing these items are not quite as divisive among Beijing Hui, although some 
participants did mention that such representations were perhaps outdated.  
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Figure 5.2: Hui traditional headwear in Xi’an. 
Source: Author’s own (2017). 
Similar to common perceptions of the Hui’s traditional headwear, the Hui are also 
occasionally represented as wearing all white clothing, further distinguishing them from 
the Han (Figure 5.3). Although there is a certain amount of truth in these depictions of 
Hui clothing, they are by no means all encompassing. The all white clothing often 
associated with the Hui is generally only worn by men when attending mosque, during 
prayer time, or during times of Islamic festivals and celebration. In urban centres such 
as Beijing this is particularly true. Once again, the universality of this cultural practice 
was questioned by some participants who claimed that such clothing was only worn by 
particularly religious individuals and was not adhered to by all Hui, even some of those 
attending mosques. According to several participants, the practice of wearing all white 
clothing is now largely limited to elderly males. This is even true for some of those 
participants that come from rural areas of China’s north-western provinces, once again 
drawing doubt on the universality and commonality of this “shared” cultural trait. It 
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also exposes a generational difference among the Hui, similar to the theme of 
modernity discussed in relation to the cultivation of beards and wearing of traditional 
headdresses; whereby wearing all white clothing is seen as unmodern and therefore not 
favoured by younger Hui. Further, many people explained that the white clothing is 
purely related to religion and is a symbol of devotion to Islam, similar to white clothing 
worn by Muslims in other countries. As such, some Hui in Beijing viewed these 
religious garments as being unrepresentative of, and unrelated to, Hui identity and 
cultural practices, with many referencing the differences between the labels of Hui and 
Muslim. While for others, the association of white clothing with Islam is in fact the 
quality that establishes them as a cultural symbol of Hui identity.  
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Figure 5.3: Hui man wearing all white clothing at mosque in Xi’an. 
Source: Author’s own (2017). 
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With the exception of certain restaurant employees, select mosque attendees, visitors at 
tourist sites and some residents of ethnic enclaves, traditionally dressed Hui are quite a 
rarity in Beijing. Even amongst restaurant employees, who are often encouraged (and 
indeed expected) to perform certain ethnic stereotypes, there are varying levels of 
commitment to their “traditional” dress. Among these workers, the decision to wear the 
headdress is arguably tied not only to religiosity, but also to various other obligations. 
In some instances, this obligation was often a familial one, rather than being directly 
tied to personal religious affiliation, with one young waitress explaining that she wore a 
headscarf at the request of her father. For some others, their employers compelled them 
to wear headscarf or cap (Figure 5.4). As one devoutly Muslim manager said when 
asked if the employees had to wear the traditional dress; “Yes. Look at these girls, they 
are Huizu. This is what they wear. They have to.”68 Interestingly, despite this manager’s 
insistance that the bulk of his staff should dress conservatively, management staff were 
exempt from the rule. Neither the manager, the two male supervisors nor the female 
member of management wore the traditional headdress sported by the waiting and 
kitchen staff. This exemption from the uniform, I believe, exposes a quite interesting 
power dimension whereby the lower ranking staff were forced to perform the role of a 
stereotypical “Hui” for the customers, while management were allowed to dress in a 
fashion more akin to the broader populace, perhaps indicating a desire by management 
to be taken seriously by the restaurant’s non-Hui patrons. When asked why he didn’t 
wear the uniform, the manager explained “because I am [the] manager, so I need not 
wear these clothes. [It’s] Not professional.”69 
 
68This section of the conversation took place in English at the request of the participant.  
69This section of the conversation took place in English at the request of the participant. 
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Figure 5.4: Traditional dress in chain restaurant in Beijing.  
Source: Author’s own (2015). 
The manager’s preference for traditional dress was shared by some employees. When 
speaking with three young female staff members from Gansu Province regarding their 
clothing in January 2016, they explained that they chose to wear headscarves not 
because it was part of their asigned uniforms but because it was prescribed in the 
Qur’an. This personal decision and religious commitment to wearing traditional and 
modest dress, as opposed to managerial or parental enforcement, was common among 
many Hui women that participated in this project. Often, I would be told by female 
participants that they chose to wear the headscarf because they felt as though it was 
their religious duty and obligation. For many of them, the headscarf was a symbol of 
their personal commitment to Islam, a link between themselves and God. One elderly 
woman described her headscarf as a symbol of her devotion to God and her 
commitment to following God’s will and the teachings of the Qur’an, a desire that was 
echoed by several other participants. Other participants explained that they felt obliged 
to wear the headscarf due to societal pressures or expectations stemming from its 
cultural connotations. As was explained to me several times by participants, the 
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headscarf and white caps made their status as Hui visible to others, something which 
they felt was important. These societal and cultural pressures also have a geographical 
element to them, with some participants referencing geographical or place-based 
differences in the need to wear traditional headdresses. During a conversation with two 
female street food vendors they explained to me that their choice to wear the headscarf 
was a personal one and that they had to wear headscarves because “we are Muslim, we 
are north-western people.”70 These geographical dimensions were elaborated on further 
by others, including a young Hui man who explained that in his north-western 
hometown he felt a greater pressure to wear the white cap than in Beijing where 
wearing the cap was not considered to be as important.  
Interestingly, many of the respondents’ explanations for choosing to wear headdresses 
of various kinds involved the presence of external pressures or expectations. 
Specifically, these were parental and familial pressures, managerial and work-related 
requirements, societal expectations, and religious obligations and commitments. Within 
each of these, there was a strong gender dynamic, as women more often reported 
feeling a greater pressure to conform to traditional dress codes than was reported by 
men. Further, the pressure to conform to traditional dress often stemmed from male 
figures of power (fathers, managers, husbands, brothers, male co-workers). In some 
restaurants, this gendered dimension was clearly visible as the uniforms for women 
employees included the headscarf, while the male employees were not expected to wear 
white caps. In many of these cases, religion once again played a role with management 
referencing the gendered aspects of Islamic dress. When asked to explain this gendered 
difference, one male manager explained that women were expected to wear the 
headscarf because it is instructed by Qur’anic teachings, whereas the Qur’an does not 
say that men should wear the white caps. 
Although many participants did discuss their decisions to wear headdresses within the 
context of external pressures, some participants offered counter-narratives to this. For 
some, the decision to wear traditional headwear was solely down to personal choice and 
was often linked with themes of empowerment and pride. Some participants explained 
that for them, traditional headdresses and clothing were symbolic of their ethnic 
difference to the Han, something which many of them prided themselves on. One 
middle aged male baker from Beijing summed this view up quite succinctly when he 
 
70我们是穆斯林，我们是西北人。 
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explained that he wore the cap because he wanted people to see that, “I am a Hui, not a 
Han, not a Manchu nor a Mongol. I am Hui.”71 
5.1.b  Religious Practice and Family Structure 
As with their traditional dress, embodied cleanliness and the cultivating of beards, other 
aspects of Hui culture are also influenced by Islamic beliefs, specifically the need to 
attend mosque and its impact on family structure and life. Despite efforts being made 
by most Beijing mosques to include women by providing separate prayer halls or 
spaces for them, as with elsewhere in China, there is often a gender imbalance of 
mosque attendees. In some areas of China, there are women’s mosques which are led 
by female ahong and cater solely to Hui Muslim women in an effort to make attending 
mosque for prayer more appealing and accessible for women. Some of these women’s 
mosques are centuries old (Jaschok, 2012; Jaschok and Shui, 2000). Yet, there is a 
notable difference between the number of men and women attending mosques, 
something which was very apparent in all cities visited during this project’s fieldtrips 
and which was mentioned by several participants, including the ahong of a Beijing 
mosque. One explanation for this is the inherently gendered roles of Islamic practices 
which prioritise male participation. This has helped to shape the traditional gender roles 
within the Hui family structure and organisation. As one elderly Ningxia-native woman 
informed me in her small restaurant in Beijing, attending mosque is traditionally 
considered to be the “duty”72 of men, while women are expected to “care for their 
families.”73 She went on to explain that this division of duties based on gender was how 
men and women cared for their families together: i.e. the women cared for their 
families’ practical needs while the men attended to their spiritual and religious 
obligations. However, once again this practice is no longer universal among the Hui, 
with several interviewees in Beijing explaining that family life has changed over time, 
especially in cities.  
Many informants linked the changing gender roles within the family unit to China’s 
modernisation and the demands on both parents to work; something which they claimed 
was the case for all Chinese people, not merely the Hui. For some, this change was seen 
as being a negative consequence of modern China, disrupting the family structure and 
 
71我是回族。不是汉族，不是满足，也不是蒙古族。我是回族。 
72 义务。 
73 照顾家人。 
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preventing both men and women from carrying out their traditional roles as parents and 
as heads of their households. Further, some argued that the demands of modernisation 
were placing the practical needs of life in Beijing in opposition to their spiritual duties 
and traditional beliefs, with many men complaining that they felt as though they were 
making spiritual and religious sacrifices in order to work and survive. For others, 
however, this change was welcomed. As one young mother explained, many women 
now seek the independence offered to them by working outside of the family home and 
as such, they are increasingly choosing to join the workforce: “women want 
independence now, so we work.”74 According to this woman, this shift is a relatively 
recent one and is only made available by the diminishing role that tradition and religion 
are playing in the lives of Hui living in Beijing. This theme of changing gender roles 
and women’s involvement in the workforce will be explored further in Chapter 7.  
5.1.c  Qingzhen and its Cultural Significance 
Given the diversity of these cultural practices, and the varying degrees in which people 
perform and adhere to them, it is perhaps unsurprising that so many scholars have 
questioned the existence of a shared culture among the Hui and the extent to which the 
group meets Stalin’s (1957) fourth criteria for ethnic classification. Yet, the Hui do 
possess some shared commonalities that may be considered as cultural traits. 
Specifically, the words Qing (清 - Pure) and Zhen (真 - True) are of importance here. 
Or rather, it is their compounding into Qingzhen (清真 - Pure and True) that holds the 
most significance. When carrying out field work in Beijing, I noticed that these 
characters usually signalled the presence of the Hui, Hui products or Hui spaces, such 
as mosques, restaurants, cafes, bakeries, butcheries, markets, food wrappers, literary 
works, etc.; although it is also used by other Islamic minority groups including the 
Uyghur, Kazakh and indeed foreign Muslims in China. The term Qingzhen is often 
translated as meaning Halal, however it exceeds such simplistic definitions (as will be 
discussed below). The significance of the concept to the Hui is so great that Gladney 
(1996) has argued that it has become a “sacred symbol” – borrowing from Geertz 
(1968) – marking Hui identity, while acting as a cornerstone of their shared cultural and 
ethno-national practices and identifications.  
 
74 女人现在要独立，所以我们工作。 
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In his landmark study Muslim Chinese, Gladney (1996) conducted fieldwork in four 
distinct Hui communities across China: Na Homestead in Ningxia Hui Autonomous 
Region, Niujie (Oxen Street) in Beijing, a suburban village called Changying east of 
Beijing (now a part of Beijing’s Chaoyang District), and a Hui community in Southeast 
China. He contended that Hui identity was centred on the belief that the Hui were 
descendants of foreign Muslims. Further, he noted that across these different social 
settings, the ethno-religious expressions of identity differed, as did their cultural 
practices. These expressions of Hui identity and local understandings of Qingzhen 
varied as they were adapted and altered to fit with their social contexts. As such, 
prominent cultural symbols such as the pork taboo, religious rituals, endogamy, 
genealogy and occupational specialisation varied depending on their understandings of 
Qingzhen. Further, they became salient for each community when expressing their 
ancestral heritage. Specifically, Gladney points out a rather interesting geographical 
dimension to his findings of the importance of these cultural symbols. For the Na 
Homestead community in Ningxia, religious rituals were of particular importance, 
while for south-eastern Hui genealogy was of upmost significance. For the Hui of 
Changying, endogamy was the most salient way in which the Hui adhered to a 
Qingzhen lifestyle, while for Beijing Hui, occupational specialisations, and most 
importantly, the avoidance of pork, were how they expressed their Hui identity.  
Although having been originally written nearly 30 years ago (with a revised version 
published in 1996) following fieldwork carried out in the late 1980s, it is arguable that 
Gladney’s thesis that Qingzhen is central to Hui cultural practices and identity still rings 
true today for Beijing Hui. However, as one might expect given the almost 30-year 
period since the research was conducted, a great deal has changed in relation to the 
cultural importance of Qingzhen and its manifestations through cultural practices in 
Beijing. Firstly, within the context of contemporary Beijing, this research refutes the 
notion that Hui invariably ground their identity in the notion of descent from foreign 
Muslim ancestors. Rather, participants in this research project offered a greater array of 
definitions and understandings of Hui identity, which will be discussed in further detail 
in a later section. Secondly, Gladney’s geographical distinctions between the differing 
levels of importance associated with cultural practices and understandings of Qingzhen 
are perhaps no longer as clear-cut as they were. Rather, within Beijing (including 
Changying), respondents did not merely reference occupational specialisations, 
endogamy and food taboos as being important cultural practices for maintaining 
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Qingzhen lifestyles. In fact, fewer participants discussed occupational specialisations or 
endogamy than those who mentioned genealogy and religious rituals, or indeed, other 
practices. This diversification of cultural practices is unsurprising when we consider 
Beijing’s huge development over the past three decades, its role as an epicentre of 
internal Chinese migration, and the diverse backgrounds and places of origin of this 
project’s research participants. Thirdly, as Beijing’s urban sprawl spread over the past 
30 years, Changying Village has become a neighbourhood of urban Chaoyang District, 
rather than a suburban village. As such, it is perhaps unsurprising that residents’ 
understandings of Qingzhen and the importance that they’ve attached to its associated 
cultural practices does not vary noticeably from those of other areas in Beijing. This is 
representative perhaps of assimilation into the broader Beijing Hui culture as the village 
became further connected and enmeshed within Beijing’s urbanity. Lastly, of the two 
cultural symbols that Gladney identified as being important for Beijing Hui, the pork 
taboo is unquestionably still an important practice for Hui today. However, rather than 
focusing solely on the avoidance of pork, most participants referred to the Hui’s 
distinctive food culture more broadly when discussing their understandings and 
interpretations of Qingzhen, Hui identity, and Hui culture. Therefore, although 
Gladney’s emphasis on the Hui’s pork taboo is still relevant for Beijing’s Hui today, the 
practice is better framed within the context of adherence to Hui food cultures more 
broadly considering the multiplicity of dietary practices mentioned by participants.  
5.1.c.i  Qingzhen as Halal? 
Given the importance of Qingzhen to the Hui cultural practices and identities discussed 
above, the question arises: what is Qingzhen? Or more importantly, how is Qingzhen 
understood and interpreted by the Hui? The term Qingzhen is most commonly translated 
as Halal and it is this understanding that is most often used by academics, and indeed by 
the PRC state. The word halal itself is usually translated into English as meaning 
“lawful” or “permitted”, although most Muslims relate the labels of lawful and unlawful 
to concepts of purity and pollution (Gillette, 2000). Islamic dietary restrictions are based 
on God’s revelations to Muhammad and are listed in chapters two, five, six, sixteen and 
eighty of the Qur’an (Ali, 1984; Esposito, 1995; Gillette, 2000). According to these 
passages, most plant and animal life are permitted for Muslim consumption. However, 
there are certain foods that are deemed impure or Haram (unlawful or polluted). 
According to Gillette (2000: 116), God prohibits only four types of food: “(1) animals 
that have not been consecrated to God and properly slaughtered (including those that die 
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of disease and old age, are killed by another animal, or have been improperly killed by 
humans, for example, strangled or beaten to death); (2) blood; (3) pork; and (4) 
alcohol”. In relation to alcohol, it is commonly debated whether God forbids all 
intoxicating substances or merely certain types of alcohol. Murata and Chittick (2013: 
24), in their insightful exploration of Islam, elaborate further on the restrictions that are 
dictated by the Shariah (Islamic law or revealed law); 
“Muslims are forbidden to consume intoxicating beverages and narcotics. They 
are also forbidden to eat pig, dog, domestic donkey, and carrion, which is defined 
as the meat of any animal that has not been ritually slaughtered. Animals are 
slaughtered ritually by cutting their throats while mentioning the name of God. 
This ritually slaughtered meat is then called halal (permitted). Many jurists 
maintain that meat prepared by Jews or Christians is halal for Muslims, while 
others disagree. On this point the Koran gives a general ruling: ‘The food of the 
People of the Book [those who have been given scriptures, such as Jews and 
Christians] is permitted to you’ (5.5), although it is understood that this food, if 
meat, must be slaughtered in the name of God. Kosher meats in particular seem to 
fit this category. In general, the Shariah declares that it is forbidden to eat any 
wild animal that has claws, nails, or tusks with which it overcomes its enemies, 
such as lion, tiger, wolf, bear, elephant, monkey and cat. However, one school of 
law maintains that it is reprehensible to eat these animals, not forbidden. Minor 
differences of opinion among the jurists are quite common. Thus, most of them 
maintain that all animals that live in the sea are permitted, whereas one school 
makes an exception for sea animals that do not take the form of fish – such as 
shellfish, crabs, alligators, or walruses”. 
In light of this definition of halal, there are a few noteworthy points in relation to the 
Hui. Specifically, Murata and Chittick (2013) reference the contested and interpretive 
natures of Halal among Muslims and Islamic schools of law. This is an important point 
as the scriptures of Islam are often interpreted in very different ways by followers of the 
religion. As such, the religious, and indeed cultural practices relating to halal will vary, 
as will people’s understandings of it. This is particularly relevant for the Hui, whose 
views and opinions of Shariah law pertaining to dietary restrictions varied significantly. 
Consequently, their understandings of Qingzhen, and the Hui’s food culture more 
generally, were diffuse, numerous, and often conflicting. Interestingly, Murata and 
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Chittick (2013) also mention several key topics that are pertinent to the Hui and Hui 
food cultures; such as the type of meat permitted for consumption (including wild 
animals, seafood and meat prepared by non-Muslims), and the issue of alcohol and 
intoxicants.  
5.1.c.ii  Qingzhen: A Sinocisation of Halal 
Despite often being translated as meaning halal, Qingzhen is arguably better understood 
as “pure and true”, incorporating the dietary restrictions and associated practices of 
halal while also exceeding such simplistic definitions. In addition to compliance with 
Qur’anic teachings regarding what are deemed lawful to eat, many participants 
explained that Qingzhen also draws from broader Chinese teachings, specifically from 
Chinese medicine, the Chinese humoral system, and the notion of chi shenme bu 
shenme,75 or “eat something to fix/mend something”. According to the Chinese humoral 
system, all foods are divided into two categories; cold (liang76) and hot (re77), or Yin 
(cold) and Yang (hot). The consumption of foods with either hot or cold energies is 
believed by many to affect the balance of hot and cold within the human body. When an 
imbalance occurs, people may become sick or begin displaying certain symptoms. 
However, people may strategically alter their internal balance by consuming foods with 
the desired hot or cold properties (Gillette, 2000; Kaptchuck, 2000; Wiseman and Ellis, 
1996). As with Gillette’s (2000: 127) participants in Xi’an, all of the Hui that I spoke 
with in Beijing were aware of this concept, with many claiming that they actively 
practiced such an approach to health and diet. Similarly, and interlinked, the Chinese 
medicinal principle of chi shenme bu shenme also professes a strong unavoidable link 
between human diet and an individual’s embodied state of being. Drawing upon her 
exchanges with a Hui professor of Hui culture named only as Zenglie, Gillette explains 
that in line with this teaching, a person with poor eyesight might increase their intake of 
eyeballs as a way of improving their vision. This teaching continues to influence 
understandings and dietary practices of Qingzhen by directly associating the innate 
attributes of an individual’s food with their embodied physicality and characteristics. 
In line with these principles, many Hui, like their Han counterparts, believe that eating 
food with certain characteristics will impact on the body in such a way as to pass on 
 
75吃什么补什么。 
76 凉。 
77热。 
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those traits. As such, the food cultures of the Hui are considered to have an embodied 
element, whereby eating Qingzhen foods will cause a person’s body to become a purer 
body, or, a Qingzhen body. The belief in the Chinese medicinal teachings of chi shenme 
bu shenme and the humoral system have led to a hybridization and sinocisation of halal, 
placing Qingzhen at the interface between the majoritarian traditionally Confucian 
society and the Islamic beliefs of the minority. Hui people not only believe that they are 
living a righteous lifestyle by eating foods deemed lawful in the Qur’an, but they 
believe that they are actually transforming and purifying their bodies in the process. 
Further, this direct association between one’s diet and one’s bodily characteristics has 
led to Qingzhen restricting the consumption of foods that are not necessarily considered 
unlawful in Islam. Many interviewees explained how foods from animals that are 
considered “ugly”, “dirty”, “wild” or that possess “unwanted”, “mean” or “unkind” 
characteristics are prohibited by Qingzhen as they will pass on those characteristics to 
the individual. These animals included fish with teeth, fish without fins or scales, more 
than 3.5Kg (7斤 Jin – a traditional unit of weight; 1斤 isapproximately 0.5Kg) of fish, 
crocodiles, eagles, dogs, rabbit, loaches, tigers, leopards, turtles, foxes, squid, snakes, 
lizards, birds with curved beaks, shrimp, crabs, and of course, pigs. It should be noted 
that not all research participants mentioned most of these animals when discussing 
prohibited foods (although all did mention pork), showing a similarity to the diverse 
understandings of Qur’anic Law mentioned by Murata and Chittick (2013). 
Furthermore, many of those that did list these additional animals explained that these 
animals were prohibited because of their potential to pass on unwanted traits, rather than 
with reference to religious and Islamic doctrine.The direct correlation between what 
people eat and their embodied state of being, combined with understandings of the 
morality of animals and Qur’anic teachings pertaining to halal, are arguably the defining 
pillars of contemporary understandings of Qingzhen dietary restrictions for many urban 
Hui in Beijing, and thus play a vital role in their self-identifications.  
5.2  QINGZHEN, HUI IDENTITY AND FOOD CULTURES.  
As a hybridisation and sinocisation of Halal – which is itself a contestable and 
interpretative religious and dietary practice – Qingzhen is a rather loose and open 
concept that is understood in a variety of fluid, diffuse and contested ways. Among 
Beijing Hui, understandings of Qingzhen vary from it being a practice deriving from 
religious doctrine, to a set of cultural traits that define and reaffirm the biological 
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difference of an ethnic minority group. This is awkward and dangerous territory for, in 
affirming a biological difference in the context of their broader denigration through a 
process of minoritisation (see section 2.5 above), the Hui people of Beijing seek to 
reverse the hierarchy that marginalises them as Other to the hegemonic Han identity in 
China. As Bhabha remarks, minoritisation is a stain upon citizenship: ‘the question of 
difference, the question of the failures of the democratic promises of nations’ (Anfeng, 
2009: 164). Moreover, in taking biology as a basis for differentiation these Hui Chinese 
take a dimension of identity that is intrinsic to the most extreme versions of Othering 
and shameful abjection (Nussbaum, 2004). Indeed, Sedgwick and Frank (1995: 1) 
underline this suspicion of biology suggesting that the distance from ‘a biological basis’ 
of ‘any account of human beings or culture’ is generally ‘assumed to correlate near-
precisely with its potential for doing justice to difference […] and to the possibility of 
change.’ To claim a biological basis for a civilizational superiority in the context of 
food and eating is a very radical response to the disqualification of minoritisation. Yet, 
as I show below, this is precisely what the Hui Chinese attempt.   
At the core of Qingzhen for Beijing Hui, both conceptually and in practice, are notions 
of religiosity, cleanliness, place, and nationality – both “big” and “small” nationality. 
Continually during my field work, individuals and groups expressed different 
understandings and approaches to Qingzhen. Often individuals would offer an absolute 
and definitive interpretation of the concept that was dependent exclusively on one of 
the aforementioned core notions of cleanliness, religiosity, nationality or place, arguing 
that their version of Qingzhen was the “true” meaning of the term. While others defined 
the term in relation to a multiplicity or combination of some/all of these themes. 
Interestingly, two other central understandings were present in all of the participants’ 
conceptualisations of Qingzhen: that Qingzhen is central to Hui identity and culture, 
and that it is primarily associated with practices of Hui food culture. It is this imagining 
of Qingzhen (as understood by Beijing Hui) as being inseparable from the Hui’s food 
culture and the centrality of this food culture and Qingzhen to Hui identity that grounds 
this project. In this sense, it is perhaps useful to think of these three factors of Qingzhen 
as understood by Beijing Hui, the Hui food culture in Beijing, and Hui identity in 
Beijing, as being a triad – as demonstrated in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.5: Triad of Hui Identity. 
Source: Author’s own (2019). 
The three vertices of this triad are all inter-related and co-dependent in each other’s 
understandings and meanings for Beijing Hui. For example, understandings of 
Qingzhen are central to how the Hui in Beijing view both their food cultures and their 
identity as a group. Likewise, their food culture plays a central role in defining not only 
Qingzhen, but also the group’s identity. And finally, conceptualisations of the group’s 
identity are linked with Qingzhen and their food cultures. In short, the three themes of 
Qingzhen, food culture, and Hui identity are co-constitutive for Beijing’s Hui. When 
conversing with participants about their understandings of Qingzhen, Hui food cultures 
or definitions of the Hui as a group, it was commonplace for them to define each of 
these themes in relation to each other. Again, these terms were defined in a myriad of 
ways with individuals highlighting or omitting different relationships between the 
topics depending on what they deemed important. However, the inter-connectedness 
between them was always present with most participants explaining that adherence (of 
varying degrees) to the Hui’s food culture was the defining feature of contemporary 
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Hui identity in Beijing, and that Qingzhen was central to this food culture and as such 
to Hui identity formation.  
Throughout interactions with participants, a number of terms and phrases would 
repeatedly appear which best encapsulate this relatedness. For example, “We are 
Qingzhen Ren”78 (Qingzhen People), “I eat Hui food, so I am Hui,”79 and “Hui people 
have to eat Qingzhen food”80 were three statements and notions that would often 
appear. “Of course I only eat Qingzhen food, I’m Hui,”81 was the response of one male 
chef from Gansu Province working in a Lanzhou noodle restaurant in Central Beijing in 
early August 2017. He went on to explain that eating Qingzhen food is what makes him 
a Hui. When asked if failure to adhere to a Qingzhen diet meant that one couldn’t be 
considered a Hui, he said that in his opinion, failure to adhere to a Qingzhen diet was 
equivalent to not eating Hui food and as such one couldn’t be considered a Hui. This 
opinion was echoed by some others, including a young male Beijinger working in 
Changying but educated in the West who explained that “if you stop eating Qingzhen, 
then you quit being a Hui. Then you’re just like everybody else, like the Han.”82 This 
man’s view that Hui identity and status could be lost or given up if Qingzhen food is 
not consumed was not unique, nor was his emphasis on the Hui’s food culture as being 
their distinctive trait. Similarly, many other participants explained that the group’s 
shared food culture was the defining and distinguishing characteristic of the Hui and an 
essential requirement in qualifying and identifying as a member of the group. For some 
Hui, particularly those whose understandings of Hui and Qingzhen depended also on 
religious devotion to Islam, anyone who followed a Qingzhen diet could be called a 
Hui. One young Shandong waitress working in Dongcheng District perhaps best put the 
importance of this triad’s inter-dependency into words when she said that Qingzhen 
food “symbolises us as Hui people.”83 
Entwined and enmeshed within this triad of Hui identity, food culture and Qingzhen, 
are the themes of religion, nationalism[s], cleanliness and place (see Figure 5.5). Each 
of these themes relate to one or more vertices of the triad depending on an individual’s 
understandings, interpretations and identifications, with some connections and themes 
 
78我们是清真人。 
79我吃回民食物，我是回民。 
80回民要吃清真的。 
81当然我只吃清真的，我是回族。 
82Interview was carried out in English at the interviewee’s request. 
83就是它是指象征着我们是回民。 
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being viewed as more important or relevant, while others are ignored or dismissed 
completely. For some, each theme relates to all three parts of the triad, while for others 
only certain themes, or even one theme, are relevant. Further, these themes are not only 
connected and related to the vertices of the triad, but they are also inter-connected to 
each other in intricate, diffuse and often confusing ways, again depending on individual 
understandings. For example, when interviewing a middle-aged female restaurant 
owner in Xicheng District in summer 2017, it became clear that her understandings of 
Hui identity, Hui food culture and Qingzhen were not only inter-dependent and co-
constitutive, but that they were also hinged upon the themes of religion, cleanliness and 
place. These three themes were then not only connected to each other and the triad, but 
they were also linked in lesser ways to the themes of “big” and “small” nationality.  
5.2.a  Religion 
“Are you Hui? Is he Hui?”84 asked a young female waitress from Shandong Province 
working in Beijing’s Fengtai District within the first few minutes of our interview 
together in July 2017 – the first full interview of this project. I was initially surprised by 
this question as I failed to understand how she might have mistaken a white Westerner 
for a member of her own ethnic group. However, I quickly realised that for her the term 
“Hui”85 was interchangeable with that of “Muslim,”86 and as such, she was in fact 
asking me if I were Muslim, not a member of an ethnic minority group. This conflation 
of terminology and meaning between “Hui” and “Muslim” was not unique to this 
woman; rather it is one that appeared time and again throughout the research project. 
Many participants, varying across ages, genders and occupations, switched between 
these two terms regularly when discussing the Hui, Qingzhen, their own ethnic 
identification, their religion, their food cultures, and their cultural practices. Often, when 
asked a question regarding the Hui, participants would answer using the term Muslim, 
demonstrating their belief that both terms signified the same connotation. One example 
was the response given by a middle-aged male butcher from Beijing when asked if he 
thought that his status as Hui was important for his occupation; “About this, it’s 
important. Because Muslims are united throughout the world, he recognises this, 
 
84你是回族马？他是回族马？ 
85回/回族/回民。 
86穆斯林。 
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Qingzhen food is legal, Hui people are universal. Beef and mutton are universal.”87 
More common still was the response we often received when recruiting participants. 
When asked if they were Hui, many respondents simply responded with “Yes, [I] am 
Muslim.”88 
For some participants, this conflation of terms happened instinctively, or at the very 
least, without them consciously making efforts to distinguish between them. While for 
others, the conflation was a deliberate and intentional move; these individuals 
understood both terms to be synonymous and actively made efforts to communicate this 
point to me. For many people, to be Hui means to be Muslim, and likewise, to be 
Muslim means to be Hui. When asked to explain who the Hui people are, one elderly 
Shaanxi native explained that he believed that “In China, as long as people believe in 
Islam [they] are counted as Muslim.”89 “It’s your faith that determines if you’re a Hui 
person or not a Hui person” explained a young Lanzhou Hui woman in English before 
asking me “do you understand? It’s important that you understand that Hui and Muslim 
are the same. We are Hui because we are Muslim.”90 Other participants explained that 
these two terms did in fact hold very different connotations. Some participants 
explained that for them, the term “Hui” refers to all Chinese Muslims, regardless of 
official ethnicity. This is unsurprising given the fact that the term was historically used 
to denote all Muslims and Islam in China, as discussed in Chapter 4 (see also Leslie, 
1986: 195-6; Zheng, 2010: 161). Several individuals said that although they understood 
and recognised differences between China’s 10 identified Islamic minority groups, the 
term “Hui” could be used as an umbrella term to describe all of them, including Muslim 
Han; whereas the term “Muslim” refers to all followers of Islam globally. One young 
noodle chef in Haidian District explained,  
“The Hui people are one of 56 ethnic groups in China, [and their] symbol is the 
white hat. However, [while] this nationality is specifically called the general 
term ‘Hui people’, all Islamic believers in China are [also] collectively referred 
to as Hui people. Other [minorities] are not closely related to the Hui people. 
Once Han people join Islam, they can also be called Hui people. There are also 
 
87这个来说很重要。因为这个穆斯林是全世界统一，他这个认可，清真食品它是合法的，回民它
是世界通用。牛羊肉是世界通用。 
88是的，是穆斯林。 
89在中国，只要信仰伊斯兰教的人都算回民。 
90Interview was carried out in English at the interviewee’s request.  
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many Chinese Tibetans, for example Xinjiang’s Uyghur, Kazakh, Bao’an, 
Dongxiang and Salar ethnic groups, these minorities are different but they all 
believe in Islam. Collectively they are known as the Hui people, and so on.”91 
This multi-scalar way of addressing identity raises once again the geopolitical context in 
which the personal is assembled, which is a fundamental insight of Feminist Political 
Geography (see section 2.1.d above). For many others the term “Muslim” refers to all 
followers of Islam globally, while the term “Hui” means a distinct Islamic ethnic group 
in China, rather than referring to all Chinese Muslims. What is interesting about this 
understanding of terminology is that although they are understood as signifying 
different meanings for some individuals, the concept of being Hui was still dependent 
on being Muslim. In other words, many Beijing Hui explained that although the terms 
held different meanings, you could not be Hui without also being a Muslim; although 
you could be Muslim without being a Hui. When speaking with young waitresses from 
Shandong Province working in a tourist area of Dongcheng District, I asked if “Hui” 
and “Muslim” meant the same thing. One eighteen year old waitress explained that for 
her, they were not the same thing but that in order to qualify as a Hui, people “must 
have strong faith in Islam.”92 This association between being Muslim and being Hui 
was paramount for many of the people with whom I spoke. When asked if the faith of 
an individual was important in either their qualifying as Hui or their ability to cook 
Hui/Qingzhen food, many participants would answer that one simply cannot be 
considered as Hui if one was not a Muslim. One male Gansu chef told me that “[if] he is 
a Hui person he must be a Muslim, [if] he is not a Muslim he is not a Hui person.”93 
Many participants believed this. Some of these respondents would appear shocked or 
confused by the mere suggestion that a Hui might not believe in Islam, demonstrating 
how absolute they were in their understanding that in order to be a Hui, one must be a 
Muslim. One elderly Beijing-native who owned her own small but popular canteen 
immediately interrupted me once she realised what I was suggesting: “If someone is Hui 
but they don’t believe in Islam [Interrupted],”94 “That’s impossible […] He is a Hui, he 
will definitely believe in Islam. Although he is a member of the Communist Party, they 
 
91回民是中国五十六个民族之一，认为回民的标志就是带着白帽子。但回民这个民族具体统称，
在中国所有的伊斯兰教的信徒被统称为回民。其他跟回族是关系不是很大。一旦有汉族加入伊斯
兰教，也可以被称为回民，也有中国的藏族很多，比如像新疆的维吾尔族，哈萨克族，保安族，
东乡族，撒拉族，这些民族不同，但他们都可以信仰伊斯兰教，统称为回民，这样的。 
92就必须是非常信仰伊斯兰教的。 
93他是回民他就必须得是穆斯林，他不是穆斯林他就不是回民。 
94如果他是回民，但是他不信仰伊斯兰。 
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have their own belief.”95 The impossibility of a Hui being a non-Muslim was elaborated 
on by another restaurant employee who explained that if someone stopped believing in 
Allah, or if their faith weakened considerably, then they could no longer claim to be a 
Hui. Showing that for some individuals, not only was their status as Hui dependent on 
being Muslim, but this status was fluid and changeable, and that it could indeed be 
revoked from those whose faith in Islam wavers. This bears similarity to the claims of 
the young Beijing-native mentioned earlier when discussing the importance of 
consuming Qingzhen foods for the maintenance of one’s Hui status.  
The qualifying trait in determining the “Hui-ness” of a person for all of these people 
with a religious understanding of the Hui was the level of faith that a person held in 
their heart. “Everybody should have a strong belief in their heart,”96 “It depends on your 
understanding of the belief,”97 and, “Generally speaking, as a Hui, we have faith,”98 are 
three responses that are representative of many of the replies given by people who view 
religion as the defining trait of Hui identity. However, there was consensus among all 
interviewees that this personal faith, although essential, was not enough to classify a 
person as Hui. Rather, these people contended that in order to call oneself a Hui, one 
must maintain a religiously appropriate lifestyle through performing certain cultural 
practices. Surprisingly, very few interviewees mentioned the importance of praying 
regularly as a criterion for being a Hui. In fact, out of 34 interviewees, only three men 
specifically stated that such practices were important for qualifying as a Hui. Rather, all 
of these individuals stressed the importance of following the Hui’s food culture and 
practicing a Qingzhen diet. Unlike the broader definitions given by some other Hui 
participants, and indeed as understood in the preceding section of this chapter, these 
more religious Hui often understood Qingzhen through a purely Islamic lens.  
For these people, Qingzhen could be understood as meaning halal, with its practices and 
rules stemming from the teachings of the Qur’an. What is important to mention here is 
that although these people understood Qingzhen to be in line with the teachings of the 
Qur’an that does not mean that they did not also practice the sinocised version of halal 
as argued earlier. It simply means that many of these people believed that the rules 
associated with the sinocised version of halal actually came directly from The Prophet 
 
95不可能！[…]他是回民他肯定信仰伊斯兰教，虽然他是共产党员，他自己肯定也是有信仰的。 
96每个人心中必须得有一个坚定的信仰。 
97那要看他对这个信仰的认识。 
98但是普通来讲，我们作为回族来说，我们就是有信仰。 
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Muhammad’s teachings in the Qur’an. These people understood not only Hui identity to 
be pinned on Islam, but also Qingzhen and Hui food culture: “Qingzhen represents the 
corresponding, it can be said to represent Islam, Muslim,”99 “According to the 
requirements of the Qur’an, we can only eat Qingzhen food, Qingzhen food is also 
translated into Arabic as Halal, translated into Chinese [it] is legal, that is, it is 
legitimate food among Muslims,”100 “You see, the food [Hui] people eat, it depends on 
their belief in their heart. If they are Hui, then they will eat Hui food, Qingzhen food. 
These foods depend on the Qur’an to know what is clean. It is your faith that makes it 
clean.”101 The arguments made in these three quotations were neither unique nor 
isolated. Rather, the belief that religion is central to all three points of the triad – Hui 
identity, Hui food culture and Qingzhen – was quite common among Hui participants. 
In fact, all participants that stressed the important link between religion and one of the 
triad’s points also emphasised that religion shaped the other two aspects. Therefore, for 
some, the triad of Hui identity discussed earlier is best explained through a religious 
lens: the Hui are an Islamic group, Qingzhen means lawful in the Qur’an, and Hui food 
must follow Qur’anic teachings.  
5.2.b  “Small Nationality”/Ethnicity 
Despite religion being the most common directly referenced theme through which the 
project’s participants claimed to understand their identities, food cultures and Qingzhen, 
ethnicity also arguably played a dominant role in shaping many individuals’ 
perceptions, either directly or indirectly. For many, the concept of minzu, or ethnicity, 
was far more relevant and appropriate than religion for explaining who the Hui are and 
the importance of their distinctive food culture. Many of these people would directly 
refer to their ethnic status or (small) nationality during conversations, while others 
would imply it through their discussions of a shared culture and history among the Hui 
– two features that are considered important in their qualifying as an ethnic group. This 
shared culture, specifically their shared food culture, was mentioned by every 
participant throughout the research. As was discussed earlier, Qingzhen has become a 
“sacred symbol” (Gladney, 1996) for the Hui as a collective group, and both it and its 
 
99清真代表着相对应来说，可以说是代表伊斯兰，穆斯林。 
100还有一个就是按照古兰经对我们的要求，我们是只能吃清真的食品，情真的食品也翻译成阿文
是 Halal，翻译成中文是合法的，就是在穆斯林当中它是合法的食物。 
101Interview was carried out in English at the interviewee’s request. 
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associated food cultures have come to represent essential traits for qualifying as a 
member of the nationality for Beijing Hui.  
Although many participants understood the concepts of Hui identity, Hui food culture 
and Qingzhen through the frame of religion, many others downplayed these religious 
associations, or even refuted them entirely. “First of all, Hui people are only one 
nationality in China. The Hui and Muslims who believe in Islam are two concepts. 
Most of the traditional ideas are that the Hui people are Muslims who believe in Islam. 
But there are also a small number of Hui people who do not believe in Islam,”102 was a 
response given by the middle-aged male owner of a small bakery in Xicheng District 
when asked if Hui people are all Muslim. He went on to explain, “I just said, the 
difference between Hui and Muslim is; one is an ethnic one, a nationality of the 
Chinese Government, a name for this category, [and it] became a nationality. [This] 
And faith are two different concepts, faith is Islam.”103 This man’s insistence that the 
concepts of Hui and Muslim were distinct from one another was one that appeared 
throughout the research’s field trips. These two statements from this baker arguably 
summarise many of the key points that were made by several Hui with whom I spoke; 
that the concepts and terms of Hui and Muslim were not synonymous, that Hui people 
did not have to be Muslim, and that the Hui were in fact an official ethnic group 
designated by the Chinese authorities.  
Often, people would refer to China’s other officially classified nationalities when 
attempting to explain their understandings of the Hui as an ethnic group rather than a 
religious one; “We [have] 56 nationalities, there is a Hui nationality, it is the Hui 
nationality, but it is not necessarily Muslim”104 and “[We are] divided into many 
nationalities. The Hui are a single nationality, my understanding is this.”105 By 
comparing the Hui to other officially recognised nationalities, these individuals were 
legitimising the group’s official state imposed classification and strengthening official 
narratives and discourses which have defined the Hui as a distinct ethnic group and 
which have subjected them to the government’s nationalities policies. At times I was 
struck by how pressing it was for some people to explain to me that the Hui held the 
 
102首先，回民在国内只是一个民族。回族和信仰伊斯兰的穆斯林还是两个概念，大多的传统的思
想就觉得回族是信奉伊斯兰教的穆斯林。但是也有少部分的回族不信仰伊斯兰。 
103我刚说了，回民和穆斯林的区别，一个是民族的，中国政府对民族，对这一类的一个称呼成为
民族。和信仰是两个概念，信仰是伊斯兰。 
104我们五十六个民族，有回族这个族，它是回族，但它不一定是穆斯林。 
105分成好多个民族。回族呢就是单一的一个民族，我的理解是这样。 
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status of an official ethnic group akin to any other in China, until one Hui woman 
elaborated on this point by suggesting that their ethnicity is often mistaken for religion 
or disregarded by many non-Hui. This association with religion is unsurprising given 
the close association between the Hui and Islam as discussed earlier, and the term’s 
history of being an umbrella term for all Muslims and Islam in China until the modern 
era (Gladney, 1996; see also “Islam in China” in Chapter 4.2 above). When conversing 
with non-Hui in Beijing, particularly the Han or other Islamic minorities, this 
uncertainty around the Hui’s status as a nationality occasionally appeared. When 
recruiting interviewees in Beijing’s Chaoyang District in August 2017, my interpreter 
and I visited a Qingzhen restaurant that was run by a Salar family. After speaking 
separately with different people, the interpreter later told me that the male manager of 
the restaurant, and the patriarch of the family, said that we should be conducting our 
research with the Salar, Uyghur or another minority group as the Hui aren’t a real 
nationality, exemplifying the disregard experienced by some Hui for their ethnic status.  
When discussing their ethno-nationalist understandings of Hui identity, lineage and 
genealogy were prominent factors, with the status of Hui being something that one 
inherits from their parents at birth: “You are born a Hui, you are a Hui,”106 “[His] 
Parents are so he is […] Because of your parents, it passes over to you […] You have 
Muslim bloodline,”107 and “His parents are Hui, so he is also Hui.”108 This belief in the 
inherited nature of Hui ethnicity has led some to consider the Hui as holding distinct 
physical qualities from other nationalities. As one young female waitress from 
Shandong told me, “Hui characteristics, [are] large eyes, [and] high-bridged noses.”109 
Claims of facial differences between the Hui and other groups, particularly the Han, 
were not frequently encountered when speaking with the Hui but were nonetheless 
relevant as they were more often mentioned by Han. Gladney (1996: 23-24) writes that 
physical differences between the Hui and Han are not uncommon in China’s north-west 
where communities arguably better preserve their Central Asian genealogy and 
therefore possess qualities such as high-bridged noses and hazel-green eyes. He goes on 
to mention eastern cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, saying that one is often 
surprised to meet a Hui who looks unlike the majoritarian Han population. Within 
Beijing, there certainly are some individuals who possess these non-typical Chinese 
 
106你出生是回族，打出生就是回族。 
107父母是他就是[…]因为你的父母，你这么传承下来的[…]他有穆斯林你的血统。 
108他父母是回民，他也是回民。 
109回族的特征，眼睛大，鼻梁高。 
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facial features; however, they are a minority. Even the eighteen year old waitress that 
described the Hui as possessing different facial features from the Han admittedly 
possessed neither the large eyes nor high-bridged nose that she mentioned. Among the 
interviewees of this project, such features were only encountered among some 
participants that originated from China’s north-western provinces, which perhaps lends 
itself to Gladney’s comments regarding the continuation of Central Asian genealogies 
in that region. During one of our weekly conversations in 2015, a Gansu-native street-
food vendor explained to me that in her opinion, these features aren’t a shared trait 
among all Hui. Rather, she claimed that they were largely confined to people of the 
Northwest, both Hui and non-Hui, and that their association with the Hui was 
predominantly due to the fact that the Hui come from that region. This linking of Hui 
identity with the places of China’s north-west will be discussed further on in the chapter 
and in chapters 6 and 7, however what is important to note here is the refuting of such 
physical ethnic differences by some Hui and the use of place-based discourses of 
belonging.  
Although contention does exist between participants as to whether the Hui identity, 
Qingzhen and Hui food cultures are best understood through religion or ethnicity, some 
interviewees argued that these three points are best understood as the products of both 
concepts. For many of these individuals, the categories of religion and ethnicity are 
over-lapping and co-constitutive: religion is an ethnic “characteristic” of the Hui, and 
Hui ethnicity and ethnic difference is dependent on this religious practice and cultural 
trait. Therefore, Hui identity, Qingzhen and Hui food cultures can be understood 
through an appreciation of the inter-linked relationship between religion and ethnicity: 
“The Hui nationality has their own belief. Moreover, Hui people only eat beef and 
mutton, chicken, and don’t eat other meats,”110 and “We have been Hui people for 
generations, and then some of our beliefs, and what we usually worship, they are 
already customs.”111 Adding to these points, a young male from Lanzhou working as a 
supervisor in a large restaurant in Chaoyang District perhaps summarised it best by 
saying, “But in no way [are we] allowed to go to the Arab restaurant to eat if it is not 
Qingzhen. If [we] go in to eat, [it] will hurt our taboos, and there will be no difference 
 
110回族有自己的信仰，而且回族只吃牛羊肉，鸡肉，其他的肉都不吃。 
111我们世世代代都是回族人嘛，然后你像我们的一些信仰，还有那个平常我们礼拜什么的，那是
就是已经习惯性的了就是。 
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from other nationalities. This is what is prescribed in the Qur’an”112 and “The Hui 
nationality is Islam.”113 
5.2.c  “Big Nationalism”/ State Nationalism 
“Big nationalism”, or nationalism at the level of the Chinese State, was yet another 
important lens through which people described their understandings of Hui identity, 
Hui food cultures, and to a lesser extent Qingzhen. When discussing these topics during 
interviews, it was explained three times to me that the most important facet of Hui 
identity was, according to these three individuals, that the Hui are Chinese people 
before all else. These individuals, two male and one female, insisted that Hui shared 
identity was similar to those of other ethnic groups in China in that individuals first 
identified as Chinese, and that ethnic and religious labels held less significance than the 
national one. The male interviewee, a manager of a small restaurant in Haidian District, 
answered that “First of all, we are Chinese people”114 when asked to explain what the 
term Hui means. The precedence of their citizenship was mirrored by the responses of 
the other two, with the female interviewee referring to her status as Chinese several 
times. Admittedly, this repeated mentioning of her citizenship was most likely in 
response to a miscommunication between my interpreter and I, and his biases regarding 
Han festivals. Following her explanation of the Hui, I had intended to ask her about her 
participation or non-participation in various holidays and festivities. As the excerpt 
below shows, this miscommunication resulted in unintentional insult being caused: 
Me: “Will you ask her if she also celebrates other festivals, like Chinese New Year?” 
Interpreter: “Do you celebrate Chinese traditional festivals?”115 
Interviewee: “Chinese?”116 
Interpreter: “Yes, like Spring Festival, Dragon Boat Festival, Lantern Festival 
[Interrupt].”117  
 
112但是绝不允许到没有打着清真，没有打着阿拉伯的餐馆进去吃饭。如果说进去吃饭，就伤了我
们的忌口，就等于的其他族别没有什么区别。这就是古兰经上规定的吧。 
113回族就是伊斯兰教。 
114首先，我们是中国人。 
115你们会庆祝中国的传统节日吗? 
116中国的? 
117对，像春节啊，端午节，元宵节[Interrupt]。 
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Interviewee: “Like us Hui generally don’t celebrate those holidays, because sometimes 
like […] we are also Chinese. Hui people are Chinese.”118 
Understandably, the interviewee appeared a little displeased, or possibly even annoyed, 
by the question being asked, or more specifically, the by the wording of the question 
and its insinuation that she was non-Chinese. I had, in my naivety at this early stage in 
my research, conflated Chinese and Han identities, repeating the very minoritisation 
(see section 2.5 above) that marginalised the Hui as Other to a hegemonic identification 
of Chinese with Han. After apologising to her for unintentionally causing upset, she 
accepted the apology and luckily confirmed that she was willing to continue with the 
interview. A good rapport was re-established quite quickly and she appeared to relax 
once again. However, she continued to reference her Chinese citizenship several times 
later in the interview. Although likely a response of the earlier line of questioning, her 
insistence on the importance of “big” nationality to Hui identity, food cultures and 
Qingzhen fits with her initial explanation of the Hui as being Chinese before all other 
categories.  
Although only three individuals argued specifically for the importance of Chinese 
nationalism when asked to explain who the Hui are, many others did allude to the topic 
of state-level nationalism and Chinese citizenship. Most often, this was done by 
describing the Hui as either Chinese Muslims, or a Chinese ethnic minority group. 
Although both of these responses also define the Hui as either a religious or ethnic 
collective, they nonetheless demonstrate the importance of “big” nationalism in 
people’s understandings of Hui identity. This implied national unity also appeared 
when discussing the Hui’s food cultures and Qingzhen. Although the majority of 
participants focused on their food culture’s differentiating characteristics as a way of 
exemplifying the Hui’s ethno-religious individualism and uniqueness, some participants 
argued that Hui food was no different to that of the Han with the exception of their food 
taboos: “The difference, now [it is] a harmonious society, there is no difference. Except 
for our additional taboo, oh, things. I feel nothing [is different], now it’s almost the 
same.”119 This culinary and cultural similarity to the Han and other minority groups was 
even more pronounced for others who didn’t mention any differences between the 
groups. As the male manager of a Lanzhou Beef Noodle restaurant explained in relation 
 
118像我们回族一般都不过些节日，因为有时像[…]我们也是中国人。回族人是中国的。 
119区别，现在和谐社会嘛，没有什么区别。除了我们那个比较忌讳的一些，呃，东西以外，我感
觉没有什么，现在都差不多了。 
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to inter-ethnic differences, “Almost no difference, because all [are] the same. All are 
Chinese.”120 
5.2.d  Cleanliness 
Another key theme through which participants understood the triad’s vertices was the 
notion of cleanliness. During the early stages of participant observation and 
interviewing, it was somewhat surprising to learn of the importance of cleanliness in the 
self-identifications and conceptualisations of Hui individuals in defining not only their 
identities, but also their food cultures and understandings of Qingzhen. Unlike the 
themes of ethnicity, “big” nationality and religion, which were often given precedence 
over one another by the denial of the others’ relevance, cleanliness was most often 
mentioned in relation to the other themes, specifically religion and ethnicity. 
Cleanliness was viewed as being a central component in all three points of the triad in 
myriad ways. In relation to Hui identity, cleanliness was viewed as being an ethnic 
characteristic, religious necessity or both, depending on the particular participant’s 
understandings of Hui group identity. Embodied practices of cleanliness were often 
considered to be nationality traits by participants, with personal hygiene and clean food 
practices being held in high regard as uniquely important to the Hui. The definitive and 
most unique quality of the Hui nationality, according to two young Gansu-native male 
employees in a Fengtai District restaurant, was the group’s cleanliness and hygienic 
practices. As the younger eighteen-year-old explained, “The most special part […] It’s 
what I feel, [for] Hui, is, clean,”121 when asked what separated the Hui from other 
ethnic groups. After being asked if he meant the cleanliness of Hui food, he went on to 
explain, “Food […] in general my hometown [is clean], I haven’t been to other places. 
For my hometown, we dress neater and tidier, relatively clean.”122 Other participants 
also attached significance to the neat and clean appearance of the Hui, with many 
claiming that a person’s clean appearance, specifically a restaurant employee’s, was a 
sure sign of them being a Hui.  
This attention to personal hygiene, although considered by many as an ethnic trait, also 
relates to religion in quite obvious ways. Within Islam, ablution is considered a 
 
120几乎是没有区别的，因为都一样。都是中国的。 
121最特别的地方 […] 就是我感觉，回族的，就是，干净。 
122食物，[…] 我们那儿，相对我们那儿，我也没到过其他地方。相对干我们那儿，就是比较衣装
整洁那样的，比较干净。 
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requirement for many religious practices. Major ablution, or ghusl, which involves 
washing the entire body, is required after sexual intercourse, emission of semen, 
menstruation, touching a human corpse or childbirth. Without ghusl, a person cannot 
perform ritual prayer, touch the Qur’an or enter a mosque. In order to perform the salat 
(the prayers that are observed five times daily), one has to be free from all minor 
impurities also, including impurities that occur if one goes to the toilet, sleeps, breaks 
wind, and so on. These impurities are removed by carrying out minor ablution, or wudu, 
which involves washing the hands, mouth, nose, right and left forearms, face, head, 
ears, and right and left feet in that order (Murata and Chittick, 2013: 13). This washing 
for religious purposes was referenced by some of the project’s participants, although 
many admitted to not carrying out the minor ablution practices regularly given 
restrictions on their ability to practice salat in the Beijing work environment and the 
limited ablution and prayer spaces available to them. Nevertheless, these participants 
maintained that the Hui’s cleanliness, stemming from religious practices and doctrine, 
were defining features in not only Hui identity, but also Hui food cultures and 
Qingzhen. When asked why he considered Qingzhen foods to be clean, a Ningxia-native 
male chef explained: 
“Faith is faith. Because of the teachings of Islam, the overall outline is passed 
down. Because we have a week of Islam, we have to eat every day for lunch, wash 
our hands, wash our faces, wash our feet, and these [fore]arms. Wash it five times 
a day. Keep your body clean everywhere. First of all, your body is clean and 
[then] your mind can be clean. Including these clothes, because when you are 
praying, there is no dirt on your clothes. [You] must wear neat and clean clothes 
to worship.”123 
For this man and others, there was a link between the cleanliness of food and the 
embodied religious cleaning practices and appearance of Hui people. Of further 
significance here is the statement, “First of all, your body is clean and [then] your mind 
 
123信仰，就是信仰。因为伊斯兰教的教法，整体大纲，流传下来的就是。因为我们伊斯兰教有一
个礼拜，每天的午饭拜公，洗手，洗脸，洗脚，胳膊这些，每天要洗五次，你要随时保持你身体
的任何地方的洁净。首先你身体干净了，你的心灵才能干净。包括你这些衣物，因为你做礼拜的
时候，你衣物上有污垢是不行的。必须得穿整洁干净的衣物才能拜公。 
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can be clean,”124 as it alludes to another commonly argued point: that there are two 
types of clean.  
The belief in the existence of two types of cleanliness is one that was encountered time 
and again. Rather than viewing cleanliness as simply corresponding to sanitation or 
hygiene, it was commonly perceived by individuals that there was a deeper meaning to 
cleanliness, one more akin to purity. When asked if cleanliness was important to Hui 
people, a young Gansu-born waitress answered: 
“Yes, there are two kinds. Clean is clean on the surface, not clean in the heart, not 
clean in the body. It’s [about being] clean in both parts. Clean is the surface, wipe 
it clean, [but] the heart is not clean, the inside is not clean. The cleanliness of the 
Hui nationality is from the bottom to the top: they are clean in their bodies, clean 
in [their] hearts, the things they do are clean, and it tastes especially different 
when you eat it.”125 
This understanding in the different types of cleanliness is one that was continually 
discussed by participants. For some, the deeper level of cleanliness possessed by the 
Hui was due to their religiosity, while for others it was a result of their Qingzhen diets. 
Generally, those who believed that this internal cleanliness was the product of religious 
devotion unsurprisingly considered Hui identity, food culture and Qingzhen to be 
defined by adherence to Islam. In this regard, the internal cleanliness described above 
and the clean taste of Hui food came from following Qur’anic teachings: “The food 
itself is clean, afterwards you are a Hui nationality. You perform the ghusl, what you do 
is clean, after you perform the ghusl you read aloud, Allah gave that food. After ghusl 
you read aloud while you cook […] after you have finished reading aloud, the food you 
cooked is especially fragrant,”126 “In our Islamic classics, only Qingzhen is legal. The 
so-called Qingzhen is clean and tidy, from the inside to the outside,”127 and “So in our 
family, [when] my mother cooks, she will read the Qur’an. After reading the Qur’an, it 
 
124首先你身体干净了，你的心灵才能干净。 
125对，分两种，干净是表面的干净，不是心里面的干净，不是身里面的干净。是分两边的干净。
干净就是表面，擦的干净，心里面不干净，内里面不干净。回族的干净是从下到上，他们身里面
干净，心里面干净，做的东西也是干净，也吃起来也口感特别不一样。 
126食物本身是干净的，然后你这个人就是回族嘛，你洗完大净做的是干净的，你做的是干净的，
洗完大净你念，安拉给那个食物，洗完大净做那个食物的时间念 […] 念完以后做的食物特别香。 
127只有清真是合法的，在我们这个伊斯兰教的经典中。所谓清真就是干净，整洁，从内心到外
面。 
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will be especially clean and delicious. We Hui nationality think this is the case.”128 
Therefore, in order to qualify as being clean both internally and externally, and to have 
your food meet these standards, one had to demonstrate religious purity through Islamic 
practice.  
For most participants this internal and external cleanliness was the result of adherence 
to a Qingzhen diet rather than religious practices: “I think that maybe if the food is 
made real Qingzhen, so it must be clean. Because Qingzhen is a symbol of clean 
itself”129 and “So-called Qingzhen is clean, tidy, from the heart to the outside.”130 As 
discussed earlier, some people understood Qingzhen to solely mean halal, or lawful in 
accordance with the Qur’an, linking their belief in Qingzhen’s resultant internal 
cleanliness with the views discussed above in relation to Islamic practice. However, 
more common was the broader sinocised understanding of Qingzhen put forward earlier 
in the chapter. As a result, religion played a lesser role for many individuals in their 
conceptualisations of internal cleanliness, with the purity of the Qingzhen diet being 
paramount. Of particular importance here is the notion of chi shenme bu shenme, or 
“eat something to fix/mend something”. In line with the earlier discussion of this 
concept, many people believed that by eating Qingzhen food, which they considered to 
be purer and cleaner than non-Qingzhen food, they were transforming their bodies into 
cleaner and purer bodies from within.  
In addition to having impacted on personal conceptualisations and embodied states, the 
notion of cleanliness has also shaped food preparation practices. Similar to Gillette’s 
(2000) discussion of food preparations in a Hui neighbourhood of Xi’an, some people 
with whom I spoke explained that their methods of preparing food were cleaner than 
those of the Han. In addition to choosing only Qingzhen meats for consumption, some 
argued that Hui people also prepared their vegetables and fruit in a more sanitary and 
hygienic manner; although some others refuted these claims and believed that no inter-
ethnic differences existed in relation to the cleanliness of food preparation practices. 
Specifically, it was claimed that the Hui only use running water when preparing food, 
unlike the Han who were often accused of using the same basin of water for several 
purposes. Another practice that many Hui claimed differentiated them from non-Hui 
 
128所以我们家里面，母亲做饭也好，也会念古兰经。念了古兰经，做的就是特别干净，也比较好
吃。我们回族自己认为是这样。 
129Interview was carried out in English at the interviewee’s request. 
130所谓清真就是干净，整洁，从内心到外面。 
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based on sanitation was the storage and packaging of food. For some, a basic 
requirement in determining if food was Qingzhen, and by association clean, was how 
the food was stored before use. Some necessary conditions mentioned included, 
keeping all food dry and ventilated, storing it away from rubbish and animal stools, and 
keeping it covered at all times, even from air pollution. Although these practices are not 
exclusive to the Hui, many believed that they were, claiming that the Han do not hold 
the same regard for hygiene and sanitation as them and as such, do not follow these 
basic principles of clean storage. The need for covering food and the assumed inter-
ethnic differences in cleanliness were taken further by some interviewees, with one 
male Gansu-native explaining that non-Hui, specifically the Han, could not touch any 
Qingzhen food or it would be contaminated and therefore unsuitable for Hui 
consumption. He claimed that this was the case as the Han would have previously come 
into contact with tabooed contagions and that they were not clean from the inside. An 
elderly Ningxia-native woman mirrored these sentiments and went on to add that this 
was why most Hui food came in sealed packages, so as to avoid it being touched by 
non-Hui people. Without these sealed packages and a clearly visible Qingzhen sign, 
these foods were not considered by many to be edible. Again, some people refuted 
these claims by saying that foods such as vegetables, rice, noodles and processed 
candies (with the exception of those containing animal derivatives) were by their very 
nature Qingzhen and therefore acceptable to eat as they did not contain any forbidden 
animal meats or blood. Given the association between these standards of cleanliness 
and Qingzhen, and the contested and multifaceted understandings of Qingzhen within 
Beijing’s Hui communities, these differing views are unsurprising.  
This strong emphasis and focus on cleanliness, and its role in understanding the triad of 
Hui identity, Hui food cultures and Qingzhen, has inevitably had an impact on the 
spatial, social and material composition and structuring of places of Hui food culture. 
Within many Hui restaurants, cleaning staff are employed in addition with waiting and 
cooking staff. The sole job of these staff members was to maintain the level of 
cleanliness in the restaurant by continually collecting and washing dishes, cleaning 
tabletops, sweeping the floor, and so on. In all restaurants that were visited, waiting and 
kitchen staff were also expected to assist with maintenance and upkeep by cleaning 
their work surfaces and equipment, and cleaning the floor of their workspace. In one 
key participating restaurant in Beijing’s Haidian District, these efforts to maintain a 
high standard of cleanliness were undeniably apparent, continual and systematic. 
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Figure 5.6: Loop system of cleaning. 
Source: Author’s own (2018). 
In an attempt to maximize efficiency and ensure high levels of cleanliness, the 
restaurant implemented a loop system (Figure 5.6). This system meant that plates of 
food were given to customers at the service window to the kitchen before being taken to 
the main space of the restaurant by the customer. The dishes were then collected by the 
cleaning staff and brought to the cleaning area in the far-left corner of the restaurant 
where they were scraped clean and separated before being passed through a window to 
the washing room. Dishes were then washed by other members of the cleaning staff and 
sent back into the kitchen to be re-used (Figure 5.7). Interestingly, this cycle of 
cleanliness and its inherent re-use of dishes may be seen as a performance of Qingzhen, 
and indeed, of Islam. As the manager of this restaurant explained, this process of 
washing and re-using dishes and chopsticks is important for the restaurant “because it’s 
Islamic, it’s Qingzhen. Washing, use again and again, again and again. Even for 
people’s health, Islamic is very good.”131 Interestingly, he then went on to link the 
restaurant’s cleaning practices with environmental consciousness, and how working 
towards a cleaner environment is an act of Qingzhen:  
“Not like the paper. You see in the Kentucky [Fried Chicken], in the 
McDonalds, all this some brands, famous brands’ fast food. All use the paper. 
 
131Conversation took place in English at the participant’s request.  
Kitchen
Customer 
Space
Cleaning 
Area
Washing 
Room
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So, paper from where? From the trees. They [are] coming from trees. So, you 
see this always international brand they use this paper on the daily. They use 
daily, they waste how many? Even our chopsticks not one-time use. We can 
clean there. We can make three people, four people wash it for use it again and 
again, not the waste. So, if we waste chopsticks, daily we have around 2,000 
people here. In a year that’s how many trees? In Beijing we have more than a 
1,000 restaurants. If every restaurant uses one time, how many? It’s not 
Qingzhen.”132 
 
Figure 5.7: Cleaning staff at the cleaning window. 
Source: Author’s own (2016). 
This emphasis on cleanliness undoubtedly involved a certain spatiality. As the manager 
explained, the layout of the restaurant was designed to allow for the possibility of the 
circular cleaning system, in addition to the L-shaped queuing system used for ordering 
food. Most importantly, the layout of this restaurant, like some other Qingzhen 
restaurants in Beijing, included a large open window between the main space of the 
restaurant and the busy kitchen – an area that usually remains sealed off from the public 
in most non-Qingzhen restaurants (Figure 5.8 and 5.9). The manager explained that this 
 
132 Conversation took place in English at request of the participant.  
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was not only an important aspect of the restaurant’s physicality but was an important 
part of their “model”: that the kitchen was kept open to the public so that they could see 
that everything was being made fresh in a clean kitchen. Proudly adding that “this is 
[the] Qingzhen way. This is Islamic” and that as such “it is clean, and it is open. That’s 
why people like us”. Despite this being a trait of this restaurant’s “model”, it was by no 
means a unique feature. Open kitchens could be seen in many of the Qingzhen 
restaurants visited across Beijing, particularly in newer ones. Perhaps this is, as the 
manager of the aforementioned chain restaurant claims, one characteristic of his 
restaurant that has been copied by its competitors, or perhaps not. Regardless, it is 
certainly a trend among Beijing’s Qingzhen restaurants and could be found in many of 
the observed Qingzhen restaurants and all of the participating ones. When asked why 
the restaurant’s chefs could be seen working from the main seating area, the supervisor 
of another restaurant said that it was done to demonstrate the restaurant’s cleanliness 
and that it played an essential role in building trust among diners and in garnering 
popularity.  
 
Figure 5.8: Open service window to kitchen. 
Source: Author’s own (2015). 
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Figure 5.9: Open service window to kitchen. 
Source: Author’s own (2016).  
Aside from the obvious visual aspects associated with good hygiene, some restaurants 
have taken further steps to make their “clean status” visually apparent. Specifically, 
some restaurants display their health and safety certificates and “certificates of high 
quality” on the walls of their establishments for customers to see (Figure 5.10 and 
5.11). One restaurant advertised not only the certificates of excellence for their 
restaurant, but also for the quality of the products that their establishment produced, 
such as vinegar and chili paste. Pride in the cleanliness and quality of the restaurant’s 
ingredients was not limited to their own produce, with many of the participating 
restaurant workers frequently advertising to customers their meat’s freshness and their 
good relations with their meat suppliers. On numerous occasions, both restaurant 
workers and customers informed me that the high quality and cleanliness of Qingzhen 
meat was a major draw for customers.  
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Figure 5.10: Certificates. 
Source: Author’s own (2015). 
 
Figure 5.11: Certificates and Awards. 
Source: Author’s own (2019).  
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5.2.e  Place 
The final lens through which the triad of Hui identity may be understood is place. 
Specifically, I argue that the triad’s elements are often shaped by geographical 
imaginaries, emotive ties to places, and group and individual understandings of 
belonging. Importantly, these place attachments and imaginaries play major roles in 
local conceptualizations of both individual and group identity among the Hui and in 
their determining of what constitutes Hui food cultures and what qualifies as Qingzhen. 
As was previously discussed in Chapter 4, the Hui are a geographically diverse and 
widely dispersed group, occupying every region and province across the PRC. This 
geographical diversity was somewhat evident in the provinces of origin of the project’s 
34 interviewees. As Figure 5.12 shows, the interviewees’ places of origin ranged from 
China’s north-western provinces to China’s most north-easterly province, Heilongjiang. 
Although none of the interviewees came from China’s southern regions that is not to 
say that southern Hui did not participate in this project. In fact, during the participant 
observation phases, I spoke with Hui individuals from China’s southeast and also from 
Yunnan Province, China’s most south-westerly province.
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Figure 5.12: Map of interviewees’ provinces of origin. 
Source: Author’s own (2019).  
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This geographical difference and migratory status is important for the discussion of 
place attachment and imaginaries as these migrants generally believed that their native 
food cultures were more “authentic” and Qingzhen than the local Hui food cultures in 
Beijing, specifically the Hui from China’s Northwest. Many Hui, including some 
Beijing Hui and Hui from other eastern provinces, regarded the food cultures of China’s 
north-western regions to be the most authentic, legitimate and pure examples of Hui 
food culture. For some, this was because of the assumed religious purity and orthodoxy 
of north-western Hui. These people’s assumed higher level of Islamic devotion and 
practice has resulted in the belief that they are better qualified to make real Qingzhen 
food, similar to the discussions above in relation to religion and cleanliness. For others, 
the perceived authenticity of north-western food cultures stems from the Hui’s historic 
ties to China’s north-western regions, where Muslim groups were once the majority and 
through which Islam first entered China (see Chapter 4). While for some, ties to 
governmental discourses are clear, with many referencing these periphery border 
regions as the “home” or “place” of China’s minority/non-Han populations, implying 
that the Hui are “out of place” in Beijing. This exclusionary, or reactionary (Massey, 
1994), view of the Hui’s place was evident in many people’s perceptions of the Hui’s 
food cultures in Beijing. Most often, when asked to describe Hui food culture, or when 
asked to name a typical or representative Hui dish, participants would name foods 
associated with China’s north-western regions or define Hui food as north-western 
cuisine. Foods and dishes such as Mianshi,133 Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles, 
BaBaoCha,134 Chuan’er,135 goji berries, and a range of beef and mutton dishes such as 
hand-grasped mutton, were most commonly identified by participants as being most 
representative or typical of Hui food culture due to their inherent association to China’s 
Northwest. These dishes become performances of place-based identities for many 
Beijing Hui, as will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7. Many restaurants are modelled 
after those of other provinces and regions in the Northwest. These restaurants not only 
serve dishes from those places, but they also use language to signify those places in the 
names of restaurants and dishes, while modelling the restaurants’ style of décor and 
uniforms on them, while often only hiring serving staff and cooks from these provinces. 
These representational and place-making practices, as is argued in Chapter 6, are 
intended to encode these signs with meaning, signifying the places that the Hui are 
 
133面食。Eng: wheaten products - particularly noodles and breads. 
134八宝茶。Eng: Eight Treasure Tea. 
135串儿。Eng: barbecues meat skewers. 
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associated with and attached to, while exemplifying the provincial connections of 
Qingzhen places of Hui food culture in Beijing. Despite the insistence by some that the 
food cultures of China’s north-western Hui are more authentic due to their belonging 
“in place”, many Hui claim that their Qingzhen versions of Beijing cuisine are also 
authentically Hui. These Beijing Hui refute claims that Hui cuisine and food culture 
must be linked with Western China, insisting that Qingzhen versions of traditionally 
Han – or even foreign - dishes are also Hui and therefore deserve to be recognized as 
such. Beijing as a place not only impacts on how these individuals understand their food 
cultures, but also shapes their conceptualizations of Qingzhen and Hui identity. For 
them, they are not “out of place” in Beijing. Rather, they belong in Beijing and their 
places of food culture are linked to Beijing in unavoidable and inseparable ways.  
5.3  HUI IDENTITY, FOOD CULTURES AND QINGZHEN. 
In his landmark text “Muslim Chinese”, Dru Gladney (1996) demonstrated the diffuse 
ways that the concept of Qingzhen had shaped the ethno-religious identities and socio-
religious practices of four Hui communities across China. Further, he argued that for 
China’s Hui, the concept of Qingzhen was as a “sacred symbol” marking Hui identity in 
China, borrowing the term from Geertz (1968). Building from this understanding, this 
chapter argues that it is the ways in which Qingzhen has influenced the food cultures of 
Beijing’s Hui that is the most significant performance of Hui ethnic identity in the city 
today. Informed by the work of Gillette (2000) and drawing from empirical data, 
Qingzhen is understood here as meaning “pure and true”, rather than the oft-used and 
overly simplistic translation of halal. This chapter argues that for this research’s 
participants, the concept of Qingzhen not only refers to Qur’anic teachings surrounding 
halal, but it also draws from Chinese medicine, the Chinese humoral system, and the 
notion of chi shenme bu shenme, or “eat something to fix/mend something”. Therefore, 
this chapter presents an understanding of Qingzhen as being a sinocisation of halal.  
The importance of this sinocisation of halal, or Qingzhen, to Hui culture was explored 
in detail in Section 5.2. Specifically, it was shown that for Beijing Hui, it is now the 
manner in which Qingzhen has shaped the group’s food cultures that is the most salient 
performance of Hui ethnic identity today. Building from this conceptual underpinning, I 
argue that local interpretations of Qingzhen and Hui food cultures are mutually 
dependent, and as such, are co-constitutive of Hui identity, forming an interlocked triad, 
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as is presented in Figure 5.5. This triad of Hui identity, Hui food culture and Qingzhen 
can most often be understood through one, or several, of five key thematic lenses 
identified. These are religion, “small” nationalism/ethnicity, “big” nationalism/state 
nationalism, cleanliness, and place. However, it should not be misinterpreted or 
construed that I am proposing that only five absolute lenses of understanding exist or 
that they are all encompassing or definitive. Rather, it is possible, and indeed probable, 
that there are a multitude of other themes through which local Hui understand each of 
the triad’s points. It is important here to remember the fluidity and performative nature 
of identity and the subjectivity of understandings. The five themes suggested and 
discussed above, are better understood as the key themes to have been identified during 
the course of this fieldwork. Nevertheless, the value and space afforded to these five 
themes is warranted given their prominence and continued presence during this 
research project, and the strong emphasis placed on them by participants. Importantly 
Section 5.2.e showed how for Beijing Hui, this triad draws heavily from the group’s 
diffuse attachments to places, an important point for establishing a conceptual 
foundation for the next chapter. In Chapter 6, these attachments to place will be 
explored in further detail and the notion of Qinqie place will be developed.  
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CHAPTER 6: PLACES OF HUI FOOD CULTURE.  
“Does it bring up any memory for you?”136 
“Yes, it is the feeling […] just like seeing our own ethnic minority, Islam, it 
feels very Qinqie. 137 Then it seems to give people the feeling of returning home, 
especially the feeling of peace of mind, what we need is this kind of practical 
feeling.”138 
The above quotation was taken from an interview with a Shandong-native, Hui waitress 
working in Fengtai District in July 2017. Prior to this segment, she had been asked to 
explain what features made Hui restaurants distinguishable, and what material objects 
and representations she liked about the restaurant that we were in. The restaurant 
displayed a number of place-making features that will be discussed throughout this 
chapter, such as Qingzhen signs, Arabic writing, Islamic and Chinese artwork, and 
Arabic-style cutlery. This bricolage of references from diverse places bring with them a 
set of geopolitical significations that are assembled under the current pressure of the 
GWOT. In these ways, and others, the geopolitical becomes personal (Eken, 2019; 
Fluri, 2015) in the fashion that Feminist Political Geography has identified (see section 
2.1.d above). This interviewee’s reflection highlights several aspects of these place-
making tactics and practices that are important for how we conceptualise and 
understand Beijing’s places of Hui food culture, and their importance for Hui people. 
Specifically, that these material objects and representations are used to signify 
connections to people and places, to evoke emotional responses, and to provide a sense 
of belonging and safety for Hui. 
This search for safety and belonging is over-determined by the geopolitical context. The 
events of 9/11 and the anti-Islamic and anti-Arabic ideology sanctioned by the US as 
the GWOT in its response (see section 1.1 above) set the context for the PRC to adopt 
with impunity public denigration of its own Islamic minorities and of the seeming 
Arabisation of elements of public Islamic cultures as described above (see section 1.2). 
Islamic scholars often study abroad and some Hui imams have fallen under suspicion in 
 
136会有什么样的，就是会想到什么样的一些东西吗？ 
137亲切。Eng: Cordial, kind, close, familiar, warm, intimate, dear. 
138对，就是感觉 [。。。] 就是像见到我们本身那个少数民族啊，伊斯兰，就是感觉特别亲切。再
就是看上去给人感觉回到了家的感觉，特别踏实的那种感觉，我们需要的就是这种踏实的感觉。 
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this regard (Stewart, 2017: 41). In this context, the expression of international Islamic 
culture in public places is now a risky business in the PRC and throughout this chapter 
and the next anxieties linked to this intense minoritisation (see section 2.5 above) will 
become evident (see also section 8.5 below). 
In Chapter 5, I argued that Hui food cultures, local understandings of Qingzhen, and Hui 
identity form an interlocked triad for Beijing’s Hui. Further, Section 5.2.e showed that 
this triad draws heavily from the group’s myriad attachments to places. Building from 
this and guided by the theoretical underpinning that places and food are essential 
practices through which identity is formed (Ohnuki-Tierney, 1993), this chapter aims to 
take seriously the places of Hui food culture found in Beijing as important sites of 
meaning and performances of identity. Individual and group attachments to place are 
highly emotive (Davidson and Bondi, 2004) and may be performed through dietary 
practices (Longhurst et al., 2009). In light of this, and building from the 
conceptualisation of Qinqie place presented in Chapter 2, this chapter is framed 
theoretically by the understanding that: places are embodied; that experiential and 
emotive imports are central to places; they are not static, but are processual and mobile; 
they possess a bounded openness; places are connected and relational to other places 
and people; places hold multiple temporalities; they are socially and historically 
contingent “gatherings”, or bundles; and they are inescapably political. 
Working within this conceptual framework and drawing from eight months of 
ethnographic fieldwork in Beijing’s Hui restaurants and Qingzhen foodscapes (see 
Chapter 3), the chapter explores the place-making tactics and representational practices 
employed by the Hui in establishing places where the Hui feel that they belong, are safe 
and Qinqie. The features used to demarcate a place as Hui are examined using a 
semiological approach, as are the ways that the objects and features are believed to 
signify Hui-ness, and why. This includes features such as menus, signage and restaurant 
names, uniforms, pictures and photographs displayed, artwork, utensils, and the 
physical layout of restaurants. Central to this semiological approach are practices of 
active reflexivity, which allowed me to challenge my initial decodings of signs. The 
emotional attachments and resonances of these places to Hui individuals are explored as 
are their individualistic and subjective decodings of these meaning-laden signs.  
Structured in a way that highlights the relational and connected nature of places of Hui 
food culture in Beijing, this chapter will first discuss place-making as a connected 
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practice, further developing the understanding of place discussed in Chapter 2. The 
following four sections will then continue to advance our understanding of Qinqie 
places by looking at the specificities of these places’ connectivities. Specifically, 
through a semiological analysis of visual referents, it will be argued that places of Hui 
food cultures in Beijing are connected to people, connected to other places, connected 
temporally, and connected emotively. In addition to making these arguments of 
connectivity and relationality, there is another clear and over-arching conceptual thread 
running through each section. That is to say, that these places are undeniably political, 
something that will be evidenced through the chapter.  
6.1  PLACE-MAKING AS A CONNECTED PRACTICE 
Places are important. They are our most intimately felt geographies and the sites of our 
embodied engagements with the world around us (Casey, 2013). As we interact with the 
places that make up our lifeworlds, we experience a range of emotional, affective and 
sensorial responses. In consequence, our engagements with places are always framed by 
our emotional knowings (Tuan, 1979; Davidson and Milligan, 2004; Adams et al., 
2001). These places, as was argued earlier (see section 2.3 above), are not static and 
rooted entities with fixed boundaries. Rather, they are processual and full of movement 
with open, porous borders (Pred, 1984; Massey, 1993; Malpas, 2012). Places are 
historically contingent processes that possess and draw from multiple temporalities at 
once, challenging linear conceptualisations of time (Hamilakis, 2017). Given their 
socially constructed nature, and the centrality of human bodies and experience in their 
composition, places are inescapably political (Pierce et al., 2011; Massey, 1994a). 
Places are always relational and connected to one another: they are simultaneously 
embedded within other places, while also having those places enmeshed in their own 
constitution (Malpas, 2012).  
Each of these above assertions holds importance for understanding the geographies of 
Hui food cultures in Beijing. Specifically, it is argued in the following sections of this 
chapter that within Beijing, places of Hui food culture may be conceived of as 
connected places. Firstly, places are connected to individuals and groups. This 
connection not only happens through bodily engagements with places, but also through 
discursive and representational practices that act to link Hui places of food culture with 
localised understandings of Hui identity. These connections are, of course, the basis of 
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the relations between collective memory and the making of places (Jones and Garde-
Hansen, 2012). The understandings of the Hui discussed in Chapter 5 are once again of 
importance here: that the Hui are an Islamic group; that the Hui are an official ethnicity; 
that the Hui are Chinese citizens; and that the Hui are distinguished by their higher 
levels of cleanliness.  
The final understanding of the Hui discussed in Chapter 5, that Hui identity is linked to 
certain places, is of significance to the next connection: that places are connected to 
other places. Following Massey’s (1991) and Malpas’ (2012) work, places are seen as 
inherently relational, with each place holding aspects of other places within it while also 
lending itself to those other places. These connected places draw from other places by 
using referents to signify their association in an attempt to establish them as authentic 
and legitimate. Specifically, places of Hui food culture in Beijing were most often 
connected to areas of Northwest China, Beijing, and even the Arab World and the West. 
These connections between places and their inherent geographical imaginaries and 
attachments to places, not only play vital roles in how the Hui perform their identities 
and understand their place within the locality of Beijing, but also their sense of 
belonging on national and global scales. As such, an analysis of these performances of 
place allows for the (geo)political nature of these places to be explored.  
The final way in which these places of Hui food culture are connected is through the co-
existence of multiple temporalities. Through representational practices and place-
making tactics, references are made to other places and people. However, when places 
are being represented, superimposed, performed or modelled after another, they’re not 
just re-creating, representing or performing a different place, but also a different time; a 
snapshot or impression of the original place at a particular time. This is important as 
minorities in China are not only seen as belonging elsewhere in China, but they are also 
seen as “backward”. As such, they’re not only segregated spatially but also temporally. 
This is the ethnographic gaze that ejects the exotic from the progressive train of 
modernity (Fabian, 1983). 
In addition to these three types of connections, places of Hui food culture in Beijing are 
connected in two further, over-arching ways which frame the following arguments of 
places as connected to other places, people and times. Importantly, these places are 
connected emotively and politically. This concept of emotively connected places refers 
to the emotional knowings and experiences of the Hui people that engage with them, 
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with specific attention being given to the feelings of safety, belonging and Qinqie. All 
of these places are also connected to the political happenings and discourses of both 
Chinese national, and international, politics. These connections are discussed in the 
following subsections, with specific focus on the representational place-making 
practices used by Hui individuals when creating places of Hui food culture in Beijing. 
The use of representations and material objects is analysed, and their meanings explored 
using a semiological approach.   
6.2  CONNECTED TO PEOPLE: THE HUI 
When attempting to locate and identify Hui restaurants in Beijing, the presence of 
Qingzhen signs and logos, or more specifically the characters 清真, was undoubtedly 
the most telling sign. These signs could be found adorning the entrances and exterior 
street-facing walls of all Hui restaurants and food-vendors. Often they would be 
featured on the name displays of establishments, or else positioned above, beside or on 
the door, clearly visible from the street (Figure 6.1). Further, it is also commonly 
featured on menus, cutlery and utensils, artwork, packaging, and so on (Figure 6.2). 
These signs, specifically the characters 清真, act as signifiers for staff and potential 
customers. Signage, its typography and placing, is an important element of the semiotics 
of place (Stroud and Jegels, 2014; Zabrodskaja and Milani, 2014). These signs signify 
different meanings for different people. It is important here to remember Hall’s (1980) 
work on encoding and decoding: whereby a sign may be encoded with meaning, but this 
meaning is decoded differently by different people, depending on their own 
understandings and positionalities. In light of this, it is perhaps unsurprising then that 
various individuals and groups with whom I conducted research decoded these signs as 
meaning different things, especially given the multiplicity of understandings of 
Qingzhen and Hui identity expressed by participants. 
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Figure 6.1: Qingzhen Signs Outside of Restaurants and Vendors’ Units. 
Source: Author’s Own (2015, 2019).  
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Figure 6.2: Qingzhen Signs on Plaques, Menus, Utensils, Chopsticks and Bags. 
Source: Author’s Own (2017, 2019). 
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Initially, I had decoded the characters of 清真 as meaning halal, that is to say the set of 
dietary practices as outlined in the Qur’an. However, after discussing such a reading 
with Hui participants and after carefully reflecting on these conversations and my own 
initial reading, I realised that such an interpretation was a case of aberrant decoding 
resulting from my positionality as a non-Hui person. In fact, for most participants the 
characters清真 acted as an indexical sign for the Hui as a collective: with the characters 
acting as the signifier and the concept of “the Hui” acting as the signified due to their 
culturally specific inherent relationship. This seemingly inherent relationship is not 
surprising given the importance of Qingzhen to the Hui and Hui identity discussed in 
Chapter 5. However, beyond this culturally specific connection between the Hui and 
Qingzhen, or清真, the relationship between the two concepts was decoded in very 
different ways by individuals. For some others, the characters acted as a denotive sign 
for the concept of Qingzhen. The characters 清真 become a signifier for Qingzhen, 
making the concept of Qingzhen the meaning as this is a first-level sign. This sign then 
becomes the form (or signifier) of the second-level sign with the concept (or signified) 
being Islam, resulting from the close association between Qingzhen and Islam held by 
many people. As was discussed in the previous chapter, some people contended that 
Qingzhen derives purely from Qur’anic teachings, and as such, it is an Islamic concept. 
Therefore, the mythological, or second-order semiological system between清真 and 
Islam, as understood by some, is unsurprising. In other words, a set of signs that at one 
level refer to Islam, in this context incite the broader reflection about the Islamic 
identity of the Hui people, their story of their origin. 
6.2.a  Hui as Islamic 
Similar to the Islamic decoding of 清真 described above, a number of other traditional 
“Hui” representations and material objects are also often understood by participants as 
signifying the Hui’s assumed Islamic nature and religious devotion. As was discussed in 
Chapter 5.2.a, many participants equated being Hui with being Muslim and they 
explained the particularities of Hui food culture in religious terms. Linked to the 
discussion above regarding the characters清真 as signifiers of Islam, is the use of 
Arabic writing and the word “Halal” (written in Latin script) on signs surrounding 
entrances of restaurants, over street-food vendors stalls, on other material objects within 
restaurants, on food products, and on signage related to food. Often the signs featuring 
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the characters of清真, as shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2, would also contain the word 
“Halal” or Arabic script (see Figures 6.3 and 6.4). Similar to how the characters清真 
acted as signs for Islam as discussed above, the use of Arabic signs and the word 
“Halal” also act as signs for Islam. In particular, they can be viewed as second-level 
signs, or myths (Barthes, 1973), for Global Islam, rather than more localised or 
sinocised interpretations of Islam. In relation to the Latin scripted “Halal”, it acts as a 
denotive sign at the first-level for the Islamic dietary practice of halal. This denotive 
sign then acts as the form/signifier for the second-level sign. The signified/concept of 
this mythological sign is Global Islam. This decoding of “Halal” as meaning Global 
Islam stems largely from its non-Chinese nature. The fact that the word is neither 
written in Chinese characters, nor is it translated as Qingzhen, contributes to this 
globalised decoding. Similarly, the use of Arabic writing may also be described as a 
second-level sign for Global Islam; however its meaning is derived in quite a different 
way. At the first level, the Arabic script acts as a denotive sign for the Arab World. This 
then becomes the form at the second-level of meaning for the concept of Global Islam 
due to the historical, religious and cultural association between the Arab World and 
Islam. These connotations of a global religious culture not only connect these districts 
of Beijing to other sites of Islamic significance but they also reinforce the interpersonal 
and gendered relations that Islamic culture in Beijing claims for itself on the basis of 
this global reach, even while these are contested in various ways in all parts of that 
diaspora (Aitchison et al., 2007). In general, these gendered implications of the 
linguistic landscapes of cities have been little researched (Milani, 2014), but it is one 
further dimension of the geopolitics of gendering to which Feminist Political Geography 
has drawn attention (see section 2.1.d above). 
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Figure 6.3: Arabic and English Featured on Qingzhen signs. 
Source: Author’s own (2015, 2016, 2017, 2019). 
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Figure 6.4: Arabic writing in artwork, on a menu and on packaging. 
Source: Author’s own (2017, 2019). 
In addition to the above referents, Islam was also signalled through the use of other 
representational practices. As Figures 6.5 to 6.8 show, references were often made to 
mosques in the place-making practices of Hui restaurants in an attempt to signify Islam. 
Specifically, references were usually made to mosques through the use of images of 
mosques in menus (Figure 6.6), paintings, photographs, name signs, packaging of 
utensils (Figure 6.2, 6.5 and 6.7), and through the use of dome shaped, Islamic-style 
arches in the built environment of the establishments (Figure 6.5 and 6.8). These 
representations of mosques act as synecdochal signs, with the mosques symbolically 
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standing in for that which they are part of; Islam. For these signs, the images of the 
mosques act as signifiers and Islam acts as the signified. In relation to the arches, domes 
and silhouettes used in restaurants’ décor, they act as denotive signs at the first-level for 
mosques. These signs then become the form for the second-level signs with Islam 
becoming the signified/concept, similar to how mosques signify Islam above.  
 
Figure 6.5: Restaurant with a name display shaped in the silhouette of a mosque 
featuring an image of a mosque, the characters of 清真, crescent moon and Arabic 
writing. 
Source: Author’s own (2017).   
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Figure 6.6: Representations of Mosques in menus. 
Source: Author’s own (2016, 2017, 2019).  
220 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Representations of Mosques used in restaurants: table number displays, 
photographs, artwork & name plates above door. 
Source: Author’s own (2019). 
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Figure 6.8: Arches and domes used in restaurants. 
Source: Author’s own (2015, 2017, 2019). 
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Representations of other aspects of Islamic practices and paraphernalia were also used 
to reference Islam by restaurateurs. In Figure 6.9, we can see a piece of art displayed on 
a wall in a small restaurant in January 2019. When asked about the artwork, the 
restaurant’s owner explained that the script was “Islamic.”139 The Islamic script written 
on the pages of a book acts as a denotive sign for the Qur’an at the first-level of 
meaning. This sign then becomes the signifier for the second-level sign, with Islam 
being the signified.  
 
Figure 6.9: Representation of the Qur’an in a restaurant. 
Source: Author’s own (2019).  
One further symbol used to signify Islam in Beijing restaurants was, unsurprisingly, the 
crescent moon and star. For many in Beijing, and indeed globally, the image of the 
crescent moon and star act as symbolic signs for Islam, in a similar manner to how the 
cross might signify Christianity for observers. In Figure 6.10 the crescent moon acts as 
the signifier, with Islam being the signified for this symbolic sign. This sign is a 
 
139伊斯兰的。 
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symbolic one due to the conventionalised and historically contingent but clearly 
arbitrary relationship between the signifier and signified.  
 
Figure 6.10: Crescent moon and star featured on a menu and front of restaurant. 
Source: Author’s own (2019).  
In evoking an Islamic culture, all of the elements mentioned already come freighted 
with implications for gendering identities. Beyond the specific gendering evoked by 
reference to mosques and their segregated spaces, the contradictory translation of the 
domestic work of cooking into the commercial world of the restaurant brings (as I will 
show below in section 7.3) further gendered-related to pressures to mark architectural 
space as gendered (Rendell et al., 2000). But, there is one final signifier of Islam that I 
will now discuss that is among the most visible markers of Islamic culture for many 
people: the headscarf (Scott 2007; see the discussion in section 5.1 above). Images of 
women wearing headscarves, and indeed the embodied wearing of headscarves, were 
often used in restaurants to reference Islam and appeared in a variety of forms; such as 
artwork, menus, on signs over restaurant doors and most often, as uniforms. As was 
discussed in Chapter 5.1.a, and as is seen in Figure 6.11, female staff often wore 
headscarves for a variety of reasons, with some being required to do so by their 
employers. In relation to these embodied materialities, the headscarves act as 
synecdochal signs for Islam, with the headscarves being the signifiers and Islam being 
the signified. As with the representations of mosques discussed above, the headscarves 
are synecdochal signs as they come to represent that which they are part of; Islam. For 
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some participants, these signs also carried a higher level meaning. At the first-level, 
these signs could be understood as representing Islam. However, after discussing the 
meaning of these headscarves with participants, it became clear that for them, these 
signs had a second-level meaning. That is to say that through signifying Islam, they also 
could be decoded as meaning religious devotion, modesty, and even authenticity for 
participants.   
 
Figure 6.11: Islamic dress as uniform. 
Source: Author’s own (2015, 2019).  
Images of headscarf-clad women were also a common occurance in Hui restaurants in 
Beijing. These images usually featured alongside other signs of Islam, such Arabic 
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writing (Figure 6.11) and images of mosques (Figure 6.12). The co-existence of these 
two (or sometimes more) signifiers of Islam together causes the image of the 
headscarve-adorned women to gain further meaning from the other signs, be they 
Arabic writing (Figure 6.12) or images of mosques (Figure 6.13). This means that these 
representations of headscarved women can be understood as syntagmatic signs for 
Islam. In other words, the headscarves receive their reading as Islamic in part from the 
context of the other signs—as Rose describes for syntagmatic signs (see section 3.2.c. 
above). 
The Islamic character of these spaces, then, is signalled in different ways that will be 
more or less legible to different patrons. The Chinese characters of the Hui people are 
immediately taken by some patrons as indicating an Islamic context. This is given a 
transnational context with the use of Latin and Arabic script for Halal and also by the 
presence of crescent and moon as international icons of Islam. The religious character of 
these spaces is further signified by the presence in Arabic script of Qur’anic texts as 
decoration, by the illustrations of mosques, and by the wearing of headscarves by 
female staff. 
 
 
Figure 6.12: Representation of a woman wearing a headscarf on a restaurant’s name 
display that also features Arabic writing. 
Source: Author’s own (2019).  
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Figure 6.13: Islamic dress and mosques featured together on a menu and painting. 
Source: Author’s own (2016, 2019). 
6.2.b  Hui as an Ethnicity 
As was discussed in Chapter 5.2.A, many of this project’s participants considered Islam 
to be an ethnic characteristic or trait of the Hui, linking the themes of religion and 
ethnicity and bearing considerable similarity to official discourses of the Hui as being 
an Islamic ethnic group. Although such a belief was not universal amongst the Hui in 
Beijing, it nevertheless deserves consideration when looking at representational 
referents and place-making tactics in Hui restaurants. Given these associations between 
Islam and the ethnicity of the Hui, as understood by participants and in official 
discourses, the above decoding of Islam may also hold a higher, second-level meaning. 
The signs discussed in section 6.2.a, such as images of mosques, headscarves, Arabic 
writing, the work “Halal”, the Qur’an, and the crescent moon and star, act as signifiers 
at the first-level for Islam. These signs then become the form for the second-level 
mythological signs, with the Hui’s ethnicity being the signified/concept. As Barthes 
(1973: 127) writes, a myth “postulates a kind of knowledge, a past, a memory, a 
comparative order of facts, ideas, decisions”. In relation to these signs, the myth created 
is that Islam is a defining trait of the ethnic group known as the Hui and is important in 
their identification and differentiation as a group. Once again, considering the political, 
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discursive and representational practices and interventions of the Chinese Government 
in the establishment of the Hui as a group and in controlling their portrayal in Chinese 
media, it is unsurprising that such a meaning is decoded by so many individuals. As one 
of my Han friends advised me in the early days of my fieldwork, “look for Islamic 
things; signs, pictures, clothes. Then you will know they are Hui people, because they 
are an Islam[ic] minzu.”140 Although I initially followed my friend’s advice by 
employing such a decoding of “Islamic things” as meaning Hui when searching for Hui 
restaurants, this sweeping reading unsurprisingly proved to be an aberrant decoding as 
such Islamic paraphernalia could also be found in eateries of other Islamic groups. 
Further, such an interpretation of these signs as exclusively meaning Hui is telling of 
both my positioning as a non-Hui, along with the positionality of my Han friend, 
something which became evident through reflecting on my early semiological readings.  
Similar to how the images and representations of women wearing traditional 
headdresses may be considered as signifiers of the Hui’s ethnicity, the traditional white 
caps adorned by some Hui people also act as signifiers of ethnicity. As Chapter 5.1.a 
discussed, the small white caps traditionally worn by the Hui are often considered to be 
a symbol of Hui culture and ethnicity. These caps are not an uncommon sight among 
Hui communities in Beijing. This is particularly true in Beijing restaurants, where many 
members of staff are expected to wear the white caps as part of their uniform. 
Subsequently, it is unsurprising that these caps, whether in the form of clothing worn by 
staff members or representations and images displayed in the restaurants, act as 
signifiers for the Hui’s ethnicity (Figure 6.14). These signs are indexical ones, given the 
culturally specific reading and decoding of the inherent relationship between the 
signifier and signified. In other words, the hat is not just a hat but, in this context, an 
indication, or what Pierce (Rose, 2001) called an indexical sign, that this person and this 
establishment affiliate themselves with a Hui ethnicity in a traditional and Islamic form.  
  
 
140民族。 Eng: Ethnicity. Taken from fieldnotes, dated 20 September 2015. This conversation took place 
in English. 
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Figure 6.14: White cap worn as uniform in restaurants and image displayed above 
entrance. 
 Source: Author’s own (2015, 2019).  
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6.2.c  Hui as Chinese 
In addition to signifying the Hui’s ethnicity, references were also often made to 
concepts of the Hui’s “big” nationality, or Chineseness. Figure 6.15 shows the most 
blatant way in which the group’s Chineseness was signified. The image shows the 
service window of a small Chuan’er141 vendor in a popular tourist area of Beijing. 
Placed in clear sight behind the display of meat skewers is a Chinese flag. Displays and 
images of the national flag of the PRC act as metonymic signs for the Hui’s 
Chineseness.  
 
Figure 6.15: Chinese flag on display. 
Source: Author’s own (2019).  
Figure 6.16 shows another rather overt way in which one Hui establishments was 
aligned with nationalistic ideologies and rhetoric. The poster visible in Figure 6.16 was 
displayed on the wall of one of this project’s key participating restaurants. The 
restaurant specialises in Lanzhou Spicy Beef Noodles and is managed by a Lanzhou-
 
141串儿。Eng: Barbequed Meat Skewers.  
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native man, who explained to me that this poster was “very important [for] all Chinese 
people [to] see. Important for, eh, SheHui.”142 The writing at the top of the poster reads 
“Socialist Core Value View,”143 and consists of 12 pictures illustrating the fundamental 
societal values as advocated for by the Chinese Communist Party. Beginning in the top 
left-hand corner of the image and moving horizontally, these values are illustrated, and 
indeed named as: Prosperity;144 Democracy;145 Civility;146 Harmony;147 Freedom;148 
Equality;149 Justice;150 Rule of Law;151 Patriotism;152 Dedication;153 Integrity;154 and 
Friendship.155 These core values were first presented in 2013 as part of a new 
ideological framework of the CCP (Pieke, 2016) with President Xi Jinping calling on 
officials in 2014 to make the values “all-pervasive, just like the air” (Zhao, 2016). 
This poster (Figure 6.16) is laden with meaning and may be decoded in a number of 
ways using an array of semiological terminology. Firstly, the characters featured in each 
of the 12 red text boxes act as indexical signs for their corresponding core value, with 
the characters being the signifiers and the values as the signified. Yet, these may also be 
considered syntagmatic signs as they gain their meanings from the signs that surround 
them. Specifically, the cartoon images attached to them add further meaning to these 
signs, working with the characters to strengthen the meaning being signified. Each of 
these signified 12 core concepts also work as syntagmatic signs (or contextual) in 
another way as they relate to each other. In this regard, each of the signified core values 
(characters and cartoon images) gain meaning from each other. In sum, the signs are 
understood as one of the 12 Socialist Core Values, not only because of what the 
character and image represent individually, but also because they work together to 
signify the 12 values as a complete concept. The co-presence of these signs in a single 
poster also acts as a denotive sign at the first-level of meaning for the 12 Socialist Core 
 
142社会。 Eng: Society. This section of the conversation took place in English at the request of the 
participant.  
143社会主义核心份值观。 
144富强。 
145民主。 
146文明。 
147和谐。 
148自由。 
149平等。 
150公正。 
151法治。 
152爱国。 
153敬业。 
154诚信。 
155友善。 
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Values. This denotive sign then becomes the form/signifier at the second-level within 
the context of this Hui restaurant. The signified concept is the Hui’s “big” 
nationalism/Chineseness. Once again, the specific context of the Hui restaurants is 
important here, as this decoding of the poster is very much dependent on its presence 
within this specific place.  
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Figure 6.16: Socialist Core Values Poster. 
Source: Author’s own (2016). 
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Within restaurants, references to the Hui’s nationalistic identifications were also made 
in more subtle ways. Specifically, the artwork commonly displayed in restaurants acted 
to signify the group’s nationalist identity in an interesting manner. Many restaurants, 
particularly restaurants owned and run by Beijing Hui or serving Beijing/North-eastern 
style cuisine, often displayed traditional Han Chinese art. Art such as calligraphy, 
Chinese-style landscape paintings, paintings of Beijing opera masks and people wearing 
traditional clothing from various dynasties, and even scenes from famous Chinese 
novels such as “Journey to the West”, were often visible in Hui restaurants (Figures 
6.17 and 6.18). Some participants mentioned that such artwork is generally associated 
with the Han and Han culture. When asked why his restaurant only featured Islamic art 
and not the types described above, the owner of one small north-western style restaurant 
argued that it was because those forms of art “are Han. The Hui have [their] own artistic 
style.”156 Yet, many other participants explained that these features and artistic 
traditions did not belong solely to the Han, claiming that they were simply traditional 
Chinese styles of art. For these individuals, such forms of art and artistic traditions 
belonged to all Chinese people, including the Hui. Within the context of Hui 
restaurants, these traditional forms of art act as signifiers for China’s traditional art and 
culture at the first-level of meaning. This denotive sign then acts as the form for the 
second-level of meaning, with the Hui’s Chineseness/“big” nationalism being the 
signified at the mythological level. In other words, something that at one level refers to 
traditional Han art, in this context begins a story about the Chinese identity of the Hui 
people. 
  
 
156是汉族。回族有自己的艺术风格。 
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Figure 6.17: Chinese Artwork in restaurants. 
Source: Author’s own (2019). 
235 
 
 
Figure 6.18: Chinese Artwork in restaurants. 
Source: Author’s own (2019). 
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6.2.d  Hui as Clean 
As was discussed in Chapter 5.2.D, the concept of cleanliness is one that lies at the heart 
of self and group identifications for many Hui people, and is considered by many to be 
an ethnic trait. This association between the Hui and cleanliness is one that was openly 
embraced by all Hui participants throughout the fieldwork. As such, it is unsurprising 
that references to high standards of cleanliness and hygiene were frequently 
encountered in places of Hui food culture. Firstly, the plaques and certificates discussed 
in Chapter 5.2.D and seen in Figures 5.10, 5.11 and in profusion in Figure 6.19, act as 
denotive signs for the cleanliness of the Hui. The plaques and certificates are the 
signifiers, while the Hui’s assumed cleanliness is the signified. Similarly, the open 
kitchens discussed previously may also be viewed as a signifier for the Hui’s cleanliness 
(Figure 6.20). The example on the left is of a smaller establishment of more ‘traditional’ 
appearance (note the white cap, as discussed above in section 5.1.a) and on the right is a 
larger, more modern restaurant. Despite these differences the adoption in both cases of 
the open kitchen arrangement underlines its significance for the Hui food culture. This 
layout is by no means as common across non-Hui restaurants in Beijing. Once again, 
these can be described as denotive signs, with the large windows to the kitchens being 
the signifiers. Both of these denotive signs also arguably carry higher meanings; the 
ethnic superiority of the Hui over the Han. These first level-signs act as the forms for 
the second-level mythological signs, with the Hui’s higher level of cleanliness (and 
therefore their superiority) being the signified. Such a reading was supported by 
numerous claims of superior cleanliness by participants. When asked about the purpose 
of the open windows, one waitress explained that they have the open windows because 
“we are Hui, we are cleaner [than the Han]”.157 
These signs in their context, then, tell a story of Hui ethnicity elaborated from diverse 
materials. The hat gives the notion that traditional Hui culture is Islamic. The flags, 
posters and traditional Han art are a claim upon a Chinese national identity. Finally, the 
open kitchen in this context underlines the Hui claim to the very highest standards of 
 
157 我们是回族人，我们更清洁。 
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cleanliness and thus, even from their position of minoritisation (see section 2.5 above), 
to aspire to a position of civilizational superiority within Chinese society. 
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Figure 6.19: Certificates of Cleanliness. 
Source: Author’s own (2016, 2019).  
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Figure 6.20: Open kitchens in Hui restaurants. 
Source: Author’s own (2015, 2017, 2019). 
6.3  CONNECTED TO PLACES 
As has been argued in the previous sub-sections, places are inherently relational and 
connected phenomena. The connections between places and people (specifically the 
Hui) are often referenced, represented and manifested in a range of place-making tactics 
deployed by restaurant owners and managers in their attempts to establish Hui, or 
Qingzhen, places in Han-dominated Beijing. Yet, references to the Hui people in the 
form of their religion, ethnicity, nationality and assumed cleanliness, are not the only 
way that the group shows itself within Beijing. Rather, references to other places (places 
often more commonly associated with the Hui) are another powerful way that the 
group’s presence is signalled. These place attachments, geographical imaginaries and 
subsequent connections between places, not only play vital roles in how the Hui 
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understand their place within the locality of Beijing, but also their sense of belonging on 
national and global scales.   
6.3.a  Connections to Northwest China 
When attempting to locate Hui restaurants, eateries and food vendors in Beijing, one of 
the most telling signs of their presence (other than the appearance of the characters for 
Qingzhen) was the use of geographical references and place names to denote the group. 
Words such as Northwest,158 Western Regions,159 Gansu,160 Xinjiang161, Ningxia,162 
Lanzhou,163 Urumqi,164 and so on were used to demarcate places of Hui food culture. 
Often the names of these north-western places would be visible above the entrances of 
restaurants, over street-food stalls and in menus, with restaurants and dishes being 
named after them (Figure 6.21). These names act as indexical signs for the places of 
China’s north-western territories, or more specifically, geographical imaginaries of 
those places. In this sense, the characters written are the signifiers, while the places 
imagined or remembered are the signified. However, these signs may also be decoded in 
another way; a way that I would argue is particularly resonant for Hui restaurants in 
Beijing. In this specific context, these signs may also be considered as denotive signs at 
the first-level of meaning, with the relationship between signifier and signified 
remaining the same as above. However, these denotive signs, or signified places, carry a 
higher meaning, acting as the form at the mythological level. The concept of this 
second-level sign, or the myth, is the Hui, through their close historic and discursive 
association with these places (see Chapter 4). More specifically, it is belonging of the 
Hui in these places that is signified by this myth, and subsequently, their lack of 
belonging in Han-dominated Beijing. As one north-western restaurant owner explained 
when discussing the frequent use of referents to north-western places in his 
establishment, “[it is] because we are Hui people, the Northwest is our home.”165  
 
158西北。 
159西域。 
160甘肃。 
161新疆。 
162宁夏。 
163兰州。 
164乌鲁木齐。 
165 因为我们是回族，所以西北是我们的家乡。 
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Another powerful representational practice used to signify these places of China’s 
northwest was the use of landscape paintings and photographs (Figures 6.22 and 6.23). 
Images of the Northwest’s arid lands, plateaus, deserts, valleys and grasslands often 
hung on walls and featured in menus. Media and political discourses undoubtedly play 
important roles in making such landscapes known and recognisable to Chinese living in 
Beijing, as the Northwest is often depicted as a dry, barren and sparsely populated land. 
As such, the landscapes represented in the artwork and photographs act as iconic signs 
for the Northwest. These signs are iconic as the relationship between the signifier and 
signified is based upon resemblance. Once again, these referents to China’s north-
western lands may also be understood as denotive signs at the first-level, with the 
mythological concept being that the Hui belong to this place and not Beijing.  
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Figure 6.21: Place names and Geographical referents in names of dishes and 
establishments. 
Source: Author’s own (2015, 2017, 2019).   
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Figure 6.22: Scenic Paintings. 
Source: Author’s own (2016, 2019). 
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Figure 6.23: Scenic images in menus. 
Source: Author’s own (2019). 
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Maps were another representational tool used by restaurants to reference the imagined 
and remembered places of the Northwest. As Figures 6.24 and 6.25 show, maps of 
north-western provinces were often found in menus and hung on the walls of place-
based restaurants, such as those specialising in specific regional cuisines. These maps 
can be understood as iconic signs, with the outline of the map representing the signified 
territory, whose shape the map is assumed to resemble. Again, these maps, as with the 
place names and images above, can be decoded as references to the home of the Hui 
within modern China and their being “out-of-place” in Beijing.  
 
Figure 6.24: Map featured in menu showing source of meat. 
Source: Author’s own (2019). 
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Figure 6.25: Map of Ningxia displayed on wall. 
Source: Author’s own (2019).  
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6.3.b  Connected to Beijing 
Given the close association between the Hui and China’s north-western provinces, the 
frequent references made to these places are unsurprising. However, the Northwest is 
not the only region of China that was frequently signified by visual representations and 
material objects within places of Hui food culture. The connections between these 
restaurants and Beijing were also common. In addition to the north-western style décor, 
designs and artwork found in many restaurants across the chosen 5 districts of urban 
Beijing, traditional Beijing and north-eastern styles were also evident in a number of 
restaurants. These styles of décor often resembled classic Beijing architectural designs; 
specifically, they were intended to resemble Beijing’s famous hutong166 districts. 
Hutongs are narrow alleys that are formed by the joining of siheyuan,167 which are a 
compound of houses around a square courtyard. Throughout Beijing’s hutongs, a 
number of Hui restaurants and eateries could be found in street-facing siheyuan (Figure 
6.26). These establishments usually featured the dark slate-tiled roofs and grey 
stonework typical of traditional hutong neighbourhoods, with many also having the 
characteristic red wood and intricate paintwork. These characteristics were often 
replicated by places of Hui food culture that were not located in siheyuan, and even by 
those establishments outside of the hutong areas. 
  
 
166胡同。 
167四合院。 
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Figure 6.26: Hui restaurants in hutongs. 
Source: Author’s own (2019). 
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In Figure 6.27, it is clear how this traditional Beijing design was mimicked in the décor 
of several food vendors and restaurants. These features – the dark tiles roofs, the grey 
stonework, the red wood and detailed paintings – each act as synecdochal signs; with 
the features being the signifiers and Beijing being the signified. These signs are 
synecdochal as the come to represent something that they are part of. In other words, 
they come to represent Beijing. However, these signs may also be considered to carry a 
higher meaning. In this regards, they can be understood as denotive signs at the first-
level of meaning. These denotive signs then act as the form at the mythological level of 
meaning. The concept being signified at this second-level of meaning is that the Hui 
belong in Beijing. This decoding is arguably justified when we take the arguments in 
Chapter 5.2.e and 7.1.b into consideration, where Hui participants claimed that they 
belonged in Beijing and that their Qingzhen variations of traditional Beijing cuisine was 
also authentically Hui.  
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Figure 6.27: Beijing style décor. 
Source: Author’s own (2019). 
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6.3.c  Connected Internationally 
As Massey (1994a) has argued, places are often connected globally. These global 
connections were signified in a number of ways by Hui eateries. Firstly, as was 
discussed in Section 6.2.a above, Arabic and Latin texts were often used by restaurants, 
with the written words acting as mythological signs for Global Islam (Figures 6.3 and 
6.4). Furthermore, and importantly for the discussion here of connections to places, the 
Arabic texts act as denotive signs for the Arab World. The Arab World was also 
signified in a number of other ways by material objects within restaurants. Figure 6.28 
shows a variety of material objects – including teapots, tiles and windows – that 
participants explained were “Arabic.”168 To these individuals, these items were 
synechdocal signs for the Arab World. Interestingly, however, as with all signs these 
items could be decoded differently depending on personal understandings and 
positionalities. For most of the staff within these establishments that I spoke with, these 
objects signified connections to the Arab World. However, one waiter countered his 
colleague’s assessment by arguing that they were in fact western Chinese features, not 
Arabic, emphasising the subjective nature of interpreting these signs and the variety of 
potential decodings.  
In addition to signifying the Arab World, references were also occasionally made to the 
West and Western nations. Similar to how the maps of Northwest China discussed in 
Section 6.3.a act as indexical signs for those places, the maps and flags of Western 
nations also act as indexical signs for their respective countries (Figure 6.29). Further, 
the statues of the Eiffel Tower and of the Queen’s Guard act as synecdochal signs; the 
objects are the signifiers with the West, or more specifically France and the United 
Kingdom, being the signified. In other words, patrons were expected to be able to read 
these representations of elements of each country as standing in for the country itself 
and in that way to recognise the restaurant as claiming an affiliation, at least of 
friendship, with these other places. 
 
 
 
168阿拉伯的。 
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Figure 6.28: Referents to Arab World. 
Source: Author’s own (2017, 2019). 
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Figure 6.29: Referents to the West. 
Source: Author’s own (2015, 2019). 
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Another interesting, and seemingly contradictory way, in which the West was signified 
was through references to Christmas. When conducting research in Hui restaurants, I 
was surprised to see Christmas decorations being displayed in two restaurants, 
especially as the owner of one of these establishments identified as a devout Muslim. 
Nevertheless, as Figure 6.30 shows, Christmas decorations could be seen hanging in his 
restaurant. These decorations act as denotive signs at the first-level of meaning for the 
Christian holiday of Christmas. At the second-level however, the concept being 
signified is the West. 
As discussed above (section 2.3) place-making is partly about assembling connections. 
In this chapter so far, I have reviewed the way the Hui represent themselves as a 
religious and ethnic group and then I examined what we might term the geographical 
imagination (Gregory, 1994) represented in the decoration of Hui restaurants in Beijing. 
The geographical imagination of these Hui restaurants claims three sets of affiliations. 
In the first place, with place-names, maps and landscape paintings and photographs, the 
Hui claim connection with North-West China. I explained above (section 4.2) the 
troubled genealogy of the Hui and the extent to which some view them as no more than 
Chinese-speaking Muslims (discussed also in Stewart, 2017: 82). In the geographical 
imagination represented in the restaurants they are a specific ethnic group that may 
originally have been aggregated from diverse migrant streams but which centred and 
reproduced itself in North-West China. The second set of links claimed in the 
architectural form of at least some Hui restaurants is with Beijing itself, particularly in 
the replication of the architectural forms of some of the older parts of city by restaurants 
located away from these historic districts. Finally, as the geographical imagination 
claims an ethnic identity in North-West China and right to belong in Beijing, it is also 
expressive of what Stewart (2017) calls a ‘cosmopolitan’ (p. 59) and elective, rather 
than inherited, Islamic identity, that ‘transcend[s] the local’ (p. 164). In this regard the 
third set of links are international and go far beyond the Arabic world to make links 
with the West more broadly through flags, synecdochic signs, and the use of Christmas 
decorations in even the most Islamic of establishments. 
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Figure 6.30: Christmas decorations. 
 Source: Author’s own (2015, 2019). 
6.4  CONNECTED TEMPORALLY 
As was argued in Section 2.3.d, places simultaneously contain multiple temporalities, 
with this co-presence of times meaning that places draw from multiple temporalities and 
memories at once (Hamilakis, 2017; Pred, 1984). These temporal connections to diffuse 
pasts and presents were referenced regularly within Hui restaurants and they played 
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significant roles in the place-making tactics of restaurateurs. The black and white 
photographs seen in Figure 6.31 show scenes from Lanzhou, Gansu Province – or more 
specifically, scenes from Lanzhou’s past. Photographs such as these featured in several 
restaurants, particularly in one of the project’s key participating establishments. During 
my first prolonged visit to the restaurant in January 2016, the manager gave me a 
guided tour, highlighting the aspects that he thought I might be interested in for my 
research. After a tour of the kitchen, he quickly brought me to the photographs hanging 
on the wall in the main space of the restaurant. He explained that “This is Lanzhou. This 
is my hometown,”169 before following in English “This is LaMian,170 eh, noodle’s 
hometown. Name [is] Lanzhou NiuRou LaMian.”171 
The images in the photographs can be viewed as iconic signs for Lanzhou’s, or more 
specifically a Lanzhou of the past. Given the political discourses in China around ethnic 
minority groups as being “backward” and “feudal”, this reference to the past carries a 
higher meaning, although this meaning may be decoded in very different ways. At the 
first-level, these images are denotive signs for Lanzhou’s past. However, two distinct 
mythological level signs can be inferred. Firstly, in line with Governmental rhetoric, it 
is possible to decode these second-level signs as signifying the Hui’s backwardness or 
feudal nature. However, after carefully reflecting on this initial decoding I realised that 
such a reading may be due to my outsider positionality and familiarity with 
Governmental rhetoric. Further, following conversations with Hui individuals, this is 
likely to be a case of aberrant decoding – at least for Hui participants. Rather, the Hui 
staff with whom I spoke in these establishments took great pride in showing me these 
pictures, claiming that they showed the historical authenticity of their food. For these 
people, the concept being signified by these mythological signs was one of authenticity. 
Specifically, it was the authenticity of their food cultures that was being signified.  
The authenticity of Hui food cultures was also signalled by other referents to the past. 
Rather than including historical photographs, some restaurants chose to display 
paintings of scenes from China’s past (Figure 6.32). These paintings act in a similar 
way to the photographs, with the scenes signifying either the Hui’s backwardness or 
authenticity depending on the individual’s decoding. Some restaurants made these 
 
169这是兰州。是我的家乡。 
170拉面。 Eng: Hand-pulled noodles. 
171 兰州牛肉拉面。 Eng: Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles. This section of the conversation took 
place mostly in English at the request of the participant. 
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connections to history even more apparent by including plaques and images detailing 
their own histories and development. Figure 6.33 shows how two restaurants in Beijing 
advertise their histories to customers. The image on top includes English writing for 
tourists, while the bottom poster uses photographs placed in the shape of the company’s 
name to make their restaurant’s history clear. 
In light of this focus on the temporal, certain representational practices and material 
objects discussed above take on a further meaning. Specifically, the references to the 
West and Christmas made in Figures 6.29 and 6.30. These signs of the West may also 
be decoded as signifying the modernity of the Hui; given the rhetoric of modernity in 
China in relation to minorities and the imaginary of the West as spearheading modernity 
globally. This decoding of these representations as mythological signs of Hui modernity 
show that it is not only through referencing times past that Hui restaurants are made, but 
rather, by also signifying different interpretations of the present. As Hamilakis (2017) 
points out, time can be understood as non-linear, and places are made up from the co-
presence of multiple temporalities.  
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Figure 6.31: Historical photographs. 
Source: Author’s own (2016, 2017). 
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Figure 6.32: Historical paintings. 
Source: Author’s own (2019). 
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Figure 6.33: Restaurants’ histories. 
Source: Author’s own (2015, 2016).  
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6.5  CONNECTED EMOTIVELY 
Emotions and places are intimately linked (see Chapter 2). As we engage with the world 
around us, our emotional states impact on how we experience and come to know our 
places-worlds (Davidson and Milligan, 2004; Davidson and Bondi, 2004). Likewise, 
places can evoke emotional responses (Tuan: 1977). Contextually speaking, the material 
objects and representations evident within Beijing’s places of Hui food culture hold 
great significance for this project’s Hui participants. These place-making tactics and 
practices elicit emotional responses from those that engage with them as the various 
signs are subjectively decoded. Such emotional knowings are vital to how these places 
are experienced, known and performed by individuals and groups, exposing the 
important and oft-overlooked spatialities of Hui identity politics. As such, these places 
are not only connected to other places, people and times, but they are also connected to 
individuals on a more intimately felt and experiential level; they are connected 
emotively.  
During the initial stages of covert fieldwork between August and December 2015, Hui 
restaurants, food stalls and other eateries were visited across Beijing (see Chapter 3). As 
time progressed, and more and more establishments were visited, a range of visual 
referents and material objects continually reappeared. Although I quickly learned to 
identify these features as possible referents of the Hui, it became clear that they were by 
no means trivial or irrelevant. Rather, their continued reoccurrence across the diverse 
array of eateries suggested that they carried higher meaning and significance for the 
Hui, one more closely linked to the increasingly apparent heterogeneous understandings 
of Hui identity and culture suggested by the early research.  
The importance of these emotive connections to place became abundantly clear during 
the many visits to key participating restaurants. In mid-January 2016, during the quiet 
period between the lunchtime rush and dinner service, I stood in one restaurant’s open-
kitchen with four male chefs aged in their 20s and 30s. All four were specially trained in 
how to hand-pull noodles and each occupied a separate station in the rather cramped 
kitchen. The first chef prepared the dough and hand-pulled the noodles before throwing 
them into the large cauldron of boiling broth. The second chef – the youngest of the 
three – then timed the boiling noodles, keeping each portion separated, before scooping 
them out and adding them to a bowl. The third chef stood by the open window to the 
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main part of the restaurant, taking orders and adding the beef, broth and the desired 
toppings of scallion, radish and chilli oil to each bowl as ordered. The fourth chef, the 
head chef, normally pulled the noodles while the first chef prepared the dough for him, 
but given the physicality of his role, he was taking a much needed rest during the mid-
day lull. During busy rush hours this production chain of noodle chefs worked at a 
staggering speed, however at this time it was relatively quite so we could talk with very 
little disturbance. After describing the events of my previous visit to the four men – 
whereby the manager had given me a guided tour through the restaurant – I mentioned 
that I thought the decoration of the restaurant was interesting. The head chef agreed 
before adding that he especially liked the Islamic scroll painting because it made him 
feel safe.172 
This feeling of safety summoned by the painting was mirrored by many other 
participants when discussing the décor of restaurants. When asked about these features 
(many of which are discussed above), many respondents also reported feeling safe, with 
most mentioning feeling at home, like they belonged, felt united, or most commonly, 
Qinqie. It is notable that that as in many studies of domesticity, the home is understood 
as a place where ‘people feel secure and centred’ (Blunt and Dowling, 2006: 9), but it 
also worth remarking that these Hui are referring to the presence in their homes of 
paintings that express a collective identity, in much the way Tolia-Kelly (2004) 
describes for the homes of South-Asian migrants in Britain, and that it is the presence of 
these homely objects that makes them feel comfortable in the public space of the 
restaurant. The security of a collective belonging being marked in this explicit way. 
These emotive ties were particularly evident during the interviews in the summer of 
2017, where I often asked interviewees to explain why they liked certain features or 
what these features meant to them. The quotation used at the beginning of the chapter is 
worth mentioning here again as it encapsulates all of these feelings best: 
“Yes, it is the feeling, just like seeing our own ethnic minority, Islam, it feels 
very Qinqie. Then it seems to give people the feeling of returning home, 
especially the feeling of peace of mind, what we need is this kind of practical 
feeling.”173 
 
172Taken from field-notes, written in English. 
173对，就是感觉，就是像见到我们本身那个少数民族啊，伊斯兰，就是感觉特别亲切。再就是看
上去给人感觉回到了家的感觉，特别踏实的那种感觉，我们需要的就是这种踏实的感觉。 
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These positive emotional responses to material objects and visual representations are 
extremely important if we are to understand how places of Hui food culture work in 
Beijing, and what they mean to the Hui living there. Gladney (1996: 189) has argued 
that within the urban context of Beijing, restaurants act as “centre[s] for cultural 
dissemination”, forming important meeting points for cultural and social exchanges. 
However, the emotional attachments and engagements described by all interviewees and 
many other participants would suggest that these places hold even greater significance 
for the Hui than merely acting as centres for cultural dissemination. Rather, the 
narratives of safety, belonging, home, unity and Qinqie point to a deeper political 
discourse and rhetoric of belonging and minoritisation in Han-dominated Beijing, and 
indeed, China. Within the Beijing context, these representations and objects are encoded 
with further, more emotionally-laden and politically-charged meanings. Specifically, 
these various signs – be they Qingzhen signs, Islamic art, headscarves, certificates of 
cleanliness, etc. – act as denotive signs at the first-level of meaning, signifying these 
various establishments as Hui places. At the second-level, their meaning is that these are 
safe places of belonging for the Hui. 
Of particular importance for this chapter is the feeling of Qinqie that participants 
described. “If I see it, I have a Qinqie feeling”174 was the reply given by an 18 year old 
waiter from Gansu Province when asked why he liked the Qingzhen sign above the 
front door. This young man’s feelings of Qinqie, were mirrored by 12 of the other 33 
interviewees when asked about various features. In addition to being linked with the 
politics of minoritisation and belonging, participants’ decisions to describe their 
affective experiences and reactions as Qinqie holds significance for this thesis’ 
conceptualisation of places as connected and relational. Interviewees described not only 
feeling Qinqie to the Hui as a group (be it as a religious or ethnic one), but also as being 
Qinqie to the places themselves, and also to the other places referenced such as Beijing, 
the Northwest, or the places outside China.  
6.6  QINQIE PLACES. 
Places are complex and multifaceted. They are our most intimately felt geographies and 
are known to us through our bodily engagements with the world around us (Casey, 
2013). They are bound up with our emotional states and understandings, and these 
 
174我要是看到的话，有种亲切的感觉。 
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emotive imports are central to the constitution and experience of our place-worlds 
(Tuan, 1979; Urry, 2007, Davidson and Bondi, 2004). These places are constantly in a 
processual state of becoming, possessing open and porous boundaries (Pred, 1984; 
Malpas, 2012; 2017). These historically and socially contingent bundles are inherently 
relational and connected (Massey, 1994). A central component of places is the 
connections that they have to other places, people and times (Pierce et al., 2011; 
Hamilakis, 2017). Given the sensorial qualities of place and the importance of personal 
experience in place, they can also be understood to be connected in more personal, 
emotive ways to individuals. These connections, emotional knowings and individual 
engagements with places are inherently political, with our most personally felt 
geographies being affected by political discourses and imaginaries (Pierce et al., 2011; 
Harvey, 1993; Massey, 1994).  
This conceptualisation is important for how we understand Hui places of food culture 
within Beijing. In order to carve out distinctly Hui places and spaces within Han-
dominated Beijing, Hui minority subjects have used a range of material objects and 
visual referents in their place-making efforts. Each of these features is laden with 
meaning, signifying a plethora of concepts for those individuals that engage with them, 
depending on subjective and personal understandings of the Hui, Hui identity and the 
place of the Hui in China and the World. These signs work by focusing on connections 
between these places and four loosely grouped, and often overlapping, categories: other 
places such as China’s Northwest, Beijing, and more global contexts; various 
understandings of the Hui as a group; multiple temporalities, specifically past and 
present; and subjective, emotional connections on an individualistic and experiential 
level. Framing all four of these connections is a fifth, over-arching one. Connections to 
the political are evident throughout, be it in the form of discourses: of (not) belonging; 
of ethnic, religious and national unity; of inter-ethnic relations; of place attachments and 
imaginaries; and most importantly, in the self-identifications, lived experiences and 
emotional responses of Hui minority subject. 
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CHAPTER 7: PERFORMING HUI FOOD CULTURES. 
Food holds deep political, sociological and emotional meaning for people (Bell and 
Valentine, 1997; Bonnin, 2015, 2018; Bonnin and Turner, 2012; Waitt, 2014). We 
consume and produce certain foods within a variety of affective political and social 
arenas, from which we construct boundaries of self and other, identity and belonging 
(Isakjee and Carroll, 2019). Within geography, Sibley (1995) and Hall (1996) have 
shown that objects (such as food) are important in identity formation, while Bell and 
Valentine (1997) have demonstrated that such identities are often performed through 
demonstrations of food cultures. This performative nature of identity through food 
cultures will be evidenced by this chapter, focusing specifically on how certain dishes 
may be seen as performances of Hui identity. Specifically, this chapter will do so 
through exploring three themes that were found to be particularly relevant to the 
performances of Hui food cultures.  
Firstly, this chapter will explore the performances of place-based identities through 
food, looking specifically at how people’s emotive ties to places and geographical 
imaginaries impact on how they perform and consume certain dishes and food. Food 
and place are essential practices through which individual and group identity is formed 
(Ohnuki-Tierney, 1993) and is therefore a central component in conceptualisations of 
belonging. A further element of belonging is the personal attachment to place (Yuval-
Davis, 2006), or sense of place (Tuan, 1979). This connection to place is highly emotive 
(Davidson and Milligan, 2004; Davidson and Bondi, 2004) and is often performed 
through food cultures and dietary practices, as Longhurst, Johnston and Ho (2009) have 
shown, and as this chapter will further develop theoretically with respect to Hui food 
cultures. The chapter will then look at how the distinctive food practices of Beijing’s 
Hui have been impacted on by processes of minoritisation and inter-ethnic relations in 
the Han-dominated city. Specifically, section 7.2 will look at how places of Hui food 
culture are increasingly selling alcohol across five central districts in Beijing, a change 
that challenges individual desires to live a Qingzhen lifestyle. This shift, it is argued, is 
the result of a two-fold assimilative force. On the one hand, economic necessity requires 
many establishments to sell alcohol in order to survive in a hyper-competitive market, 
while narratives of modernity simultaneously influence Hui attitudes towards this 
contentious and divisive product. Finally, the performance of gender through Hui food 
cultures will be explored. This section argues that minoritisation is impacting on how 
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Hui gender and gender roles are performed and defined in Han-majority Beijing. 
Specifically, section 7.3 argues that gender and male-domination are reconfigured 
within the place-specific context of Beijing’s Hui restaurants and eateries, as Hui 
patriarchy and minoritisation are synthesised to accommodate to life in a Han-
dominated society.  
7.1  PERFORMING PLACE-BASED IDENTITIES. 
For Hui people living in Beijing, connections to places are important. As Chapter 5.2.e 
shows, these connections to places greatly influence each of the identity triad’s three 
vertices of Qingzhen, Hui identity and Hui food cultures. Specifically, these concepts 
are shaped by geographical imaginaries, emotive and experiential ties to places, and 
notions of belonging. Connections to places are drawn upon and highlighted in the 
place-making practices of Hui restaurants and eateries through the use of material and 
representational referents (see Chapter 6). These signs are decoded differently by 
different individuals and groups. Often participants explained that they interpret these 
references to places as signifying the Hui’s place or home in China. These narratives of 
belonging have direct impacts on understandings of Hui identity, both group and 
individual.  
For many participants, China’s north-western territories are the legitimate and primary 
home of the Hui, and of the other nine Islamic minority groups too. This identification 
of the Hui as belonging to the Northwest is one primarily based on historical affiliation 
and on the shared myth of common lineage and ancestry among the group. It is also 
fuelled by the fact that Muslim minority groups were once the majority population in 
many areas of the region, including Xinjiang and Ningxia. In particular, the Hui are 
often associated with specific north-western cities, autonomous counties and provinces; 
most notably, the city of Lanzhou in Gansu Province and, of course, the Ningxia Hui 
Autonomous Region. However, this narrative of belonging is not universal among 
participants, with many refuting it and offering a counter-narrative of Hui belonging 
that is noticeably wider in geographic scope. These individuals understand the Hui as 
hailing from across China, something which is perhaps more reflective of the group’s 
position as the country’s most widely dispersed minority group (see Chapter 4). 
Unsurprisingly, many (although not all) of these individuals were born in provinces 
outside of the Northwest, whereas many of the people advocating for a strictly north-
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western view of Hui origin came from that region. Specifically, participants named 
provinces such as Beijing, Shandong, Hebei, Anhui, Yunnan, and Inner-Mongolia when 
discussing the group, with some others simply explaining that they came from every 
province. Yet other participants associated the Hui with places that were far more global 
in reach. As Chapter 6.3.c shows, regions such as the West and the Arab World are also 
important for many Hui. This association between international places and the Hui 
frames many people’s understandings of Hui identity and influences their food cultures 
in interesting ways, as will be discussed below.  
These multiple interpretations of Hui identity and narratives of belonging are 
manifested and performed in diffuse ways through the group’s heterogeneous food 
cultures. These food cultures are intimately tied to places, varying from region to 
region. Although this variance in food cultures across China’s provinces is not unique to 
the Hui – as the Han’s food cultures also change depending on location – what is 
particular to the Hui is the contesting discourses of group belonging and authenticity 
associated with the different foods. This varied array of Hui cuisines was evident in the 
establishments visited and is reflective of the plethora of understandings of Hui identity 
present among the city’s Hui minority population. In this regard, the dishes offered in 
restaurants and the embodied practices of their making and serving are performances of 
place-based identities. These performances of place-based identities through food are 
distinctly apparent in relation to certain dishes and cuisines. Of particular importance 
are Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles and north-western cuisine, Beijing/north-
eastern dishes, and Western foods. Dishes such as these sell place through food, along 
with the ideals and geographical imaginaries that are associated with those places. The 
production, performance and consumption of these dishes are, I argue, linked with 
place-based identities and perceptions of belonging.  
7.1.a  North-western Cuisine: Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles. 
As Chapter 5.2.e discussed, when asked to name dishes that are considered to be 
representative of Hui food cultures respondents would often identify dishes from 
China’s north-western provinces. In fact, ingredients and dishes such as Wheaten 
Products,175 Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles, Eight Treasure Tea,176 Sanzi,177 
 
175面食。 
176八宝茶。 
177馓子。 
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Barbequed Meat Skewers,178 Steamed Nine Bowls,179 goji berries, and a number of 
mutton and beef dishes such as Hand-Pulled Mutton,180 were the most common 
responses given - with the exception of Youxiang181 (see Section 7.3.b for a discussion 
of Youxiang).  
Wheaten products were among the most common examples of stereotypical dishes 
named by interviewees, particularly those from the Northwest. These dishes ranged 
from hot and cold noodle dishes, to Tianpei182 to baked, steamed and fried breads and 
pastries. Some individuals named certain dishes as being most important, while for 
others it was the broad grouping of wheaten products that was most representative of 
the Hui and their food culture. When asked to describe Hui food, a male manager from 
Xining, Qinghai Province explained that it was “mainly wheaten products.”183 This 
understanding of Hui food was shared by other participants, with many drawing 
connections between wheaten products and the Northwest. During a visit to a Hui-run 
Jianbing184 stall in November 2015, the middle-aged Gansu-native vendor explained 
that in her opinion wheaten products best symbolised the Hui’s culture because both 
originated in northwest China. Two young waitresses from Shandong Province working 
in Dongcheng District also mentioned this association between the Northwest and 
wheaten products when asked if Hui food varied geographically: “There is not a big 
difference, but there are some differences. Like in Gansu [and] Ningxia, there’s a little 
more wheaten products.”185  
Similar to wheaten products, certain dishes and ingredients are considered to be typical 
of Hui food culture due to their association with the Northwest. As was mentioned in 
Chapter 6.3.a, north-western China is often depicted as a barren and dry land, especially 
in comparison to China’s southwestern “rice bowl” region of Yunnan, Sichuan and 
Guangxi Provinces. This rather harsh and agriculturally challenging landscape means 
that many of the ingredients popular in other areas of China were historically 
unavailable in the Northwest. As such, the Northwest’s food cultures (including the 
 
178串儿。 
179蒸九碗。 
180手抓羊肉。 
181油香。 
182甜胚。Eng: Sweet Fermented Grains. 
183主要就是面食为主。 
184煎饼。Eng: Thin pancake made of millet flour.  
185区别不大，但是也会有区别。像甘肃宁夏那边，他们是面食多一点。 
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Hui’s) rely heavily on a distinctive range of ingredients. Of these ingredients, wheat, 
mutton, beef and goji berries are particularly relevant to the Hui. Wheat, mutton and 
beef are popular ingredients across the entire north-western region and feature 
prominently in the food cultures of all groups across the Northwest, including the Han, 
Uyghur and other minorities. However, goji berries are particularly popular in Ningxia, 
with one female supervisor from the province explaining to me that, “Our specialty is 
goji berries. They are famous throughout the country. So, we [Hui] generally pick 
them.”186  
Although these ingredients are by no means exclusive to the Hui, their association with 
the Northwest means that they are commonly linked to the group. Further, their 
historical availability in the Northwest has unsurprisingly resulted in them featuring 
strongly in most dishes from the region – many of which are generally linked with the 
Hui. These dishes, specifically beef and mutton dishes, are better attributed to the Hui, 
despite their also featuring in Han cuisine. This is likely the result of the perceived 
superiority of Hui, or more specifically Qingzhen, meat. When discussing her opinions 
and experiences of Hui food cultures, a Lanzhou-born Han explained that, “If you want 
to eat real LanzhouCai,187 you need to go to a Hui Canting.188 Because in my 
hometown, all meat is Qingzhen. Qingzhen meat is better so their food is authentic.”189 
Although ethnically Han, this woman’s statement about the superiority of Qingzhen 
meat, and her claims of authenticity for Hui north-western dishes, encapsulates the 
sentiments shared by many of this project’s Hui participants – and evidently many Han.  
In addition to Qingzhen variants of common north-western dishes, there are a number of 
other dishes that are viewed as being distinctly Hui. Excluding Youxiang, two other 
specifically Hui dishes and one tea were frequently named by participants as being 
important to Hui culture. These were Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles, Steamed 
Nine Bowls and Eight Treasure Tea. Although considered by many to be representative 
of the Hui more broadly, these dishes undoubtedly have strong links with the region. 
Eight Treasure Tea is a tea consisting of eight ingredients, many of which have strong 
connections with the Northwest, specifically Ningxia (see Figure 7.1). Although 
ingredients occasionally vary depending on the restaurant or brand in question, the tea 
 
186我们特产就是枸杞。最有名的，在全国都是有名的。所以我们一般就是，摘枸杞。 
187兰州菜。Eng: Lanzhou cuisine. 
188餐厅。Eng: Restaurant.  
189Conversation took place in English.   
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usually contains Chinese tea leaves (such as jasmine or green tea), chrysanthemum, red 
dates, ginseng, goji berries, longan, rock sugar and rose buds or lotus seeds. Many of 
the ingredients in this tea, such as goji berries and dates, have strong ties with the 
region. Therefore, although this tea is generally considered a Hui speciality, its use of 
regional ingredients links it to the Northwest, once again drawing connections between 
Hui food cultures and the Northwest. This relationship with the Northwest was very 
apparent for some individuals, with one Shandong-born waitress in Dongcheng District 
claiming that the tea comes from Gansu and Ningxia: “Then there is the Hui nationality, 
in Gansu, [and] Ningxia that have a famous tea called Eight Treasure Tea.”190 
 
Figure 7.1: Eight Treasure Tea. 
Source: Author’s own (2017).  
Another specialty dish of the Hui that has prominent connections to the Northwest is 
Nine Steamed Bowls (Figure 7.2). This dish is often prepared to mark important events, 
such as births, funerals, weddings and religious festivals like Ramadan. Nine Steamed 
 
190再就是回族，甘肃吧，宁夏有一个比较有名的茶，叫八宝茶。宁夏的八宝茶。对，主要就是这
些吧。 
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Bowls consists of nine separate, but equally sized dishes arranged in three rows of three, 
making a square. The nine dishes vary depending on individual interpretations of the 
meal, the event being celebrated and on geographical location, with different individuals 
and groups often claiming to know the authentic or definitive version of it. However, 
according to participants, there are some generally adhered to rules about the 
composition and placement of the nine dishes. Specifically, that the dishes must be 
arranged in a square, there must be four dishes of meat with one placed at each corner, 
that there must be a dish of green vegetables, and that the guest of honour must be 
seated in front of the vegetable dish. As one waitress from Shandong Province, but 
whose family comes from the Northwest, explained, “In particular, the Hui people are 
represented by Steamed Nine Bowls. […] There will be nine bowls. Four bowls of beef 
or mutton, there is chicken, cabbage or dried kelp, fried meatballs, and ZhaOuHe.191 
This food is particularly representative in our homes.”192 The specificities of the dish 
were elaborated on by a young male chef from Gansu Province, “There is a certain 
amount of attention paid to the way the dishes are placed. For example, the upper seat is 
given to the guests. The four corners must be four bowls of beef and mutton. On both 
sides are ZhaOuHe, croquettes, and both are placed on the sides. But all four corners 
must be four bowls of meat. And in our home, a bowl of cabbage in front of the person 
sitting in the upper seat.”193  
 
191炸藕盒。 Eng: Bomb Box – battered lotus root with a meat filling.  
192就回族特别，有代表性的九大碗[。。。] 都会有九大碗。四碗牛肉或羊肉，就有鸡，白菜海
带，再有炸的丸子，还有炸藕盒。在我们家里特别有代表性的这个食物。 
193它摆的那个方式，有一定的讲究。比方说咱，[。。。] 就咱说的上座，贵宾坐的上座，四角必
须是四碗牛羊肉。两边是藕盒，炸丸子，两边那边放都可以。但必须四个角都是四碗肉。但是上
席，你知道吗，上席必须是一碗白菜，在我们家。 
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Figure 7.2: Steamed Nine Bowls, including additional pastries (bottom left and right 
corners) and rice. 
Source: Author’s own (2017).  
7.1.a.i  Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles. 
“Lanzhou natives start their days with a bowl of beef noodles. With the Yellow 
River crossing the city, Lanzhou is home to over 1,000 Muslim noodle shops. 
Everyday more than 1,000,000 bowls of beef noodles are consumed. People 
have lavished praise on the tender and hot Lanzhou noodles. 100 years ago, a 
Hui ethnic person, Ma BaoZi, poured the water in which the beef and lamb 
livers were just boiled into a pot. Noodles made in that pot won popularity 
immediately. The clarity of the beef broth is the best way to check if the beef 
noodles are authentic. The best beef noodles should acquire the following five 
features: clear soup, clean white turnips, brilliant red chilli oil, green parsley, 
and yellow noodles. When kneading the flour, Ma BaoZi creatively added some 
special water. The main component of this water is potassium carbonate. It made 
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the flour more elastic. All the procedures are manual. Ma WenBin is the fourth-
generation successor of Lanzhou Beef Noodles. He’s been working in a noodle 
shop for 40 years. To pull the dough into noodles of different thicknesses, a chef 
needs to have extraordinary strong arms. They also need exquisite skills in 
controlling this strength. The same wheat and the same flour, but different 
noodles, and different wonders are produced”194 (A Bite of China Season 1 
(Eng.), 2014).  
The above excerpt is taken from episode two, “The Story of Staple Food,”195 of the 
hugely popular Chinese documentary series “A Bite of China.”196 This originally seven-
part show, which was produced and aired by the Government-owned China Central 
Television (CCTV), gained tremendous popularity among viewers and achieved high 
ratings when aired on the network’s main CCTV1 channel (Chow, 2012). Episode two 
focuses on the history and cultural importance of China’s staple foods. As the above 
excerpt is being narrated, images of Lanzhou’s mosques and traditionally dressed Hui 
people are continually displayed: with some praying, some eating noodles, and some 
hand-pulling noodles. Figures 7.3 to 7.5 show the opening scenes of the section 
dedicated to Lanzhou Beef Noodles. As the narrator explains that “Lanzhou natives start 
their days with a bowl of beef noodles,”197 the images displayed alternate between Hui 
men wearing their stereotypical white caps and a landscape shot of Lanzhou City. In 
Figure 7.3, we see a man bowing in prayer, accompanied by the spoken words and 
written text of “Lanzhou people’s early morning.”198 The men’s white caps act as 
indexical signs for their ethnicity; with the caps being the signifiers and the men’s status 
as ethnically Hui being the signified (see Chapter 6.2.b above). As Barthes (1977: 38–
41) has argued, the text accompanying images is important, and may have a relay-
function, adding to the meaning and influencing the particular decoding. In the case of 
Figure 7.3, the presence of the text “兰州人,” or “Lanzhou people” is important, as it 
also works as an indexical sign. The words become the signifiers, while people from 
Lanzhou are the signified. Importantly, these two indexical signs may also be 
 
194 A Bite of China, Season 1 Episode 2, “The Story of Staple Food”, 23:35 to 26:31. English translation 
is taken from the English version produced by CCTV. Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B8lTWruUaQc&list=PLEmk2mJtZJ7FIVleraLI2t9xhqYVkiWqU&i
ndex=2 
195主食的故事。 
196舌尖上的中国。 
197兰州人的早晨是从一碗牛肉面开始的。 
198兰州人的早晨。 
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understood as syntagmatic signs as they work together to produce a further meaning and 
potential decoding. Specifically, the co-presence of these two signs acts as a signifier 
for the belief that the Hui are from Lanzhou. Similarly, the text heard and seen in Figure 
7.4, along with the visual image of Lanzhou City, also acts as a syntagmatic sign. 
However, in this instance it is the words “beef noodles” or “牛肉面” that work with the 
image of Lanzhou to signify the concept that Lanzhou is where beef noodles are from. 
These two syntagmatic signs, along with the image and text in Figure 7.5, may also be 
understood as syntagmatic signs in a broader sense. Together, the three visual images 
and the accompanying text act to signify a further syntagmatic sign. Specifically, the 
sequence of signs present in the clip suggests that the Hui are from Lanzhou and that 
their food is beef noodles.  
 
Figure 7.3: Lanzhou natives start their days with a bowl of beef noodles 1. 
Source: A Bite of China (2014).  
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Figure 7.4: Lanzhou natives start their days with a bowl of beef noodles 2. 
Source: A Bite of China (2014). 
  
 
Figure 7.5: Lanzhou natives start their days with a bowl of beef noodles 3. 
Source: A Bite of China (2014).  
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This concept of the Hui belonging in Lanzhou and of beef noodles as being a Hui dish is 
evident throughout the excerpt, in particular when the narrator claims that “Lanzhou is 
home to more than 1,000 Muslim noodle shops” and when he discusses the history of 
the dish: “100 years ago, a Hui ethnic person, Ma BaoZi, poured the water in which the 
beef and lamb livers were just boiled into a pot”. This association between the Hui, 
Lanzhou, and Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles, was one that appeared time and 
again during fieldwork, especially in the many restaurants visited that specialised in the 
dish.  
 “You see these pots? This style of cooking is called, eh, I don’t know how to say [it] in 
English. It’s this character, maybe you know it?” explained the male manager of a key 
participating restaurant while he wrote the character 品 on the palm of his hand. “Shape 
is [the] same, look[s] the same. You see? That is how we cook our LaMian. It[s] 
Lanzhou style”. He was referring to the three large cauldrons standing in the centre of 
the small kitchen in his Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles restaurant (Figure 7.6). 
One cauldron was filled with beef stock, the same stock used for the broth of the 
noodles. “The beef [is] cooked in this soup [stock]. Then take[n] out. Now [there are] 
just bones in there. [We] cook bones for four hours or more. This is our special way 
[…] Our beef comes from Niujie, very good quality. Best quality. Each day [we] use 
maybe 100kg of beef. Other restaurants’ quality is not so good. They can’t afford this 
much”. As the manager later explained, this beef stock is mixed with water to make the 
broth for the noodles at a ratio of roughly 30% stock and 70% water – although the 
manager pointed out that the exact recipe was a “secret. It’s our own special recipe: 
Lanzhou flavour. Just for us”. This broth was kept in the second cauldron, the one 
closest to the service counter with sliced vegetables and cooked beef added to it. 
In the corner of the kitchen was a large metal worktop used for rolling and pulling the 
dough into noodles (Figure 7.6). As the noodles were pulled to shape and size, they 
were then thrown into the third cauldron, which was filled with boiling starchy water. 
The restaurant offered seven different sizes of noodles for customers to choose from, 
ranging in length and thickness. As the chef pulled the noodles, he alternated between 
dipping his fingertips in oil and thinly spreading flour on the work surface, with the 
amount of oil and flour varying depending on the type of noodle that he was pulling. As 
the chef pulled each of the seven types, the manager explained that different noodles 
were popular with different genders and ages. “You see this type, for the kids. For the 
277 
 
old people too. Because it is thin, easy to eat […] This fat one [is] for the very young 
guy, they like it. Because their stomach is very strong and nice […] This normal model 
is for everyone. Everyone can eat [the] standard model […] This one, is for the lady. 
Maybe 40 or 50 year[s] old. The thickness is nice for them”. Once the noodles had been 
pulled from the starchy boiling water, they were added to a bowl with a ladle full of 
broth and topped with radish, scallion and chilli oil before being handed to the 
customer. Pointing at the bowl of noodles, he went on to say “this is why our Lanzhou 
Lamian are so famous now in Beijing. [In] One day, maybe 2,000 people eat [it]. In 
Beijing, [there are] 1,000 Lamian restaurants. Taste is clean, and our chef[s] are very 
skil[ful]. […] Take[s a] lot of strong [strength] for these noodles. Only man can do 
[it].”199 
 
Figure 7.6: Kitchen with 品 cauldrons and noodle-pulling table. 
Source: Author’s own (2016).  
 
199Taken from fieldnotes dated 20 January 2016. Conversation took place in English.  
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The details of this performance of Hui food culture through the making of Lanzhou 
Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles are important for our understandings of the geographies of 
Hui identity in Beijing for several reasons. Firstly, the practicalities of cooking this dish, 
along with the high demand from customers, have resulted in a certain spatiality being 
arranged within the restaurants: the positioning of the staff around the 品 cauldrons, the 
workspace given to the noodle-puller, the circular cleaning system (see Chapter 5.2.e), 
and the L-shaped queuing system implemented by the restaurant to deal with the high 
volume of customers. These particularities mean that a similar spatial model was 
followed by many of Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodle restaurants visited. In this 
regard, these places of Hui food culture are structured according to the requirements of 
this dish. Closely related to this is the second point: that these spaces are structured and 
organised by gender, as are the consumption practices (a point that will be discussed in 
Section 7.4.c). Thirdly, the popularity of this dish among customers, both Hui and non-
Hui, is significant as it means that this performance of Hui food culture is one that is 
often consumed by residents within Beijing. Lastly, and undoubtedly most importantly 
for this chapter, the production and consumption of Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Beef Noodles 
is a performance of place-based identity, directly associating both the Hui and their food 
culture with Lanzhou.  
7.1.b  North-eastern Cuisine: Beijing Specialities. 
A second type of place-based identity often performed by the Hui through their food 
cultures is identifications with Beijing and Northeast China. Similar to the performances 
of north-western and Lanzhou identities discussed above, many Hui used their food 
cultures as a mechanism for performing their north-eastern and Beijing-based identities. 
Specifically, these individuals and restaurants offered a range of dishes that are more 
traditionally associated with the Han, given their origins outside of China’s Northwest. 
Stir-fried dishes such as Deep-Fried Tripe,200 Kung Pao Chicken,201 Mapo Tofu,202 
Disanxian,203 Fish Flavoured Shredded Meat,204 and a range of other stir-fried 
vegetable, beef and mutton dishes, were often named by participants as being important 
and popular examples of their group’s food. Several other non-stir-fried, and usually 
 
200爆肚。 
201宫保鸡丁。 
202麻婆豆腐。 
203地三鲜。Dish consisting of stir-fried potato, aubergine and green pepper.  
204鱼香肉丝。 
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Han-associated, dishes were also named by participants, including Dumplings,205 Soya 
Milk206 and Lǘdagun.207 Further, a number of other, more locally specific and non-stir-
fried delicacies and dishes were also named by participants and offered in their 
restaurants, such as Beijing Barbecue Meat,208 Pea-flour Cakes,209 Steamed Corn 
Buns,210 Beijing Noodles with Fried Bean Sauce,211 and even Beijing Roast Duck,212 
and Beijing Copper Hotpot.213   
Although of Han origin, some of these dishes, specifically the vegetable dishes, breads 
and cakes, are considered by many as being Qingzhen and as such, Hui, because they 
don’t contain any animal derivatives or meat. For others, however, even these dishes 
need to be prepared in a certain way if they are to be considered Qingzhen. Of particular 
importance here is the discussion about cleanliness and food preparation in Chapter 
5.2.d. Despite differences in opinion regarding whether these dishes could be 
considered as Hui/Qingzhen or not, participants from both viewpoints did share a key 
similar belief. Specifically, when discussing these vegetable dishes, it was often 
explained that these dishes could only be considered as Hui dishes if they were cooked 
using clean vegetable oil, a point that participants claimed differentiated their versions 
of the dish from the Han, and which therefore excluded them from eating in Han 
restaurants. As a Hui Imam from Shandong Province explained to me in August 2017, 
“Qingzhen oil is included and must be Qingzhen. It must be used by our Muslims. It is 
not that we do not eat [non-Qingzhen oil], we may not eat [it].”214 
In addition to using clean vegetable oil when cooking, and the apparently uniquely Hui 
method of cleaning and preparing vegetables before use, another important factor in 
making these previously Han dishes qualify as Hui is unsurprisingly, the use of 
Qingzhen meats. For some meat dishes, this process simply involved using Qingzhen 
beef, mutton or other meats in place of their non-Qingzhen equivalent. An example of 
 
205饺子。 
206豆汁。 
207驴打滚。Eng: Pastry made of steamed glutinous millet flour.  
208北京烤肉。 
209豌豆黄。 
210窝窝头。 
211北京的炸酱面。 
212北京烤鸭。 
213北京铜火锅/北京涮肉。 
214清真的油都包含在内，必须要是清真的。必须我们穆斯林用的可以，不是我们不吃，就不能
吃。 
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this is the widely popular Kung Pao Chicken, which some participants explained was 
primarily made into a Hui dish by substituting the non-Qingzhen chicken with Qingzhen 
certified chicken. For other meat dishes, specifically dishes that are most often made by 
the Han using pork, some participants explained that they could be made Hui by 
replacing the pork with permitted meats. An example of this is the commonly found 
Fish Flavoured Shredded Meat dish which is often made using shredded pork in Han 
restaurants. However, it was offered by several participating restaurants in the form of 
shredded beef or shredded mutton. By making Hui or Qingzhen versions of Beijing and 
north-eastern dishes, the Hui are performing their place-based identities, making 
assertions of belonging, and challenging discourses that would otherwise confine them 
and their food cultures to China’s Northwest.  
The selling of Qingzhen versions of previously Han dishes was viewed by many 
participants as being a relatively new occurrence within Beijing. For some, this was an 
example of modern Hui cuisine and the inherent modernity of the group. When asked 
about this apparently recent trend most participants described it as a positive change, as 
something that broadens the Hui’s gastronomic choices and allows the Hui to enjoy 
foods that were previously off-limits for them: “But as a Qingzhen customer, he won’t 
go to a non-Qingzhen restaurant to eat Roast Duck or go to eat Kung Pao Chicken […] 
Although it is not the special feature of this restaurant, he can also taste the Qingzhen 
version of Kung Pao Chicken”215 and “I see that a lot of Muslims in the local area can’t 
eat authentic Beijing snacks. I have an idea to change it [the restaurant] into an old 
Beijing snack [restaurant].”216 This acculturation of Hui food cultures through the 
adoption of Han dishes was consciously pursued by some individuals, who saw it as a 
part of joining Han-dominated society: “Plus if someone else lets you go to the Han 
world, we will also try hard to make some changes.”217  
Although many participants view this broadening of Hui food culture as a beneficial 
occurrence, other interviewees were less positive about the change and were somewhat 
more critical of the reasons behind this form of assimilation. When asked about the 
 
215但是作为一个清真的顾客来说，他不会去到非清真餐馆里去吃烤鸭或者去吃宫保鸡丁[。。。] 
在我们餐厅里虽然说不是我们的特色，但是他也可以尝到清真版的宫保鸡丁。 
216我看本地好多穆斯林吃不上正宗的北京小吃，我有这想法给它改成老北京小吃了。 
217在加上别人如果让你去了汉族的世界，我们也会努力尝试着也去做一些改变。 
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authenticity of Qingzhen restaurants serving Qingzhen versions of traditionally Han 
dishes, two Hui waitresses explained to me that: 
“if it is from the side of Islam, it is not a Qingzhen restaurant, but now there is 
no [other] way […] After all, we have to live [ …] Whether it is consumption in 
Beijing or accommodation, it is too high [expensive]. [If the restaurant] simply 
sells to some of the Hui people, it completely can’t keep up […] For example, 
[if] it is something [a dish] that is not Qingzhen, but they change the meat to 
Qingzhen and then sell it, it will improve business […] Islam does not allow it, 
but there is no [other] way. After all, the boss is also a businessman.”218  
This belief that Hui restaurants were being forced into selling traditionally non-
Qingzhen dishes in order to survive economically was shared by many other 
respondents, and is reflective of a kind of forced assimilation and adoption of Han food 
cultures experienced by many Hui restaurants across Beijing (a point that will be 
discussed in greater detail in Section 7.2).  
This narrative of the Hui’s assimilation into Han food cultures as being a recent 
phenomenon, as described by many of the project’s participants, was countered by the 
elderly, female owner of a small bakery and cooked meat shop. According to this 
interviewee, Hui and Han cultures developed alongside each other, and as such their 
food cultures are the results of this combination, which she claims has happened over a 
thousand years of inter-ethnic interactions and from ongoing Han-support:  
“There are the Hui people in China, [with] a thousand years of history. With a 
thousand years of history, its culture is here until now, and it is inseparable from 
the support of the Han people. In fact, 50% of the Han people lived together 
with the Hui people, and then merged with Han culture. Although its belief is 
Islam, its eating habits are still in Chinese culture. For example, you can say 
steamed bread, steamed white rice, and stir-fry. This is all Han culture, but the 
Hui people both eat and make [these dishes], and they are making very well. 
Why? This is a combination of two cultures. There is not much difference 
 
218要是在伊斯兰教这边的话，就不算清真的餐馆，但现在没办法[。。。] 毕竟也要生活[。。。]
无论是北京的消费也好，住宿也好，太高太高了。它单纯的卖回族的一些，就完全就是，跟不上
了[。。。]比如说它会上一些本来不是清真的东西，但它会把肉改成清真的，然后再卖那个，就
会对生意提升一点[。。。]伊斯兰教的话，是不允许的，但是没有办法。毕竟老板他也是生意
人。 
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between Qingzhen culture and life. [...] Why must he be tolerant? If it is not 
tolerant, it [Hui culture] will not be there anymore. Therefore, the predecessor of 
the Hui people in China is the Han nationality. […] Its halal culture is mainly a 
habit of eating, nothing else.”219 
7.1.b.i  Niujie Meat.  
Among the performances of Beijing-based identities, there are some even more 
localised attachments to place and demonstrations of place-based identities. These 
attachments to local places and performances of neighbourhood identities were 
particularly prominent in regard to one key component of Hui food cultures: meat. 
When discussing their restaurants’ dishes or important ingredients in the group’s food 
cultures, many of the project’s participants would reference their restaurants’ higher 
quality meat as a way of distinguishing them from competing establishments. These 
claims of superiority were generally legitimised by naming the source of their meat; be 
it through linking the meat to the region of its production (often Northwest China or 
Inner-Mongolia), or more commonly, through explicitly stating that they sourced their 
meat from butcher shops and wholesalers in Beijing’s historical Niujie neighbourhood.  
“You should go to Niujie,”220 was one of the most common pieces of advice that 
participants would share with me during all stages of the fieldwork, and it was also said 
to me by numerous Han friends, teachers and acquaintances when they discovered the 
nature of my research. Niujie, or Oxen Street, is a predominantly Hui ethnic enclave 
surrounding one of Beijing’s most historically important mosques in Xicheng District. 
Given the neighbourhood’s historical role as an epicentre of Hui cultural and social life 
within Beijing, it is unsurprisingly often associated with notions of authenticity with 
respect to Hui food cultures and it was explicitly studied as such by Gladney (1996) 
some three decades ago. Specifically, given its close ties with the Hui, their food 
cultures, and consequently Qingzhen, the meat prepared and sold in the neighbourhood 
was considered by participants to be of higher quality and more authentic than meat 
 
219这样中国这个回民，一千年历史。有一千年历史，它的文化在这里能到现在，离不开汉民的支
持。其实百分之五十的都是汉民和回民生活在一起，然后融合了汉文化。它信仰虽然是伊斯兰
教，它的饮食习惯还是汉文化里的。你比如说馒头，蒸的白米饭，炒菜，这都是汉文化，但是回
民都吃都做，而且都做得特别好。为什么？这是两种文化结合了。清真文化和生活没有多大的区
别，...为什么，他肯定是包容。如果不包容的话早就没有了。所以说中国的回族前身就是汉族 
[。。。] 它的清真文化就主要是吃的习惯，其他的没什么。 
220你应该去牛街。 
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sold by butchers elsewhere in Beijing. As such, butchers and wholesalers in Niujie often 
sold their meats for a higher price than their out-of-neighbourhood competitors, with 
some establishments serving huge queues of patrons daily (see Figure 7.7 and 7.8).  
 
Figure 7.7: Queue at Niujie Butcher Shop. 
Source: Author’s own (2015). 
 
Figure 7.8: Queue at Niujie Butcher Shop 2. 
Source: Author’s own (2016). 
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“We only buy from Niujie, all our meat. Beef and mutton. Very high quality. Best 
quality. Very expensive. Other places [restaurants], they can’t do [it]. [It costs] Too 
much money.”221 This male manager’s emphasis on the higher quality of Niujie meat 
was mirrored by many other participants and offered as examples of their restaurants’ 
superiority and authenticity. It was not only through word of mouth that the meats’ 
source of origin was advertised to customers visiting restaurants across the city but was 
also often advertised within restaurants. By highlighting the connections between their 
food and Niujie, these individuals were performing a very specific and local place-based 
identity. This identity draws from the popular imaginaries and narratives of Niujie’s 
meat as being superior in quality, authenticity and cleanliness, while also building upon 
local understandings of Niujie as being the Hui’s historical place in Beijing. Thus, by 
performing Niujie-based identities through meat, these individuals and restaurants were 
stating claims of being more authentically Hui while simultaneously asserting 
themselves as belonging in Beijing.  
7.1.c  International Dishes: Cafes and Bakeries. 
One further example of place-based identities evident in the food performances of 
Beijing Hui is identifications with international and global places. Similar to how some 
Hui restaurants chose to serve Qingzhen variations of traditionally Han dishes in order 
to broaden the food choices of local Beijing Hui, some establishments offered dishes 
from further afield when attempting to modernise and broaden Hui food cultures. In 
recent years, there has been a significant increase in the number of Western-style 
restaurants, cafes and bars across Beijing, serving an array of international dishes and 
drinks. Most often, these restaurants serve distinctively Euro-American style cuisines 
but as interpreted to appeal to the Chinese consumer base. This trend in establishing 
places of localised Western-style food cultures was also evident among the Hui in 
Beijing.  
When scouting restaurants during the early stages of fieldwork in September 2015, I 
was somewhat surprised to find a Qingzhen Western-style café nestled among the 
hutongs in central Beijing. Clearly displayed to the right of the glass door was an 
English sign reading “Halal Food. Tea. Coffee”, with a small green Qingzhen sign to the 
left of the doorway. After entering, I was directed to a seat near the window by a young 
 
221Taken from fieldnotes dated 28 January 2016.  
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Hui waitress, who later explained that all of the staff in the restaurant were also Hui. 
After chatting for a while, she handed me a leather-bound menu and recommended that 
I try their coffee before walking to the back of the restaurant to chat with her colleague, 
leaving me to look through the thin menu alone. The contents of the menu were even 
more surprising to me than the existence of the café. On each page were images of 
typically Euro-American dishes, including margherita pizza, toasted cheese sandwiches, 
green leaf salad with mayonnaise dressing, creamy tomato soup, vanilla ice-cream, 
cheesecake, beef burgers, fries, and even chicken nuggets. Although it shut down soon 
after my first visit due to the café’s failure to secure necessary certificates from local 
authorities, I spoke via phone call with the owner who explained to me that her 
intention for opening the café was to show that Hui people could also be “modern 
people,”222 and to demonstrate that they were “global citizens”223 like the Han.  
 
These discourses of modernity and global identifications were also repeated by some 
other Hui working in four similar establishments visited between 2015 and 2019. For 
many of these individuals, Western dishes are considered to be a sign of modernity 
through their attachments with seemingly modern places; i.e., Western nations. By 
selling a Hui version of foreign foods, the Hui are not only selling “modern” dishes and 
contemporary understandings of modernity but are also selling a Sino-Islamic version of 
Western cuisine. By doing so, they are localizing the international and are expressing 
aspects of how their identities are tied to the “global” and “modern”.  
 
When asked for her opinion of these types of Hui cuisine, the elderly owner of a Beijing 
canteen explained that:  
“This [selling beef burgers] is normal, it’s keeping up with the times. It is 
impossible to eat braised oxtail or sautéed ox tripe with coriander [all the time]. 
But no matter how many innovations are made, its core never changes, must be 
Qingzhen. Qingzhen scriptures, Qingzhen words, Qingzhen restaurants, how can 
you change us all? Without the Qingzhen signs, we certainly won’t go in [to the 
restaurant].”224  
 
222今人。 
223世界公民。 
224这个很正常，与时俱进，不可能老吃红烧牛尾或者芫爆散丹。不管一系列怎么创新，但是万变
不离其宗，必须得有清真。清真的经文，清真的字，清真的餐厅，你怎么变我们都可以去。没有
这些清真标识，我们肯定不去。 
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This acceptance of Qingzhen variations of Western style dishes was evident in the 
responses of many interviewees, although all also shared the belief that the dishes could 
only be considered as Hui if they used certified Qingzhen meat and/or followed the 
Qur’anic way of slaughtering animals. However, the acceptance of such interpretations 
of Hui cuisine was challenged by other participants, specifically by some elderly 
interviewees. When asked to comment on the recent trend of Qingzhen Western-style 
foods, specifically beef burgers, the male manager of one small restaurant in Beijing’s 
Dongcheng District said “[I] can’t accept those, there is no such thing [as Qingzhen beef 
burgers].”225 Although this refusal of Qingzhen Western-style foods was occasionally 
found among some older participants, most respondents supported such food practices, 
agreeing that they demonstrated the modernity of the group and their international 
attachments and identifications with places. For some other interviewees, such 
performances of modernistic and place-based identities were unnecessary given the 
strength of the Hui’s traditional food cultures: “You mean innovations? Yes, I think 
[they’re okay] […] It doesn’t have to be [innovative], but in fact traditions are also very 
good.”226 
7.1.c.i  Chocolate Cake. 
“The original intention for investing in this [bakery] was to do something for our 
minority, because there was no such thing as a specific Qingzhen bakery in 
Beijing, no. And the ingredients we use in our bakery are made entirely from 
Millacin the UK and the Anchor Pure Cream in New Zealand. Then including 
our entire raw materials, we use the Qingzhen certification, which is the 
certification of Malaysia's global Qingzhen. Therefore, it is aimed at Muslims. 
Who [I] mainly want to target [are] Muslims in Beijing, thus we can give our 
Muslim brothers and sisters a little [more] convenience. Therefore, the original 
intention at the time was to establish a minority business, and at the same time 
provide our people with some useful services.”227 
 
225接受不了，没有那样的。 
226创新吧你是说？可以吧，我觉得, 可以吧。不一定非得，但其实传统的也挺好的。 
227投资这个就是想做一些我们民族的事情，因为在整个北京没有专门针对 focus on 清真面包的这
块，没有。而且我们面包房它现在用的原料都是完全从英国的南风车和新西兰的安佳纯清真的奶
油制作的。然后包括我们整个原料用的都是用有清真的 halal认证，就是马来西亚全球的清真的这
样的认证。所以说主要想针对北京的穆斯林做一个就属于针对于穆斯林，然后呢又能够给我们的
穆斯林兄弟姐妹提供一点方便。所以说当时的初衷是为了做一些民族的事情，同时给我们的民族
提供一些方便才做的这个行业。 
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This interviewee, a 30-something year old, Heilongjiang-native, had opened this bakery 
five years previous after noticing a gap in the Qingzhen market and spurred on by his 
desire to give back to his minority group. Like many other Hui restaurateurs across the 
city, he took great pride in the high quality and Qingzhen certification of his ingredients, 
using their status to assert his food’s authenticity. However, unlike most participants 
who boasted about their products’ Chinese origins, the owner of this bakery proudly 
broadcasted (and indeed advertised) his products’ foreign origins. Specifically, he 
highlighted the products’ certification as Qingzhen by international agencies, in 
particular from Malaysia. By doing so, he was aligning his foods’ Qingzhen status with 
that of other Muslim produce globally, legitimising its qualifying as Muslim food. 
Further, by emphasising its association with Malaysia, a predominantly Muslim 
country, he was identifying with other Muslims globally through the concept of Global 
Islam.  
Of the many popular baked goods sold in his establishment, it was chocolate cake that 
proved to be most popular among his patrons. “What is the most popular product in the 
bakery?”228 He repeated the question to the female server standing behind the cash desk 
before turning back to me and relaying the answer: “Chocolate cake.”229 “Because, as I 
have told you, most of our customers are young people […] The chocolate that we use 
is the top Qingzhen chocolate, so this may be [why] it is more popular. Whether it is 
Hui or not, there is basically a kind of chocolate [that gives you] a very special feeling. 
And we have very few Qingzhen chocolates, and there are very few [Qingzhen] 
chocolates on the market except for ours. And in fact, on the market, except for us, it is 
rare to buy Qingzhen chocolate, Qingzhen chocolate cake. So, our chocolate cake is 
really delicious. Chocolate cakes are the best-selling item in the cake category.”230   
As the owner makes clear, Qingzhen chocolate and baked chocolate goods are quite a 
rarity in Beijing, largely explaining the popularity of this dish among the bakery’s 
patrons. However, the scarcity of Qingzhen chocolate among the city’s Hui foodscapes 
is not the only reason behind the popularity of this dish. Rather, the foreign source of 
 
228店里面最受欢迎的产品是哪一些? 
229Answer was given in English.  
230因为刚才我谈到我们的顾客大部分以年轻人为主[。。。] 而且我们用的巧克力呢就是在清真内
最顶级的巧克力，所以这种可能是受欢迎多一些，因为只要是，不论是不是回族，基本上对巧克
力都有一种，很特殊的感觉。而且我们清真的巧克力又很少，市场上除了我们之外，很少有巧克
力。而且像那个市场上，除了我们之外，很少能买到清真巧克力，清真巧克力蛋糕这样。所以说
我们的巧克力蛋糕确实是比较好吃。巧克力蛋糕是在蛋糕类卖得最好的。 
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origin of the cake’s ingredients, which is widely advertised within the bakery and is 
often explained by staff to customers, also plays a central role, as does the fact that 
chocolate cakes are associated with the food cultures of Western nations. These clear 
ties to non-Chinese places, along with the associated discourses and narratives of 
modernity, position the bakery’s popular chocolate cake in an interesting way in relation 
to Hui food cultures and identity performances. By making and consuming these 
chocolate cakes, Hui participants were not only demonstrating their identities as modern 
people, but were also performing place through food, specifically places of the West, or 
more accurately, imaginaries of the West.  
7.2  PERFORMING ASSIMILATION. 
Hui performances of their food cultures in Beijing not only acted to signify place-based 
identities and senses of belonging but were also telling displays of the ways that the 
minority are being affected by political processes of assimilation and how individuals 
understand and internalise these approaches to minority cultures. Specifically, the 
performance of certain dishes and foods can be seen as reactions to increasingly 
assimilative forces impacting on Beijing’s Hui minority as they attempt to carve out 
‘Hui’ places in a Han-dominated society. This section argues that these performances of 
Hui food culture, particularly appertaining to what is deemed culturally and morally 
acceptable practice in contemporary Qingzhen restaurants, is shifting over time due to 
external assimilative factors. As Section 7.1.b showed, the serving of Qingzhen 
variations of north-eastern/Beijing dishes was considered by many to be a relatively 
recent occurrence, although some argued that it was the result of a longer shared history 
with the Han. Regardless of temporal differences, both accounts pointed towards the 
reasons behind the Hui’s adoption of Han cuisine. For some, the reason was that such 
adaptations of Han dishes signalled the Hui’s modernity and their aligning with Chinese 
discourses and conceptualisations of being a modern Chinese person. While for others, 
the serving of Qingzhen north-eastern/Beijing dishes was the result of economic 
survival and the need to cater to a predominantly non-Muslim, Han customer base. 
Rather than implying a binary understanding to such a phenomenon, this chapter argues 
that it is helpful to consider both processes as occurring simultaneously, especially as 
both are evident in participants’ understandings. This two-fold approach to 
understanding the apparent changes of Hui food cultures in Beijing will be explored 
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through the lens of one highly contentious, divisive and widely disputed performance: 
the selling and consumption of alcohol.  
7.2.a  Alcohol. 
“What makes a person Hui?”231 
“People with faith. The Hui people are those with Islam in their hearts, no 
smoking and no drinking.”232 
The above quotes were taken from an interview with an elderly male manager of a small 
Qingzhen restaurant in Chaoyang District. This belief, that Hui people must not drink 
alcohol, was common among research participants in Beijing, as was his religious 
justification. As a 19-year-old waitress in Dongcheng District explained when asked 
directly why Hui people can’t drink alcohol, “Because the Qur’an stipulates, the Hui 
people can’t smoke, can’t drink alcohol.”233 Elaborating on this religious taboo, a male 
chef from Ningxia explained that drinking alcohol “is absolutely forbidden. Because 
alcohol will make us temporarily lose our faith. The brain is in an unclear state. You 
don’t know yourself, [you] don’t know what your mission is; don’t know what your 
beliefs are. When the faith leaves your body, you can say that you are not a Muslim, 
because you haven’t done your own cleansing.”234 For some individuals, such as the 
middle-aged Gansu-native female manager of a small restaurant in central Beijing, the 
adherence to the alcohol taboo is of upmost importance, taking precedence over other 
dietary practices and restrictions: “The sin of drinking is more serious than the sin of 
eating other foods.”235 Although most participants explained the Hui’s alcohol taboo 
through a moralistic and religious lens stemming from Qur’anic teachings, the need for 
alcohol abstention was also understood through the more socio-cultural frame of 
Qingzhen and the embodied practice of becoming a Qingzhen person through the belief 
in Chi Shenme Bu Shenme236 (as discussed in Chapter 5). In line with this belief, one 
male chef described the requirement for restaurant staff to be Hui by linking it with the 
 
231您觉得什么样的人可以称为回民？ 
232有信仰的人就行。就是内心信仰伊斯兰教就称为回民，不抽烟不喝酒。 
233因为古拉经里规定了，回民不能抽烟，不能喝酒。 
234是绝对禁止的。因为酒是会让我们暂时的失去信仰，大脑处于不清晰的一个状态，你都不认识
自己，不知道自己的使命是什么，不知道自己的信仰是什么。当信仰离开你身体的一瞬间，你已
经可以说不属于穆斯林了，因为你没有做到自身的洁净。 
235喝酒的罪过要比吃其他食物的罪过还要严重。 
236Eng: Eat something to mend/fix something. 
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Han’s consumption of alcohol and their subsequent embodied impurity and potential to 
diminish the clean and Qingzhen status of food being produced:  
“If you are not Muslim, you can’t work in the kitchen. For pure Qingzhen, 
Qingzhen represents the cleansing from the mind to the body, because we have 
faith and feel that it is clean. But for non-Muslims, they may have had it 
[alcohol] before. After work, they might smoke and drink alcohol. These are 
forbidden […]They’re not clean from the body to the soul. [But] we are, and we 
will stop non-Muslim staff from coming into contact with our dishes and food. 
To ensure that it is absolutely pure Qingzhen.”237  
Such strong beliefs in the necessity to avoid consuming alcohol have unsurprisingly had 
a direct impact on the way that Qingzhen restaurants in Beijing have traditionally 
operated. Traditionally, alcohol was not sold in such establishments, and was in fact 
often forbidden to be brought onto the premises, a practice that continues in some of the 
restaurants visited. The female supervisor of one of the project’s key restaurants stated, 
“you can’t take alcohol [to a Hui restaurant], they won’t let you go inside […] For 
example, if you are not a Hui, you cannot go into a Hui restaurant with alcohol, they 
will not let you go in”238 – a rather contradictory claim as her restaurant was known 
locally for selling high quality Ningxia-produced wine. These alcohol-free places were 
made publicly visible to customers not only through the advertising of Qingzhen, 
Islamic and Arabic signs, logos, clothing and decorations, but also through explicitly 
displaying notices on table-tops and walls that made the ban on alcohol clear.  
Yet, over the course of three research trips conducted for this research project between 
August 2015 and January 2019, alcohol has increasingly become a feature within many 
of the Hui restaurants visited. During the phases of participant observation between 
August 2015 and April 2016, alcohol became increasingly noticeable in restaurants 
across the city. Specifically, Chinese beers such as Tsingdao and Yanjing, various 
 
237如果非我们穆斯林的人是不能做后厨的，对于我们纯清真来说，清真本来就代表着从心灵到身
体所有的洁净，因为我们有信仰，觉得这是洁净的。但是非穆斯林呢，他以前或许会有，下班了
之后或许会抽烟啊，喝酒啊，这些在我们是禁止的[。。。]不是从身体到心灵上，不洁净。所以
我们就是，也杜绝非穆斯林人员，会接触我们菜品，食物。保证了它就是绝对的纯清真。 
238你拿酒去都不行，它不让往里带的[。。。] 你比方说我不是回民，我拿酒去回民餐厅都不行
的，它不让进 
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brands of Chinese Rice Wine, or Baijiu, and Chinese produced red wines, were being 
sold. Although the exact percentage of Hui restaurants selling alcohol across Beijing 
was not documented during the initial phase of participant observation (an unfortunate 
shortcoming of the initial fieldwork), field-notes and reflective memos from the later 
phases of participant observation shed some light onto the prevalence of alcohol in such 
eateries from late 2015. Following the initial stages of fieldwork, it became evident that 
alcohol was being sold in more Qingzhen restaurants than suggested by preliminary 
research or early informants. As such, I began documenting the number of restaurants 
that sold alcohol.  
Of the 20 establishments initially shortlisted for possible further participation across 
five districts, one half sold alcohol. Of the final four restaurants recruited for in-depth 
participant observation from January 2016, one sold alcohol. During the second fieldtrip 
between June and August 2017, 34 interviewees were recruited from 26 establishments, 
including 21 restaurants, two butcher shops, and three bakeries. Seven of these 
establishments had previously been visited, while the remainder were randomly 
selected. Of these 21 restaurants, 16 sold alcohol, meaning that it was available in more 
than two-thirds of visited restaurants. This increased visibility of alcohol in Hui 
restaurants, along with interviewee accounts of the rising prevalence of alcohol among 
Hui eateries, was a key driving factor necessitating the third follow-up research trip in 
January 2019. The main focus of this fieldtrip (as was discussed in Chapter 3) was to 
follow-up on earlier research leads and to explore the validity of the thesis’ proposed 
arguments. During the 17-day long trip, 62 restaurants were visited. Of these, alcohol 
was being sold in 49, or about four-fifths of them. Although these figures cannot be 
considered to be wholly representative of the wider situation in Beijing, they do 
nonetheless support the claims being made by this project’s participants. That is to say, 
that alcohol is becoming ever more present in Hui restaurants and eateries, signalling a 
major shift in the moral and ethical practices of those involved in public performances 
of Hui food cultures.  
Tracking and documenting the increased presence of alcohol in Hui restaurants across 
Beijing was complicated by the ever-changing urban landscape of the city. Initially, I 
had hoped to (re)visit the same restaurants during each of my fieldtrips so that temporal 
variances could be recorded. However, this proved impossible as upon returning, I 
discovered that many of the previously visited establishments had since been closed 
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down, moved, or in some cases, that entire buildings had been demolished (see Figure 
7.9). Among the establishments to have closed down was one of the key participating 
restaurants. This restaurant was owned and managed by a Xinjiang-born Hui woman 
who took great pride in its modern approach to Xinjiang-Hui cuisine and its popularity 
among a younger clientele, including numerous Chinese television stars. Upon 
discovering the closure of the restaurant in July 2017, I contacted the owner who 
explained that she had to shut down her two restaurants due to her inability to secure 
newly required business permits, and also as a result of the restaurants’ financial 
difficulties in a precarious market. Rather than being unique, according to this 
informant, the economic difficulties faced by her restaurants were general. She went on 
to explain that Beijing’s market was becoming increasingly difficult for Qingzhen 
restaurants to survive in. In addition to naming factors such as a diversified range of 
food choices available to customers and the local authority’s shifting legal 
requirements, she placed particular emphasis on one other aspect: that modern Han 
people wanted to drink alcohol with their meals. Although hopeful that she would soon 
re-open her restaurants, she defiantly insisted that she would not sell alcohol, as to do so 
would not be Qingzhen.  
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Figure 7.9: Demolished Restaurants in former ethnic enclave. 
Source: Author’s own (2019). 
In many areas or neighbourhoods where Hui restaurants had been shut down, new 
Qingzhen eateries often replaced them, either in the same business units or in a nearby 
location. Some of these new establishments served similar foods to the previous ones, 
were often decorated in a similar fashion, were sometimes staffed by the same people, 
and targeted the same local communities. However, there was one noticeable difference 
in the majority of cases: the new restaurants usually sold alcohol. Very often these new, 
alcohol-friendly restaurants would be replacing ones that had previously refused to sell 
alcohol, which resulted in an increase in the number of restaurants selling alcohol in 
several of this project’s key research areas. This increase was also the result of changing 
practices within restaurants that had previously refused to sell alcohol, but which over 
time, began to sell it. Figure 7.10 shows the increased percentage of restaurants serving 
alcohol in three select research areas between 2017 and 2019.  
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Area 2017 2019 
Niujie (& surrounding 
area) 
3/6 Restaurants - 50% 5/7 Restaurants – 71% 
Chaoying (& surrounding 
area) 
8/10 Restaurants -80 % 10/11 Restaurants – 91% 
Houhai Lake (& 
surrounding area) 
2/4 Restaurants - 50% 5/6 Restaurants – 83% 
Figure 7.10: Increase in alcohol vendors in chosen neighbourhoods. 
Source: Author’s own (2019). 
Although one of the key participating restaurants had shut down, the other three 
remained open as of January 2019 with some changes occurring in relation to their 
approaches to alcohol. As was mentioned above, only one out of these four had been 
selling alcohol as of late 2015 and it continued to do so in early 2019. In fact, the 
manager of this restaurant explained that many patrons visited her business purely to 
purchase their specialty Ningxia-produced wine. The second restaurant, a fast-food style 
chain restaurant, did not serve alcohol at any time of the research. The manager, who 
was firmly opposed to the consumption of alcohol on religious and moral grounds, 
acknowledged the changing attitudes of both Han and Hui people towards alcohol and 
the increasing trend of drinking alcohol with meals in Beijing. Yet, he remained 
steadfast in his view that his restaurant would not bend to such a trend, claiming that it 
would not be necessary as his restaurant served fast-food, and as such, people didn’t 
have the same desire to consume alcohol as they would in another type of restaurant 
where meals generally take more time. The final restaurant to have consented to 
participating in the project (but which never allowed me frequent visits) explicitly 
changed their stance on selling alcohol between the initial fieldtrip in 2015/16 and 2019. 
Initially opposed to the selling of alcohol based on the belief that alcohol consumption 
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was not Qingzhen, this restaurant had begun selling Chinese beers such as Tsingdao and 
Yanjing by July 2017.  
This shift in food cultural practices was repeatedly spoken about by interviewees and 
participants. One female manager of a small Gansu restaurant, who did not sell alcohol, 
emphasised the commonality of selling alcohol among Hui restaurants in August 2017: 
“But nowadays, many Qingzhen restaurants have alcohol, most of them have. Very few 
of these restaurants don’t have alcohol and tobacco. It’s really common now.”239 The 
pervasiveness of alcohol in Qingzhen restaurants was elaborated on by another male 
interviewee who said “Because a Qingzhen restaurant does not sell wine, you will find 
that there’s very little Qingzhen in Beijing. Because you see this Qingzhen shop, if it 
doesn’t sell [alcohol], it is true Qingzhen.”240 Another interviewee, a male middle-aged 
manager of a busy restaurant in a popular tourist area, emphasised the widespread 
presence of alcohol in these establishments by claiming that he only knew of one 
restaurant in China that didn’t sell alcohol, before erupting into laughter: “So far, it 
seems that in China, if you say that Qingzhen restaurants don’t sell alcohol, I have only 
heard of one [like that] in China.”241 
This increasingly popular trend among Beijing restaurants has a distinctly geographical 
element as the shift from alcohol-free spaces to selling alcohol has not only changed 
over time, but also differs from place to place. All participants from areas other than 
Beijing, who mentioned the commonality of alcohol in Beijing, also discussed 
differences between their hometowns and the Chinese capital. These participants – from 
Shandong, Gansu, Ningxia, Shaanxi, Anhui and Heilongjiang – all pointed out that 
although alcohol consumption was a common practice among Hui in Beijing, it was not 
found in their home areas. When interviewing two waitresses in a predominantly Hui 
ethnic neighbourhood, one told me that “people in my hometown don’t drink [alcohol], 
but Beijing Hui all drink alcohol.”242 These geographical variances are the result of a 
more complex set of conditions than a merely spatial differentiation. Rather, the specific 
ethnic compositions of these places are at the forefront of these differences, as are the 
 
239但是现在很多清真餐馆都会有酒，大多数都会有，很少很少一部分是没有烟酒的这个餐厅。这
是已经很典型的一个状态了。 
240因为清真是不卖酒，你在北京能发现真正的清真非常少，因为你看到这个清真的店，如果说不
卖酒它就是真正的清真。 
241到目前为止，好像在中国来说，你要是说不卖酒的清真餐厅，我好像只听说过有一家，在中
国。 
242我那边回民是不喝的，北京的回民都喝酒。 
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exchanges occurring between the Hui and non-Hui, particularly the Han. One 30-
something year old waitress in Fengtai District summed this point up when she 
explained, “Some of these things [consumption practices] are sub-regional […] In some 
places where the Hui are more concentrated, they will not [drink alcohol] […] Where 
the Muslims are not so concentrated, or those who are working away from home, or 
something like that. How do you say, it is understandable.”243 
The growing presence of alcohol in Beijing’s Hui restaurants is telling of a shifting 
approach towards alcohol among these gatekeepers of Hui food culture. This change, as 
was discussed earlier, is the result of two simultaneous processes of assimilation: 
assimilation through economic necessity; and assimilation through discursive practices 
of modernity. Discourses of modernity were used less often than economic necessity by 
participants when explaining their views of alcohol’s role in contemporary Hui food 
cultures. However, informants’ aspirations of modernity were used as justification for 
alcohol consumption by the three male participants that admitted to drinking it, and also 
by some of the younger participants who could understand why another Hui person 
might drink it. While chatting with three chefs during their lunch break in February 
2016, two of these men explained that they occasionally drink beer while living in 
Beijing because that’s what young people do in China nowadays. The more senior of 
the group went on to say that most young Hui people drink now because the Hui are no 
longer a “feudal”244 group.245 When the third member of the group jokingly asked then 
if these two men would be drinking in a few days when they returned home to Gansu 
Province for Chinese New Year, both laughed at this seemingly outrageous suggestion.  
Views of alcohol consumption as being a modern practice carried out by young people 
were echoed by several other participants. Such claims of modernity in relation to their 
choice to consume alcohol, positions these Hui individuals in an interesting position in 
relation to the Government’s policies and narratives of modernity and development. In 
accordance with the communist state’s development strategies and notions of 
assimilation, or Ronghe (as discussed in Chapter 4), the Hui are often seen as being less 
socially developed and more feudal than the Han majority. As the Hui minority develop 
 
243这个东西也有一些是分区域性的[。。。] 就是清真回族比较集中的一些地方啊，他们就不会。
我们回族不怎么集中的那些地方啊，或者说你像就像他们在外边什么业务啊，或者有什么他们是, 
也是有的时候也是，怎么说呢，你说情有可原吧。 
244封建。 
245Taken from field-notes dated 3 February 2016. Notes were written primarily in English with some 
Chinese characters.  
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overtime, it is believed that they will eventually assimilate into the Han and ethnic 
distinctions will become irrelevant. The role of the Chinese State in this development 
model is to act as the purveyors of modernisation, guiding the primitive minorities into 
civilisation (Zang, 2015). These performances of “modernised”246 Hui food cultures are 
telling examples of how the Hui have internalised assimilation policies through their 
associated discourses of modernity. Similar to the participants in Gillette’s (2000) study 
of consumption practices among a Hui neighbourhood in Xi’an, these Beijing Hui are 
using alcohol consumption as a mechanism for manipulating notions of social 
development while placing themselves strategically in relation to the evolutionary 
ideology of the Chinese State.  
The second assimilative force driving this change in approaches to alcohol is economic 
necessity in a Han-dominated society. Although Qingzhen restaurants make food 
directed at the dietary needs of the Hui minority, restaurants in Beijing generally serve 
more Han customers daily than Hui according to all of the project’s participants with 
the exception of those in Niujie and Changying neighbourhoods. Similar to the need for 
making Qingzhen versions of local Han dishes, many restaurant employees and 
managers explained that they had to sell alcohol in order to survive in Beijing’s 
economically challenging business environment. In August 2017, I visited a small, 
cheap restaurant on a quiet backstreet in a residential area of what was formally a Hui 
ethnic enclave – a restaurant that has since been demolished, along with its 
neighbouring Hui businesses. The male manager of this restaurant spoke openly with 
me about the financial difficulties he faced trying to operate a Qingzhen restaurant in a 
neighbourhood that was increasingly becoming Han. He explained that in order to 
survive, the restaurant had to sell alcohol: “We are pure Hui people, but in order to 
make a living, there is no way to survive in Beijing if you don’t sell alcohol. You can’t 
do it. It is said that it is difficult to survive.”247 His need to sell alcohol in order to 
satisfy his customers’ demands and survive economically placed this interviewee in a 
peculiar position in relation to how he understands his restaurant’s qualifying as 
Qingzhen: “In real life[Han society] it can be called a Qingzhen restaurant, but it is not 
acceptable in the teachings of the Hui people, because this restaurant has violated the 
 
246现代化。 
247因为我们是那个纯粹型的回族，但是为了生活，没办法，在这北京生存，不卖酒的话是不行
的。就说是，很难生存的。 
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rules of Islam and cannot be called a Qingzhen restaurant.”248 By breaking the alcohol 
taboo, this man believed that his restaurant failed to meet the criteria for qualifying as 
Qingzhen, and this was physically manifested and visible in how the restaurant was 
decorated. Specifically, the Arabic signs, Qingzhen artwork and other Islamic artworks 
were not present in his restaurant (except for the small Qingzhen sign hung above the 
door), a decision that he consciously made as he believed his restaurant was not worthy: 
“There is no typical decorations […] Because of alcohol, we can’t have some things.”249 
Despite expressing remorse over his choice to sell alcohol, and his subsequent belief 
that the restaurant wasn’t fully Qingzhen as a result, this interviewee explained how he 
navigated the morally precarious situation of operating a Qingzhen restaurant that sells 
alcohol through adhering to the other rules of Qingzhen. Specifically, he justified 
hanging the Qingzhen sign above the door by explaining that “this it’s okay. Because 
our ingredients are all Qingzhen, except for alcohol, everything else is legal in Islam.”250 
Accounts like this interviewee’s were not unique, with multiple participants describing 
a similar situation in their place of work, which filled many of them with a sense of 
regret at having to act in a way that they consider morally and religiously corrupt. 
Several interviewees expressed the conflict that they faced at being forced to sell 
alcohol to patrons; something which they believed was non-Qingzhen. Often, 
participants would tell me that although they firmly believed that no Hui should drink, 
but that it was ultimately a personal choice to be made by the individual. Two young 
waitresses from Xinjiang Province, working in a restaurant that sells beer in a Hui 
neighbourhood, explained that although their jobs involved selling alcohol, they also 
had a moral obligation to try and stop customers from drinking which positions them in 
a contradictory and difficult way. One of them explained that if “you have violated this 
[alcohol taboo], you will definitely be punished. But as a normal person, we are also 
obliged to stop them. If they can’t be stopped, then we can’t do anything about it.”251  
The economic strain faced by Qingzhen restaurants in Beijing’s Han-dominated society 
is causing Hui individuals to reassess and redraw their lines of moral and religious 
acceptability by forcing them to sell alcohol despite their personal objections. Such 
 
248在这个现实生活来说是可以称为清真餐厅的，但在回族的教义来说是不可以的，因为这个餐厅
已经违反了伊斯兰教的教规，是不可以称为清真餐厅的 
249装修也就没有什么典型的[。。。]因为在饮酒这方面，我们是不能有的一些东西。 
250这个可以。因为我们的食材全是清真的，除了酒这一样，其他的全是伊斯兰教合法的东西。
251你违反了这个，你肯定会受到惩罚的。但是作为一个平常人的话，我们也是可以有权利有义务
去责令制止他，去制止他，如果制止不了的话，那我们也已经无能为力了。 
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practices are deeply troublesome for some participants who express great sorrow and 
regret at having to engage in the distribution of alcohol. The reluctant selling of alcohol 
stemming from economic necessity is a performance of forced assimilation, 
demonstrating the lived effects that an increasingly mono-culturalist and Han-centric 
society in Beijing is having on its ethnic minorities. Further, the increasing demand 
being placed on Hui eateries to sell alcohol shows the economic strains being placed on 
these establishments by Beijing’s competitive and capitalistic marketplace.  
7.3  PERFORMING GENDER. 
The final performances of food cultures that this chapter discusses are those 
appertaining to gender and gender roles among the Hui in Beijing. The decision to 
discuss this topic last should not be viewed as representative of its possible 
insignificance in comparison to the other performances, or of it holding lesser 
importance or relevance to the thesis’ arguments. In fact, the opposite may be said. 
Structurally, this thematic grouping of performances is placed at the end of this chapter, 
and indeed empirical contents of the whole thesis, as the topic of gender is one that 
applies to all of the arguments being made throughout. In addition to often being 
directly named by participants – be it through discussions of gender roles, gendered 
differences, or the place/belonging of genders – the topic of gender also ran through 
participants’ discussions of other issues.  
 
Drawing from the field of feminist geography and the work of geographers interested in 
gender studies, this section explores performances of gender through Hui food cultures 
in Beijing, the place-specific implications and influences of such performances, and the 
intersections of gender with other social relations, specifically inter-ethnic relations. 
This exploration of food performances is guided by several theoretical understandings 
about the nature of gender, and indeed geography. Firstly, gender relations vary both 
spatially and temporally, and distinctive gender roles may exist within groups that may 
seem to be culturally homogenous (Massey, 1994: 178). As such, it should not be 
assumed that all Hui in Beijing experience, understand and perform gender in the same 
ways, a point that is highlighted if the concept of intersectionality is taken into account. 
According to Crenshaw (1989: 139), intersectionality is “the multidimensionality of 
marginalized subjects’ lived experience”, whereby individuals are often simultaneously 
impacted by multiple bases of identity (Chapter 2). As was discussed throughout the 
thesis, Beijing’s Hui population varies significantly in terms of migratory status and 
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place of origin. These two factors influence individuals’ performances, experiences and 
conceptualisations of gender and gender roles, as do the issues of age, religion, place of 
residence/work within Beijing (i.e., ethnic enclave or Han-dominated neighbourhood), 
marital and familial status, and occupation, to name but a few.  
 
Further, if we are to understand that identity is performative (Butler, 1990; Goffman: 
1956) and that it is an articulation of social relations which are themselves 
geographically varied, then we must also concede that these geographical variances 
must be acknowledged when making claims of how gender relates to social relations 
and processes. Put another way, although gender may be affected by, and be reflective 
of, a particular set of social relations in one place, that does not mean that it will be 
shaped in the same way by those social relations elsewhere, as these social relations 
vary geographically. In the case of the Hui in Beijing, their performances of gender are, 
as this chapter argues, heavily impacted by inter-ethnic relations, specifically with the 
Han majority. However, these inter-ethnic relations vary from place to place, meaning 
that gender performances of Hui elsewhere in China, or indeed in other parts of Beijing 
not visited during this research, may very well differ, as was suggested by the claims of 
many of this project’s participants.  
 
Gender and power reinforce each other in many ways, often limiting women’s mobility. 
As Massey (1994b: 180) writes, “in general terms what is clear is that spatial control, 
whether enforced through the power of convention or symbolism, or through the 
straight-forward threat of violence, can be a fundamental element in the constitution of 
gender in its (highly varied) forms”. Within the West, this spatial control traditionally 
worked to confine women to the domestic sphere, which was differentiated from the 
public, masculine sphere. Much of the early work on gender and geography was about 
the circumstances of women in the Euro-American world although there were early 
collections on gender and the spaces of colonialism (Blunt and Rose, 1994). Since this 
early work, here has been extensive work in may contexts and there have also been 
global overviews of the resulting literature (Garcia Roman and Monk, 2007; Oberhauser 
et al., 2017).  
Explications of the gendered distinction of domestic and public sphere based upon 
Western experience do not necessarily apply to China, perhaps particularly during the 
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socialist period when the CCP promoted collective labour while de-emphasising gender 
differences. There is some evidence that gender disparities have widened with the re-
establishment of freer market relations (Fincher, 2016). Post-socialist China has seen 
the development of several distinct gender and family regimes varying with socio-
economic contexts (Hu and Scott, 2016; Yingchun and Xiaogang, 2018). As Sean H. 
Wang (2019: 145) briefly writes in his review of recent work on gender in China (a 
topic that is too rarely critically researched within Western academia), in post-socialist 
times there is currently a “rise of hyper-heteronormativity, informed by traditional 
gender roles and enforced by the state” as “public expressions of gender and sexuality 
are vigorously policed” in China today. Given this shift of attitude of the Chinese State 
towards gender and as enforced by its actions and policies, the topic is becoming 
increasingly contested and overtly political among the Hui. As Chapter 5.1.b discussed, 
many Hui women now actively engage in the workforce, a change that is viewed as 
positive by some women who claim that it has granted them enhanced independence, 
yet is condemned by other people (often men) who see it as a violation of traditional 
roles and family structure. As one Qinghai-native woman explained of Hui people back 
home in Northwest China, “their thinking is that women stay at home, married, bringing 
up the children, cooking, and not working. Men make money outside and also spend it 
on their families,”252 a common story that was re-told time and again, especially by 
participants from outside of Beijing. 
Finally, in her chapter “A Woman’s Place?”, Linda McDowell (1994: 192) writes that: 
“capitalism presented patriarchy with different challenges in different parts of 
the country. The question was in what ways the terms of male dominance would 
be reformulated within these changed conditions. Further, this process of 
accommodation between capitalism and patriarchy produced a different 
synthesis of the two in different places. It was a synthesis which was clearly 
visible in the nature of gender relations, and in the lives of women”.  
Despite writing about capitalism and its relationship to gender in the United Kingdom, I 
find that McDowell’s statement can be applied to a number of different contexts and 
social processes. We might, for example, ask how minoritisation presents patriarchy 
among the Hui with a distinct set of challenges in Han-dominated Beijing and 
 
252 他们的这个思想嘛，女的就是在家，结完婚，带孩子，做饭，不工作。男的在外面赚钱，也都
在家花。 
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reformulates male dominance in ways that are shaped by the specificities of this place. 
Gender relations among the Hui of Beijing are framed by this distinct synthesis of 
minoritisation and patriarchy. The synthesis comes out differently in different places. 
This section argues that minoritisation is an inherently gendered and place-specific 
process. These place-specific syntheses are performed through Hui food cultures and are 
visibly evident in the spatial demarcation and uses of places of Hui food culture across 
Beijing City. In sum, the three related themes of Feminist Political Geography that have 
run through this thesis come together here. First, the public/private binary with respect 
to space is unstable. Second, gender and sexuality are implicated in geopolitical 
relations at the broadest scale even while they are themselves formed under the pressure 
of geopolitical imperatives. The geopolitical is personal and the person is geopolitical. 
In this regard, bodies (Mountz, 2018) and their capacities (suggestively termed 
geocapabilities by Solem et al., 2013) are central to a Feminist Political Geography and 
it is to them that I now turn. 
7.3.a  Butchery and Hand-Pulling Noodles. 
Although these two performances of Hui food culture – butchery and hand-pulling 
noodles – were discussed in earlier sections, they have been returned to here as they are 
inextricably and inescapably shaped by discourses of gender. In section 7.1.b.i it was 
argued that the origin of Qingzhen meat was of upmost importance for many Hui 
eateries and individuals across Beijing, allowing vendors to make claims of superiority, 
while linking the popular meats produced to localised and place-specific understandings 
of belonging and authenticity. In section 7.1.a.i, it was shown that Lanzhou Hand-Pulled 
Noodles are closely associated with the Hui, portrayed as being the group’s signature 
dish by state media and resulting in it being among the most popular Hui dishes 
consumed in Beijing. Although both performances of Hui food culture differ in terms of 
food produced and skills required to do so, they do have some common features. Firstly, 
both produce food commodities that are highly popular and highly valued among Hui 
participants, and also by Han consumers. Secondly, both are closely tied to popular 
narratives of Hui identity, Hui food cultures and Qingzhen, viewed by most non-Hui as 
being representative and stereotypical of the group and their shared food cultures. 
Thirdly, meat and hand-pulled noodles, given their popularity, common representations 
as the Hui’s signature food commodities, and their ties to places, are bound up within 
discourses of authenticity. Fourthly, both involve a high level of skill and are labour-
intensive. Lastly, given their links to authenticity, their high public visibility and 
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popularity, their famed and valued status, the high-level of skill involved, and their 
importance to narratives of Hui identity, it is significant that the performances of 
butchery and hand-pulling noodles are considered to be men’s work. The gendering of 
these skilled and valued forms of labour as masculine is similar to way that certain 
forms of labour in the UK were considered to be men’s work due to their skilled nature, 
as is shown in the work of Linda McDowell (1994).   
 
“I knew from a young age that the chickens were slaughtered in the house, and the 
sheep were grandpa’s, later they were dad’s, and then husband’s. This is the feeling that 
women do not slaughter, and women cannot slaughter. It’s not Qingzhen.”253 This was 
the answer given to me during an interview with an elderly female business owner in 
August 2017 when asked “Why is it only men that slaughter the animals?”254 We later 
went on to discuss the preparation of meat for consumption and sale and she informed 
me that this also was a man’s job, and that is why she only buys meat from male 
butchers. This belief in butchery, both the slaughtering of animals and preparation of 
meat, as being a man’s role was shared by most participants of this research project, 
with the exception of three individuals (two of whom were female butchers and the 
third person was the husband of one of those women. It should also be noted that neither 
of the female butchers slaughtered animals). Although some answers did vary when 
individuals were asked why butchery was a man’s job and not suitable for women, by 
far the most common responses were that “it’s not Qingzhen”255 and “It is men’s 
work.”256 
 
The insistence of participants that butchery is the work of men as it is not Qingzhen for 
women to do so, illuminates an interesting aspect of the gendered power dimensions of 
Qingzhen. Whereby women are not only made subordinate to men through their 
exclusion from the highly valuable and culturally important role of butchery (as it is 
perceived to be masculine), but their subordination to men is also exacerbated by the 
heightened status given to men. The participation of women in butchery is seen as 
tainting the meat, with women themselves apprehended as a pollutant. In Beijing’s Hui 
communities, men are entrusted within the socio-cultural and religious norms of 
 
253从小就知道，家里面宰鸡，羊都是爷爷，后来就是爸爸，然后就是老公了。这是女人都是不去
宰，女人宰的不能吃，这种感觉。 
254为什么只有男人们才可以做聚义？ 
255不是清镇的。 
256这是男人的工作。 
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Qingzhen to prepare the most sensitive, profitable and publicly visible of Qingzhen 
commodities, meat. By making men the sole purveyors of Qingzhen meat, Hui 
traditions and norms are establishing men as the gatekeepers and preservers of authentic 
Qingzhen within public places of Hui food culture in Beijing. This role is significant 
given the strong links between Qingzhen, Hui food cultures, and Hui identity for Beijing 
Hui as discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
Similarly, women are also excluded from making the Hui’s signature dish, Hand-Pulled 
Noodles. However, rather than being excluded due to their inability to produce 
Qingzhen produce, they are considered too weak for the task: 
Interviewer: “Is there any dish that men make better than women?”257 
Interviewee: “Hand-Pulled Noodles. Women can’t make them. And Stir-fry 
dishes and rice.”258 
Interviewer: “Why do men make Hand-Pulled Noodles better than women?”259 
Interviewee: “Because this is what men do, women can’t […] [men have] More 
power.”260 
 
This young male chef’s opinion that women can’t make Hand-Pulled Noodles was 
shared by the staff of all other Hand-Pulled Noodle restaurants visited, both male and 
female. Within these restaurants, the role of chef was solely given to male employees, 
while women acted as waitresses and cleaners, a trend that continuously reappeared in 
almost every restaurant visited (and which will be discussed in section 7.3.c). As the 
manager of one Hand-Pulled Noodle restaurant explained to me, “look here, this [needs] 
much strong [strength]. Woman cannot do. Only men.”261 The chef in one of these 
establishments did concede that he had previously seen a woman pulling noodles by 
hand, but he dismissed her efforts as “not tasty.”262 The belief that men were better able 
physically to pull noodles by hand than women reinforces traditional, divisive and 
binary forms of thinking about gender, whereby women are weak, and indeed unskilled, 
in comparison to their strong and skilled male counterparts. This point is similar to 
McDowells (1994: 195) discussion of the textile industry in the United Kingdom during 
 
257有没有哪些菜男人做的比女人更好？ 
258面啊，女人就做不了。还有炒菜啊，米饭啊。 
259为什么男人做拉面比女人做得更好。 
260因为这就是男人做的活，女人做不了[。。。] 多的力量。 
261Taken from fieldnotes. Written in English.  
262不好吃。 
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the nineteenth century, whereby certain work is considered “heavy”, and as such skilled, 
therefore making it necessary for men to complete. This point is made all the more 
salient by the conversation above with the young male chef where he even states that 
men are also better at stir-fried dishes and rice – two cornerstones of Chinese cooking.  
 
Yet, when discussing gender roles in the domestic-private sphere of home and 
hometowns, interviewees and participants continually referred to their mother’s home-
cooked dishes and the role of women in preparing food in those places. The important 
role of women in performing and producing food cultures within the private sphere was 
particularly pointed throughout the interviews conducted in 2017 when interviewees 
would most commonly name their mothers’ or grandmothers’ home-cooked dishes as 
their favourite foods, explain how they learnt to cook from their mothers, or in many 
cases, especially for those interviewees from Northwest China, state that it was only 
women who cooked at home. As the male manager of a small Gansu restaurant in 
Chaoyang District explained, “Like us in Gansu […] Generally women do it [cooking], 
men don’t. Like me, I can’t even cook. I’m in my twenties, I can’t cook. Usually 
women do it.”263 
 
Given that cooking is considered women’s work in the private sphere, yet men’s work 
in the public sphere in Beijing, a question arises as to why the role seems to have 
switched from a feminine one to a masculine one. Once again, the work of geographers 
working within the field of gender studies is helpful in understanding this spatial 
differentiation between the presumed femininity of cooking in one place, yet the 
masculinity of it in another. Hopkins and Gorman-Murray (2019: 302) state, “it is 
important to explore how certain ‘ways of being a man’ challenge – or not – dominant 
understandings of masculinities”. Building on this, I contend that this change in gender 
roles is an example of the synthesis of minoritisation and patriarchy discussed earlier, 
and as influenced by McDowell’s (1994) contribution: whereby minoritisation 
presented patriarchy with specific challenges which caused male dominance to be 
reconfigured as the two issues were synthesised in place. As such, this section argues 
that these roles were reformulated and re-gendered to support Hui patriarchy within 
Han-dominated Beijing. By positioning men as the only gender capable of producing 
profitable Qingzhen produce through highly skilled and labour-intensive means in the 
 
263像我们甘肃的话[。。。] 一般都是女士做，男的没有做。像我就是做饭都不会，二十多岁了，
做饭都不会，一般都是女士来做。 
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competitive Beijing market, female subordination was being reconfigured and 
reinforced. Within Beijing’s public spaces of Hui food culture, men are the only ones 
capable of authentically performing and producing Hui food cultures and dishes through 
their superior strength and skill, while the subordination of women continues in new 
manifestations.  
7.3.b  Youxiang. 
“Because this is not something that you can make casually in Islam. That’s what 
makes this thing special and very particular. To make Youxiang, it must be 
[made by] a woman, it must be. […] Just to make it very clear. It must be very 
clean. You can’t be sick, there are many rules, and then you can make it. And 
there must be important things happening, happy events and funerals before you 
can make it, which is very important. The most important thing is to share it, and 
to share the making of it. […] For example, if someone in your family is sick 
and hospitalised, and then they recover, then you can make Youxiang after it is 
done, but you have to share it with everyone. […] You can’t hold [a whole] one 
to eat, because it is round. You have to split it and share the other half. The main 
thing is sharing.”264  
 
The above quote was taken from an interview with a young, Shandon born, female 
waitress in central Beijing and it captures many of the main aspects of the highly 
significant food, Youxiang. Youxiang, which literally translates into “oil fragrance” in 
English, is a round deep-fried pastry (Figure 7.11) which holds tremendous socio-
cultural and religious importance and symbolism for Hui communities across China. 
During the 30 interviewees conducted in summer 2017 with 34 Hui interviewees across 
Beijing, each individual was asked to name the dish that they believed to be the most 
important to Hui food cultures. Of the 34 responses to the question, 20 people named 
Youxiang as either the most important food, or as one of the most important ones, with 
other dishes such as Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Noodles, 8 Treasure Tea, and various meat 
and wheaten dishes also being chosen. Even the 14 interviewees who did not initially 
 
264因为这个在我们伊斯兰教不可以随便做的，就是做这个东西特别的有讲究，非常有讲究，做油
香，必须是妇女，必须要，[。。。] 就是要弄得非常干净。要干干净净的，然后不可以没有感冒
的，然后很多很多要求，然后你才可以去做。而且必须有重大的事情，喜事丧事，才可以做，就
是非常重要的事。还有一个最重要就是，这个东西要拿出去分享的，做这个东西要拿出去分享 
[。。。]比如说他们家有个人生病了住院了，然后好了以后，然后你就可以做油香，做好了以后
吧，但是你要拿出去给大家分享[。。。]你不可以抱着一个吃，因为它是圆的嘛。你必须把它分
开，送出一半才可以吃另一半。就是，最主要的就是分享。 
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identify Youxiang as the most important dish, later agreed that it was important to Hui 
culture when asked directly about it. “I think the most distinctive thing is Youxiang […] 
it is a kind of deep-fried pastry […] it is made at every festival,”265 “Youxiang, yes, this 
is the most important. The Hui’s Youxiang,”266 and “I think Youxiang is the iconic food 
for Hui people.”267 These quotes are representative of the 20 answers given by 
interviewees in which Youxiang was named as the most important dish to Hui food 
culture.  
 
Figure 7.11: Youxiang. 
Source: Author’s own (2015). 
When asked why Youxiang is such a significant dish to the Hui, participants’ answers 
could generally be classified into three inter-linked themes: its importance to religious 
 
265我感觉最有特色的应该就是油香[。。。] 就是一种油炸的面食 [。。。] 每个节日都会做那个。 
266油香，对，这最重要的。回族的油香。 
267油香我觉得对回民是一个标志性的食物。 
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festivals and important social and life cycle events; its emotive ties to “home”; and its 
role in fostering a sense of community among the Hui. The religious festivals and life 
cycle events listed included Ramadan, Eid al-Adha, births, deaths and funerals, 
weddings, or visits from special guests, imams, the elderly or relatives. Due to the 
important role that Youxiang  plays in the celebration of these festivals and important 
events, all of which usually (or at least traditionally) involve spending time with one’s 
family, it is unsurprising that so many interviewees felt that the fried pastry reminded 
them of home while living in Beijing. These links to home and family are made 
evermore apparent if the way that Youxiang is made and consumed is taken into 
account. According to interviewees, and indeed other participants in the project, 
Youxiang must be both made and consumed through shared effort. When making 
Youxiang, it is customary for the women of the family to gather together to make the 
pastry as a group, and in some cases, they are accompanied by female neighbours. The 
finished product, as the informant quoted at the start of the sub-section explained, must 
be shared with other people as it is extremely rude, and not Qingzhen, to eat one by 
oneself. This need for sharing Youxiang is more than simply a traditional custom. 
Rather, it is due to Islamic teachings and practices. As one male supervisor explained, 
“This is in religion, because in religion there are our former saints and prophets. This is 
done in memory of the saints who have passed away. Its main importance is to give 
alms to the poor and to do good. These things will be given to the poor after they are 
made.”268   
 
By coming together to make Youxiang, and indeed by sharing the finished product, 
many interviewees noted that the food built community. As one Ningxia-born female 
supervisor noted when asked about the importance of sharing Youxiang, “so it plays a 
role, a cohesive role, right? Very cohesive.”269  This “cohesive” role is often challenged 
by the ethnic demographics of Beijing City, with two waitresses informing me 
sorrowfully that due to the small number of Hui in their area of Beijing, they could not 
share Youxiang with others at Ramadan. However, they went on to explain that they still 
made the pastry with their colleagues and that they shared it together. Although unable 
to deliver Youxiang to other Hui people due to there being so few in some areas of 
Beijing, these waitresses continue to engage in the performance of Youxiang and in the 
 
268这是宗教里边的，因为宗教里边会有我们以前的圣人先知。纪念逝去的圣人先知会做这个，它
的主要意义在于施舍穷人，施善，这些东西做出来之后会给穷人送去一部分。 
269所以它起着一种，有点凝聚力的作用，是吧。凝聚力很大的。 
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interactive and community-building aspects of the food by sharing it with their 
colleagues.  
 
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of Youxiang, at least from the perspective of this 
research project, is that “generally women make it at home.”270 All interviewees that 
discussed the pastry agreed that it is made by “women in every family.”271 Most stated 
that it could only be made by women, while three interviewees argued that men could 
also make it. Although claiming that men could make it, these three interviewees 
admitted that in their families only women make it and that “women make it more 
fragrant.”272 The ability of women to make it more “fragrant” was elaborated on by one 
young male supervisor who explained that “men are not so attentive, women are more 
attentive, so it is more fragrant, tastes better. It is better,”273 using a binary 
understanding of male-female difference. Given the subordination of women to men 
evident in the performances of Hui food cultures in Beijing, and as discussed in section 
7.3.a, it is perhaps surprising then that the making of the group’s most important food 
product be left to women when all other foods are seemingly better made by men. 
However, the reason for this is evident if we look back at the statement at the head of 
this paragraph: “generally women make it at home”. What’s interesting here is not just 
who makes it, but rather, the place where it is made – “at home”. The narrative that 
women make better Youxiang is allowed to continue because it is a food that is made 
within the private sphere of home, rather than in the masculine public sphere. As one 
north-western middle-aged woman explained, within Hui homes (especially those of 
north-western Hui), women are inferior to men: “Qinghai men do not cook. There is no 
seat at the table for women, and she sits behind to eat, on a stool”274 and “there is still a 
patriarchal ideology.”275 
To some extent, I am generalising here from what men and women in the restaurants 
told me about their domestic circumstances and we must be careful not to read evidence 
of women’s lack of agency either from Western presumptions of the limited autonomy 
of Chinese women, or from testimony that describes the external appearances of 
 
270一般都是家里的妇女来做。 
271每个家庭的妇女。 
272女人做得更香吧。 
273男士没有那么细心吧，女士比较细心，所以说比较香，味道也好，比较好一些。 
274青海男的不做饭。女的桌子上面没座位，坐后面去吃饭，那个凳子。 
275男尊女卑思想有还是。 
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practices, but not their contestability. Nor, as Mahmood (2005) cautions, should we 
assume that female autonomy everywhere takes a Western liberal form. For example, 
within Hui culture in central China there is a strong tradition of women-only, female-led 
mosques that bespeak a qualified but still effective autonomy for women (Jaschok, 
2018). It is also clear that some seeming markers of subordinate status can be subverted, 
as where Hui women express their modernity by adopting fashionable Arab headscarves 
and in this manner display their Muslim identity (Gillette, 2005). As Ga (2017: 747–8) 
remarks in a study of headscarves in the context of rural Hui people in China, 
‘[s]ignifiers […] do not simply point to their signified when they travel transnationally,’ 
and in the case of rural women Ha studied, their headcovering, the maozi, was 
configured as mark of rural backwardness only after neoliberal reforms broke the 
socialist solidarity of urban and rural Muslim women. 
There are at least two arguments to be made here in regard to the power dimensions of 
gender as performed through Youxiang and the synthesis of minoritisation and 
patriarchy. Firstly, women continue to be responsible for producing food within the 
private sphere of home as it acts to reinforce and strengthen Hui masculinities and Hui 
patriarchal family structures, while further diminishing the agency of women through 
assigning them to subservient roles. Secondly, and at the same time, women are 
specifically designated as the purveyors of Youxiang as it is a food product that has little 
monetary value or potential to enhance women’s social mobility given the norms, rules 
and values associated with it by Qingzhen in Beijing. During the early stages of 
fieldwork, I was continually taken aback by the notable absence of Youxiang in the 
restaurants that I visited. In fact, during the initial eight months of fieldwork, Youxiang 
was found in only one establishment visited – a run-down food court which has now 
been relaunched. Later, when I asked staff in restaurants why they didn’t sell Youxiang, 
I was always met by the same consistent answer, that selling Youxiang is not Qingzhen. 
As such, given the restrictions placed on Youxiang by the social rules of Qingzhen, 
whereby it’s prohibited to profit from Youxiang, one can simply share it, women’s role 
as purveyors of the socially important pastry does not challenge the patriarchy, and as 
such, gender roles do not need to be reconfigured.  
 
7.3.c  Spatial Divisions and Limitations on Women’s Mobility. 
The final point of this section regarding performances of gender through Hui food 
cultures is that the aforementioned syntheses of minoritisation and patriarchy have an 
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embodied spatiality within Beijing’s public places of Hui food culture. Given the 
reconfigurations of male dominance evidenced above, whereby men are most often 
positioned as the sole producers and performers of Hui food cultures within the public 
sphere, it is unsurprising that this division of gender is manifested in a certain 
geography. Within the majority of restaurants and eateries visited during fieldwork, 
there was a clear division of labour based on gender. Men generally held positions of 
authority within Hui restaurants, such as managers and supervisors, or occupied the 
higher-paying, skilled roles of noodle-pullers, butchers, and chefs. While women were 
largely confined to low-waged, un-skilled, and presumed temporary roles such as 
waitresses, cleaners, cashiers or servers at food counters and stalls. Having said that, it 
was not uncommon for restaurants to have young men and teenage boys employed as 
waiters, although according to participants, these young males quickly progresses to 
other roles while women were expected to continue as waitresses. This trend is one that 
was apparent in nearly every restaurant visited, although there were some exceptions.  
 
In relation to chefs, female chefs were an extreme rarity and only encountered in very 
small, family-run eateries in residential areas. More often, Hui women were found 
cooking at street-food stalls – which are themselves becoming increasingly rare in 
Beijing as the city has prohibited them in urban areas. Another exception to the 
gendered norms of labour divisions can be seen in managerial roles. However, once 
again, female managers and supervisors were extremely rare in Beijing. Of the eight 
female restaurant managers met during the fieldwork, six were self-appointed as they 
owned their respective eateries, while two were hired by female owners: one managed a 
permanent Jianbing counter and one managed a food court. Female supervisors were 
more commonly found; however, these women were responsible solely for the 
waitressing staff and running of the dinning spaces in restaurants, had no role in 
overseeing the kitchen, and they ultimately answered to a male manager. Figure 7.12 
shows the managerial breakdown by gender within the project’s four key participating 
restaurants. 
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 Manager Supervisor 
Restaurant 1 Male Male x3 
Restaurant 2 Male Female x1; Male x1 
Restaurant 3 Male Male x2 
Restaurant 4 Female (Owner) Male x1 
Total Male: 75%;  
Female: 25%  
Male: 87.5% 
Female: 12.5% 
Figure 7.12: Managerial breakdown by gender in key restaurants. 
Source: Author’s own (2020). 
By dividing the Hui workforce based on gender, a clear spatial differentiation was being 
imprinted onto places of Hui food cultures. Ultimately, all spaces in the restaurants, 
specifically the main areas of the dinning space and kitchen, were male-dominated 
spaces, reinforcing the patriarchy and female subordination. In most instances, kitchens 
became male only spaces, with these places being occupied almost exclusively by men. 
In many cases, this male-only space was further strengthened by the existence of a 
separate space or room for cleaning dishes, a task generally reserved for women. 
However, even in the kitchens that did contain female-occupied cleaning stations, the 
majority of the kitchen was devoted to the cooking and preparing of food. Therefore, 
maintaining them as largely male only spaces, where women’s presence was only 
accepted on the basis that they were there in service, to assist the men in their roles. 
While being excluded from the spaces of kitchen, women primarily occupied the 
dinning spaces, working as waitresses, cashiers, cleaners and servers. Yet, although 
being staffed predominantly by women, these spaces nonetheless acted to bolster male 
dominance, with women being once again subservient to men, as enforced through the 
presence of male managers and supervisors. This division of spaces within Hui 
restaurants based on gender acts to further constrain women while reinforcing male 
dominance in line with place-specific syntheses of minoritisation and patriarchy. 
Women have, in line with Chinese socialist-era ideologies, been allowed greater access 
and freedom to join the labour force, yet it is done in a way that supports modern 
reconfigurations of Hui patriarchy. Similar to the arguments made by Browne (2004) in 
regard to genderism and public bathrooms, I argue that within public spaces of Hui food 
culture the socio-cultural sexing of space is such that these sexed sites and bodies are 
mutually constitutive within sexed regimes of power.  
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7.4  PERFORMANCES OF FOOD.  
The goal of this chapter was to explore the diffuse performances of Hui food cultures 
evident in Beijing to see what insights could be gleaned into the lived realities of Hui 
minority subjects. In doing so, this chapter made empirical contributions in three main 
areas. Firstly, performances of Hui food cultures are closely tied to places, emotive ties 
to place, and to geographical imaginaries. This was made evident through an 
exploration of dishes that could be understood as performances of place-based 
identities, exposing the myriad of ways that geographical imaginaries and places 
influence the ways that Hui people consume and perform certain dishes. Key arguments 
were made in relation to three distinctive dishes found in eateries across Beijing. These 
were Lanzhou Hand-Pulled Noodles and its ties to Northwest China; Meat from 
Beijing’s Niujie neighbourhood; and chocolate cake and geographical imaginaries of the 
West. 
 
Secondly, it was shown how minoritizing processes within Han-dominated Beijing 
increasingly impact on Hui food cultures, placing many individuals in a precarious 
situation between the need for economic survival, desires to modernise, and moral 
obligations to maintaining a Qingzhen lifestyle. Specifically, the impact that these 
assimilative forces and inter-ethnic interactions are having on Hui food cultures were 
discussed in relation to one highly contentious product: alcohol. The increasing demand 
being placed on Hui restaurants to sell alcohol is the result of a two-fold assimilative 
and minoritising process. There is an increasing need for these restaurants to sell 
alcohol as a means of economic survival in Beijing’s competitive market, while 
discourses of modernity simultaneously play a role in changing many participants’ 
views of the divisive product. 
 
Lastly, the chapter discussed in detail the performances of gender through food culture 
evident in Hui eateries. Section 7.3 argued that minoritisation is an inherently gendered 
and place-specific process, resulting in localised manifestations of gender roles and 
norms. Ultimately, it was argued that the specificities of place in Beijing have resulted 
in male-dominance being reconfigured to produce unique syntheses of patriarchy and 
minoritisation in a Han-dominated society where Muslims are increasingly treated as 
suspect under the guise of the Global War on Terror. Gender and gender roles are re-
imagined and performed in nuanced ways that act to support male superiority and 
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female inferiority, limiting female mobility and confining female performances of food 
cultures to the private sphere. 
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CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION. 
In recent years, Islam has become increasing securitised in many countries across the 
world as the Global War on Terror is continually used as a justifying discourse for the 
unfair treatment of Muslims, further conflating the concepts of Islam and terrorism. 
Although much of the scholarship on the Global War on Terror has been focused on 
either the military actions, security policies, or lived realities in the Middle East or 
Euro-American contexts, Muslims outside of these areas have also found themselves the 
targets of unjust and discriminatory policies and policing. In the People’s Republic of 
China [PRC], the securitisation of Islam is felt particularly hard by those Muslims living 
in China’s north-western Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region [XUAR]. Since 2017, 
the XUAR has experienced an unprecedented “re-education campaign” targeting its 
Muslim subjects (Zenz, 2018). In 2018, it was reported that over 1 million Muslims 
were being held in “political re-education” camps across XUAR (Wen and Auyeziv, 
2018). Most of these Muslims belonged to the Uyghur ethnic minority group, although 
ethnically Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and other Islamic minority groups are also being detained. 
According to ex-detainees, Muslims are “encouraged to renounce their religion” in these 
camps (Brophy, 2019), learn Mandarin Chinese and swear loyalty to the Chinese 
Communist Party [CCP] and President Xi Jinping (Nicolaci da Costa, 2019). Initially, 
Chinese authorities denied the existence of these camps, facilitated in part by their 
restricting of media access to Xinjiang. The CCP has since claimed that these camps are 
“vocational training centres” aimed at helping these Muslims integrate into Chinese 
society (ibid, 2019), and that they are intended for “voluntary re-education purposes to 
counter extremism” (BBC, 2019c).  
The detainment of Muslims in XUAR, has been accompanied by other draconian 
policies and policing practices in what David Brophy (2019) has called “a sweeping 
campaign against Islam – what some activists decry as a total ban on the religion”. 
Ethnic Uyghurs have been prohibited from wearing burqas or veils, growing their 
traditional long beards, or performing certain Islamic practices such as fasting during 
Ramadan or praying in mosques (Fathil, 2019). Further, the BBC (2019d) reported that 
the building of unprecedented “re-education” camps across XUAR was happening at the 
same time as a large-scale campaign by the Chinese authorities to build boarding 
schools for ethnically Uyghur children whose parents had been detained in the “re-
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education” camps. In July 2019, 22 predominantly Western nations signed a letter 
calling on China to end its detention programme in XUAR. However, this letter was 
quickly followed by a similar letter signed by 37 countries in support of China’s 
“counter-terrorism” actions (Putz, 2019), many of whom are economically and 
politically linked, or even dependent, on China (Kelemen and Turcsányi, 2019). The 
change in both domestic and international perceptions, discourses and public images of 
the Uyghur, from an oppressed minority to that of separatist Islamic terrorists 
(Holdstock, 2015), has been largely enabled by the Global War on Terror (see Chapter 
1.2). The PRC authorities claim that their actions in XUAR follow international norms 
of de-radicalisation and counter-extremism, and that they are therefore necessary to 
combat Islamic radicalisation (Brophy, 2019). These counter-extremism measures are 
not confined to XUAR, although that is undoubtably where they are most strongly felt. 
As Chapter 1.2 discussed, impacts of China’s “people’s war on terror” are being felt in 
other provinces of China, such as the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region [NHAR] where 
mosques have been demolished and regulations have been tightened for the labelling of 
Qingzhen food.  
The geographic spread of these “counter-terrorism” measures, and the rapid decline of 
the situation in China for Muslims since the beginning of this project in October 2014, 
unfortunately stand testament for the relevance and value of this research into the lived 
geopolitical realities of Islamic minority identity in contemporary Beijing. As was 
outlined in Chapter 1.6, the aim of this research project was to examine how, under the 
impress of the Global War on Terror, processes of minoritisation and place impact on 
the identities, experiences and everyday geographies of the Hui people. Specifically, the 
overarching aim was to explore how Hui identity is performed, made public, othered, 
negotiated, and contested through its food cultures. These aims were achieved through 
addressing the following objectives: 
• To gain an understanding of the minoritisation mechanisms experienced by the 
Hui population and to explore how minoritising processes are performed 
through Hui food cultures and their associated places. 
• To explore public and visible ‘outings’ of Hui peoples through an examination 
of the ways in which they create distinctively Hui spaces and places. 
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• To explore how these above processes impact on the emotional geographies of 
Hui people, vis-à-vis the places of Hui food culture they frequent and the 
practices they engage in. 
• To explore the cultural meaning of food in the establishing and performance of 
Hui identities and places and how these relate to gender. 
Through employing a feminist political geography approach and methodology to the 
context of Beijing’s urban Hui population, their food cultures, their public places of 
food cultures, and their experiences of minoritising processes, the above aims and 
objectives were achieved, as was evidenced throughout the thesis. This chapter will act 
as a conclusion for the thesis, drawing out the key contributions made by this project’s 
findings, as will be discussed in sections 8.1 to 8.8. Finally, the chapter, and indeed 
thesis, will finish with a short reflection on the research project and research process.  
8.1  TOWARDS A FEMINIST POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY. 
In order to understand the complexities of the Hui minority identity, their food cultures, 
places, and experiences of minoritising processes, a new theoretical framework had to 
be compiled, drawing from a diverse range of sub-disciplines, theories and concepts. 
Broadly speaking, the theoretical framework for this thesis brings into conversation 
feminist, post-colonial, anti-racist, post-structuralist, and even phenomenological 
scholarship through piecing together a conceptual assemblage from various sub-
disciplines within human geography and the social sciences. This medley of theoretical 
perspectives aims to bring together areas of geographical thought that can help us to 
understand the particular situation of the Hui in Beijing. As such, in order to better 
understand the Hui’s precarious situations in Beijing, multiple aspects of numerous 
theories and concepts need to be reformulated into a nuanced, context-appropriate 
approach.  
At the core of this approach are concepts from political geography, namely critical 
geopolitics (Ó Tuathail, 1998), feminist geopolitics (Koffman, 1996; Dowler and Sharp, 
2001; Hyndman 2001; Massaro and Williams, 2013), subaltern geopolitics (Sharp, 
2011a; 2011b) and popular geopolitics (Dodds, 2007). Although each provides 
important analytical and methodological tools for fostering a better understanding of 
how global geopolitics affect the Hui, each falls short of being able to completely 
address the complexities of Hui experience. As such, I suggest an approach that brings 
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into conversation these different schools of political geography. Such an approach is 
one that is feminist, post-colonial, anti-racist, and post-structural in nature, and that 
takes seriously emotions, embodiment, and the performative and intersectional aspects 
of identity.  
This eclectic theoretical assemblage was largely defined in terms of the postures of 
which it was suspicious. In trying to understand the social construction of identity 
against a geopolitics of asymmetrical power, wealth, and status, I found the recognition 
of the continuing legacies of colonialism necessary. The approach was postcolonial. 
Learning how research was inflected by a positionality that incorporated power relations 
and privilege, I profited from feminist epistemologies and methodologies. Finally, I 
accepted the claim that there was no position from which a researcher could produce an 
account of anything important without having to accept some partiality of perspective, 
and no explanation so complete that all relevant dimensions could be reduced to the 
action of only a few structures or forces. The research had to accept a post-structuralist 
epistemology.  
The certainties and over-simplification against which I defined my approach have 
sometimes been identified with the European Enlightenment and its clearest expression 
has been developed out Kantian philosophy as Rorty (1983) describes. This set of 
ideas—that there is an absolute truth that is discoverable and that there is a singular 
humanity about which we can speculate—was criticised as Eurocentric by anticolonial 
scholars (Young, 1990) and as sexist by feminist scholars and activists (Alcoff and 
Potter, 1993). As a set of attitudes that sustained a sense of Euro-American superiority, 
this version of Enlightenment philosophy has sometimes been described as Western 
philosophy or Western theory, and there are now many attempts to displace this focus 
and learn differently about the world (Chatterjee, 2014). 
It is in this regard that I find Jennifer Hyndman’s (2019) recent call for a “feminist 
political geography” to be most valuable. This broader, more inclusive, umbrella term 
fits well with the approach outlined and employed by this research. By using the term 
feminist political geography, Hyndman (2019: 4) aims to “create more space for and 
provoke a wider range of feminist interventions related to embodied geopolitical 
phenomena, materialism, violence, displacement (of all kinds), and scale to consolidate 
a thoroughly feminist and anti-racist political geography that does not succumb to 
Orientalist rescue narratives or produce regimes of care and security that subjectify” 
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vulnerable people. Such a feminist, post-colonial, anti-racist, political geography allows 
for the “embodied, contradictory, messy, co-constituted illiberal subjects contesting 
multiple modalities of violence” (Hyndman, 2019: 23). Further, as Chapter 2.1.d 
argued, by using the term feminist political geography to describe the approach taken by 
this project, and thus avoiding the singular terminologies and framings of political 
geography’s fragmented sub-fields, a feminist framework is being implemented that is 
committed to “postcolonial critique, subaltern geopolitics, and a refusal of Orientalist 
rescue narratives”, thus creating “more space for projects that take violence, exclusion, 
inequality, the materiality of the bodies, and their various subjectivities seriously” 
(Hyndman, 2019: 8). 
Although Hyndman’s (2019) call for a “feminist political geography” is a recent one, 
one which I only became aware of towards the end of the PhD process, I’ve 
nevertheless found it an important contribution to this project as it has provided the 
language necessary for framing the multifaceted approach implemented. The clarity of 
Hyndman’s argument and its specific address to geographical scholarship are welcome, 
yet it builds upon a tradition of scholarship critical of Western-centric approaches to 
gender in non-Western contexts including subversive readings of Eurocentric 
assumptions to animate, for example, a Yoruba understanding of gender as not 
grounded in bodily difference (Oyěwùmí, 1997) or the over-turning of white readings of 
Black gender relations because they occlude the violence of white male slave-owners 
against Black women and displace this into an account of the pathology of Black 
families and their absent fathers (Spillers, 1987). These arguments for solidarities that 
transgress the borders of the West (Mohanty, 1986) have been taken up within 
Geography (McEwan, 1998; Mitchell, 2003). The synthesis Hyndman offers is 
particularly helpful because it explicates relations between geopolitical systems and 
gendered identities that were helpful in framing this work on Hui food cultures as 
overdetermined by state practices and the GWOT.  
Borrowing the term “feminist political geography”, this thesis argues in favour of such a 
theoretical and methodological approach for studying the complexities of Islamic 
minority identity in place, one that allows for the place-specific manifestations of 
geopolitical violence and marginalisation of vulnerable groups to be researched and for 
its lived realities to be taken seriously. As the feminist scholarship has taught us, the 
personal is political, and this is something that such an approach allows for. Further, 
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such an approach is particularly well suited for researching in non-Western contexts, 
such as Beijing, through engaging with post-colonial, anti-racist and subaltern theories 
and by challenging the dominance of masculinist knowledges. Such feminist, post-
colonial and critical challenges of Enlightenment philosophy allow for emotional 
geographies, embodiment, and the performative and intersectional aspects of identity to 
be taken seriously as academic lines of enquiry (ibid, 22-24). Perhaps more important 
yet, at least for further research endeavours, is that such an approach to research is open 
and versatile. It can be implemented in countless ways and in multiple manifestations 
depending on the specific contexts and places being researched. Such an approach 
allows space for critical engagement to happen between various sub-fields of political 
geography, meaning that new approaches can be formulated from previously disparate 
sub-fields. Thus, allowing for these new approaches to political geography to be 
reconfigured in line with what is contextually relevant and appropriate, something that 
is particularly important when researching non-Western peoples and places.  
8.2  PERFORMING THE POLITICAL THROUGH FOOD. 
The second contribution from this project that this chapter will discuss is closely related 
to the first. If we are to accept that a feminist political geography approach is a 
worthwhile and analytically fruitful undertaking for research into non-Western contexts 
and/or vulnerable people, then methodological questions arise as to how this might be 
carried out. With these methodological queries in mind, I contend that such an approach 
to geopolitics may be carried out through an exploration of the everyday, seemingly 
mundane practices of our lives. To turn again to feminist thought, the personal truly is 
political. Building from this assumption, and developing out of the feminist political 
geography approach, this section will argue for the analytical richness and 
methodological usefulness of using food as a method for researching geopolitics. 
Following the work of Low and Ho (2018) and Ho (2018a), I argue that researching 
food is a particularly fruitful method for researching geopolitics and geographies of 
power in Asian, or more specifically Chinese, contexts. 
Informed by the understanding that geopolitics is multi-scalar, occurring at the level of 
the body and manifested in and through our everyday embodied practices, food is a 
route into exploring the lived realities of international geopolitics. As Chapter 2.5 
discussed, geographers are increasingly becoming aware of the deep political and 
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sociological meaning that food holds, and of the centrality of food in the 
communication, reproduction and performance of cultures and identities (Bell and 
Valentine, 1997; Isakjee and Carroll, 2019). Further, given the close association 
between food and identity for many people and groups, food is extremely emotive, and 
intimately tied to places. Food and dishes may therefore be viewed as performances of 
identity, which are inextricably tied to geopolitics. Through looking at performances of 
food, and through taking people’s personal attachments and understandings of food 
seriously, we can gain an understanding of the lived implications and realities of global 
geopolitics. This has been proven to be particularly true for the case of the Hui in 
Beijing, as was evidenced by Chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
Through examining the food cultures of the Hui in Beijing, an understanding was 
gained of how processes of minoritisation and othering have impacted on the lived 
experiences of Islamic minority subjects in China. Further, by using food as a method of 
exploration into Hui identity, intersections with other aspects of individual identity 
could also be investigated, including gender, religion, ethnicity, nationality, and 
migratory status. Using food as method also allowed for the Hui’s use of places to be 
examined, specifically the public places of Hui food culture that they establish across 
Beijing. The usefulness of using food as a method for researching geopolitics, 
particularly when used as part of a feminist political geography approach, is evidenced 
by this research, and is a method whose usefulness may be applied elsewhere. Further, 
as many scholars within Western and Chinese academia attempt to bridge the gap 
between the two academies, I suggest that examining food cultures is a particularly 
fruitful, and context appropriate, method of conducting cross-cultural research, 
especially on topics that may otherwise be deemed “too sensitive” by authorities.  
8.3  TRIAD OF HUI IDENTITY. 
In his valuable and pioneering work “Muslim Chinese”, Dru Gladney (1996) showed 
how the concept and socio-religious practices of Qingzhen impacted differently on the 
identities and lives of four distinct Hui communities across China. Informed by this 
work and presented as somewhat of a contemporary response to it, Chapter 5 showed 
how for Beijing Hui it is the ways that Qingzhen has shaped the group’s food cultures 
that is the most salient performance of Hui ethnic identity in the Chinese capital today. 
Rather than understanding Qingzhen as simply meaning halal (a common and over-
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simplified Western interpretation), I argue that the direct translation of Qingzhen as 
“pure and true” is more appropriate and encapsulating of its complexities. For Beijing 
Hui, the notion of Qingzhen not only entails the dietary restrictions and associated 
practices of halal, but it also exceeds Qur’anic laws by incorporating aspects of broader 
Chinese teachings, specifically from Chinese medicine, the Chinese humoral system, 
and the notion of chi shenme bu shenme, or “eat something to fix/mend something”. 
Subsequently, I argue that Qingzhen may be seen as a sinocisation of halal, whereby 
halal and its dietary practices have been localised over time, fusing with Chinese 
culture to produce a distinct set of socio-religious and cultural practices and beliefs for 
the Hui.  
Building from this understanding of Qingzhen and its importance to Hui culture, I argue 
that for Beijing Hui, the defining performance of their identity is the way in which 
Qingzhen has influenced and shaped their food cultures. As such, I argue that Hui food 
cultures and local interpretations of Qingzhen are mutually dependent, and as such, are 
co-constitutive of Hui identity, forming an interlocked triad (Figure 8.1). This triad of 
Hui identity was expressed in many ways by participants, although five dominant and 
reoccurring lenses continually appeared. These were religion, “small” 
nationalism/ethnicity, “big” nationalism/state nationalism, cleanliness, and place. 
Ultimately, Figure 8.1 should not be viewed as an attempt to essentialise Hui identity, as 
such an attempt would be futile given the fluid, multifaceted and performative nature of 
identity. Rather, it is merely an attempt to visually represent and make sense of the 
complexity, and interpretive and individualistic nature of Hui identity in contemporary 
Beijing, while taking seriously the close relationship between Hui identity, Hui food 
cultures and localised interpretations of Qingzhen.  
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Figure 8.1: Triad of Hui Identity. 
Source: Author’s own (2019). 
8.4  QINQIE PLACES. 
Places are multifaceted, fluid and complex. Yet, many scholars writing about place have 
had a tendency to essentialise and simplify the concept to one or two select traits or 
aspect, often prioitising certain qualities of place over the others. Examples of this are 
Casey’s (2001) emphasis on the body’s “constitutive coingredience” and 
“implacement”, Tuan’s (1974) focus on “sense of place”, Pred’s (1984) “paths” and 
place’s processual qualities, Massey’s (1993) discussion of places as relational, Malpas’ 
(2012, 2017) open and porous boundaries, and Pierce, Martin and Murphy (2011) focus 
on place-making as political and networked. While each of these examples have 
undoubtedly helped to further our understanding of place as a concept, they nonetheless 
have failed to fully capture the depth of place through their privileging of certain 
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qualities while eschewing others. Although narrowing one’s theoretical focus to a select 
aspect of place can be conceptually fruitful, particularly when presenting a new 
conceptualisation in opposition to established understandings, it is ultimately a 
potentially damaging endeavour to our understandings of place and identity more 
broadly. As Mills and Gökariksel (2014: 902) have shown in their exploration of 
Muslim identities outside of the West, “what it means to be Muslim is contextually 
specific and formed through relationships with others” and as such, entails a 
reconceptualization of place that is more dynamic than most single-factor explanations 
allow for – a similar claim to the one being made here in relation to the Hui.  
The antifoundational logic of feminist and post-structuralist treatments of place is 
certainly helpful as a caution against any synthesis that promises a full account of places 
as bounded objects. Certainly, the relations that enable and constrain activities at any 
location extend well beyond that site and their interaction does not always or even often 
produce stable local arrangements; places are unstable (Hyndman, 2019; Johnston, 
2018). Introducing one collection on Feminisms in Geography, Moss and Falcolner Al-
Hindi (2008: 3) note that the central concerns of feminist geographers are somewhat 
orthogonal to the ‘more discipline-based concepts of place, space, spatiality, and 
environment.’ There might be a risk that place as a category gets dissolved into relations 
that leave very little conceptual room for thinking about co-presence and the references 
that get made to a past that is resonant because of its traces at a particular location, 
endowing it with meaning as a place. Ettlinger (2007: 320) notes this risk and suggests 
that we do not ‘need to jettison boundaries or categories altogether, but to be more self-
conscious about the problems of boundary construction and to understand how 
tendencies to essentialize might be constructively engaged.’ One recent essay that 
develops a poststructuralist and feminist reading of place in a fashion that sits well with 
my ambitions here is Kofman and Raghuram’s (2020) discussion of place in the context 
of gendered geographies of migration where they suggest that place operates difference 
and connection. 
In light of the shortcoming of Western scholarship on place, and the lack of critical 
theoretical contributions of Chinese geographers, or other scholars in Southern Theory 
(Connell, 2014), in presenting new understandings of place to date, an in-depth 
conceptualisation of place was presented in chapters 2 and 6 of this thesis which draws 
from a diffuse array of existing Western theories. Although the concepts of place used 
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are noticeably Western in their origins and viewpoints, that should not mean that they’re 
incompatible with non-Western places when taken together. Following the research 
project’s three field visits, and the analysis of empirical data, a multifaceted 
conceptualisation of place was developed in order to understand the phenomena of 
place-making among the Hui. The suggested concept of place is a feminist and post-
colonial conceptualisation, drawing heavily from Chinese empirical research. Such an 
understanding of place is, I believe, in line with the feminist political geography 
approach and methodology of this project.   
The resulting conceptualisation of place, which I call Qinqie place due to the emotive 
and relational qualities of Hui places and the term’s frequent use by participants, is one 
that challenges masculine and Western-centric conceptualisations of place, while 
remaining grounded in academic literature and theory. Specifically, Qinqie place is a 
more wide-ranging and all-encompassing conceptualisation of place which argues that: 
it is in and through our bodies that we experience places; our emotive and experiential 
imports are fundamental properties of places; these places are not static, but are 
processual and mobile; places are not enclosed by rigid borders, but rather, they possess 
a bounded openness; places are connected and relational to other places and people; 
they are multi-temporal; they are socially and historically contingent “gatherings”, or 
bundles; and they are inescapably political. This broader understanding of place is, I 
argue, essential in understanding the complexities of place and place-making practices 
within the context of public places of Hui food culture in Beijing. Although such a 
conceptualisation of place is undoubtedly the result of context-specific factors, I also 
contend that its wider and more encompassing approach to understanding place may be 
beneficial for other studies, both in China and elsewhere. 
8.5  MINORITISATION. 
As the introduction to this chapter discussed, minoritising practices and processes in 
China are becoming increasingly drastic and violent towards their Muslim subjects, 
spurred on by draconian policing measures and policies under the guise of “counter-
terrorism”, “de-radicalisation”, and “counter-extremism” (Roberts, 2018; Brophy, 
2019). Given the ongoing persecution of Xinjiang’s Muslims, particularly the Uyghur, it 
is unsurprising that most of the academic focus on minoritisation in China in recent 
years has focused on the Uyghur (Clarke, 2010; Roberts, 2018). The focus of this 
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research, however, has not been on the more overt manifestations of minoritisation 
experienced by Northwest China’s Muslims. Rather, it has attempted to investigate the 
more mundane, “under the radar”, processes of minoritisation affecting those living in 
China’s political heartland. In doing so, an insight was gained into how minoritisation 
differs as a practice both spatially and socially.  
Ultimately, the argument made in regard to minoritisation here is that it is an inherently 
gendered and place-specific process, as minoritisation and patriarchy are reformulated 
and synthesised in place. As these reformulations of minoritisation and patriarchy 
happen in place, they are unavoidably impacted on by social relations. Specifically, they 
are shaped by inter-ethnic relations, demographics and politics. As the case of the Hui 
has shown, minoritisation is impacting on how Hui gender and gender roles are 
performed and defined in Han-majority Beijing. Specifically, gender and male-
domination are reconfigured within the place-specific context of Beijing’s Hui 
restaurants and eateries, as Hui patriarchy and minoritisation are synthesised to 
accommodate to life in a Han-dominated society. These place-specific syntheses are 
performed through Hui food cultures and are visibly evident in the spatial demarcation 
and uses of places of Hui food culture across Beijing City (Chapter 7.3). The 
specificities of Beijing as a place have resulted in Hui patriarchy being reconfigured in 
unique ways, producing distinct syntheses of minoritisation and male dominance. These 
unique synthesis evident in Beijing cannot be assumed to happen in the same ways 
elsewhere. In fact, as participants often referenced, gender and gender roles were 
performed in very different ways in their home areas outside of Beijing. This fact, 
coupled with the minoritisation practices evidenced by Xinjiang-based research, bolsters 
this project’s findings: that minoritisation is not only a gendered process, but is place-
specific.  
8.6  SECURITISATION OF ISLAM IN CHINA.  
At the beginning of this thesis, and indeed at the start of my PhD journey in late 2014, I 
asked a series of questions relating to the securitisation of Islam and its possible 
implications for Chinese Muslims. Given the recent geopolitical developments in China 
discussed at the start of this chapter, and indeed the findings of this project regarding 
the minoritisation of the Hui in Beijing, I think it’s worthwhile returning to these 
questions and addressing them more directly. Specifically, in Chapter 1.4, I asked: 
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• Has the Global War on Terror impacted on the lived experiences of Muslims in 
other more “harmonious” parts of China outside of the Northwest?  
• Has the GWOT awarded other provincial authorities the right to label their 
Islamic minorities as terrorists too?  
• If so, are the lives and everyday practices of Muslim minorities outside of 
Northwest China also subjected to exclusionary and discriminatory practices 
and policies? 
• What about those considered to be “good Muslims”? Are they facing similar 
oppressive forces by majoritarian populations? 
• If so, how have their lives, experiences and identities been affected, and how 
does this play out spatially?  
Unfortunately, the answers evidenced by this research project are perhaps less 
comforting or reassuring than one might hope for. As was shown throughout, the 
securitisation of Islam is not merely a Western or western Chinese practice. Rather, the 
effects of the Global War on Terror are also being experienced by Muslims in Beijing, 
far from China’s turbulent Northwest. As the anti-Arabisation campaigns in NHAR 
have shown, along with the crackdowns following Uyghur “terrorist” attacks in 
Kunming and Beijing in 2014 and 2013 respectively (Holdstock, 2015), other provincial 
authorities are also applying the label of “terrorist” to Muslim (specifically Uyghur) 
subjects accused of carrying out violent actions. Framed by this geopolitical context, 
Muslims across China are increasingly being subjected to discriminatory and 
exclusionary practices. Fortunately, Muslims in areas outside of China’s XUAR are not 
routinely subjugated in the same harsh and violent ways by predominantly Han 
authorities. However, as this thesis has shown, the Hui are nevertheless experiencing 
ongoing processes of minoritisation within Han-dominated Beijing.  
Throughout this dissertation, I have described a certain reticence in the expression of 
Hui culture in their restaurants. I have described the difficulties that some restaurant 
owners have described themselves as having experienced in getting licenses to operate 
restaurants (see section 7.2.a above). I have described the restrictions placed upon the 
use of Arabic script in denoting halal foods (see section 1.2 above). I have described the 
official attempt to demolish a newly-built mosque in Wanzhou, an effort understood by 
my informants as targeting public expression of Arabic architectural forms (see section 
1.2 above) These forms are very commonly used in the decoration of Hui restaurants in 
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Beijing (see section 6.1.a.i above) and are now felt as being taken to identify an alien 
cultural presence linked to the GWOT. 
The impacts of these processes are manifested in the group’s distinctive food cultures, 
socio-cultural practices, gender roles, and performances of identity. These lived realities 
undeniably shape the ways that the Hui make places, use them, and connect with them. 
By establishing distinctly Hui places in Beijing through the selling and consumption of 
food, the Hui are marking out places where they feel that they are welcomed, safe and 
Qinqie, despite the worsening geopolitical climate. Yet, these spaces are not detached 
from the geopolitical, with assimilative discourses and practices impacting on how the 
Hui perform their food cultures and on the way they create Hui places. In light of this, 
this research has exposed an unfortunate reality: that Islam has become a securitised 
matter in Beijing, meaning that the securitisation of Islam is not confined to the XUAR 
but is more widespread in its geographic scope, affecting Muslims across the country.  
8.7  ACTIVE REFLEXIVITY. 
Throughout the research process, a large dataset was co-produced in place with 
participants, from which the findings discussed above could be interpreted. However, 
these are not the only contributions to be extracted from the project. Rather, there is 
great value to be gained from reflecting not just on the dataset produced, but on the 
process of co-producing the dataset in the field. As was discussed in Chapter 3, in 
attempting to conduct research in the field, we are actively shaping the field through our 
presence, our actions and our objectives. Therefore, it is vitally important that we, as 
researchers, continually implement reflexive practices to critically question our 
positionalities while challenging our situated knowledges and the inherent power 
relations involved in conducting research. Such reflexivity helps to ensure an ethics of 
care, for both the research participants and the researcher.  
Given the nature of this research project, its non-Western context, and the subjectivities 
of the research participants, reflexivity was a primary concern, and indeed major 
obstacle, for me and was something that needed to be implemented methodologically. 
Given my positioning as a white, Irish, Western-educated, gay man who was raised a 
Roman Catholic but is now spiritual but not religious, my subjectivities needed to be 
taken seriously throughout the research process. Fortunately, the importance of 
reflexivity and positionality were something that I was made aware of from early in the 
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research process through reading academic literatures and from conversations with my 
supervisors, mentors and lecturers. As such, I entered the field in August 2015 with an 
understanding of this importance and a reflective practice in mind. Yet, as the research 
process advanced and I began trying to make sense of my observations, I quickly 
realised how limited my initial understandings of reflexivity were and how significantly 
I had underestimated the importance of reflecting on my own positionality at all times. 
Rather than merely attempting to address the issue of my positionality through writing 
weekly reflective memos (as I had set out to do in the beginning), it became evident that 
reflexive practices needed to be incorporated into every single aspect of my research 
methodology. The more I began reflecting on my positionality, the more obvious it 
became that my pre-conceived, Eurocentric “knowledge” was influencing my 
interpretations of the daily occurrences and phenomena in ways that didn’t necessarily 
match with the lived realities of my research participants. Thus, through practices of 
reflexivity, it became evident that more reflection and consideration of my positionality 
was needed in order to challenge my interpretations and allow room for the empirical 
data to challenge Eurocentric assumptions; not that reality can essentially speak for 
itself but that in attending the ways of, in Kearns’ (1998) terms, making virtuous the 
circularity of facts and values we might appreciate how our theories make claims upon 
the world that may be challenged by empirical findings, while recognising that those 
findings are themselves directed in part by the presumptions and priorities of our 
theories. Through practicing reflexivity, my methodology continually evolved and 
adapted as I challenged not only my views of the phenomena I observed, but also the 
ways in which I engaged with people and places, and my role in actively shaping the 
field. The paragraph below was taken from a reflexive memo that I wrote on 25 
November 2015 while in Beijing for my first field visit, and I think that it demonstrates 
a key moment in my realisation for the need to change my reflexive practices and in 
challenging my own situated knowledges:  
“After class today, I visited a north-western style restaurant in Dongcheng 
District. While I ate my Lanzhou MianPian276 at my table near the service 
window, I watched the lunchtime rush unfolding. As I had observed before in 
other restaurants, the waiting staff were all female, rushing around between 
tables delivering dishes, taking orders and clearing plates. While the kitchen 
staff (from what I could see through the large glass window) were all male. 
 
276面片。 
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Although this gendering of space is something that I’ve discussed already, I 
spent some time thinking about it today again. I had a thought then: how does 
this gendering relate to minoritisation? Does it? I think so. Up until now I had 
just been thinking about this gendering of space as a possible continuation of 
Hui gender norms. But I think it’s deeper than that. I think it’s representative of 
subversive processes of minoritisation. The more time I spent thinking about it 
today, while jotting notes into my notebook, the more I began to question 
minoritisation as a concept. At first, I did this by considering my observations, 
but then I had to turn the lens onto myself and my own understandings. From 
doing this, I realised some things. I realise now that my view to date of 
minoritisation as simply being a damaging process for all minority subjects is 
too simplistic. It’s deeper than that. It happens at different levels. In this regard, 
I need to think more about how it’s impacted by intersections with gender (and 
other things). Also, are there minority people who benefit from it? Now I find 
myself asking why I just viewed it as a negative process for everyone. Why 
didn’t I consider previously that it affects people differently, or that some Hui 
might even benefit? Sadly, I think that answers are clear: I’ve been western-
centric and masculinist in my views. I’ve even been somewhat Orientalist, 
viewing the Hui as people to be saved, rather than letting the reality speak for 
itself. And by viewing it as a universal process, my privilege as a white man is 
clear. This is definitely something that I need to be cautious of and reflect on 
more regularly.”277  
These reflexive practices drastically altered the project’s methods of data production 
and analysis from the initial planned methodology. Rather than writing reflective pieces 
every week, I began structuring my notes in three parts after every interaction with 
participants or visits to research sites. These three types of notes were descriptive 
fieldnotes, interpretive notes, and reflective memos. Further, even when not in the field, 
I continually wrote reflexive memos, especially when analysing the dataset, translating 
documents or writing findings. These reflexive practices, which are detailed in Chapter 
3.3.e, allowed for the obstacles faced by my positionality to be addressed. Reflexivity 
allowed me to learn to mitigate some of the power differentials of the interactions with 
local informants. As my language competence improved, I was able to appreciate more 
of the nuance in responses and pay more heed to the work being done for me by my 
 
277Taken from reflexive memo dated November 25th, 2015.  
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translators. I was always aware that it was only the liberal generosity of the people I met 
in the restaurants that allowed me to do any work at all. My research was never their 
priority. It became more easy with time to be effectively respectful since I learned more 
about the acceptable mores of personal interaction across barriers of age, class, gender, 
ethnicity, and sexuality. Sometimes, I was the junior party in terms of some of these 
dimensions and at other times my own emotional and health circumstances disqualified 
any self-confidence I might otherwise have allowed myself. Of course, no exercise in 
reflexivity could cancel entirely the asymmetries of privilege that attached to me as a 
Western visitor with an income above that of most of the people whom I was asking for 
help. 
These exercises in reflexivity allowed me to be more attentive to way my informants 
interpreted the world for themselves and to allow this to challenge my unthinking 
western-centric biases. Through actively practicing reflexivity, I increasingly became 
aware of the limitations of the geographical theories of place to explain the situation of 
the Hui in Beijing. From my informants I learned of the complexity of Qinqie, and 
found that complexity helpful in explicating what was involved in the place-making that 
was part of Hui food cultures. By allowing space for the development of a multifaceted 
and nuanced theoretical framework that draws from multiple theories and concepts, and 
accepting instruction from my local informants, a feminist political geography approach 
could be developed. This approach is one that strives to better understand the case of the 
Hui in Beijing through piecing together relevant concepts to make a context appropriate 
and empirically driven framework, rather than attempting to simply apply Western 
theory to the Chinese context.  
Ultimately, reflexive practices have formed a cornerstone of this project, shaping the 
methods used, driving the ethics of care implemented, and allowing for the development 
of an empirically evidenced and context appropriate theoretical approach. Although the 
issues of reflexivity, positionality and situated knowledges are not new concerns within 
geography or the social sciences, I argue that reflexive practices need to be taken more 
seriously by academics, particularly those working in non-Western contexts. Rather 
than viewing reflexivity and reflexive practices as being mere supportive tools or 
secondary methods in research, thus under appreciating their importance, reflective 
practices need to be more actively carried out by researchers. Epistemologically 
speaking, many feminist, post-colonial, post-structuralist and queer scholars have been 
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advocating for the importance of reflecting on one’s positionality for quite some time. 
Yet, perhaps the methodological implications and practices of reflection need to be 
advocated for even more strongly within geography. Although arguing for the 
theoretical benefits of reflexivity is a worthwhile endeavour, the practical application of 
this understanding into methods and methodological practices need more transparent 
and detailed discussion. The active and regular engagements in reflexive practices 
throughout all stages of the research processes holds tremendous methodological, 
ethical and conceptual benefits for geographers, particularly those working in non-
Western contexts. The contributions made by this research project were only made 
possible once I began actively reflecting on my own positionality and role in the co-
production of the dataset, highlighting the importance of such a methodological practice 
in generating new geographical knowledge.  
8.8  A MORE EMOTIONAL GEOGRAPHY. 
The next contribution to be discussed is closely linked to the discussion in Section 8.7 
regarding the importance of active reflexivity as a method. In recent years, there has 
been significantly increased interest in emotions and geographies of emotions within the 
discipline of geography. There is now a growing appreciation of the powerful role that 
emotions play in shaping our identities, impacting on our sense of the world around us, 
and in influencing how we reflect on the past or project the future (Davidson and 
Milligan, 2004; Davidson and Bondi, 2004; see also Chapter 2.2). The sub-field of 
emotional geography holds tremendous potential for our discipline, shedding light on 
how we engage with places as well as the lived implications of geopolitics (Davidson 
and Bondi, 2004; Urry, 2007; Pain, 2009). Yet, the field is not without its critiques, 
particularly from a methodological viewpoint. Many geographers working within the 
field of emotional geographies tend to place their focus largely, or in many cases solely, 
on the emotions and emotional knowings and experiences of the research participants. 
Although this is undoubtedly an important practice, particularly when researching a 
topic centred on participants’ experiences of place, I argue that it falls short of being a 
truly emotional geography. Such an aspiration is, I believe, only achievable through the 
ongoing active reflexive practices discussed above. If we are to accept that our emotions 
and the places we inhabit are mutually constitutive as was argued in Chapter 3.2.d 
(Urry, 2007), and that researchers are also involved in the co-production of the research 
field (or places) as was argued in Chapter 3 (Smith, 1988; Harraway, 1988; Kearns, 
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1998; Limb and Dwyer, 2001; Walsh, 2009), then we need to be more mindful of our 
own emotional states when conducting research, particularly when we are in the places 
that we hope to study.  
The importance of such a mindfulness and reflexivity of our emotional states and 
experiences was one that became increasingly apparent to me as I carried out the first 
field visit between August 2015 and late March 2016. As this field visit progressed, I 
experienced a decline in my mental and emotional wellbeing, brought upon by a series 
of changes in my personal circumstances and a deteriorating underlying health 
condition, which was exacerbated by my being in the field. Resulting from this, I began 
experiencing extreme feelings of homesickness, loneliness, anxiety and sadness. At 
first, in an effort to “battle through” the hardships I was facing and to distract from my 
emotional state, I was dismissive of such feelings, continually attempting (with little 
success) to ignore my emotional state through near-complete immersion in my research. 
However, I quickly realised that such an attempt to dismiss my emotions was not just 
proving detrimental to my own wellbeing, but rather, it was also damaging to the 
research and to the dataset that I was inescapably involved in co-producing. As I wrote 
in my reflexive memo dated 28 January 2016: 
“Up until now I’ve been making a point of briefly referring to my emotional 
responses and states in these reflexive memos. But admittedly, it’s been more of 
a tick the box exercise than something that I’ve been taking seriously or 
attributed any real value to. I had a quick read back over some of my previous 
entries and words like “excited”, “nervous”, “happy”, “worried” and so on, have 
been used to describe my emotional responses to situations and developments 
from the research. But I nearly always just add a short line naming the primary 
emotion I felt, without actually engaging with my full range of emotions or 
taking them seriously. But today, just before I left R1, I was so exhausted, 
drained and overwhelmed that I thought I might cry. I suddenly became aware 
that I just didn’t want to be there, I couldn’t be there, I couldn’t focus. I had to 
take a deep breath, give an excuse and quickly walk to the subway – trying to 
ignore the sinking feeling in my stomach the whole time. After some time, while 
I was sitting on a train somewhere along Line 13 and had managed to finally 
breathe through the wave of emotions, I found myself asking a question: how 
can I claim to be researching the Hui’s emotional geographies and experiences 
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of place, without really paying attention to my own emotions? Especially when 
my own emotions are not just impacting on my ability to engage with 
participants, but they’re also affecting my own experience of place to the extent 
that I had to physically remove myself from R1. I realise now, that it’s not good 
enough to just talk about participants’ emotions, or to briefly name my own 
emotions without really engaging with them. Going forward, I’m going to have 
to be more critical and detailed with my reflections. After all, I’m in those places 
too, I’m part of them, and my emotions are impacting in a big way on how I’m 
experiencing them. I need to be more attentive of my own feelings, my own 
emotional geographies.”278  
The realisation made in this memo was an important one in the development of this 
research project and is at the core of the argument being made here. That is to say, that 
as researchers engaging with emotional geographies, or indeed any engagements with 
place or feelings more generally, we should be taking seriously our own emotional 
states and understandings as they inevitably shape our engagements with place, with our 
participants and with our research projects and data. It is important to be actively 
reflexive and mindful of our emotions in order to not only provide more transparent 
accounts of our research processes and experiences, but also in order to provide a more 
honest telling of the complexities of places and our roles in “knowing” these places 
through our own embodied experiences. Therefore, I argue, that as geographers we need 
to be mindful of both the participants’ and the researcher’s emotions if we are to 
achieve a more emotional geography.  
8.9  CONDUCTING FIELDWORK ABROAD.  
A final key contribution of this project that I have become increasingly aware of as I 
reflect on the PhD process is the benefits of having completed fieldwork abroad. The 
benefits of conducting fieldwork abroad to this project go beyond the practicalities and 
logistics of researching the Hui in Beijing. As has been made clear throughout, much of 
this thesis has been devoted to challenging Eurocentric and masculinist theories and 
hegemonic Anglo-American thought through a feminist political geography approach 
that is contextually relevant and empirically driven. Such an aspiration would not have 
been possible without having conducted research in Beijing. In fact, at the beginning of 
 
278Taken from reflexive memo dated 28 January 2016.  
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the PhD process, I had somewhat underestimated the extent to which this project needed 
to critique the geographical concepts and theories that I brought with me into the field in 
order to better frame the Hui’s lived realities. However, as the project developed and 
evolved to meet the requirements and necessities of the field, it became evident that 
many of the theories and practices that I had intended to employ were insufficient, or 
even incompatible, with the realities of the Beijing context. Throughout my field visits, 
and indeed later reflections of these visits, I became increasingly appreciative of the 
relationship between our conceptual and theoretical knowledge, and the everyday 
processes and phenomena of our lives. Our concepts were developed to explain our own 
everyday experiences. The assumption of a common experience already did violence to 
difference within Western society but it was the confrontation with the ideas of place 
that my Chinese informants tried to explain to me that gave me the insight that the 
geographical notions of place that I had studied up to now were seriously limited. This 
dissonance spurred me to think anew about the ways in which I tried to conceptualise 
the phenomena and processes I observed and experienced. As such, my experiences of 
conducting fieldwork abroad, specifically in a non-Western country, provided me with 
the opportunity (through necessity) to challenge the hegemony of Anglo-American 
geographic thought. Resulting in a re-conceptualisation of concepts such as place and 
minoritisation to better fit the lived realities of Beijing’s Hui, and indeed, my 
experiences of researching with them. Such experiences of conducting international 
fieldwork not only shaped this project’s findings in unforeseen ways, but have also 
undisputedly changed my opinions, approaches and practices as a researcher and 
geographer. As Sidaway, Ho, Rigg and Woon (2016: 786) suggest, “there might be 
something gained by plunging into new areas, leaving a disciplinary comfort zone, with 
familiar literatures, paradigms and people, to think, present and publish comparatively, 
venturing into reconfigured area studies communities or across disciplines, where we 
are in less secure territory”. 
8.10  CONCLUDING REFLECTION. 
“Qinqie? Why Qinqie? Why does this place make Hui guests feel very 
Qinqie?”279 
 
279亲切？为什么亲切？为什么这个地方会让回民的客人会觉得非常有亲切的感觉吗？ 
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“First of all, diet is very important to everyone, but [for] Hui people, diet is very 
important to Hui people. Qinqie feelings can only come from your products, 
your food, your service, and your place. This is the point, which will make some 
people feel that, especially some Muslims, [that they] have this Qinqie feeling. 
The average person, a non-Muslim stranger, may not feel Qinqie [. . .] There is 
one big difference between Muslims and other Han Chinese or non-Muslims. 
When any Muslim arrives in an unfamiliar city, he first looks for the mosque, as 
long as he finds the mosque, the purpose is to facilitate worship, because 
Muslims have to worship five times a day. First of all, [they look] to facilitate 
worship. Secondly, there must be a Qingzhen restaurant near the mosque for 
convenient meals. But for us, this food is like home. Rest assured, because it’s 
Qingzhen. Hui people feel relieved.”280 
The above excerpt was taken from an interview with the male owner of a small 
wheaten-product stall in mid-August 2017. At his busy stall, adjoined to a busy 
supermarket, this man and his small team of employees sold a range of fried, baked and 
steamed wheaten products: which were made in his private kitchen nearby before being 
delivered to the small stall several times throughout the day. The stall was staffed 
exclusively by women, who worked tirelessly to deal with the unrelenting queue of 
customers that snaked its way through the thoroughfare between the entrance to the 
supermarket and the building’s exit. The kitchen staff were all male, as were the staff 
responsible for delivering the products to the stall. The male owner described his own 
role as managerial. He checked the kitchen in the morning, but otherwise left the male 
staff to operate it by themselves, while he monitored the female cashiers at the stall. The 
plastic barrier that divided the women and food from the customers was covered in 
small gold and green Qingzhen signs featuring both Chinese and Arabic characters, 
while on wall behind them there was a large piece of framed Islamic scripture and a 
black and white photograph of Xi’an’s Great Mosque.  
 
280首先呢，饮食对谁都是非常重要的，但是回族，饮食对回族是非常重要的。亲切感只能来源于
你的产品，你的食品，你的服务，和你所在的这个位置，就是这个点，会让某些人会觉得，尤其
是一些穆斯林会有这样的亲切感。一般人，陌生的一个非穆斯林他不见得有亲切感[。。。] 而穆
斯林有一个和其他咱们汉族，或者非穆斯林有一个最大的不同是。任何一个穆斯林到了一个陌生
的城市，他首先找清真寺，只要找到了清真寺，目的在于方便礼拜，因为穆斯林一天要有五次礼
拜，首先是方便礼拜。第二，清真寺附近肯定有清真饭店，方便吃饭，如果你离开了这个区域，
你想找吃饭的清真食品很难找，所以说这里的人看到了这样的，这有个清真超市，这有个清真食
品，他觉得亲切，除此以外没有人会觉得亲切。但是对于我们来说，这个食物就相当于家的感
觉。心里放心，因为是清真的。回族感觉心里放心那种。 
337 
 
I chose to end this thesis with the above excerpt by this interviewee and with a summary 
of my fieldnotes from my visit to his stall, not because they were especially distinctive 
from the rest of my dataset, but because the exact opposite is true. In fact, I failed to 
fully appreciate the significance of this man’s interview until quite late in the writing 
process, after I had analysed and reflected on the dataset several times. In the end, what 
struck me as important about this particular male, our interview and my notes from that 
August day, was how seemingly ordinary they were and how often I had witnessed, 
heard and experienced similar statements, actions and places throughout my three field 
visits to Beijing. As with many other places of Hui food culture across Beijing, this one 
featured many visual representations that helped to establish and demarcate this stall as 
authentically Hui and Qingzhen by connecting it to other people, times and places. It 
was staffed by Hui men and women who were spatially separated as both sets 
performed their distinctive food cultures for the queue of predominantly Han customers, 
breaking with traditional gender roles and reformulating Hui patriarchy and 
minoritisation in context specific ways. This place and these performances of Hui food 
cultures were deeply emotive for Hui people, allowing Muslims and Hui to feel at 
home, assured, relieved and Qinqie. Such emotive ties to these places were uniquely 
Hui, meaning something more to them than simply spaces for food consumption. 
Rather, despite the worsening geopolitical climate surrounding them in China, and the 
assimilative forces and discourses surrounding them in Han-dominated Beijing, these 
emotive ties to places of Hui food culture provide them with somewhere they belong in 
an increasingly intolerant society. For Beijing Hui, their food and public places of food 
cultures are central to how they perform their identities and how they understand their 
place in Chinese society.  
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